The Defendant, Forrest S. Greenwood, was tried in Superior Court in Androscog-gin County on an indictment charging three counts of aggravated assault 1 and one count of terrorizing with a firearm. 2 The jury acquitted him on the aggravated assault charges, but returned a guilty verdict on Count IV, which was the terrorizing count. He appeals from the judgment of conviction on that count which was entered on the verdict, assigning as errors the manner of interrogation of a witness by the presiding justice, and the alleged violation of a sequestration order by somе of the witnesses.
Finding merit in the former point, we sustain the appeal and remand for a new trial. 3
Hеre credibility was the key to the outcome of the trial. The stories of the Defendant’s subsequently divоrced wife, his brother-in-law, and his teen-age daughters were aligned against the Defendant’s own recollection of the events.
Although the Defendant’s son, Forrest (Sonny) Greenwood, was called tо testify by the State, his testimony was of critical im *804 portance because he alone among these several witnesses tended to support his father’s version of the events. 4
Nevertheless, after counsel had completed examination and cross-examination of Sonny, the presiding justice
sua sponte
launched his own examination of the young man, which extended to twenty-nine questions. Objectiоn by Defendant’s counsel came during this questioning, and under M.R.Evid. 614(c) his objection was sufficient to preserve the point for appellate review. Compare
State v.
Haycock, Me.,
When Defendant’s counsel attemрted to state the grounds of his objection, he was interrupted by the presiding justice, who stated that counsel’s objection might be noted and declared:
I think the Court is entitled to know. The jury is entitled to know whаt went on out there. We have a difference of testimony here and we’d like to know what the truth is what happened.
The presiding justice then resumed his questioning of the young man.
Significantly not one of the four witnesses who related a different version of the facts, and a version extremely damaging tо the Defendant, was subjected to any questioning whatsoever by the presiding justice.
The right of a trial judge to interrogate witnesses appearing before him is expressly granted by our rules. M.R.Evid. 614(b). So long as the trial judge intervenes for the purpose of clarifying testimony, saving time, or preventing a miscarriаge of justice, he must be allowed considerable latitude in his questioning. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 614.2 (1976).
The issue presented by the instant case, however, is whether this trial judge’s protracted interrogation of this one witness went sо far as to suggest to the jury that he had aligned himself on the side of one of the contestants, notwithstanding his disavowal of such alignment while he was instructing the jury.
State v. Hunnewell,
Me.,
While this issue must be resolved in the light of the facts of the рarticular case, we reach the same result here as we reached in
State v. Lint,
where it was сoncluded that the justice’s examination of a defendant’s sole supporting witness was a serious injustice to that defendant. Me.,
Our review of the record in the instant case leads us to conсlude the court below erred in singling out this one witness for extended examination. His twenty-nine questions were, for the most part, leading, and were occasionally argumentative. At best these questions wеre only marginally helpful in ascertaining the facts. Moreover, when the objection to such questioning was interposed, the justice’s response that “we’d like to know what the truth is” could suggest to the jury thаt they had heard something other than the truth in this witness’ prior testimony.
In sum, the jury could infer that the presiding justice hаd retreated from a position of judicial impartiality.
The crucial nature of the credibility of this witness, the potential effect on the jury of this one witness being singled out, and the cross-examinatiоn style of the questioning by the presiding justice lead us to further conclude that the cautionary instructiоn which he later gave the jury was insufficient to remedy the error.
As we cautioned in
Haycock,
a trial judge should not assume the posture of an
*805
advocate. Me.,
The entry will be:
Appeal sustained.
Remanded for a new trial on Count IV of the indictment.
Notes
. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208.
. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210, elevated to a Class B offense, with mandatory prison sentence, by the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252.
.This Court’s opinion in
State v. Porter,
Me.,
. The other prosecution witnesses testified that the Defendant pointed a loaded shotgun at his brother-in-law and said that he was going to “shoot the turkey off the tailgate” of his truck. In contrast, the Defendant and Sonny testified that the gun was unloaded, and that the Defendant stated that he was going to “shoot the tires off the truck,” so that certain items could not be removed from the marital home. The aggravated assault charges stemmed from a struggle for the gun immediately thereafter.