State v. GreenState v. Green
The question presented by this appeal is whether evidence obtained as a result of the arrest of a person who the police reasonably but mistakenly believe to be the person named in an arrest warrant must be suppressed.
Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine, in violation of
On appeal, defendant makes the following arguments:
I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED BY THE POLICE.
A. The police lacked reasonable suspicion.
B. The police had no authority to enter a private house without a warrant.
II. THE ABRUPT CHANGE IN THE SCHEDULED TRIAL DATE ON LESS THAN A WEEK‘S NOTICE DENIED THE DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
III. THE DEFENDANT‘S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
We conclude that defendant‘s second and third points are without merit and do not require discussion.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented evidence that on April 3, 1995, two investigators from the Camden County Sheriff‘s Department were assigned to execute a fugitive arrest warrant for a person named Corey Lovett. The investigators had a card containing various identifying information about Lovett, which indicated that he was a six foot tall, 160 pound, twenty year old black man with a dark complexion who resided at 724 Tulip Street in the City of Camden. When the investigators arrived at this address, they saw a young black man whose appearance matched Lovett‘s description standing directly in front of the porch to the house. One of the investigators got out of the car and identified himself. At this point, the person who looked like Lovett ran into the house at 724 Tulip Street, locking two doors behind him. The investigator pursued the suspect into the house, kicked the locked doors open and chased him up a flight of stairs. When the investigator caught him, the suspect discarded a bag containing ninety small plastic vials with cocaine inside them. After the investigators brought the suspect back to headquarters, they determined that he was defendant Green, rather than Lovett.
The trial court found that defendant‘s appearance was “dramatically similar” to Lovett‘s description on the warrant identification card and consequently that the arresting officer had a reasonable belief that defendant was Lovett. The court also found that when
In State v. Jones, 143 N.J. 4, 667 A.2d 1043 (1995), the Court held that a police officer may forcibly enter a private residence to execute an arrest warrant if the arrestee flees into the residence to avoid apprehension. The Court noted that “[l]aw enforcement officers have a duty to enforce validly issued arrest warrants,” and that “[a]s long as the officers act[ ] reasonably in executing the warrant, ... the arrest and any evidence seized incident to the arrest should be admitted.” Id. at 17, 667 A.2d 1043. Consequently, if the person in front of 724 Tulip Street actually had been Lovett, there is no doubt the investigators could have forcibly entered the house to execute the warrant and that the arrest of Lovett and any search incident to that arrest would have been valid. The only question is whether a different outcome is required because the entry resulted from the arresting officer‘s misidentification of defendant as Lovett.
The leading case dealing with the validity under the Fourth Amendment of an arrest of a person who the police mistakenly identify as the arrestee is Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed.2d 484 (1971). The police in Hill had probable cause to believe that Hill had been involved in a robbery. After obtaining Hill‘s description, the police went to his apartment. A person who exactly fit Hill‘s description, named Miller, answered the door. Although Miller denied that he was Hill and produced his own identification, the police did not believe him. Consequently, they arrested Miller and conducted a search of the apartment incident to the arrest which revealed evidence of the robbery subsequently introduced at Hill‘s trial. In sustaining the validity of the arrest and search incident to the arrest, the Court stated:
[T]he officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.
[Id. at 803-04, 91 S.Ct. at 1110-11, 28 L. Ed.2d at 490.]
Although Hill involved a warrantless arrest of a person who the police mistakenly identified as the suspect, the Court subsequently applied the reasoning in Hill to a case involving a mistake in the execution of a warrant. In Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L. Ed.2d 72 (1987), the police reasonably believed both when they applied for and when they executed a search warrant that the building where they conducted the search contained a single third floor apartment. However, the third floor was actually divided into two apartments. As a result, the police searched not only the apartment which the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search but also the adjoining apartment. In sustaining the validity of a conviction based on evidence found in that apartment, the Court stated:
While Hill involved an arrest without a warrant, its underlying rationale that an officer‘s reasonable misidentification of a person does not invalidate a valid arrest is equally applicable to an officer‘s reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid warrant describes too broadly the premises to be searched.
[Id. at 87-88, 107 S.Ct. at 1018, 94 L. Ed.2d at 83.]
In this case, there is no dispute concerning the validity of the warrant for Lovett‘s arrest, and we are satisfied that the arresting officer reasonably believed that defendant was Lovett. Defendant‘s appearance closely matched the description of Lovett set forth on the warrant identification card; the two men were substantially the same height, weight, age, race and complexion. Moreover, the investigators found defendant standing directly in front of the house which the card indicated was Lovett‘s residence, and when the investigators identified themselves, defendant ran into that house. Therefore, the record amply supports the trial court‘s finding that the arresting officer‘s belief that defendant was the person named in the warrant was reasonable in light of the facts known to him at the time.
We reject defendant‘s argument that his arrest was invalid because the investigators should have obtained a photograph of Lovett, which would have reduced the risk of arresting the wrong person. Although the better practice may be for law enforcement officers to obtain a photograph of the person named in an arrest warrant, the failure to take this step does not automatically require the suppression of evidence if the officers mistakenly identify the arrestee, especially in the absence of evidence that his photograph was readily available. To sustain the validity of an arrest and incidental search based on an arrest warrant, the State is only required to show that the warrant was valid and that the arrest of a person believed to be the one named in the warrant was “a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.” Hill, supra, 401 U.S. at 804, 91 S.Ct. at 1111, 28 L. Ed.2d at 490. Therefore, if law enforcement officers reasonably believe, based on the information immediately available to them, that a person is the one named in a warrant, an arrest is not invalid solely because they could have obtained additional information concerning that person such as a photograph.2
We also reject defendant‘s argument that State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) requires the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of a reasonable mistake in identifying a person named in a warrant. In Novembrino, the Court declined to follow United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.2d 677 (1984) and held that under
However, defendant does not dispute that there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for Lovett‘s arrest and that the warrant was valid in all other respects. Consequently, unlike Novembrino, this case does not involve any issue relating to the integrity of the warrant-issuing process. Rather, the only issue is whether evidence must be suppressed because law enforcement officers made a reasonable mistake in executing a valid warrant. See Sanders, supra, 339 A.2d at 379 (noting the distinction between “an infirmity inherent in the foundation of the warrant,” such as “an insufficient affidavit,” and a mistake in the execution of a “constitutionally valid” warrant, such as “the seizure of an individual other than the one against whom the warrant is outstanding“).
The resolution of this issue is not governed by Novembrino but rather by cases such as State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219-21, 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed.2d 695 (1984), which deal with the validity of a police officer‘s actions in executing a warrant. See Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 148-49 n. 30, 519 A.2d 820. The basic test under both the Fourth Amendment and
Affirmed.