The respondent was convicted on March 15, 1966 in Windsor County Court after trial by jury on the charge of statutory 'rape.
The court instructed the jury in part as follows:
“Now the law does not require that each particular incriminating fact which may aid you in determining if the accused is guilty should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A doubt which will justify an acquittal is not a doubt of any particular fact, but a doubt on all the evidence that he is guilty.”
The resрondent excepted to this portion of the charge in the following language:
“We would except to that portion of the charge wherein the Court charged that reasonable doubt did not apply to a particular fact or element but that he (sic) must find reasonable doubt as to all of the evidence, it being our understanding of the law that each and every element of fаct must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The respondent arguеs that, to convict, it is necessary for the state to prove all the matеrial facts of its information beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, that if the jury beliеves any essential element of the case admits of reasonable dоubt, they must give the benefit of this doubt to the respondent and render a verdict of not guilty.
There is no question but that in a criminal case the degree of persuasiоn required of a jury in order to find the respondent guilty is proof beyond a reasоnable doubt. The basic law of the land places the burden upon the statе to establish each essential element of the crime charged beyоnd a reasonable doubt. Lacking such proof, the respondent is entitled tо an acquittal. 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §910; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, §§1256-1258;
State
v.
Meyer,
Just previous to the statement exceрted to, the court instructed the jury what constituted- the elements of the crime сharged in the information, and that “the burden is upon the State to make out and *313 establish each of these essential elements of the crime charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court then went on to explain the meaning of “reasonable doubt.” It also instructed the jury that “you cannot find him guilty unless from all the evidence you believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Manifestly, the respondent takes the position that the phrases “particular incriminating fact” and “element of the crime” are synonymous and equivalent, which they are not. One does not necessarily embrace the other and generally this is so.
The jury is not required to find every particular incriminating fact beyond a reasonable doubt. But, to warrant a conviction, eaсh fact which is necessary to the conclusion that a respondent committed the crime charged must be fully established beyond a reasonable doubt. This is truе even though there may be various facts not demonstrated by this measure of рroof.
State
v.
Orlandi,
The respondent argues it was “prejudicial error for the court hаs said that it is not necessary for the jury to find each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.” As we have pointed out, the court instructed the jury рrecisely to the contrary.
Moreover, the language used in that part оf the charge excepted to here was only slightly different with that challengеd in
State
v.
Anderson,
This language of the charge on the subject of reasonable doubt was approved again in
State
v.
Goyet,
There is nothing in the charge givеn by the court here, which, taken as a whole, shows that the respondent was рrejudiced thereby.
Ballou v. Stebbins,
It is only when facts constitute an element of the crime itself that they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court should make this distinction abundantly clear to the jury in its instructions on this aspect of the case.
*314 Respondent’s exception is overruled.
Judgment affirmed. Let execution be done.