State v. GuricanState v. Gurican
We review Gurican v. State, 552 So.2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which the district court certified the following questions as being of great public importance:
Should Florida‘s appellate courts apply the federal escape rule in whiсh the court, upon proper motion, will dismiss an appeal of an accused who has fled the jurisdiction before sentencing, and hence before filing a notice of appeal, evеn though the accused is back within the court‘s jurisdiction when the motion to dismiss is filed?
Should Florida‘s appellate courts apply a harmless error analysis where a defendant has been wrongfully denied the right to the last argument before the jury?
We have jurisdiction.
The same attorney represented both Gurican and her codefendant Ramirez at their joint trial. Ramirez testified in her own defense and presented several witnessеs on rebuttal; Gurican, however, presented no defense. Their attorney sought final argument to the jury on Gurican‘s behalf but the trial court denied his request. On June 8, 1984, the jury returned its verdict finding Gurican guilty of drug trafficking. To allow completion of a presentence investigation (PSI), the court set sentencing for August 1. Gurican filed motions for a new trial on June 13. Before sentencing, Gurican, who remained on pretrial releasе, absconded from the jurisdiction. Because of her absence and failure to appear for sentencing, the court did not formally adjudicate her guilty or sentence her. It denied Gurican‘s motiоns for a new trial on August 31. Four years later, Gurican voluntarily returned to the jurisdiction and, on December 12, 1988, the court entered its final judgment adjudicating Gurican guilty and sentenced her for the trafficking conviction.1 Aftеr sentencing, Gurican filed an appeal. In response the state filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Gurican‘s four-year absence from the jurisdiction effectively waived her right to appeаl her conviction. The district court denied the state‘s motion to dismiss and reversed the convictions because Gurican was deprived of final jury argument. It then
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court havе long held that courts may dismiss the appeals of criminal defendants who flee the jurisdiction while their appeals are pending. E.g., Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 17 S.Ct. 525, 41 L.Ed. 949 (1897); Bretti v. Wainwright, 225 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1969), approved in part, expunged in part, 255 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1971); Woodson v. State, 19 Fla. 549 (1882). These decisions are based on the theory that such a defendant abandoned or waived the right to an appeal. As the Court stated in Molinaro:
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the cоnvicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape does not strip the case of its charaсter as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.
396 U.S. at 366, 90 S.Ct. at 498-99.
The state argues that the reasoning of Molinaro is equally applicablе whether a convicted defendant flees before or after filing a notice of appeal and regardless of the individual‘s return to the court‘s jurisdiction. In support of its position the state relies on United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015, 103 S.Ct. 1259, 75 L.Ed.2d 486 (1983), which held that a defendant who flees after conviction, but before sentencing and before filing a notice of appeal, waives the right to appeal from the conviction upоn his return unless he can establish that the absence was due to matters completely beyond his control. Accord United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S.Ct. 2684, 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984). The state urges this Court to adopt a rule similar to that set forth in Holmes.
Although federal courts have addressed the issue presented by the case at bar, it is one of first impression to this Court. However, we previously have addressed whether an appellate court may dismiss an appeal when the appellant escapes. In Woodson the state moved to dismiss the appeal of an escaped prisoner whose whereabouts were unknown. This Court dismissed the appeal, finding it well settled that an appellate court will refuse to hear a criminal case when the appellant has escaped and is beyond the court‘s control. Bretti applied the traditional escape rule relied upon in Woodson and upheld a district court‘s refusal to reinstate thе appeal of an escapee who returned to the court‘s jurisdiction after it dismissed his appeal. This Court stated that “[a] fugitive has no right whatever to frustrate the orderly procedures of thе courts by voluntarily absenting himself and upon his apprehension complain that his rights were violated when his appeal was dismissed.” 225 So.2d at 518.
Gurican contends that her return to the trial court‘s jurisdiction prior to filing her appeal distinguishes her case from Woodson and Bretti and, therefore, the district court correctly refused to dismiss her appeal. In support of her argument, Gurican relies upon Brown v. State, 388 So.2d 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Marshall v. State, 344 So.2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1977), which refused to dismiss escapеes’ appeals after their return, and invites this Court to adopt the reasoning set forth therein.2 We
Pursuant to
This Court will not condone such action. We will not burden our already overcrowded court system with adjudicating the appeals of individuals who have flouted its processes by absсonding from the jurisdiction. By fleeing the court‘s jurisdiction instead of obeying the conditions of her pretrial release, Gurican demonstrated her overt disrespect for the judicial system. Her absence thwarted the orderly, effective administration of justice and, as such, disentitles her of the right to call upon its protections.
In future cases where the convicted defendant escapes and fails to appear for sentencing, we advise trial courts to proceed in absentia and render their final judgments adjudicating the defendant guilty. Thus, the thirty-day period for filing an appeal will commence running unless it is tollеd until the court disposes of any authorized and timely post-trial motion as specified in
Thus, we hold that, as a matter of policy, appellate courts of this state shall dismiss the appeal of a convicted defendant not yet sentenced who flees the jurisdiction before filing a notice of appeal and who fails to return and timely file that appeal unless the defendant can establish that the absence was legally justified. In the instant casе Gurican, who absconded from the court‘s jurisdiction for four years, cannot prosecute her appeal of her conviction upon her return. She may, however, appeal any alleged defects in her sentencing which occurred after her return.
We therefore answer the first certified question with a qualified affirmative, do not address the second certified question,4
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., dissents.