*1 Hоwever, we vacate the portion of the award granting respon- dent the value of her stock.5 part part.
Affirmed in and vacated in FINNEY, C.J., TOAL, WALLER, JJ., MOORE and concur. STATE, Respondent,
The GRIPPON, Appellant. Labrone
No. 24645.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard Nov. 1996. July
Decided 1997.
Rehearing Aug. Denied 1997. Appellants also claimed the award should be vacated on the non- statutory ground disregard perverse of manifest or misconstruction of panel. the law panel arbitration Because we find the exceeded authority, its we need not reach this issue. *2 Pearce, Appellate Assistant Defender M. Anne of South Defense, Columbia, of Appellate appellant. Carolina Office for Condon, Attorney Molony Deputy Attorney General Charles McIntosh, Deputy Attorney General John W. Assistant Gener- Elliot, al Salley Attorney W. Senior Assistant General Charles Richardson, Columbia; Schwacke, H. and David P. Solicitor Charleston, respondent.
BURNETT, Justice: Appellant challenges voluntary manslaughter his conviction judge’s on the the trial on ground erroneously diluted the burden of proof. State’s We n disagree and affirm.
FACTS 4, 1996, Around 6:30 a.m. on December stabbed appellant Singleton. According appellant, Harold he awoke at his home to find over him. tried to Singleton standing Singleton him. The two men rape fought, appellant Single- stabbed leg kept fight ton with a knife he near his bed. The moved into the kitchen where appellant then Single- stabbed ton in the causing back his death. Appellant dragged Single- ton outside and then called for help. Appellant wаs indicted for murder. trial,
At the the State appellant’s introduced confession as direct evidence of the cause of Singleton’s death. The State relied on circumstantial prove evidence to malice. The de- fense did not present any and appellant did not testify.
On appellant’s request, the judge trial instructed the on circumstantial evidence. judge The trial omitted from appel- lant’s requested instruction phrase “to the exclusion of (“reasonable other hypothesis” phrase) because interpreted he this phrase as shifting the burden from the State to the defendant. The trial judge defined reasonable doubt repeated throughout his instructions reasonable doubt was the required standard of *3 proof.
ISSUE Did the judge trial err by omitting phrase “to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis” from the circumstantial charge?
DISCUSSION Appellant requested the trial court charge the following:
Crimes proven by be provid- ed that it necessary meets the legal tests. To the extent that prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence it must provе all the circumstances relied on a reason- able doubt. and, The circumstances must be wholly in every particular, perfectly another; consistent with one the circumstances must point conclusively guilt to the of the accused to the every exclusion other reasonable hypothe- of is, sis. That to be considered as guilt evidence of сircumstances must absolutely any inconsistent with reasonable hypothesis other than the accused. 82 that fact that the circum- charge you further the mere strongly suspicious
stances are and the defendant’s probable, it is not sufficient to sustain a conviction because offered the State must exclude reason- except guilt, satisfy able and must hypоthesis jury beyond a reasonable doubt. added). The trial on State v. (emphasis judge, relying Raf 110, (1995), 456 refused to include faldt, 318 S.C. S.E.2d 390 language. judge The trial incor the “reasonable rectly rejection read as a of the “reasonable hypothe Raffaldt However, phrase. except phrase, sis” for the omission of that trial judge fully jury instructed the on circumstantial evidеnce.
Appellant argues given the instruction on circumstantial incomplete proof required evidence was because the level of find him was lowered without the guilty phrase. omitted We disagree. requested by appellant initially
The instruction
re
approval by
Littlejohn,
ceived
this Court
State v.
(1955).
324,
Edwards,
272,
See State v.
denied,
246,
379 S.E.2d
cert.
493
110
U.S.
S.Ct.
(1989) (stating
L.Ed.2d 196
the appropriate circumstantial
charge).
addressing
Our recent cases
the circum
charge by
stantial evidence
modified this
deleting
language requiring
explanation.
to “seek” another
(1991),
Manning,
S.C.
S.E.2d 372
(1992);
S.Ct.
However,
instruction actually given by
judge,
the trial
whole, adequately conveyed
as a
proof required
the level of
to
Smith,
547,
appellant guilty.
find
See State v.
446
(1994) (jury
S.E.2d 411
instructions should be considered as a
whole,
error,
if
they
any
and
as a whole
are free from
isolated
which
not
portions
misleading
be
do
constitute reversible
Burton,
error);
(1990)
494,
State v.
Nonetheless, although
charge
neither the
nor
requested
actually given
the trial court in this case lowered or
shifted the
proof,
burden of
we think the
rule
posited
better
is
States,
121,
in Holland v. United
348
75
U.S.
S.Ct.
99
(1954).
Holland,
held,
L.Ed. 150
if a proper
Court
jury
reasonable
is given,
doubt instruction
a
need not be
that circumstantial
strong
evidence must
so
as to
instructed
exclude
hypothesis
guilt.
reasonable
other than
Several
jurisdictions
adopted
have
this rule. See United States v.
(4th
Russell,
Cir.1992),
P.2d 728 requiring cases Adcock, charge); 310 N.C. (no (1984) S.E.2d hypothesis instruction required when a correct instruction on reasonable doubt is given).
Therefore, in criminal relying part case whole or in on circumstantial once a proper reasonable doubt instruction is given, we recommend the be instructed as follows:
There are are types generally two evidence which during a trial —direct presented testimony person еvidence. Direct evidence is the of a who fact, asserts or claims have actual of a knowledge such as eyewitness. is proof an Circumstantial evidence of a chain *5 of a fact. indicating
of facts and circumstances the existence absolutely weight no distinction between the The law makes to to either direct or circumstantial given or value degree certainty required Nor of greater evidence. than of direct evidence. You should all the weigh weighing all the evidence the case. After evidence, if not of the of the you guilt are convinced doubt, you defendant a reasonable must find [the guilty. not defendant] Blackmar, Jury
1 E. Devitt & C. Federal Practice and (4th ed.1992). § 12.04 Instructions stated, For reasons we AFFIRM. JJ., WALLER,
MOORE and concur. TOAL, J., FINNEY, C.J., in separate opinion. concur TOAL, Justice, concurring. to affirm agree majority’s Grippon’s with the decision voluntary manslaughter, but see no need to
conviction an entirely charge. recommend new circumstantial evidence Accordingly, only. I concur in result notes, majority charge requested by Grippon
As the
correctly
language concerning
stated the law. The
neces
sity
conclusively
that the circumstantial evidence
“point
guilt
every
of the accused to the exclusion
other reasonable
hypothesis”
does not shift the burden of
to the defen
(1995),
Raffaldt,
dant. State v.
Although
majority
states South Carolina’s traditional
circumstantial evidence charge
correct,
remains
it neverthe
less recоmmends trial courts discontinue use of that
in
favor of the one recommended in
Jury
Federal
Practice and
Instructions. Unlike
majority,
I do not believe trial
judges should abandon South Carolina’s traditional charge as
Edwards,
in
described
272,
888,
379 S.E.2d
895,
246,
493 U.S.
110 S.Ct.
every сircumstance relied upon by the State [must] be proven beyond doubt; a reasonable and ... all of the circumstances so proven [must] consistent with each other and together, taken point conclusively to the of the accused to the exclusion of other reasonable hypothesis. It is not sufficient that they probabili- create a ty, though if, а strong one and assuming then to be true they may be accounted upon for any reasonable hypothesis which does not accused, include the of the has failed.
Edwards,
275,
Relying on
75 S.Ct.
(1954),
er,
of the
the widescale abandonment
mostly
“bandwagon
from a
ef-
has resulted
Holland,
rеjection
rather than from a reasoned
following
fect”
(“While
rule. See
Rosenberg at 1402
longstanding
of the
Holland for the com-
substituting
of
state courts
several
detailed, analytical opinions,
so in
for
mon law rule have done
victim of the
part
the most
the old rule seems to be the
Holland do
following
bandwagon
Many
effect.
of
states
meaningful
presеnted,
so without
discussion
the issues
decision,
its final
merely citing
Supreme
quoting
Court
to the
conclusory paragraphs,
pointing
growing
number
already
cautionary
charge.”)
states that have
eliminated
contrast, many
of the courts that have bucked the national
cogent
retaining
trend have advanced
reasons
charge.
Ford,
People
For
examрle,
N.Y.2d
N.Y.S.2d
(1985),
Appeals
87 “proof require circumstantial evidence careful reason- 644-645, of facts.” at ing by trier Id. at 488 N.E.2d 465. By emphasizing reasoning, need for careful danger circumstantial evidence “forecloses ... [the] that of facts may leap logical gaps trier in the offered probabili- and draw unwarranted conclusions based on ties of dеgree.” low Id. Nelson, Idaho
Similarly, the
Court of
112
Appeals
Idaho
'd,
with Finally, in their law this concerning very review article issue,3 argued Irene and Yale have traditional Rosenberg charge provides jurors valuable information that in order need to accurately analyze circumstantial evidence. Like the New *8 Ford, Appeals York Court of in People these scholars find that justification charge the for the is not a in difference probative between and value direct circumstantial in evaluating but a the methods for the necessary difference evidence: effect,
In analysis of cirсumstantial is a more evidence jurors in process, requiring engage lawyer- intellectual scrutiny forcing like them to see both sides. After supra 3. See note true,
concluding particular juror that a fact is the individual First, guilt ask: can I infer from that fact? upon is called Second, so, any explanation if is there other than may prevent jurors individually This guilt? process collectively deciding from the case on a more emotional and Consequently, cautionary charge intuitive basis. a with respect provides to circumstantial evidence framework ra- channeling jury’s process along deliberative more tional lines. hand,
The on the other does not charge, reasonable doubt to the manner in jury’s apprоpriate direct the attention Instead, permits which to evaluate evidence. it the finder of cumulative, comprehensive fact to make a assessment of the of all the adduced at trial. To probative value evidence sure, concept rationality, of reasonable doubt embodies any but it is not method oriented. It does not describe with in degree precision process employ is to Thus, reaching assuming its ultimate conclusion. as we jurors must do in fact listen charge, being “confusing rather than and incor- rect,” complements properly defining an instruction reason- ... by delineating appropriate able doubt basis for assessing circumstantial evidence and the determi- reaching nаtion that has or has not been established reasonable doubt. at
Rosenberg 1412-13. Ford, Nelson, I agree logic with the and the Rosenberg article. This Court should retain the Edwards because juries need more detailed information about the relation of circumstantial evidence to determination of than the majority’s suggested provides. question instruction The is not probative whether circumstantial evidence carries the same evidence; Rather, weight as direct of course it does. question is the means for proper evaluating circumstantial juries evidence and how trial courts best help understand responsibilities. my their opinion, Edwards jury’s responsibility clarifies the to evaluate circumstantial carefully. acknowledge the an endangered species the state courts of our nation and is *9 said, at extinct the federal level. That I having been think we shall lose more than if gain we we abandon the traditional charge. Accordingly, concur.
FINNEY, C.J., concurs.
488S.E.2d339 NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellant/Respondent, Bank, Robbin T. HUNT and First Citizens as Custodian Taylor, IRA, Defendants, for Don E. Bank,
of whom First Citizens as Custodian for Don Taylor, IRA, is, Respondent/Appellant. E.
No. 24644.
Supreme Court of South Carolina. April
Heard 1997. July Decided