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State v. Griffiths
610 P.2d 522
Idaho
1980
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*1 163 particular regulation required in which 610 P.2d extremely the installation of handrails on Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE precipitous stairways. long and v. hand, Boise, City of on other GRIFFITHS, Thelma that, other adopted building among code Defendant-Appellant. things, required the installation of handrails No. 12367. stairways.

in This determination Supreme Court Idaho. mere required handrails should be was not a City off-chance determination Boise 3, 1980. April Rather, adopted Council. Boise had Rehearing May 1980. Denied provisions of the edition Uni- Building (Code),2 form con- Code requirement

tained the for handrails 3305(i). The Code stated that it first

§

published by Building the Pacific Coast Of-

ficials and that it has Conference every years 1967.

been revised three thru

Testimony major at trial indicated buildings

percentage in the United Code,

States are covered purpose setting stan- up basic these regula- “maintaining safety

dards was life public buildings.” all

tions for From this it

readily City follows that the Boise ordi-

nance, although negli- could establish se,

gence per on admissible as evidence See, negligence. g.,

the issue of e. Frazier Co., (5th

v. Continental Oil 568 F.2d 378 Cir.

1978); Railway St. Louis-San Francisco Co. Burlison, 280 (Fla.App.1972); So.2d Horton,

Jorgensen (Iowa N.W.2d 100

1973); Rolling Nordstrom v. White Metal &

Stamping Corp., 75 Wash.2d (1969); Co., Vogel Steamship Alaska (1966). Wash.2d rejec-

Because cannot be said that building Boise code falls into the

tion error,

category harmless I am unable

join affirming. the Court in adopted Building the Uniform Code a statewide basis I.C. 39-4109. § *2 Kerr, Williams &

Dean Williams of Clarke, defendant-appellant. Blackfoot, for Gen., E. Lynn Atty. Leroy, H. David Boise, Gen., Thomas, Deputy Atty. plaintiff-respondent.

SHEPARD, admissibility Justice. expert testimo ny discretionary trial with the court. appeal This is an from a conviction Crook, State Idaho involuntary manslaughter after trial. (1977); Johnson, charge, verdict and conviction arose out P.2d 295 absent an abuse of defendant-appellant Thelma Griffiths’ *3 discretion, a decision will not be disturbed shooting admitted of .22 her husband with a Nelson, appeal. on Stoddard Idaho handgun. caliber (1978). P.2d We find no abuse April, Joe Griffiths arrived home of discretion. at night argument late and an with appel- lant ensued. When Joe Griffiths went into Here, permitted the witness was clothes, change bedroom to his the appel- testify to on the effects of fear on an lant argument followed and the continued individual, whether, not to in his during pushed appellant. which Joe the opinion, appellant the was in a state of fear According the appellant’s testimony, to she shooting. necessity at the time the of The opened intending an armoire obtain to her expert testimony to is confined matters purse, grabbed gun but instead the which requiring special knowledge skill and not placed had in period she the armoire a short scope understanding within the of of ordi of time before. She testified that her hus- nary persons untrained up who make lunged band Joe her toward with the same Owens, jury. g.,E. 112 Ariz. expression on his face that she had noted on (1975). Here, the witness was previous occasion when he had choked her testify asked to neither the about mental insensibility. to near appellant The fired competency appellant nor in the com gun the five times. Four bullets hit her parlance mon as to whether she was legally husband. Two of the shots would have Rather, sane insane. it is clear from the been fatal if no others been fired. Ac- sought psy record that counsel to elicit the cording testimony, stag- her her husband opinion appellant chiatrist’s the gered against her the two fell into an fear motivated at the time she shot her adjacent Appellant bathroom. admitted Further, husband. the record clear is shots, firing the the of but contended that explanation of the witness that his tes shot her husband because she feared for timony would been based state her life thus argued self-defense the- appellant ments of the and the witness’ ory. judgment appel of the truthfulness of Appellant was charged with the crime of lant’s statements. degree second jury murder and a trial was Fear is a common human within emotion held on charge. appro- The understanding and hence ex- priately instructed on included offenses pert psychiatric explanation neces- charge of second murder sary. juryA is as capable psychiatrist as a appropriate verdict form was submitted. determining the ultimate fact in this Appellant was guilty found not appellant case—whether acted under fear murder, charge of but was of found Regardless when she shot husband. charge involuntary included man- training a psychiatrist, expertise his slaughter. Upon conviction she was sen- qualify does not him to determine whether years prison. tence to a term of three any the defendant under killed fear more Appellant appeals both the conviction and qualifies than it him testify as to wheth- length sentence. er the “intended” kill. defendant The Appellant assigns first to the error trial court in excluding trial did not err psychiatric court’s refusal admit certain testimony. relating evidence to defendant’s state fear at the shooting. Appellant assigns time of the trial next error rejection testimony court’s relating of the tendered the instruction of the court to self- did not constitute error. defense. Appellant asserts that the instruc here, We

tion which states that homicide is turn now more substantial justified portion appeal. Appellant unlawful committed asserts when herself, argument person closing prosecut- that the by a lawful defense of ing attorney prej- constituted misconduct so nearly to an in erroneous identical udicial as amount to reversible error. rejected by this Court in State struction Our review of the record discloses miscon- P. McGreevey, attorney in prosecuting duct clos- (1909). language reject It true respondent ing argument. The State ar- by McGreevey is included as a ed gues argument at most such amounted instruction in the case self-defense appellant while the as- to overzealousness automatically bar. That does not invalidate deliberate miscon- serts that constitute words, utilizing par instruction those duct, severely prejudiced appel- ticularly when it is noted that the instruc eyes jury. lant defendant in the rejected McGreevey to discuss tion failed *4 prosecuting attorney language literal of the appearance danger. The instruction herein, enough need be set forth it is to not adequately here informs closing say argument that his referred to validity when is theory one self-defense urged facts which and were not evidence apparent not actual confronted with which on the of the conclusions danger. interpreted Instructions must be charge would have relevant to been in their context and not read as isolated portrayed He the de- first murder. Radabaugh, v. 93 Idaho sentences. State having deliberately planned and fendant as 727, Rutten, (1970); 471 v. 73 P.2d 582 State in a out the murder of her husband carried 25, (1952). Appellant Idaho 245 P.2d 778 manner, continuing cold and calculated to ambigu also asserts that the instruction is her body fire shots into the husband precise might and not as as ous clear position a helpless while he was in and perhaps While the is not be. instruction mercy. pleading model, misleading or ambiguous, it is not erroneous. might While statements consti such license, prosecutorial some tute if based on Appellant also asserts error in fail in a de peripheral view of the facts first requested to include five instruc case, im gree murder the statements were jury. tions to the We have examined unsustained proper in case at bar were they requested instructions and find that crimi by system the record. While our law, were erroneous statements of the mis justice adversary nal is nature and leading adequately by the actual covered expected diligent is to and prosecutor be given by the instructions court. unturned, he nevertheless leave no stone has a expected required to be fair and Appellant next to assigns error duty misrepresentation avoid of the facts the court’s relating instruction involun unnecessarily inflammatory tactics. tary manslaughter. given The instruction Wilbanks, 346, v. 95 Idaho 509 See State substantially appellant’s identical with (1973); Spencer, v. 74 Idaho P.2d 331 State instruction, elimination, requested with the 173, Bell, (1953); 1147 Hand 258 P.2d G. however, applicable language of certain Lawyer 3 book Evidence for the Idaho Further, instant case. we note that 1972). (2d ed. interrogated regarding defense counsel however, objection assume, any defining the instruction if we Even case involuntary manslaughter and defense prosecutor misconduct of the objection rep counsel the lack of at bar is egregious, unprofessional indicated rehensible, war object to the at the instruction. Failure alone is not sufficient Smoot, precludes v. Idaho objection appel trial level at the rant reversal. State See 855, (1978); Spencer, P.2d v. Wright, late level. See v. 97 Idaho State State Thomas, 173, (1975); (1953). Like 542 P.2d 63 94 74 Idaho 258 P.2d 1147 State wise, (1971). it is not sufficient that the conduct to the contrary defendant s interests to re- punishment court. maximum for in quire reversal. In the most voluntary fundamental manslaughter imprisonment sense, portions almost all case years for a term of ten and hence the prosecutor necessarily contrary must sentence here was well within statutory Otherwise, the defendant’s interests. limits, well within the discretion of the trial hearing up irrelevancy. would be bound court, and appeal not to be reversed on Rather, we hold that the misconduct must absent abuse of discretion. State v. materially be shown to have contributed to Cotton, (1979); 100 Idaho P.2d Smoot, the verdict of the jury. See State v. Powers, State 100 Idaho supra; v. Spencer, supra. State (1979); Seifert, (1979). Although P.2d 44 it is argued Smoot, here, alleged it was judge may the trial influenced that the prosecuting attorney departed officers, by police certain statements made proper from his role attempted to in were presentence contained flame jury by closing argument. report, allegedly without foundation and Court, however, This weight found that the prejudicial assuming appellant to the of the evidence great was so prose re portions presentence that those cutorial comments not have could contribut we will port improper, were erroneous and, therefore, ed verdict imposed presume the sentence conviction was affirmed. So in the case at the trial herein resulted from reliance *5 bar, we hold in view the guilty verdict of alleged state judge upon improper the involuntary manslaughter, closing the ar again opportunity We ments. take gument of prosecutor the could have not reports compiled presentence note that are contributed to that prosecuto verdict. The by persons variety from a non-law trained rial argument charge. the related to murder necessarily of sources and contain material prosecutor assertions the the that failing evidentiary to meet standards of appellant coldly deliberately shot Nevertheless, quality. presume we clearly disre husband were disbelieved and judges trial will experienced law-trained garded by jury. a verdict guilty If their exercise discretion in utilization of the returned, decision, murder been our such presentence material contained in re course, might be otherwise. We hold ports. We find no indication of abuse that the proving beyond burden of a reason indulge of discretion and will not in the able [assuming upon doubt that burden is presumption by appellant sought here. respondent that the error not did State] contribute to the guilty verdict has The conviction and sentence are af- sustained.1 firmed.

Appellant finally contends the sentence of years imprisonment DONALDSON, J., three C. and BAKES and was an abuse McFADDEN, JJ., of discretion the trial concur. Smoot, suggested (9th 1977), denied,

1. In it was that the standard F.2d 585 cert. 435 U.S. Cir. California, 18, Chapman 841, 131, (1978); v. 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. Unit 99 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d 139 824, (1967), Valle-Valdez, applied (8th 17 L.Ed.2d 705 was to ed v. 554 States F.2d 911 Cir. determining prosecutorial State, (Alaska 1977); Padgett whether misconduct v. 590 P.2d 432 Chapman Bolton, 208, constituted reversible error. 1979); People v. 23 152 Cal.3d was held that 141, before a federal (Cal.1979); constitutional Cal.Rptr. 396 State v. harmless, respondent 293, error could be held Stilling, (1979); 285 590 Or. P.2d 1223 beyond proving State had the State, burden of rea Campbell (Wyo.1979). v. P.2d 589 358 sonable doubt did not error contribute As there can be reasonable no doubt plea. Although necessary to the prosecutorial to the error did contribute today, our decision more recent case, cases present in the verdict we need not decide “beyond limited the a reasonable doubt” bur “beyond whether the a reasonable doubt” stan Chapman den of to constitutional See errors. applied prosecuto dard must be all cases of (5th Rodriguez, United v. 573 States F.2d 330 rial misconduct. X, 1978); Boy Cir. United v. Indian States 565 168

BISTLINE, Justice, by argument dissenting. duce him to obtain a verdict anything except the evidence upon based v. Chapman Even of Califor before State legiti- the conclusions case and 824, 17 nia, 18, 705 386 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. mately applicable the law deducible from (1967), Spencer, v. 74 this Court in State ” to the same.’ (1953), 173, with 258 P.2d 1147 dealt Idaho 408, 252 P.2d at Idaho at closing summa prosecutorial misconduct in case, Finding in that tion. such misconduct Shortly Chapman, this Court State after equivocate did not or mince 249, court Haggard, v. words, judgment reversed the of convic convictions, holding felony reversed murder, remand tion of second permit trial should not court “[t]he ed for a new trial: on the attorney to comment prosecuting prelimi- testify at his duty prosecuting “It attor- defendant’s failure “de- nary hearing.” It was held such a fair and ney to see that accused has and was a Bush, of a fair trial prived appellant v. Idaho impartial trial. State [50 added.) Irwin, process.” (Emphasis 166, supra; P. v. denial due State 432] 716; object, As counsel’s failure 60 L.R.A. to defense Idaho P. State recognized that: Clark, Court there 146 P. 1107. the state to see that obligation as- “the prosecuting attorney “An associate primary a fair trial is attorney defendant receives sisting prosecuting .omitted.) (Citations by the and fundamental. duty governed same same a crimi- Pointer, error in In ease of fundamental propriety. rules of 621; State, Supreme Court consider nal case the 589, 213 P. Watson Or. objection has though same even no P. 1101. Okl.Cr. (Emphasis time of trial.” been made at held that generally we have “While added.) at the objection made where there is attorney in by an 262. It cannot time to statements 486 P.2d at 94 Idaho at will jury, the court argument today issue we decide that one be doubted *6 respect, alleged error in this not consider misconduct which prosecutorial whether the Co., 68 v. C. Anderson Stores Cogswell C. federal Thelma Griffiths’ was a denial of 383, 205, is not neces- 192 P.2d this Idaho and fundamental constitutional and state prosecut- arguments sarily true as harmless process can held rights to due v. attorneys cases. State in criminal a doubt. beyond reasonable 1054; 253, Givens, 152 P. State 28 Idaho of the Court Supreme Chapman, 394, Owen, 253 P.2d 203. 73 Idaho v. its cases recognized prior that United States prose- record shows Where the some constitution- “that there are indicated of mis- guilty cuting attorney has their fair trial to a so basic rights al the minds to inflame calculated conduct harmless treated as can never be infraction passion prejudice or jurors arouse and there, its discussing in court error.” The in statements against the accused holding Fahy in possibility” “reasonable by evi- proved argument of facts 85, Connecticut, 84 S.Ct. 375 U.S. State dence, set aside and will be the conviction 229, error said L.Ed.2d “[a]n granted.” trial a new relevant evidence admitting plainly 183-184, 1153-54. 258 P.2d at at jury adverse- possibly influenced which Owen, cannot, Fahy, be under litigant 73 Idaho ly In State sat at 23- which 375 U.S. (1953), the same Court as harmless.” conceived of prosecutorial State v. Giv- quoted from That the Spencer at 828. 87 S.Ct. 253, 268, is P. in this case ens, we which review conduct relevant, (1915): argument. there can be “ the rule that formulated Chapman court to see duty prosecutor ‘It is the * can be error trial, constitutional *. federal “before has a fair a defendant harmless, able must be the court never in- held for success should The desire declare a that it “that there not a beyond possibility belief was harmless is reasonable Applying prosecutorial closing reasonable doubt.” stan- misconduct ar- dard improper it found the comment in gument may guilty to the have contributed Chapman harmless, saying was not verdict case.” The re- prosecutor’s in this only a glance prosecutorial at the comments however, bench, marks in the case at unlike conclusion, required to reach that Smoot, irrelevant; those in' were far from at expressing U.S. 87 S.Ct. contrary, on the were those comments great dismay for a denial of constitutional of an presenting officer of court rights “designed which denial was and cal- homicide, portrayal vivid petitioner’s culated to make version of the sup- based on invented “facts” nowhere evidence . worthless . . .” 375 atU.S. ported by damaging evidence. More 26, 87 S.Ct. at hardly imagined. misconduct could Clearly guilt the issue of in this case was

Admittedly any three members of this debatable, recent, clear, clearly jurors Court can retreat from the enter- pronouncements and sound tained as to the guilt. State v. doubt defendant’s Spencer, supra, Haggard,1 and State v. su- What proof better there of that than that pra, insofar fair trial process as due under charged defendant degree with second concerned, the Idaho Constitution is murder, acquitted, acquitted and also doubt, without four doing members are so. voluntary manslaughter? However, opinion the Court’s men- What particularly incomprehensible tions, upon there is also this the obli- Court given opinion: rationale in the Court’s gation process to see that due under the language “The prosecuting literal of the federal constitution has not been violated. herein, attorney need be set forth it is enough say closing argument that his I. referred to facts which were not in evi- Although the opinion fairly Court’s re- urged dence conclusions on the cites the surrounding events the death of would have been rele- appellant’s synopsis husband and a charge vant to a of first murder. prosecuting attorney’s “improper,” “egre- portrayed He as having defendant gious, unprofessional reprehensible” deliberately planned and carried out the summation the jury, I am unable to murder of her husband in cold and agree with Court’s conclusion that “in manner, continuing calculated to fire view of the verdict of involuntary body shots into the of her husband while manslaughter, the closing argument of the helpless position was in a and pleading prosecutor could not have contributed to *7 for mercy.” that verdict.” Neither the authority case upon relied the foregoing statement nor Whether a is charged defendant with mur- logic support der, common the Court’s state- larceny, running sign, or a the stop law Smoot, ment. In State 590 as I have it known has never authorized a defendant, (1978), P.2d 1001 the prosecutor argue convicted to jury to the facts which rape, of evidence, contended that closing urge were jury not in and to the “[i]n argument prosecutor injected the per- predicated upon some into which are conclusions sonal that, comment and several references missing to an those facts. More than how- ever, of the knowledge completely irrelevant fact I victim’s of am at a loss to under- having the a eight defendant wife who was stand the Court’s conclusion that such im- pregnant months at rape proper the time of the and unfair misconduct was cured incident.” at Id. 590 P.2d at where jury’s guilty the verdict was —but Consonant the requirements Fahy degree prosecu- with of not of second murder. Connecticut, argument, says, State of tor’s so the might U.S. S.Ct. Court prosecutor L.Ed.2d this Court held have proper been had the Haggard opinion 1. In the is silent to it as which constitution makes reference to. tried,

charged first charge defendant with murder the And on this defendant was convicted, men- Then, Court, not which has been degree. gays “if a verdict the tioned, returned, and not convicted of the included decision,of guilty of had been our voluntary But manslaughter. offense course, (My empha- might otherwise.” be kept that when case must be in mind this sis.)2 particularly This is unfathomable. the jury, went to the instructions of the all, assume, Back must be the one must guilty court authorized verdicts of: having strange jury, the found belief that murder, degree voluntary man- second to the evidence insufficient sustain either involuntary slaughter, manslaughter; or degree murder or vol- conviction second guilt on guilty. not The last comment the untary put able manslaughter, then was to jury which the or innocence of defendant prosecutor’s out im- entirely of mind closing by prosecut- hear to proper statement of facts not evidence ing attorney at the tail end of which he conclusions, unjustified thereup- based said: on, rationally dispas- and was able “And submit that the shots fired in upon guilt sionately deliberate defendant’s range at Joe’s back were fired close involuntary manslaughter. Those attor- were fired at a time when Joe was on his neys one two who have defended even longer any threat to the knees be at the na- criminal cases will astonished I submit further that the evi- defendant. reasoning. ivete of such that the defendant in this dence indicates genuine, place In the first all know of guilty beyond doubt case reasonable real, existing tendency prose- degree of second murder.” overcharge, with the idea in mind cutors to total excerpt above is the sum satisfactory way opened that the thus unwarranted, improper, prejudicial or, case plea bargaining goes where the prosecutorial remarks alluded in the trial, allow room for a least opinion, but is the final such com- Court’s guilty of which the defendant verdict finds prosecutor’s ment which was made offenses— highest the second of included just As the closing before the retired. offense, a charge which often Supreme of the United States did in Court justified by evi- for which was that here, too, Chapman, I Court feel that term Prosecutorial discretion dence. fully opinion which dis- should release bench, upon well to the trial a term known of the com- closes the nature and extent many which articles have been written. ments, made, complaint leaving of which is de- prosecutorial Here discretion was that reviewing it to court3 to the reader or ought charged with de- fendant first justified this Court is determine whether murder, was, gree and so and so bound declaring proving be- “that burden charge in district court. over answer yond a reasonable doubt that error did however, There, following filing of an verdict has contribute charged with information defendant Although opinion sustained.” murder, following the fil- improper prosecu- first Court concedes transcript in preliminary district torial comments consisted of assertion court, evidence, then charge the trial court reduced the of facts not in the Court prosecuting attorney theorizes that degree. murder in second *8 just upon opinion ponder The the a firm belief that as trial 2. Court’s does subscribe give parties take had the verdict been the a direction would courts should endeavor voluntary manslaughter. which, guilty possible, when facilitates the tak- record ing reporter’s appeal to a of an without resort transcript, appellate I so that defend- an 3. am not naive as to believe likewise I believe that opportunity great, even-handedly present opinion or ant’s for review is further court should determined, good. higher enabling law made in this case —the even No a facts issues only being question questions whether the Courts readily if are court to determine there Chapman. mandated in followed standards of law which need to be re-examined. Nevertheless, I that it has. Court declares guilty this case. jury of the tributed to the verdict in “urged part conclusions on the charge say which to a For certain I cannot so believe would have relevant opin- It is degree “beyond impos- of first murder.” The Court’s a doubt.”7 reasonable however, then, hy- with its say ion inconsistent sible for me that the has dem- accurate, doubt, pothesis, factually onstrated, concedes beyond reasonable prosecutor portrayed that the defendant prosecutor’s comments did contrib- body as to fire “continuing shots into Chapman ute to defendant’s conviction.8 helpless while in a misconduct, her husband he was prosecutorial dealt not with as position mercy.” pleading for Such trial, mere error at but considered “whether clearly portrayal argument that was there can ever harmless constitutional to, have, probably intended could and most prosecutor’s error” and whether the miscon- did some of the influence members duct in was indeed harmless. that case into or the belief that defendant toward possessed of the malice which is an II. murder, degree essential second or inflammatory prose- remarks of malig- that she with an abandoned or acted damaging cutor enough were considered heart, bring may nant which also about a However, isolation. in this case necessi- degree conviction of second murder.4 ty patent for when one observes reversal Moreover, probably damaging more crime, appellant convicted

defendant, wholly unmentioned in the manslaughter, involuntary there opinion, logical Court’s is the result which was no evidence. argument such improper defendant’s had on

claim of self defense —absolute destruction.5 A. impossible say,

It is discussing propriety me to as do the Before of in- Court, others manslaughter on the that “there is not a structing involuntary possibility offense, prosecutorial reasonable mis- this case was an included first con- closing argument may conduct in have con- sider the of the opinion rationale Court’s given 4.The trial court’s instructions numbered “These the essential are elements mate- allegations charged and 19 second defined malice and rial in this crime case, murder: required State of and the Idaho is prove beyond each of these elements a rea- 17: Instruction No. sonable doubt.” killing “Murder is the unlawful of human being aforethought. with malice kept that, 5. It as must be mind even the express implied. “Such malice concedes, opinion Court’s instruction express It is when there is manifested delib- lucid, exactly greatly on was not self-defense unlawfully away erate intention take damage compounding the done defendant being. implied life of a It is fellow human (Further prosecutor. comments of dis- provocation appears, when no considerable infra.) point cussion of this attending or when the circumstances the kill- malignant an show abandoned Smoot, quoted language 6. The heart.” from State (1978). 19: Instruction No. case, “In this to warrant a verdict Degree you crime Second Murder Smoot, 861, placing Chapman 7. reliance evidence, beyond must find from the a rea- California, U.S. S.Ct. doubt, sonable that: (1967). L.Ed.2d 708 Defendant, “(1) GRIFFITHS, THELMA thought; with malice afore regard In this Smoot needs to be modified Idaho, “(2) Bingham County, on or recognizing appellate court’s declara- 29, 1976; April about abstract, might tion of a belief is not in the “(3) Knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, inten- belief, religious be so with the State but that tionally, feloniously wounded JOSEPH E. demonstrate, record, beyond must on the GRIFFITHS, being, by shooting a human him improper reasonable doubt comments pistol; with a 22 caliber did not contribute the conviction. “(4) That JOSEPH E. GRIFFITHS died as a *9 wounding year of direct result the within one wounding. after such 172

relative It is thereto. said that because the involuntary manslaughter tion on —on object appellant did not to the instruction the clear from tran- own motion—is not involuntary manslaughter- pro- on fact script the instructions conference. —in posed an instruction which included the Moreover, it is now well established involuntary manslaughter charge of —that by Idaho that fundamental error committed precluded raising the giving is reversal may the trial court be cause for the an on appeal. instruction as error objection made at the even where However, duty a trial court has a to time of trial: the jury correctly, instruct this Court an for defendant failed to raise “Counsel rely upon simply not failure of counsel objection the the to cross-examination at instructions, propose to to correct failure this ordinarily time trial and Court object instructions, to excuse incorrect assignment this would not consider The pertinent incorrect instructions. However, obligation error. the provided:9 statute receive a fair state to see that defendant jury 19-2132. “Instruction —Re- Pulver trial and fundamental. primary is quests (a) charging jury, In — 687, State, (1970) 74 v. 93 Idaho all court must state them matters Commonwealth, Ky., v. quoting McIntosh Ei- information. necessary law for their In case (Ky.Ct.App.1963). 368 331 S.W.2d party may present to court ther in a criminal case of fundamental error charge request it written may consider Supreme Court it given. If the court thinks correct objection had been though no same even not, it pertinent, given; must be if trial, cases)” (citing made at the time of added.) (Emphasis must be refused.” 249, 251, 486 Haggard, 94 Idaho v. State Beason, 267, P.2d v. 506 State hardly be 260, (1971). It can con- 262 P.2d (1973), that the statute this Court held a instructing jury on crime tended court: requirement on trial imposed is has been submitted which no evidence trial requires that provision “This the most fundamen- than an error of other motion, pertinent give, on its own court Jones, As stated State tal kind. may be which the instructions 8, 798, (1975): 351 N.E.2d App.2d Ohio respect correctly with informed charges on a less- erroneously a“If court charged the crime nature and elements of when not warranted offense er included principles appli- legal to the essential jury may reach by the evidence ad- evidence that cable fair, not compromise This is verdict. Patterson, 60 Idaho State v. mitted. a defendant is If defendant. Freeman, (1939); State liberty charged, his the crime (1963).” (Empha- P.2d 632 by compro- away should not dickered original.) sis in crime which another upon mised verdict Obviously a P.2d at 1348. Id. at State is no evidence. supported duty instruct the trial court has no Loudermill, 206 N.E.2d Ohio St.2d [8 which in law supposed included offense Bandy v. (1965)]; also see offense. Such and reason not an included 131 N.E. 499.” 102 Ohio St. pertinent” as being not “correct and “it must requires, language the statute B.

be refused.” kinds, voluntary two Manslaughter give did the instruc- The trial court Voluntary manslaughter involuntary. counsel, pointing requested by defense tion upon done killing,- an intentional one inclusive. Whether out that was over passion. I.C. heat of quarrel a sudden give an instruc- court in mind to trial year structing Ida- offenses. on lesser included follow- 9. amended in the The statute was 154, p. paragraph specifi- ch. ho Laws Sess. trial add another duty cally addressing in- court’s the trial

173 18-4006(1). Woods, Involuntary manslaughter (1976); § is P.2d 424 State v. 278 N.C. an killing may- 210, unintentional be (1971); State, com- 179 358 v. S.E.2d Cullin ways: (1) mitted several in the commis- State, (Wyo.1977); 565 P.2d v. 445 Smith act, sion of an unlawful other than the (Wyo.1977); 564 P.2d 1194 40 C.J.S. Homi- felonies killing which would make the first cide 79. § degree felony murder under murder prosecutor’s appears by Thus it rule; (2) in the commission of a lawful act admission, position, Thelma’s own death, might which produce unlawful instruction, court’s aris- and the inference manner, or without due care and circum- ing gun, from use of the we spection. shooting. clear case of an intentional While The main distinguishing feature between might support evidence a conviction manslaughter intent, two offenses is murder, voluntary second degree or for present which must voluntary man- will a convic- manslaughter, support slaughter, is absent for involun- involuntary manslaughter. tion for tary manslaughter. point Cases on this are legion, and unneedful of citation. C. In this Griffiths case question there is no Voluntary manslaughter lesser in- but that Thelma intended to shoot her hus- charge cluded on a of murder. But offense Defendant, band. who never denied manslaughter also a lesser involuntary intent, having such maintains such in- included The texts and the vast offense? tent was born on being self-defense at- majority jurisdictions answer that it is tacked her husband fear and in for her not. life. That the district court’s instruction clearly the evi- appears “Where it did not include the paragraphs the reck- guilty of less, dence that accused is either careless, or negligent operation of a manslaughter voluntary murder or or in- deadly weapon firearm or clearly estab- nocent, view, involuntary neg- or manslaughter one, lished his a correct that defend- reckless, ligent ant’s and an careless, actions were not homicide is not involved negligent. necessary instruction thereon is not proper ..”

Further, clearly Idaho case law states 395(2). 41 the intent Homicide presumed kill C.J.S. § from the use of a deadly weapon, at least undisputed “Ordinarily, evidence where the circumstances show it was used striking intentionally or shoot- homicide in such a Anstine, fashion as here. State v. deadly weapon the deceased with a 169, 91 Idaho 418 (1966); P.2d 210 State v. any theory inconsistent with of involun- Buchanan, 365, 252 P.2d 524 tary manslaughter, and relieves the trial (1953). other Many of this statements rule duty court law charge as to found; can be a few are cited. State v. higher grade offense in trial for a 310, Brierly, (1973); 109 Ariz. 509 P.2d 203 or degree of homicide.” Dixon, State 415, v. 107 489 Ariz. P.2d 225 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide 531. § (1971); Mancini, 71, v. State 107 Ariz. 481 supports Case law position. also Prewitt, P.2d (1971); 864 State v. 104 Ariz. “Manslaughter is a lesser of homi- 326, (1969); 452 P.2d 500 Foggy, State cide, proved necessarily not a if crime 459, (1967); Ariz. 420 P.2d 934 State v. second-degree proved. murder is Not all Douglas, 2 Ariz.App. P.2d degrees of the elements of the two (1965);10 Parks, People 4 Cal.3d manslaughter are second-de- elements of Cal.Rptr. 193, 485 (Cal.1971); P.2d 257 gree murder.” Commonwealth, Shanks v. 390 S.W.2d 888 (Ky.1965); Dunnan, State, Dearman v. Kan. (Nev.1977); State, (1978). Moser v. 91 Nev. involuntary This case such manslaughter. states that intent is inconsistent with *11 Hickson, 218, 43, negli- Similarly, v. 450 of

In State 104 Ariz. Id. at evidence (1969), of P.2d 408 a defendant convicted conviction for gence indispensable a is sought be- voluntary manslaughter reversal it was involuntary manslaughter. Hence involuntary cause instruction man- no on offense for error to instruct on an responded: slaughter was given. The court and she should be there no evidence appellant her own “In statement discharged. gun of pulled indicates that she out 592, Brady, In Ariz. 461 P.2d v. 105 State purse her and fired it. rejected (1969), requests for 488 the court appellant fact intended to shoot. This types manslaughter both of instructions on man- involuntary nlakes an instruction on self-defense, finding over a claim of slaughter inappropriate.” there was evidence of malice but none of

Id. at 410. provocation no act unlawful other than State, 770, v. 89 N.M. 558 P.2d 39 Smith felony a or done in an lawful act unlawful (1976), charge. Defend- involved a murder manner. manslaugh- voluntary ant was convicted Other cases where instructions on invol evidence of ter but the court found no manslaughter rejected untary were under

provocation and stated: higher charged due to lack of evi offenses seriously cannot be maintained “[I]t negligence dence of or accident include Peo ‘necessarily manslaughter invariably is Gordon,, 460, Cal.Rptr. 10 110 ple v. Cal.3d in Different kinds included’ murder. Mendell, 906, (1973); v. P.2d 298 State dis- proof required to establish the are (1974); v. 111 Ariz. 523 P.2d State a situation tinct This is not offenses. (1974); Duke, P.2d 570 110 Ariz. instruc- where the lesser-included-offense Sorensen, Ariz. State evidence; it is by the tion was warranted Wilson, (1969); 215 Kan. State contrary to ... error submit (1974). . evidence Madden, Ariz. request for an instruction P.2d 39 voluntary man- conviction of “[A] manslaughter was denied involuntary on evidence slaughter where there no acciden though the defendant claimed even or heat of quarrel was a sudden there her, Since, according shooting. tal reversed, passion must be defend- gun grab the attempted to husband had Therefore, defendant’s discharged. ant discharge, it to thus caused from her and manslaughter voluntary conviction of negligence showing no the court found case, evidence of this where there was either stated that she on her passion, must quarrel or heat of sudden or innocent. charged guilty of murder as dis- likewise be reversed defendant from defend- of these cases resulted Most charged. be entitled to instructions claiming ants heat quarrel “Evidence of sudden offenses, the evidence where on lesser but . indis- passion, However, offenses. support did such voluntary pensable to a conviction for why should reason this there seems to be no manslaughter. where he a defendant’s favor apply that a from the record “It is clear verdict should or she maintains that have guilty of murder would verdict of higher offense been evidence. supported by substantial innocent. However, jury acquitted the defend- is consistent plea “The of self-defense homicide, and, erro- ant of Indeed, to kill or disable. with an intent instructed, him neously convicted described has been killing in self-defense This was did not commit. crime which he act; and affirmative, intentional remedy as an mistake, an unfortunate that self-defense courts even hold some affirming the unlawful does not lie killing, or intentional to cases of limited conviction.” in- at least is not ... No definition ordinarily applicable in the therefrom. should have been killing manslaughter case of a resulting voluntary from an act all, given one was which was but since given accidental and unintentional. an instruction plea requested . is not defendant self-defense [A] error, the latter curing inconsistent killing provocation purpose with a Its given. have been passion.” heat of should instruction *12 in case was one suggests refusal 40 C.J.S. Homicide 114. § in- could be a conviction of which there majority agreement. of case law is in manslaughter, which has belief voluntary Woods, 210, In State 278 179 N.C. S.E.2d in the record.” support no (1971), 358 a new trial follow- granted was original). in (emphasis Id. at 477-78 involuntary manslaugh- a conviction for Mexico, “it quite apparent ter. The court noted In New than an instruction involuntary manslaughter improper present give which was when facts are rise to self-defense, repeated not to new trial. plea of it is not unreasonable fails, that if plea accused should grounds defendant had

“If reasonable of guilty voluntary found manslaughter.” necessary believe was shoot 594, 882, 79 Lopez, State v. N.M. 442 P.2d Terry great to save or herself from death fact, In (1968). 597 harm, “ordinarily evidence bodily she excessive did not use requiring a submission to the an jury of shooting Furthermore, force in him. plea accused’s self-defense will one call for fighting when who is in self-defense submission voluntary manslaughter.” uses excessive force he is of volun- Plummer, tary 614, State v. 44 N.M. 107 P.2d manslaughter. . . . There was 319, (1940), 320 Simpson, State v. in this case no 39 N.M. evidence which would have (1935). justified a P.2d involuntary verdict of man- slaughter.” State, Morgan (Okl.Cr. 536 P.2d 952 (citations omitted). Id. at (Emphasis 1975), in Lopez, supra, followed and other original.) every New cases in holding Mexico that “in murder, future prosecution for wherein appears California to have followed this evidence necessitates an upon instruction years. rationale for early People As self-defense, the trial court in shall also Best, Cal.App.2d 606, (1936), P.2d upon voluntary struct or first man it was stated that the jury was warranted slaughter ... as a lesser included concluding “though killing offense.” at 959. Id. justifiable self-defense, plea under a it was done under such circumstances as to In Arizona a similar applies. rule reduce offense to voluntary manslaugh- Tuzon, State v. 118 Ariz. 575 P.2d 1231 Hatchett, ter.” Id. at 170. People v. 63 (1978), a convicted defendant of second de- Cal.App.2d 144, (1944), 146 P.2d 469 stated: gree sought murder reversal lack “[B]y this involuntary definition of man- involuntary manslaughter instruction on ar-

slaughter many were told in so guing honestly unreasonably that he words that the commission lawful thought deadly act force was needed in self-de- might produce death, an unlaw- affirmed, fense. court noting manner, ful or without due caution and such a belief does not reduce the crime to circumspection, would amount man- degree, plea lower and that a of self-de- or, slaughter words, in other that the act only fense to justify seeks a homicide. shooting, lawful, if might Prewitt, believed con- State v. 104 Ariz. manslaughter stitute the (1969), offense of if it rejecting a request for instruc- done in an unlawful manner or with- involuntary tions on manslaughter, after due out caution circumspection. Any noting that an unintentional act was con- theory guilt such offense, have been templated would by that said evi- “[t]he entirely unsupported act, the evidence or dence shows an intentional rather than legitimate fact, inferences be drawn an unintentional act. As a matter of involuntary self- man- defining one the defenses of defendant was statute slaughter.” repeated at This was defense.” Id. Young, 109 Ariz.

State v. Id. at claim instruc- where a similar The thrust of law seems to be rejected was no tions was there because at guilty of Thelma Griffiths was either act. evidence of unintentional voluntary manslaughter least However, acquitted her innocent. Commonwealth, 390 Finally, Shanks v. voluntary manslaughter. (Ky.1965), included the follow- S.W.2d 888 ing: III. state long “It been the law in this has thought opinion raises The Court’s that, present, kill is if the intention to merit, least a that there be some involuntary manslaughter doctrine raised, question by defendant’s contention place . in the case. *13 court erred in the instruction that trial gave

which it on defendant’s claim But, shooting in self-defense.11 was done deadly weapon “. . Where was . a all opinion, reads the when sentences court’s used, where accused that and admits whole, are a of the instruction considered as protect attempting he to defend and was there has no error. weapon, there is deadly with the himself McGreevey, P. argument that not no for he did room person it made clear that “a by taken the result the actions intend of great danger, clear with has a confronted him. right upon appearances as legal to act such would influence the action reasonable that actual person. may It turn out no ac- By testimony “. . his his - own that danger him and whatever confronted taken, disregard merely tion in dan thing only apparent the whole an another, rights or of indifference of ger, but the law of self-defense does defending and purpose but a until he ascertains require man to wait is consist- protecting hardly himself. It danger apparent or real.” whether the is what say doing ent that appellant to 466-67, (Emphasis at 105 P. at 1051. Id. he himself could to defend ap original.) McGreevey Court doing wantonly reckless- same time or case proved given instruction that knife, weapon, ly. deadly use of a a His one without that stated “[w]here fight the de- engaged while in a with placed suffi is under circumstances fault supposition that a precludes the to the fears of reasonable ceased cient excite . designs to commit another purview person within the that such action would fall herself, bodily injury great such to death or 11. No. 22: Instruction might as cause the death force or means justifiable is and not unlawful “Homicide adversary. her by person lawful when committed a bodily injury great “A of death or bare fear herself, defense of when she has reasonable justify To a homicide. is not sufficient danger ground apprehend that she is in justify taking the another in self-de- life of great bodily injury death and that there or fense, as to must be such the circumstances being danger design a ac- imminent of such person placed aof reasonable excite the fears complished. party killing position, in a and similar taking justify life human “In order to fears the influence such must act under self-defense, slayer, as a reasonable apparent danger and be must alone. The person, and must have reason believe imminent, present so or must danger must be or is in of death must believe slayer appear as a reasona- and, further, time to the at the great bodily injury; the cir- woman, killing done ordinarily must be and the ble that an cumstances must be such neces- it is well-founded belief person, under a circum- under similar reasonable great sary stances, necessary from death or one’s self to save it was would believe bodily use, avoid harm.” defense and to for her to dan- was no actual him, where there found even bodily injury upon great some defendant, a acting as belief, long a ger, reasonable as so as grounds afford circumstances, man, person there imminent under the reasonable reasonable accomplishment danger. the de- with danger of the herself threatened believed acting unfortunately, these fears sign, may, he under “apparent,” The word alone, justified by slay assailant and be is: meaning, of which one than one more P. at Id. at appearances.” reality as appearance “having such an added.) (Emphasis The Court there circum- reasonably true under appear view; said: “open it also means stances.” But judged be as “After he has acted cannot understood it can be visible.” And standpoint of the the theoretical eye actual to the as meaning “appearing resting apparent man who in both Collegiate New mind.” Webster’s Seventh danger safety, real confronted (1972 ed.). Dictionary menaced no threats or demonstrations the instruction above In that sentence import. violence and felonious of sudden determining meaning what quoted, in quickly. act as a He must act He must jury, key word is convey would prudent man would reasonable jury is danger which the As to a “must.” conditions and likely to act under similar imminent, it was present told must be law, circumstances, and this is all danger appar- must “the also told reason, justice demands.” meaning only be taken ent.” could Such Id. at P. at 1051. him- A defend danger. person real *14 Paragraph two of the court’s Instruction threatening danger in against actual self case, applied as to defendant in No. event, “may” that he law is but the jury as to claim of self-de- advised her of appearance an also himself from defend person as was fense that she a reasonable be way In no can it threatening danger. required to and have had reason believe the use of the word other than that said danger she was of death did believe that in together “must,” especially taken when say great bodily injury. was to or This imminent, would cause present with to have reason to believe and did she had issue in the self-defense jury consider danger, in as believe that she was actual danger. terms of real paragraph is at all in terms not couched jury, likely It too here that seems all apparent danger, not of which is mentioned. two of In- reading paragraphs on the first apparent danger in the Nor is mentioned help could not struction No. the in- preceding paragraph and first only con- impression that their under struction, only she must which reads appearance an danger, was with actual cern ground apprehend that have “reasonable nor con- danger being neither mentioned danger great bodily is or she in of death danger. The actual tradistinguished from danger injury and that there imminent paragraph final final sentence of the do design being accomplished.” Nor such a “ap- wraps together all thereof first clause the first two I think that error of danger, “present,” and “imminent” parent,” by paragraphs paragraph, is cured the final in being than taken as other and cannot be the first of the final sentence clause saving Any danger. actual reference to danger appar- which reads: “The must be found, if has to be grace to the instruction present ent and must be and imminent parenthetical) all, (almost with danger .” The fault here is that at the following: appear “or must so phrase course, is, present which is and imminent woman.” slayer as a reasonable time to danger, require actual but the law does view, in This, too late my is too little and in fear that the defendant must have acted instruction, de- leaving open also it danger, of actual but rather the defendant modi- quoted clause whether this last bate may appearances fear of the acted and immi- requirement “present in fied the jury not instructed danger. was ad- or of all three “apparent,” be nent” or of indeed least that self-defense jectives. Indeed, confusing standpoint even theoretical of the man who is becomes our leisurely resting apparent safety, close examination in both real not, jury lay danger where time is unlike with a confronted and menaced people, Quaere: any problem. danger “The no threats or demonstrations of sudden apparent, appear import. must be or must so violence and He must felonious slayer?” very inquiry suggests act He act as a quickly. That must reasonable prudent likely use word to act “apparent” of the in that man would only sentence of the instruction can be tak- under similar conditions and circumstanc- es, law, reason, meaning danger “open en as which was or and this all the view, visible,” justice and hence immediate and demands.” real. 17 Idaho at 105 P. at 1051. Whether agrees not one final that the statement

The final statement of the instruction import No. 22 the same as Instruction jury “killing told the must be done objectionable portion McGreevey it is under well-founded belief that neces- instruction, nevertheless, prejudi- it is still sary or great to save one’s self from death cially against right erroneous defendant’s bodily harm.” This of the instruction a fair trial in that it continued the theme is not unlike an instruction which would tell that the defendant’s actions had to be taken right that “the of self-defense does in a “well- belief that she acted under a (defendant) arise until done belief what she was nec- founded” did everything power in his to avoid this neces- essary great to save herself from death or sity.” portion Such indeed was a bodily harm —whereas the true statement McGreevey given instruction which the of the law is that herself of in order avail objectiona- particularly Court found there defense must be found to have ble: fear, acted in which fear that she applied, test “This not the to be danger great injury, apparent of death given is not the rule to be to a as the it making danger no difference whether the placed law of man under self-defense. A only so apparent, long actual or apparently threatening menacing *15 apprehensions of a were those reasonable expected act as danger only a rea- person. sonably person act prudent would under surroundings. my part and For hold as to Instruc- similar circumstances would ordinarily component parts tion No. 22 that the con- Under such circumstances other, bearing with flicting has but a moment for deliberation and one the “and upon they do, jury might happen subject It that as a the same as the decision. so grope as true fact he have done left to in the dark matter of could things, rule to be in such case.” applied number of other and of law one a 468, thereby danger the 105 P. at 1052. At the same avoided refrained time, which defense counsel committing the homicide. After he the instructions re- judged requested subject,12 cannot from the on the which were has acted he jury Requested Instruction No. 8: “The Court instructs the as a matter Defendant’s actual, person not of law that a need be in the “YOU ARE that law of INSTRUCTED bodily peril great life or of eminent her requires only person the self defense may before she assault her assailant. harm prudent person must act as a reasonable and good good It if faith she has a is sufficient likely similar would be to act under condi- they the and reasonable belief from facts as tions and circumstances.” appear in such to her at the time she is Requested Instruction No. 9: Defendant’s peril.” eminent that one who is “YOU ARE INSTRUCTED Requested No. 11: Defendant’s Instruction danger assailed or threatened with eminent right ARE INSTRUCTED of self “YOU the great bodily injury, right to life made, defense arises the moment attack herself, danger peril if is of defend though party assailed even eminence, may deadly apparent use a such her assailant intends to to believe that reason weapon in her defense.” bodily upon great injury the mo- inflict Requested No. 10: Defendant’s Instruction attack, makes or it becomes ment he “ ‘ * * * covered, fused as good superior were nevertheless one who has law, have, subject, knowledge statements of the of a and is there- would if given, perhaps having fore able to afford the tribunal say, enabled the Court to as does, spe- a it the matter under consideration the instructions taken as a . . whole cial assistance . embodied all of the law on the sub- ject of self-defense. 34-35, (citing Id. at 454 P.2d at 71-72 Greenstreet, 65 Idaho Greenstreet Even in the improper pros- absence of the Garrett, (1943); Sturgis v. 85 Ida- P.2d 239 comments, ecutorial the giving of Instruc- (1963)). The question, ho 379 P.2d 658 tion No. give and the failure to defend- then, a “skill or psychiatry is whether requested ant’s through instructions 8 knowledge beyond competence require that a new trial should be had. average making psychiatric testi- layman,” prosecutor’s comments, moreover, With the mony admissible in a criminal action where- totally claim of self-defense was emas- in an issue is drawn as to defendant’s culated. mental condition at the time of a homi- question impression cide—a first IV. seems, jurisdiction. legislature, so assigns defendant also error in the judiciary has declared is. ruling which excluded the testimony of Dr. provides Idaho Code 18-211 for the § Ackley. rejecting proof, In the offer of appoint psychiatrist court to to “examine explained: trial court report upon the mental condition of the say “I this is competent evidence be- Gerdau, defendant.” cause . . . [psychiatry] is more an the defendant science; art than a adapted it is not presented psychiatric testimony of three standpoint it’s a science with doctors on the sanity. issue of Gerdau’s jury which a help needs . . . if we changed When one was claimed to have got proper they kind of a and if testimony given, from that earlier the State closely watch enough, they might be able bring testimony was allowed to to arrive at thing the same that he ar- court-appointed psychiatrist. Idaho Code rived at.” 18-213(2) provides for examination § Although jury might help not need the 18-213(3) psychiatrist; defendant’s own § it would receive from testimony, such court call the party allows either or the even though reject it, might witness; psychiatrist court-appointed real issue is whether the defendant here 18-213(4) specifically that states § was entitled to have testimony such sub- psychiatrist when a who has examined mitted jury’s for the consideration. *16 testifies, may diag- he state “his defendant Co., Bean v. Diamond Alkali 93 Idaho mental,condition the of the defend- nosis of (1969), 454 P.2d 69 states: ant at the time of the commission of the expert “An generally Responding is defined as charged.” legis- some- offense to the one possessing enactment, psychiatric testimony certain skill or knowl- lative edge which beyond However, is competence question. the received without the average layman juror ... Myers, as State v. 94 Idaho reasonably apparent reasonably necessary ap- that he intends to exe- and which would purpose, present cute pear person, such and has the abili- to a reasonable in the same or do, ty right so necessary pre- to the of defense arises.” to be to similar circumstances Requested Defendant’s injury appears Instruction No. 12: vent the to be eminent. anyone “YOU ARE require INSTRUCTED that it is lawful “The law to sub- does person assaulted, being for a who is meekly indignities and who or violence to her mit ground believing has reasonable lawfully that person, may repel bod- her assailant ily injury her, upon is about to be inflicted resistance and of such charac- with as much ground stand her and to defend herself necessary from and at the time available ter as is attack, doing such and in so she use all to her.”

force and means which she believes to be (1972), held that it not binding admissibility testimony. was on a of such tes- After jury. tifying stating the issue and insanity impairment mental disease or from reject Nor holding do I the of State v. existed, psychiatric defect the ex- State’s Neil, 359, 74 58 Idaho P.2d 586 pert to defendant’s further testified as jury where is as the able to draw inferences state the incident in of mind at time of from the as expert, evidence an because question: matter is one of common observation and experience, may reject the court the testi- opinion have an you “Do [Prosecutor] mony. apparently The trial court believed as to whether or not the defendant has this to be the case Ackley here. Dr. did any corrupt seeking any was motive or jury admit could itself decide revenge, having that is this state of mind whether Griffiths told the truth when she time during period of time stated However, that she acted in fear. ejected premises from the to the this is not a sufficient basis for the trial actually were fired? time that shots ruling, court’s especially where the doctor Yes, opinion. I I have an “A believe also testified that he had access to data jury did not have and hence was more able ascertain the truth than jury. that, opinion speaking a di- “My as Nor Ackley was, does the fact that Dr. me, feelings anger rect statement effect, stating that Griffiths was telling the happened, about what that this was the truth as to her fear prevent admission of motivation, therefore the behavioral . testimony his hearsay, as for he did not feeling experi- was the that he merely repeat her assertions but made his arose, out of encing and this his action own independent diagnosis on many based out his extreme If the anger. matter factors. She was entitled to the benefit his revenge something of before the testimony might confer on version of events, know, this don’t he denied the shooting. previous difficulty. It objectionable is also not that Dr. Ack behavior, however, “I think his ley would have testified relative to an issue response feeling anger direct his jury find, e., was to i. fear. “The cause effect there was direct fact that the answer opin was the witness’s relationship.” ion on one of the ultimate issues for resolu established testimony doctor’s there tion does not make admis nearly techniques identical employment sion of wholly such evidence error Ackley here. The used Dr. those prejudicial nature.” Davis v. Nelson- and obtained his Gerdau Deppe, Inc., doctor interviewed 463, 469, educational, social, medical, (1967). history, As was in Bean : said He asked for Ger- experience. his work person “A possessing knowledge skill or description his dau’s self-evaluation qualifying expert generally him as an involved, including his shooting there express opinion allowed to mat- during and after the event. feelings both opinion ters when in issue would be of insights into Gerdau’s emo- gain He tried to appreciable help finding his atti- adjustment and evaluated tional facts.” *17 doctor, taking the of stress tude toward 93 Idaho at 454 P.2d at 72. The The doctor not- into account. the situation given should have been the doctor’s testimo- alertness, and his voice posture, ed his ny. would, course, It of be free deter- tests of Gerdau’s inflection, gave simple mine which such tes- weight the amount of functioning. mental timony Myers, supra; should accorded. Gerdau, supra. in the doctor by used procedures distinguishable from way in no Gerdau are persuasive.

I find the Gerdau case most on Thelma Grif- by Ackley Dr. those used contending There for the it was Gerdau, experts, the defendant’s condi- qualified fiths.13 The doctor testified in as here, that “these might readily tests are not definitive.” that he tion was such doctor in Gerdau inter- And genuine whereas fear than from rather from acted time, only during viewed Gerdau one which or vengeance desire from other a for undergoing Gerdau was all the stress associ- . purpose. malicious trial, Ackley ated with his here Dr.

interviewed Thelma Griffiths four times that trial upon at the fundamental “[I]t a total (and of over three hours interviewed evidence, in plea competent a not well). her children an hour as Consider- character, a which tends to show that that in Gerdau admit- ing judge the district defendant, at the he committed the time the testimony spite ted in of all the infirmi- act, possessed pos- either or did not overt it, ties inherent in upheld and this Court its specific mental state sess essential admission, I am persuaded unable to be that is admissible.” Ackley’s testimony Dr. should not have been admitted. Whether counsel made the State, In Fox v. 73 Nev. district court aware of the decision in Ger- (1957), it was said of dau does not appear. “[u]pon defendant’s state of mind that this may issue all evidence be con jurisdictions material

Other have allowed such tes- People, Battalino v. sidered,” citing Wells. Wells, timony. is People leading A case 587,199 (1948), 118 Colo. held that: 33 Cal.2d P.2d P.2d in concerning psychiatric said testimony rather, evi- “[Ejvidence insanity, of or that: dence of the condition of the mind jury could well materially crime, “[T]he aided accused at the time of the together by knowledge that, opinion circumstances, of surrounding with the portion Ackley’slengthy 13. A small of opinion Dr. testi- formulate based on reasonable mony similarity serves show both the of certainty patient medical that did act technique testimony: and the substance of the under a certain state of mind? give Yes, you “. . . May that, [Counsel]: Did Thelma say doing “A. I can. I history, history some of some course her and back- psychotherapy, you’re constantly reading ground in the of those tests? pattern response: only that of what the “A. Yes. patient says, pattern of emotional “Q. you history part And did use that as response you sense in them while your analysis diagnosis? And, they’re saying you if doing it. can’t detect it, yes. “A. As that, way therapy there’s no “Q. you And what else did use? you your interpretations things can direct My patterns “A. observations of her below level of immediate consciousness response, ways responding emotional patient. psychiatrist It’s a skill gave history. as she me that practice has to have. You it all the time. able, then, “Q. you Were course “Q. your opinion What is medical di- interview, insight subjective obtain agnosis to her state mind that date? patient into the to determine whether my impression “A. It was that she was she did have a fear state mind motivated motivated fear at the time that she shot . ? him. impression “A. Yes. That was the you “Q. opinion Do have an whether formed. “Q. you subjec- And did not the . . use these—this act or was not the insight you observing aforethought? tive physical were result of malice —the you observing, features that were acting “A. I don’t believe intonations, pitch tone and the acting malice. I believe she was in a self- you you . nervousness ? Did use way panic, protective and in in fear. subjective analyzing, diagnos- these tools patient? “Q. acting . . defendant was [T]he right. “A. Yes. That’s The same account great bodily injury under fear her life or given responses without the neuromuscular and therefore her reaction was in self-de- impress way. wouldn’t theme same . fense? tests, “Q. subjective Then these these “A. Yes.” tests, served, physical you these features that ob- medically you are reliable can *18 182 introduced, es- have before the purpose brought court could out that the

tablishing insanity, prove but to was not to jury that doctor’s definition intent specific was such that a situation court’s legal authority. taken as The is, ab- not entertained —that to show legal meaning instruction as to correct any premeditated deliberate or sence adequately would advised of malice design.” Similarly, considered jury. if the doctor (emphasis original). And 199 P.2d at 901 in at- as fear of future meaning self-defense Griffin, v. 99 406 P.2d 397 in State Ariz. imminent ongoing rather than an tacks (1965), involving a case a claim of self-de- have, one, argues may cross- as the State he held insanity, as well as the court fense would proper instructions examination that: any problem. have cured great lat- “The court should have allowed out pointed it As a final note should be offering proof in itude to defendant State, though challenge that the free inci- during state the actual of his mental Ackley, of Dr. instead offered qualifications during involving shooting, dent to them. court’s rul- stipulate The trial com- the time when the altercations noted, felt ing, on what he as based menced.” was insufficient scientific foundation. 406 P.2d testimony that the should have would hold argues testimony State lack of been allowed absence properly Ackley, in excluded because Dr. course, The prosecution, of qualifications.14 using aforethought” the terms “malice right have the of cross-examination. would “self-defense,” did thereto the not ascribe accepted legal People definition thereof. Gorshen, 492 V.

v. 336 P.2d Cal.2d “gave a doctor opinion his requires final item which I believe A aforethought.” ‘medical essence’ of malice in the Court’s beyond that found comment allowing The court found no error re- investigation presentence is the opinion testimony: were Attached with the court. port filed correctly “The trial court overruled police and the two officers letters from testimony People’s objection by this cursory attorney. A deputy prosecuting gave interpretation the doctor ‘a medical highly letters were glance shows these principle.’ court did legal attempt to in prejudicial constituted judicial permit usurp the doctor to influencing the re-try effect case lan- interpreting legislative function sentence. rather, him properly permitted guage; Hayes, letter Reed The first was from opinion what he his explain meant He inserted Shelley. Police Chief of afore- malice that defendant lacked the evi- supported by several comments not thought.” dence, strange that as such found “[w]e Here, Ackley Dr. P.2d at 496 n.3. until the gun missing notice did not Joe acted have testified that Griffiths would death,” found morning of his and “[w]e fear, anger revenge, and without not in steps the back empty casing .22 cal. shell malice, “hostility, an- defined was re- perhaps gun when the colder, chronic mode or some more ger, fired out- it was basement trieved . fear.” Al- hostility rather than . . Hayes . .” definition, see if it works back to his legal is not the though this say that: or the went on was sufficient. Counsel explanation tedly only justified judge apparently under certain conditions. trial also 14. The (1962); Valdez, polygraph part by 91 Ariz. noting that a decision Vitello, telling 376 Mass. Commonwealth a defendant also indicative whether (1978); v. A. Juve- truth, yet generally Commonwealth into evi- N.E.2d is not allowed (1974); nile, developing Mass. N.E.2d appears trend There to be a dence. State, (Nev.1978). although allowing polygraphs, admit- Corbett toward *19 dangerous a that anyone person, and could find no to FITHS is “We reason for strictly with when her she she be dealt him.....Why didn’t should shoot that house, passed. might I also add oppor- the of sentence is plenty leave she had surprised that I would be tunity to do . followed I don’t believe so . [she] to- called to that same house the if I were him claimed She [into bedroom]. shooting.” night investigate another hitting asking been she he had her. Was gun . was for more? . . When the the prosecutor The final letter was from out pointed way at Joe he had no of other himself: . through the room but Thelma. striking feature of this case “The most hope all out to “We we aren’t called inability to real- face the the Defendant’s investigate the another homicide at Grif- . ity significance of her crime. fith’s residence.” show Griffiths will ever I doubt Thelma regret slightest next the remorse or Tony letter was . from Officer During Young. killing of her husband. paragraphs first and last suf- for the trial, the attempted fice to show his Defendant attitude: entire incident on dead blame the “Throughout investigation the entire of presented a well rehearsed husband. She GRIFFITHS, the death of Joe I came to the facts which contradicted version of injustice the conclusion that a great had police statement her earlier officers. occurred. From the that I moment was attempt this feeble to ration- We believe contacted on night shooting, of the way out of blame in this case alize her day the last of trial that Mrs. I felt dangerous view of herself indicates guilty GRIFFITHS was of first relationship to others. Thelma Griffiths murder. These were not conclusions that her caused appreciated has not acts by drawn the fact that I an investi- being. of a human were the death If she officer, gating merely nor that I probation, allowed a I feel prosecution witness. This conclusion brought would re-enforce her of rationalization by forth facts that point may her acts to a throughout witnessed investigation committing itself. deterred from further acts violence.” judge Since correctly granted a motion “I believe that Mrs. GRIFFITHS is imposed only strike these letters and guilty of first degree and that murder year three sentence against eight she should have of that found years by prosecutor, recommended charge. I believe that her actions on the cannot be said he abused his discretion night shooting premeditated were swayed or was his decision let- these aforethought. and occurred with malice However, ters. I do feel constrained placed I believe that Mrs. GRIFFITHS impropriety comment on the of such letters gun in the storage cabinet in the being presentence attached to the report. for purpose using bedroom Police, firearm later in the when evening prosecutors,15 Joe duty like have a apparently arrived home. As she public. did. Just as may given reversals Furthermore, I misconduct, believe that Mrs. GRIF- prosecutorial they so prosecutor, judi- judge, judicial they 15. An Idaho department, like a is a tion to the devoted cial See charged performance officer. Idaho 18. As § Const. Art. him with the duties Wharfield, 14, 17, 236 P. powers properly belong- and the exercise (1925), explains: 862-63 judicial department. While not making judicial plain him a officer in the sense “It that the intention the framers was, Constitution, judge, yet people being quasi if and of the not a it, court, adopting judicial away was to do with the office of officer or an officer that, attorney county, judicial department, district each least an officer creation, placing election, qualifications, charged powers properly with the exercise of office, tenure of belonging and duties of the office of thereto.” attorney district in that of the Constitu- *20 given police seizing APPENDIX misconduct TO DISSENT evidence, confessions, eliciting brutaliz- prosecutor’s remarks and Excerpts of ing suspects. may there be no tech- While comments. rights nical violation of Thelma Griffiths’ you Then heard of the stories several here, it is indeed a day sad when defend- defendant about her relation- Joe and virtually ant pursued attacked and so together she stated ship and how at times viciously by the very entrusted with officers that Joe story got violent. public safety, they to the extent that attempt would to influence the court to were his side of I wish Joe here to tell us disregard jury long considered as being story. portray don’t Joe as verdict— greatest protections one of our contin- individual, perfect but I if he was question —and punishment ue to seek that they feel painted picture as bad as the that has been is warranted. of him.

Here, too, even though letter of the [*] [*] sjs [*] [*] [*] directed that summation were not the result of mis- conclusion that tor’s final with the sidered in our prosecutor was “It Chapman clearly prosecutorial design summation, State of assessment the duty stricken, and calculation mentioned improper and zeal, California, clearly it must remarks in prosecutor forces the delivered supra prosecu- be con- at And The home is didn’t the defendant divorce him? didn’t afraid for her Ask [*] bad, her father Falls, yourselves she leave if he did [*] and always open life, visit said, [*] this him? all why with her “I love question: of those [*] If she was to her.” didn’t she my daughter. family [*] things, why If Joe there? [*] go to truly Why that Joe was There’s evidence show his assistants the accused and to see that about his he wanted to worried wife and impartial has a fair and trial. Counsel at, where she when she people must know and in a criminal case home, late, come if how constantly keep people would she was in mind represents he are with the come she come time. Per- only concerned didn’t home on by compe- haps you truth and the can infer this that Joe— facts established marriage. tent admissible evidence.” there was a little in the mistrust spoke Justice for a unanimous So Knudson Joe have the defend- worried about 372, 378, Storms, in State v. Court ant, but there’s evidence to show (1962). P.2d the defendant Joe. worried about She to know where at and what wanted Joe was pros- play important part Police doing and how he wasn’t home come criminals, so. But properly ecution of and recall a name on time. You woman judge; act their they may and Shirley Chesnovar. sat here on She collecting present- lies in facts and function stand, you ample oppor- witness had an authorities, proper not in decid- ing them to tunity appraise her and atti- demeanor appro- ing the offense committed and the telling tell whether she was tude and or not penalty. Pugh, 420 U.S. priate Gerstein v. said, “Yes, And she the defend- the truth. (1975). For 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d was worried.” went over and ant And she letters was the officers to written such Chesnovar, Shirley Shirley best; talked worst, terrifying. at presumptuous said, any “I romantic Chesnovar don’t have police conduct was inexcusable here error, your intentions towards husband. I don’t and, prose- even absent other discussed, get happily I’m misconduct, want to involved with him. already cutorial a new trial. married.” required could have alone the defend- Evidently satisfy this didn’t judgment should of conviction ant— reversed. time, the defendant point

At Honor, and reached in opened the armoire going MR. I’m WILLIAMS: Your object I think a .22 semiauto- grabbed to that statement. Exhibit State’s prosecutor prepared must remain within the pistol. to fire. matic And she arguing jury, realms of evidence in intentionally she gun took the She and that the of his own witness statement pointed pulled trigger. And and she satisfy was that it the defendant seemed to pulled again again trigger *21 and she felt that. better after gun longer could no again again. and The There empty. fire. It were no more Williams, THE COURT: Mr. the Court over, shells available. After this was Joe arguments instructed this lying mortally wound- the bathroom proper of counsel are not evidence and a ed jury only matter to be if and dead. considered counsel the evidence keep within and the sequence What was the of the shots? law. And the has heard that instruc- You decide. There were five shots fired. accordingly. tion and will guided (Mr. commencing Sorensen to indicate on continue, You sir. State’s maniken) Exhibit One shot you. MR. Thank SORENSEN: right hit Joe in (indi- the front about there

[*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] cating). One shot hit dresser, vase, against wall, pieces this and of it were out, pointed Also it was she stated later found here in (indicat- front of the dresser on, that she another reason took this was ing). Three hit Joe in the shots back. Shot going neighbor’s that Joe was shoot the blank, No. 3 was point almost fired almost dog following 14-year who was around a old up against body. his No. 4 was fired from dog by the female owned Griffiths that four—from two to away. four inches happened And to be in You can heat. infer No. 5 was fired four that, about to six inches things other too. You can infer away. The first shot was fired at other a dis- meanings why reasons she took greater tance than six inches. pistol put why she downstairs. ‡ ‡ ‡ I you now, invite your deliberations, argument The in the front ensued room look over the real evidence that we’ve (indicat- right this of the here house presented. pictures, Look over the look diagram 1). marked State’s Exhibit over Compare the wounds. them with the happened What argument then? The test firing results James Mason. Com- go ceased. bowling. Joe decided to He pare them, up and come with the story of bedroom, went into the and he was there how this place. event took And I propose minutes, undressing, for about five per- his now you story, to tell based on this evi- sonal items here bed (indicating). on the I dence, sequence shots, and I’ll suppose out, got bowling he his shirt his tell you the why reasons I up come with pants. kept I don’t know where he them. this sequence. T-shirt, on, Had his shorts sox. here, standing believe Joe was down undressing, While he was where there pulled. the bed. And the gun was the defendant? She was here in the said, rang God, first shot out he “Oh (indicating), thinking. front room She I’ve been he hit.” And raised his hands thinking waited five minutes. She was (indicating). what is he going And to do? contemplating her next actions. She stated go going Where is he go bowling she came in with him. The bedroom? place go. person There’s no argument again shooting But it wasn’t a ensued. of him argument argument standing normal time. The him is in front between he go Shirley again. got centered and the door. He’s towards around Joe her or something get But out. got this resulted in far more door. He’s He can’t do leaving the go anything. going serious than Joe room to Is he to stand there and bowling. be shot?

been shot in the back? Would he have woman, defendant, grab able to shot. He’s her. He’s He moves toward arms, would all the shots have body. her He is around the His touch wounded. hands range (indicating)? Yes. up high, point almost been here at close A shot is fired down. back, (indi- They down would have been. range, touching blank cating). Could she have reached around and fired that, Somewhere, just before perhaps her, into his side, back towards on this got to her and Maybe was missed. shot then on (indicating), this side and have the him; maybe gun, missed moved the she shots up crisscross and end implanted in the coming to- he started just fired —when she sternum? wild; her, I don’t know wards fired Is that explanation? a reasonable You But was missed. exactly where this shot decide. (indicat- and here when Joe was shot here His hands came ing), he was on his knees. wounds on There are There’s some Joe. knees, he body was on his and he *22 down knees, shins, some his his wounds on his threat, was longer he out was no elbow I you and his forehead. believe can commission, given proper if probably and that, suggest big guy pur- here’s this that attention, have lived— he would medical portedly physical relationship had with Honor, object Your I MR. WILLIAMS: her, actually defendant where he and hurt That’s not evidence— to that statement. yet he’s with all the the one wounds. He’s Well, purport to it doesn’t THE COURT: the one got body that’s all the marks his appro- be evidence. And and the four bullets. instructed, sir. priately Joe that. like I don’t think it occurred right. All MR. WILLIAMS: to inflict and unable was hit and wounded knees, is on his Joe MR. SORENSEN: af- injury to the defendant bodily grievous more, maybe trying maybe stumbling some her get to He couldn’t ter the first shot. hallway. to move into the her. He gun stop before she fired Again, Joe got there. was shot he recall, expert before you ballistics said If shot, know. I think and defendant she fired he stood when recall, glanced have (indicating). She could have right about they could have landed bounce bounced inside the Vicki’s bedroom door over here to the against here out door through that and he wall right about six feet here here. said fired the bullet (indicating). closed, door it But would could gun you so time she pulled her to fire those five shot and killed Joe Griffiths. listen what was You [******] look that predominant tape, transcript if trigger, you shots, on her mind at the want, what bothered four of which over and and decide you right fired have been All the shots could Well, you I—I think can I infer. What possibility, I don’t bedroom. It’s a was merely argumentative said and it’s not people two that know: only know. There’s evidence. You can decide yourselves. Griffiths. I submit the defendant and Joe Maybe you’ll decide first shot was the and, knees, very cold that Joe on his killing shot, right back, and then calculated, pulled trigger defendant reaching Joe into the closet when once; again; she fired again, Joe moved the shot why was fired and that’s knees, crawling on up; kept Joe his backed injure couldn’t —wasn’t able to the defend- (indicating). up and ended there ant. Maybe you’ll decide that. I don’t testimony to had show ample But, was, We’ve know. it whatever there was He was about big guy. a pretty Joe was body, four shots in Joe’s three of them nine, pounds. to 190 eight, five five Try back. to account that. Our struggle been a I submit And if there office has tried.

for the gun in the bedroom, would he [******] says be ex- Finally it that malice can Application the Matter of the for and pressed when there’s a deliberate intention Against Application Protest for Trans- away the unlawfully to take life hu- Right fer of Water No. 11-0290 in the being. Again, what was the man dominant Agricultural Name of Corpora- Products thing on mind? What did she do? She tion. gun, got pointed reached in it INCORPORATED, BEKER INDUSTRIES empty. it it fired until was I submit that formerly Agricultural Corpora- Products his Joe was on knees last two shots. tion, Applicants-Appellants, ****** go- You’ve heard the evidence. I’m not GEORGETOWN IRRIGATION go again. know over You our DISTRICT, position point. on this We feel did Protestant-Respondents. with aforethought malice kill Joe Griffiths. No. 12938. ****** Supreme Court of Idaho. shooting submit that the reason for April jealousy. jeal- this case was plain She was bragging ous of Joe about conquest. saying

I’m Joe did this. I know don’t if girl

he did in fact have a friend. But he

brought up. Now is that considerable *23 submit,

provocation no, in and of itself? I

it wasn’t. known about year. She’d it for a

They’d They’d talked about it. argu-

ments it. about She never shot before him.

This was opportu- different. She had an

nity to take five minutes of her time to ponder

think over and what she was going only do ingo room in the house

where gun she knew where the was and

then use it.

[******]

And I submit that the shots fired Joe’s range

back were fired at close and were

fired a time when Joe was knees longer

and no threat to the defend-

ant. I submit further that the evidence

indicates that defendant in this case is

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt second

degree murder.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Griffiths
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 3, 1980
Citation: 610 P.2d 522
Docket Number: 12367
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.