87 Mo. 583 | Mo. | 1885
This case is before us on the appeal of the state from the judgment of the criminal court of Lafayette county in sustaining a demurrer to the indictment preferred against defendant. The indictment contains two counts, in the first of which the defendant, as collector of Jackson county, is charged with obtaining money by false pretenses ; and in the second of which, defendant, as collector, is charged with obtaining money ■'“'by means and by use of a cheat, a deception, a false and fraudulent statement,- and a'false instrument and paper writing.” The first count is based on section
It is clear, wé think, from the indictment that the-defendant is proceeded against in both counts for having, as collector of the revenue, collected from Duvall as taxes the sum of two hundred and fifty-seven dollars- and sixty-three cents in excess of what was due and payable, and the only question which the demurrer presents is whether such an offence is to be prosecuted as a felony under section 1335, Revised Statutes, making it a felony to obtain money or- property, under.false pretenses, or under section 1651, Revised Statutes, making it a felony to obtain money or property by any trick or deception commonly called “the confidence game,” or whether such an offence is to be prosecuted as a misdemeanor under section 1487, Revised Statutes, which provides that every collector of the revenue who shall unlawfully collect taxes when none are due and shall wilfully or unlawfully exact or demand more than is-due shall on conviction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor. -
Section 1335, Revised Statutes, which makes it &
Neither can the offence charged against defendant-be prosecuted tinder section 1561, which was-first enacted by the legislature in 1879, for the reason that it is a well settled rule of construction that a'later statute-which is general and affirmative does not abrogate a-former one which is particular, unless negative words-are used or the two acts are irreconcilably repugnant.Á statute can only be repealed, either by express provision or by necessary implication, and to justify a repeal by implication there should be such a repugnancy in the-Pew law as to lead to the conclusion that the later law abrogated or was intended to abrogate the former, Railroad Co. v. Cass Co., 53 Mo. 17; McVey v. McVey, 51 Mo. 406. That it was not the intention by section 1561 to abrogate section 1487 we think clear, but on -the-contrary it was intended by it to supply a ■ lack in the-law for the .punishment of obtaining money or property by' what was known and called “confidence games.” This, we think, is made manifest by the fourth section of the act of 1879 which declares that: “An emergency
We are of the opinion for the reasons given that the ^demurrer was properly sustained, and the judgment is hereby affirmed,