State v. GriffinState v. Griffin
Aрpellant Theodore Griffin was convicted o£ murder and received a mandatory life imprisonment sentence. We affirm.
On April 5, 1980, Lawrence Wilson was shot and killed аs he sat with appellant in his automobile in Richland County, South Carolina. Appellant was arrested and indicted for the
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to quash the indictment for murder. Because certain blank spaces in the caption of the form indictment were incomplete, appellant claims the indictment was improper, and therefore the trial court was without jurisdiction. On the front of the one-page printed form, the blanks reserved for the county of the indictment and the date and county of the grand jury’s convention were not completеd. Appellant alleges that there was no indication that the grand jurors presented the indictment under oath. However, appellant fails to read the indictment as a whole. On the back of the indictment, the county and date were specified, and the signature of the foreman of the grand jury appeared below thе words “True Bill”. Although the caption of an indictment should show the place and date at which the court was held and the indictment found, the omissions may be correctеd by other parts of the indictment. 42 C. J. S. Indictments and Information §§ 38, 39 (1944). It has been held that grand jurors were presumed to have been sworn when the indictment’s caption failed to state they were sworn. 42 C. J. S. Indictments and Information § 40 (1944). We presume from the foreman’s signature that the grand jurors were sworn. The trial court properly refused to quash the indictment.
Next, appellant contends that statements made by the deceased to two witnesses should have been admitted as evidence of uncommunicated threats. Uncommunicated threats are generally admitted only under qualification. McCormick on Evidence, § 295 ( 2nd Ed. 1972). When there is evidence in a homicide case tending to establish self defense, uncommunicated thrеats are admissible to show the mental attitude of the deceased and are relevant on the question of who was probably the aggressor in -the fatal difficulty. Before evidence as to uncommunicated threats is admissible, however, it must be proved that such threats were actually made by the deceased.
State v. Mason,
215 S. C. 457,
Aрpellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that he was having an adulterous relationship at the time of the shooting. In light of appellant’s contention that he killed the deceased because of deceased’s illicit relationship with his wife, evidence of appellant’s lack of affection for his wife would be admissible to refute his asserted motive for the killing. 40 C. J. S.
Homicide
§ 226(b) (1944). Appellant alleges that this evidence attacked his character and consequently should have been excluded. However, relevant evidence properly admissible for other purposes may not be excluded merely because it incidentally reflects on his character.
State v. Thompson,
S. C.,
Immediately after the shooting, appellant drove to the deceased’s house where appellant’s wife was staying. He forсed entry into the residence and pointed his handgun at his wife. His wife and an eye witness testified that appellant then declared: “I just killed Lawrence Wilson. I am going to kill yоu.” Appellant asserts the testimony pertaining to a separate crime was inadmissible. In
State v. Lyle,
125 S. C. 406,
(1) motive,
(3) the absence of mistake or accident,
(4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others, or
(5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
The test for determining the admissibility of the оther crime is its logical relevancy to the particular purpose for which it is sought to be introduced. If it is logically pertinent because it reasonably tends tо prove a material fact, it is not rejected merely because it incidentally proves the defendant guilty of another crime.
State v.
Lyle, supra,
Next appellant asserts that he should have been allowed to testify that a friend had told him the deceased owned a firearm. We agree. The trial judge excluded the evidence as hearsay. In attempting to рrove self defense, appellant offered the evidence to show he
believed
the deceased owned a firearm, not to prove the deceasеd in fact owned a gun. Evidence is not hearsay unless it is offered to show the truth of the matter asserted.
Player v.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred when he instructed the jury that appellаnt had the burden of proving the elements of self defense by a preponderance based on our decisions of
State v. Bolton,
266 S. C. 444,
Next appellant alleges that the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that a “reasonable doubt” was a “strong substantial doubt.” It is not error to equate substantial doubt with reasonable doubt.
State v. McAlister,
114
Appellant attempted to prove he was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter because he killed his wife’s paramour in the sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provоcation. After instructing the jury about the general law of manslaughter, the trial judge charged the specific law as it related to the killing of a spouse’s lover.
The killing of a wife’s paramour, a wife’s lover, is reduced to manslaughter only when the husband comes upon the pair in guilty embrace or in a flagrantly suggestive situation. The husband whо kills the paramour after there is a cooling time is guilty of murder.
This instruction was framed in light of
State v. Herring,
118 S. C. 386,
Appellant also excepts to the trial court’s charge that maliсe may be implied from the use of a deadly weapon. This issue was resolved against appellant in
State v. Mattison,
S. C.,
Appellant finally excepts to the trial judge’s refusal to include several requested instructions in the jury charge. The trial judge completely and properly instructed the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter and self-dеfense. Since the charge given adequately covered the substance of appellant’s requested charges, the trial judge correctly refused appellant’s requests to charge.
State v. McDowell,
272 S. C. 203,
Appellant’s conviction of murder and mandatory life imprisonment sentence are affirmed.