State v. GrimesState v. Grimes
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Schultheis
Just before noon in early August 1996, Cheryl Petersen drove by her daughter’s house and saw a strange pickup truck backed up to the front porch. She parked her car, blocking the driveway, and walked toward the house. Mr. Grimes and another man walked out the front door. The other man approached her and she asked him what they were doing. He answered that he was moving his furniture out. She said, “I don’t think so,” and ran inside to call police. When she found that the telephone was gone, she ran back out and told her friend, waiting in her car, to go call the police. A small white car, carrying two women and the man who had approached her, suddenly appeared from the back of the house, managed to maneuver around Ms. Petersen’s car in the driveway, and drove away.
While her friend left to find a telephone, Ms. Petersen confronted Mr. Grimes. It appeared that he might have moved the truck away from the house a few feet. Mr. Grimes asked her what was going on. She told him the police were coming and she was memorizing his license plates. He offered her a piece of paper and a pen to write down the license number and showed her his driver’s license. She then asked him what he was doing. He told her the other three people approached him at a grocery store parking lot and offered him $20 for the use of his truck to move their furniture. A police officer soon arrived and arrested Mr. Grimes, who waived his Miranda 1 rights and told the officer the same story he had told Ms. Petersen.
In a pretrial CrR 3.5 hearing, the State unsuccessfully objected to admission of Mr. Grimes’s statements of innocence (he did not testify at trial) and Mr. Grimes unsuccessfully objected to admission of his latest statements to Detective Krogh. The defense offered no witnesses at trial. One of the State’s proposed instructions indicated that intent to commit the crime could be inferred from the fact of unlawful entry. This instruction was later withdrawn. The defense proposed an instruction based on the statutory defense to first degree criminal trespass (
It is a defense to a charge of residential burglary that the defendant reasonably believed that the owner of the premises or other person empowered to license access to the premises would have licensed the defendant to enter or remain.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the trespass was not lawful. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will he your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
This instruction was excluded. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and this appeal followed.
A person is guilty of residential burglary if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent
to commit a crime against a person or property in that dwelling.
The State first urges us to disregard this issue because Mr. Grimes assigns no error to a relevant act or omission of the trial court, RAP 10.3(a)(3). Whether or not a party sets forth assignments of error for each issue on appeal, this court will reach the merits if the issues are reasonably clear from the brief, the opposing party has not been prejudiced and this court has not been overly inconvenienced. State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). Mr. Grimes clearly expresses his issue here, apparently assigns error to the trial court’s failure to give his proposed instruction on the good faith defense, the State suffers no prejudice and this court is not at all inconvenienced. The issue is properly before us on appeal.
We begin by noting that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to fully instruct the jury on the law as to the theory of defense.
State v. Montague,
10 Wn. App. 911, 917, 521 P.2d 64 (citing
State v. Walker,
82 Wn.2d 851, 514 P.2d 919 (1973)),
review denied,
84 Wn.2d 1004 (1974). The jury instructions must not be
A few jurisdictions have held that a person who enters a residence with the good faith belief that he or she has the consent of the owner or occupant is not chargeable with “breaking and entering.” See, e.g., State v. Tolley, 30 N.C. App. 213, 215, 226 S.E.2d 672 (1976), cited in K.P.M. v. State, 446 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) and Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 863 (Ind. 1985). Even in these cases, all involving defendants who were allegedly given permission by the sons of the homeowners to enter and steal, the evidence of good faith is rebutted by evidence that the defendants entered with intent to commit a crime. K.P.M., 446 So. 2d at 724; Smith, 477 N.E.2d at 863; Tolley, 30 N.C. App. at 215. As noted in Smith, 477 N.E.2d at 863, the “defendant could not have reasonably believed that the adult, nonoccupant son had authority to consent to defendant’s entering of the parents’ residence for the purpose of stealing valuables which belonged to his parents.”
Similarly, the defendant in Montague, a Washington case, asserted that he reasonably believed the owner of a house hired him to break into the house and steal a large sum of money. At his trial Mr. Montague requested an instruction that read:
“A person does not commit a crime by destroying property or taking property or entering a house, if the acts are done upon a reasonable belief that the owner of the property destroyed or taken or of the house entered, has given his consent or direction to the taking or destruction or entry. Consent may be either expressed or implied.”
10 Wn. App. at 914-15 (emphasis omitted). The appellate court found that the concept of unlawful entry implies the existence of a guilty mind, which includes the intent to commit the criminal acts and the absence of any “mental pattern sufficient in law to exculpate” the one who performs the acts. Id. at 918. Accordingly, a reasonable mistake of fact negates both the guilty mind and the unlawful entry. Id. at 918-19. Montague noted that an honest, reasonable belief must be both sincere and based on acts that would have been proper if the facts had been as they were mistakenly supposed to be. Id. at 919 (quoting Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 826 (1957)). Because Mr. Montague’s actions were criminal whether or not the homeowner (whose reasons for setting up a false burglary were at best suspicious) authorized them, those actions belied the element of good faith. Id. at 920. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to refuse the proposed instruction on reasonable belief.
Here, of course, Mr. Grimes argues he not only believed he entered the house with the owner’s consent, but he entered it without intent to steal. The trial court found that his proposed instruction was not supported by the evidence. In particular, it noted that the fact that a stranger says “Come help me move my stuff” is insufficient evidence that the stranger is authorized to license entry to the house.
Whether or not the proposed instruction on good faith belief is supported by the evidence, the fact remains that it has no bearing on the jury’s determination of Mr. Grimes’s guilt or innocence. The elements for residential burglary are unauthorized entry into a dwelling and criminal intent.
Mr. Grimes next contends the trial court erred in admitting his statement to Detective Krogh that he could “live with” or “believe” the detective thought he was guilty. He contends the statement is not an ER 804(b)(3) exception to the hearsay rule because it is not against penal interest but merely indicates his state of mind. He also argues its prejudicial effect outweighs its relevance. ER 403.
We first note that the statement by Mr. Grimes is not hearsay because it is his own statement and is offered against him in his criminal trial. ER 801(d)(2); State v. Mitchell, 117 Wn.2d 521, 534, 817 P.2d 398 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dent, 123 Wn.2d 467, 486, 869 P.2d 392 (1994). The statement is relevant because, as the trial court explained, it lends itself to two interpretations: as a confession or as an acknowledgement that the detective is entitled to his own opinion. If a confession, it contradicts Mr. Grimes’s protestations of innocence. ER 401.
Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ER 403. Admission or exclusion of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which has broad discretion to balance the probative value of evidence with its potentially prejudicial impact. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 701-02, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008 (1998). Considering the two possible interpretations of the statement here—one innocent and one inculpatory—we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
Finally, Mr. Grimes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of residential burglary. He contends a rational juror could not believe that he—a parolee—would drive up to the front door of a home in broad daylight to commit a crime.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 166, 892 P.2d 29 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996). All reasonable inferences are drawn in the State’s favor. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977).
Each of the elements of residential burglary is adequately established by the evidence here. The homeowner testified she had not given Mr. Grimes permission to enter, and her mother testified she saw him walk out of the house. These facts support the element of unlawful entry.
Affirmed.
Kurtz and Kato, JJ., concur.
Notes
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
Proof of intent to commit a crime will not establish unlawful entry.
State v. Miller,
90 Wn. App. 720, 725, 954 P.2d 925 (1998). On the other hand, the Legislature has adopted a permissive inference to establish the requisite intent whenever the evidence shows a person enters or remains unlawfully in a building.