79 P. 577 | Or. | 1905
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, Frank Guglielmo, was informed against, tried, and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, alleged to have been committed in Multnomah County June 14, 1904, by killing one Freda Guarascia, and from the judgment which followed he appeals.
At common law an information was a surmise or suggestion upon record, made on behalf of the sovereign to a court of criminal jurisdiction, charging a person with the commission of a misdemeanor: Wilkes v. The King, 6 Brown, Parl. Cases, 345; United States v. Tureaud (C. C.), 20 Fed. 621. “Informations,” says a text-writer, referring to such accusations made under the ancient rule, “are of two kinds: First, such as are merely at the suit of the King; secondly,' such as are. partly at the suit of the King, and partly at the suit of the party”: 2 Hawk. P. C. 356. Blackstone, speaking of criminal informations, in distinguishing the two kinds, exhibited in the name of the King, says:
This learned author, after quoting the acts, the substance of which is here given, makes the following declaration: “From whence it follows that informations exhibited by the attorney general remain as they were at the common law.” In King v. Joliffe, 4 Durn. & E. 285, Lord Chief Justice Kenton, referring to the act regulating the exhibition of informations by the master of the crown office, says: “Before the statute 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 18, it was in the power of any individual to file an information, without disclosing to the court the grounds on which it was exhibited. But that practice being attended with the inconveniences recited in the preamble to that statute, it was enacted that no information should be filed without the express order of the court publicly given. That statute does not enumerate the grounds which are sufficient to enable us to grant the information, but the legislature left it to our discretion, trusting that we should not so far transgress our duty as to go beyond the rules of sound discretion. In ordinary cases affidavits are sworn in the court' for the express purpose of praying an information upon them, but that does not preclude us from granting an information on affidavits equally authentic, although not made for that purpose.” Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his History of the Criminal Law of England (volume 1, p. 296), in referring to the act of 1692, regulating informations exhibited by the master of the crown office, also observes: “The practical result of this statute has been to make a motion for a criminal 'information practically equivalent to a proceeding before magistrates in order to the committal of the accused.” This distinguished jurist, on the page of his valuable work preceding that from which the foregoing excerpt is taken, in referring to the statute of 1494 (11 Hen. VII, c. 3), remarks: “This act was the one under which Empson and Dudley earned their obscure infamy.” Blackstone, alluding to the act last referred to, and also to another ordained in the reign of the same sovereign, makes the following statement: “But when the statute, 3 Hen. VII, c. 1,
It was the fear, undoubtedly entertained by the citizens of this country, that a violation of the rights of personal liberty, as practiced in England in the reign of King Henry VII, might possibly be repeated to their injury, that prompted congress to propose and secure the adoption of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the Hnited States. As this amendment was never intended to limit the powers of the states in respect to their own people, but was designed to operate on the national government only (Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 21, 22, 31 L. Ed. 80; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 20 Sup. Ct. 287, 44 L. Ed. 382), the framers of the constitution of this State embodied the substance thereof in the Bill of Rights, which declares: “No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in théir persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized”: Const. Or. Art. I, § 9. This restrictive clause has been incorporated into the statute of this State, which, so far as deemed involved herein, is as follows: An information is the allegation or statement made before a magistrate, and verified by the oath of the party making it, that a person has been guilty of some designated crime: B. & C. Comp. §1581. When complaint is made to a magistrate of the commission of a crime, he must examine the informant on oath, and reduce his statement to
At common law the attorney general, ex officio, was invested with a discretionary power of filing informations charging the commission of misdemeanors, and hence he was not obliged to ask for or obtain leave of court before exercising the responsibility that devolved upon him by virtue of his office: 4 Bl. Com. *309. Thus, in Bex v. Phillips, 3 Burr. 1564, it was ruled that the attorney general had a right himself, ex officio, to exhibit an information without leave of court; Lord Mansfield saying: “This is not a case within the act of 4 W. & M. e. 18.” To the same effect is Rex v. Mayor of .Plymouth, 4 Burr. 2089, in which ease the same learned justice also remarked: “If it appears to the King’s attorney general to be right to grant an information, he may do it himself. If he does not think it so, he cannot expect us to do it.” The discretionary power vested in and exercised by the attorney general at. common law devolves, in this country, in the absence of any statutory regulations, on the district attorneys (State v. Douglas County Road Co. 10 Or. 198; State ex rel. v. Lord, 28 Or. 498, 43 Pac. 471, 31 L. R. A. 473), who are entitled to prosecute persons for the commission of crimes by information, as a right pertaining to their office, and without leave of court: 1 Bishop, New Crim. Proce.d. §144; State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287 (65 S. W. 763, 56 L. R. A. 115). “Therefore,” says Mr. Justice Thomas in State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135 (17 S. W. 290), “when the prosecuting attorney files an
The Bill of Eights of this State does not demand that the oath or affirmation sustaining the probable cause shall be reduced to writing, nor does our statute require an information charging the commission of a crime to be verified; and, in the absence of
At common law, though the attorney general was authorized to exhibit informations, without leave of court, charging the commission of misdemeanors, if that office was vacant the solicitor general was empowered to discharge that duty. In Wilkes v. The King, 6 Brown, Parl. Cases, 345, it was ruled that notice of the right of the solicitor general to exhibit an information would be taken, without proof of the vacancy in the office of attorney general. In that case it is said: “That the attorney and solicitor generals are invested by their offices with general authority to commence’ and prosecute the suits-of the crown. It is true, the attorney general, as the superior officer, has the direction and control of his majesty’s prosecutions, in which the solicitor general seldom interferes;'but it is equally true that' during the vacancy of the office of attorney general all the suits of the crown, both criminal and civil, are commenced, prosecuted, and carried on by the solicitor general; that at the time when these informations were filed against Mr. Wilkes the office of attorney general was vacant, and consequently the solicitor general was the proper .officer to exhibit them. But it is said that the fact of the vacancy ought to appear upon the record. The only pretense for such an averment is to inform the court of the vacancy, as an inducement to. receive the information from the solicitor general, but there is no necessity for that intelligence. The attorney general is, in truth, an officer of, and has a place in, the Court of King’s Bench, and the court will take notice of the vacancy of the office; and there are multitudes of instances of suits commenced and prosecuted by the solicitor general on behalf of the crown, without any averment or notice taken of the vacancy of the office of attorney general.” In Ghoen v. State, 85 Ind. 209, it was held that an indictment, signed by a person as “special prosecuting attorney” was not subject to a motion to quash, or vulnerable to a plea in abatement which did not deny the due appointment of such special prosecuting officer. In deciding that ease, Mr. Justice Woods
Believing that the defendant had a fair and impartial trial in the manner prescribed by law, and that no prejudicial error was committed, the judgment is affirmed. ' Affirmed.
Rehearing
Decided 27 March, 1905.
On Motion for Rehearing.
delivered the opinion.
His authoritjr, however, so far as it relates to the filing of informations charging the commission of felonies, is not derived from the common law, but directly from the legislative assembly: B. & C. Comp. § 1258. The organic law of this State, in commanding the method to be pursued in securing jurors, is as follows: “The legislative assembly shall so provide that the most competent of the permanent citizens of the county shall be chosen for jurors; and out of the whole number in attendance at the court, seven shall be chosen by lot as grand jurors, five of whom must concur to find an indictment. But the legislative assembly may modify or abolish grand juries”: Const. Or. Art. VII, § 18. The legislative assembly, exercising the power thus reserved, passed an act, which was approved February 17, 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 99), authorizing the district attorney of any judicial district in this State to file informations charging persons with the commission of any crimes defined and made punishable by the laws of Oregon that have been committed in the county where the information is- filed: B. & C. Comp. § 1258. The information specified shall be substantially in the form prescribed for an indictment (B. & C. Comp. § 1304), except that the words “district attorney” shall be used instead of the words “grand jury” .wherever the same occur: B. & C. Comp. § 1259. The information, when filed, shall be construed like, and deemed to be in all respects the same as, an indictment, and
A perusal of the act in question, the substance of which is hereinbefore stated, will show that it is in effect a modification of the grand jury system, whereby that inquisitorial body has, except when in the opinion of the court deemed advisable (B. & C. -Comp, §1264), been superseded by the district attorney, who can find informations only on the testimony of witnesses taken before him, which tends to show that a crime has been committed in the county, and that there is reasonable cause to believe that the person to be charged is connected therewith and can upon a trial therefor be convicted thereof. The change in the manner of initiating criminal actions is a reasonable exercise by the. legislative assembly of the power reserved by the people in the fundamental law, and because their representatives, when assembled, considered it appropriate to designate the district attorney as the proper person formally to charge the commission of crimes, his right to employ the authority conferred is as well founded as if the control in such matters had been delegated to any other person or number of persons.
iThe bill of exceptions shows that the district attorney was absent from Multnomah County June 15, 1904, the day the information was filed, at which time it also appears that a bench warrant for the arrest of the. defendant was “ordered” to be issued on the motion of a deputy of the district attorney. Based on this condition of the transcript, it is contended by defendant’s counsel that if ratification by the district attorney gave validity to the information, which they deny, such confirmation did not occur until after the bench warrant was executed, and -hence it was issued without authority. The court’s order that a bench warrant be issued is in effect a judgment awarding the -relief demanded by the deputy district attorney when the information was filed. The. issuance of the warrant in pursuance of such judgment is a ministerial act performed by the clerk of the court, usually upon the request of the officer entitled thereto. The bill of exceptions shows that on June 16, 1904, the district attorney was in the court when the defendant first .appeared thérein, but, no copy of the warrant being set out in the record, it does not affirmatively appear that the capias was not “issued” at the request of the district attorney himself before he took any part in the action in open court, thereby ratifying the finding of the information, and verifying it with his official oath, prior to the issuance of the bench warrant. The defendant had been arrested for the commission of the crime of which he was con
It follows from these considerations that the petition for a rehearing is denied. Affirmed: Rehearing Denied.