OPINION
{1} This case presents us with the opportunity to clarify the limits on a trial court’s discretion in sentencing a youthful offender as an adult. Defendant, a fourteen-year-old child, entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,
{2} Defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the Delinquency Act gives a trial court authority to increase the basic adult sentence for aggravating circumstances as applied to a youthful offender pursuant to Section 32A-2-20; (2) whether the aggravation of Defendant’s sentence under Section 31-18-15.1 after a finding of non-amenability under Section 32A-2-20 violates the constitutional protections against double jeopardy; (3) whether an increase in a basic sentence under Section 31-18-15.1 is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
{3} We hold that the maximum sentence that may be imposed upon a youthful offender convicted of a non-capital felony is the basic sentence prescribed by NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15 (1999) plus any enhancements specifically made applicable to .youthful offenders by the Legislature. See NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-16, 31-18-16.1 (1993). It is therefore unnecessary for us to address Defendant’s second and third issues. We recently decided Defendant’s fourth issue in State v. Gonzales,
Facts and Procedural History
{4} On August 14, 1998, Defendant was involved in a fight with several other juvenile girls and two adult males. During the altercation, Defendant fatally stabbed Victim, a thirteen-year-old girl. After leaving the scene, Defendant showered and hid the knife used to kill Victim as well as the shirt Defendant had been wearing during the attack. At the time of the murder, Defendant was fourteen years old.
{5} Defendant was charged with an open count of murder and two counts of tampering with evidence. The State filed a notice of intent to invoke adult sanctions as required by Subsection 32A-2-20(A), and a notice of intent to seek an aggravation of any adult sentence under Section 31-18-15.1. Pursuant to Alford,
Discussion
{6} The issue before us is whether the trial court had the authority to aggravate Defendant’s sentence under Section 31-18-15.1. Because a trial court’s power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute, see State v. Martinez,
{7} Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See Martinez,
{8} The Children’s Code defines a youthful offender as (1) a child fourteen to eighteen years of age who has been adjudicated guilty of any one of twélve enumerated violent felonies or guilty of any felony and who has had three prior, separate felony adjudications within the three-year period immediately preceding the instant offense, or (2) a fourteen-year-old child who is adjudicated guilty of first degree murder. See § 32A-2-3(I); see also § 31-18-15.2(B) (providing identical definition of “youthful offender” within Criminal Sentencing Act). Under Section 32A-2-20(B)(1) and (2) of the Children’s Code, a court has the discretion to sentence a youthful offender as an adult only if it finds that “the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities,” and “the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally disordered.” If the court makes these findings, it may impose either juvenile or adult sanctions. See § 32A-2-20(A). Section 32A-2-20(D) provides that:
If the court invokes an adult sentence, the court may sentence the child to less than, but shall not exceed, the mandatory adult sentence. A youthful offender given an adult sentence shall be treated as an adult offender and shall be transferred to the legal custody of an agency responsible for incarceration of persons sentenced to adult sentences. This transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the [children’s] court over the child with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the petition.
{9} The State argues that the second sentence of § 32A-2-20(D), when read in pari materia with Section 31-18-15.2 (defining youthful offender in Criminal Sentencing Act), evinces a legislative intent that a youthful offender subject to adult sanctions be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act without reference to the Children’s Code. Under the State’s reasoning, since adult offenders are subject to the possibility of an increased sentence when a court finds aggravating circumstances, youthful offenders should be treated no differently. See §§ 31 — 18—15(B); 31-18-15.1.
{10} The State’s argument, however, is contrary to our understanding of the Children’s Code and rests on the misconception that the Criminal Sentencing Act rather than the Children’s Code defines the scope of a court’s authority to sentence a youthful offender as an adult. Because Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the offense, she is entitled to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Children’s Court. See § 32A-2-6 (stating that, with the exception of children categorized as serious youthful offenders, children’s court has exclusive jurisdiction over all children under the age of eighteen years). This exclusive jurisdiction continues through sentencing until it is terminated by the transfer of Defendant to a correctional facility. See § 32A-2-20(D). Therefore, we must look to the Children’s Code to determine the scope of a trial court’s authority to impose adult sanctions on a youthful offender, and we may not consider Sections 31-18-15(B) and 31-18-15.1 of the Criminal Sentencing Act in isolation. See Lopez,
{11} Under 32A-2-20(D), a trial court’s authority to sentence a youthful offender as an adult is limited to imposing a sentence less than or equal to the “mandatory” adult sentence. This authority is confirmed by Section 31-18-13(A) of the Criminal Sentencing Act, which, seeming to equate basic and mandatory sentences, provides:
Unless otherwise provided in this section, all persons convicted of a crime under the laws of New Mexico shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act [Chapter 31, Article 18 NMSA 1978]; provided, that a person sentenced as a serious youthful offender or as a youthful offender may be sentenced to less than the basic or mandatory sentence prescribed by the Criminal Sentencing Act.
(Emphasis added.) The issue presented by this case, therefore, is whether the basic sentence for a non-capital felony as authorized by Section 31-18-13 and prescribed by Section 31-18-15 is a “mandatory” sentence within the meaning of Subsection 32A-2-20(D).
{12} Under Section 31-18-15(B), the basic sentence applicable to a felony offense “shall be imposed ... unless the court alters such sentence pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15.1, 31-18-16, 31-18-16.1 or 31-18-17 NMSA 1978.” Sections 31-18-16 and 31-18-16.1 describe sentencing enhancements that are mandatory for adult offenders, but discretionary for youthful offenders and serious youthful offenders. See § 31-18-16(A) (requiring that a basic sentence of imprisonment be increased if a court or jury finds that a firearm was used in the commission of a noncapital felony, but providing that such increase be left to the court’s discretion in sentencing a youthful offender or serious youthful offender); § 31-18-16.1 (describing similar sentence increases after a finding that a defendant intentionally injured a person sixty years of age or older). Section 31-18-17 describes the mandatory penalties for habitual offenders and is not applicable to youthful offenders.
{13} Subsection 31-18-15.1(A) provides that a court “may alter the basic sentence as prescribed in Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978 upon a finding by the judge of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning the offender.” Subsection 31-18-15.1(0 limits the court’s discretion to increases or decreases that are no greater than “one-third of the basic sentence; provided, that when the offender is a serious youthful offender or a youthful offender, the judge may reduce the sentence by more than one-third of the basic sentence.”
{14} The word “shall” as used in a statute is generally construed to be mandatory. See State v. Jody C.,
{15} We conclude that the basic sentences prescribed by Section 31-18-15 are “mandatory” within the meaning of 32A-2-20(D), while the alterations in the basic sentences allowed by 31-18-15.1 are discretionary and therefore circumscribed by the Children’s Code. See § 32A-2-20(D). Our conclusion is based on the Legislature’s use of the phrases “shall be imposed” or “shall be increased” in Sections 31-18-15, -16, -16.1 and -17, contrasted with use of the phrase “may alter” in Section 31-18-15.1. See Thriftway,
{16} Even if we are incorrect in our statutory interpretation based on the words of the statute, at the very least, the use of the word “mandatory” in Section 32A-2-20(D) creates an ambiguity because there are no “mandatory” sentences that apply to juveniles and the basic sentence is in no sense “mandatory” for adults. See NMSA 1978, § 31-20-3(A) (1985) (permitting a court to defer sentence). Thus, we may use the rule of lenity to further support our conclusion. See State v. Anaya, 1997 NMSC 010, ¶¶ 30-32,
Conclusion
{17} For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the maximum sentence that may be imposed upon a youthful offender convicted of a non-capital felony is the basic sentence prescribed by Section 31-18-15, plus, if applicable, the enhancements prescribed by Sections 31-18-16 and 31-18-16.1. We vacate Defendant’s sentence and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.