State v. GreenwoodState v. Greenwood
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Lampron
The sole issue is whether a district court may suspend all or any part of the provision of
On December 13, 1973, following trial, the defendant was found guilty of that offense by Harkaway, J. Prior to sentencing, the defendant, upon the ground of hardship, sought to have suspended any imposition of a loss of license. His motion was denied as being “beyond the authority of the District Court” and the issue of law was transferred to this court. Defendant maintains that our opinion in State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), sustains his position that the district court has such authority.
State v. Burroughs supra dealt with the sentencing only. We held that in exercising that function it has always been assumed since the State’s earliest times ‘“that courts had the power to suspend either the imposition or the execution of a criminal sentence.’” Id. at 22, 300 A.2d at 316. We further held that, when the legislature has sought to prevent the exercise of the judicial privilege of suspension and to impose a mandatory sentence, it has so provided, and must do so, in language which clearly manifests its intention that the sentence is to be mandatorily imposed.
Provision for suspension of a license for violating a regulation pertaining to the operation of a motor vehicle was first enacted by Laws 1905, 86:10. The court was to notify the seci‘etary of *119state of such a conviction giving “the number, or mark of the machine and license, and shall transmit other information obtained at the hearing”. The secretary of state was charged with the revocation of the license and its return when the circumstances required it. Laws 1921, 119:18 provided that a conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor “shall be reported forthwith by the court. . . to the commissioner [of motor vehicles] who shall revoke immediately the license of the person so convicted . .. Laws 1955, 282:1 provided, as presently, that defendant’s “license shall be revoked for a period of sixty days and at the discretion of the court for a period not to exceed two years.”
This court held in State v. Wood, 98 N.H. 418, 420, 101 A.2d 774, 775 (1953), that “[t]he act of suspending and returning the license” is merely administrative. See 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 164:1 (1969, Supp. 1974). It is not part of the criminal punishment. State v. Despres, 107 N.H. 297, 220 A.2d 758 (1966); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 574, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973). This conclusion is supported by the history of that part of
The latter provision must be given the meaning which will best carry out its purpose. 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 57.04 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). By its express wording, the discretion of the court is limited to determining the length of the period of revocation between sixty days and two years. This interpretation is confirmed by the terms of section 64 of the same chapter which provides that: “Upon a conviction the court shall report to the director and shall immediately revoke the license of the person so convicted.”
Remanded.
Grimes, J., concurred in the result; the others concurred.