STATE of Louisiana v. Michael David GUIDRY
No. 93 KA 1091
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit
April 8, 1994
635 So. 2d 731
Before LOTTINGER, C.J., and CRAIN and LeBLANC, JJ.
William H. Dunckelman, Indigent Defender, Houma, for appellant, Michael David Guidry.
CRAIN, Judge.
Michael David Guidry was charged by bill of information with simple arson, a violation of
Because defendant pled guilty, the facts of the offense were not fully developed. Defendant was billed with setting fire to a residence belonging to James and Edna Pate located in Montegut. In a signed statement, defendant indicated that late one night he went to a lounge to drink beer and dance. When he noticed his wife and the man she was with were both drinking, he asked his wife why she wanted to divorce him because he drank. His wife refused to talk to him, and she later left the lounge. At about 1:35 a.m. (on November 4, 1991), defendant left the bar and bought a beer at a convenience store. He then went to a house on Roland Street, walked in the unlocked back door, and set a paper bag on fire in the living room, making sure the fire touched the sofa. He then left the house, went to his brother‘s house, and told his brother‘s wife to call the fire department. From defendant‘s statement, it is not clear who resided in the house; but it appears possible that defendant formerly resided in the house with his wife and that his wife was still living in the house on the date of the offense.
DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his assignment of error, defendant argues the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession and inculpatory statements. He asserts the waiver of his constitutional rights was involuntary because of his mental abnormality and intoxicated condition.
It is well-settled that for a confession or inculpatory statement to be admissible into evidence, the state must affirmatively show that it was freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises.
The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the trial court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless
With regard to the relationship between diminished mental or intellectual capacity and involuntariness, the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that such a condition does not of itself vitiate the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive constitutional rights and make a free and voluntary confession. Benoit, 440 So.2d at 131. The critical factors are whether or not the defendant was able to understand the rights explained to him and whether or not he voluntarily gave a statement. State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1053 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 584 So.2d 679 (La.1991).
The state may rely on the presumption of sanity provided in
When the free and voluntary nature of a confession is challenged on the ground the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the confession, the confession will be rendered inadmissible only if the intoxication is of such a degree as to negate the defendant‘s comprehension and to make him unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying. Whether or not intoxication exists and is sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of a confession are questions of fact, and the trial court‘s ruling on this issue will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the evidence. State v. Williams, 602 So.2d 318, 319 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1125 (La.1992).
At the hearing held on the motion to suppress, Lt. Elron Fanguy of the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff‘s Office testified that he first spoke to defendant about the offense at about 4:35 a.m. at the scene. When he spoke to defendant at that time, he noticed a smell of alcohol on defendant‘s breath but did not think defendant appeared highly intoxicated. He asked defendant some questions about his whereabouts when the fire began. Defendant did not make any inculpatory statements at that time.
Fanguy had defendant come to the sheriff‘s office in the afternoon of that same day for an interview. According to Fanguy, defendant was sober at the station. Fanguy noticed that defendant appeared nervous and was shaking noticeably. Although defendant did not look at Fanguy during the interview, defendant‘s answers were responsive to the questions. Defendant told Fanguy that he was mentally handicapped and had attended special schools for the mentally handicapped. Prior to the interview, Fanguy advised defendant of his Miranda rights, using a standard rights form. Because defendant told Fanguy he could not read or write, Fanguy read the entire form to him. After reading each right, Fanguy explained the right. For example, after advising defendant that he had
Initially, defendant denied setting the fire. He explained that he had wanted to talk to his wife when he left the lounge. On the way to see his wife, he stopped at a convenience store and bought a beer. When he got to the house, he noticed the house was on fire and notified a nearby relative. Defendant also admitted having an alcohol problem. When Fanguy asked defendant if he would be willing to take a lie detector test, defendant started crying and shaking and admitted starting the fire by lighting the paper bag he got at the convenience store. Defendant then dictated a statement to Fanguy. Fanguy typed the statement and read it to defendant. After Fanguy made sure defendant understood the statement, he had defendant sign the statement. Fanguy indicated that throughout the questioning defendant never indicated he did not want to answer any questions and never requested an attorney.
Defendant called Dr. Clarence Bergeron as an expert witness in the field of psychology. Bergeron testified that he evaluated defendant several years earlier (in 1985) in connection with defendant‘s application for Social Security disability payments. In connection with that evaluation, Bergeron concluded defendant had an IQ of 65. Thus, he classified defendant as being mildly mentally retarded. According to Bergeron, it would be very unlikely for defendant‘s intelligence to have improved during the interim. When asked if a person who is mildly mentally retarded would have any difficulty understanding their constitutional rights, Bergeron testified that it would be difficult for the person to understand the rights. He indicated that the way the rights were explained would be very important. Bergeron was in the courtroom during Fanguy‘s testimony; and he admitted that Fanguy‘s method of breaking down each right and explaining each phrase would have assisted defendant in understanding the rights. According to Bergeron, a person who was under a high degree of stress, signified by crying and trembling, would have more difficulty understanding things presented to them.
Defendant also testified at the hearing. He stated that he was a slow learner and had not been able to hold down a full-time job. He explained that he had been fired from jobs because he had been unable to learn the job. Defendant remembered the detective giving him a form to sign which had his constitutional rights on it; but he maintained that he did not understand that he did not have to answer the detective‘s questions. He claimed he was shaking during the questioning because he was scared. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant about each of the Miranda rights and defendant indicated he understood the rights. He originally had no explanation for why he understood the rights in court but could not understand them when he was questioned by Fanguy. However, he then explained that he had done things to rehabilitate himself since the offense. Additionally, he had discussed constitutional rights with his attorney. Defendant admitted that he understood some of the rights when he was questioned by Fanguy, but he could not recall which rights he had understood.
Despite defendant‘s diminished intellectual capacity, it is apparent he understood the rights and voluntarily gave a statement to Fanguy. There is no indication defendant‘s mental condition caused him to be unable to understand his rights. According to the psychologist, a person in defendant‘s position would be able to understand the rights if each portion of the rights was explained, such as Fanguy did in this case. The court‘s rejection of defendant‘s testimony, wherein he claimed he did not understand some of the rights read to him by Fanguy, is supported by the evidence. The questions asked of defendant at the hearing, on both direct and cross-examination, appeared more complex than the rights form; yet defendant had no
The assignment of error is without merit.
PATENT ERROR
In reviewing the record for patent error, we have discovered error in the bill of information. The penalty for simple arson differs depending upon whether the amount of damage amounts to “five hundred dollars or more” or “less than five hundred dollars.”
In reviewing the sentence for patent error, we have found error in the sentence. Although the minutes indicate defendant was credited with time served, the transcript reveals that the trial court did not give defendant credit for time served. See
CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED. REMANDED WITH ORDER.