Fоllowing a trial by jury in the county court, the defendant was found guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was fined and sentenced to a term in jail. On аppeal to the district court his conviction was affirmed. In this court he assigns as error the reception into evidence of the result of thе preliminary breath test without proper foundation, and the reception into evidence of the result of the blood test without propеr foundation. We affirm.
- On November 20, 1984, after observing the defendant driving on the highway at an extremely slow rate of speed and crossing the centerline at least two times, a trooper of the Nebraska State Patrol stopped the defendant. The trooper observed that the defendant had watery eyes, spoke with slurred speech, had an odor of alcohol about him, could not *339 locate his driver’s license in his billfold, and staggered when he tried to walk. A preliminary breath test was administered. The defendant was then placed under arrest and was taken to a hospitаl where a blood sample was drawn. Later, field sobriety tests were administered, which the defendant failed.
As to the issue concerning the preliminаry breath test, defendant argues only lack of foundation under
State
v. Gerber,
The record in the present case does not disclose, strictly spеaking, that the result of the preliminary breath test was offered or received in evidence. The prosecuting attorney did ask the arresting trooper the following question: “And, if — if the test — if the machine reads out that other than fail light, you then let the person go without arresting them?” to which an objection was sustained. Later on, the following questions and answers appear in the record, to which no objections were made:
Q. After you had сompleted the — strike that. Did you then administer the preliminary breath test to Mr. Green?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And, when that test was completed what did you do?
A. I advised Mr. Green that he was under arrest for driving under the influence.
Although a preliminary breath test advisement form and checklist to show completion of the test was received into evidence, we are unablе to find anything in the record, beyond the testimony set forth above, suggesting what the result of such test might have been. Contrary to our rules, the defendant has failеd to make appropriate references to the record of any of the facts or argument contained in his brief. See Neb. Ct. R. of Prаc. 9C (rev. 1983).
However, even assuming that such a test result was *340 erroneously admitted, it would have been cumulative and harmless error under State v. Smith, supra. Besides the description of defendant’s actions given by the arresting trooper, as previously indicated, he testified to the following observations made of the defendant during the administration of field sobriety tеsts:
Q. Okay. Can you describe how Mr. Green performed these particular sobriety tests?
A. The finger-to-nose test he couldn’t keep his head tilted baсk without nearly falling over. So, we allowed him even to put his head in an upright position, he never came close to his nose with either hand, with either index finger, I should say.
Q. What about the walking test, walking a straight line?
A. He was uncapable [sic] of putting one foot in front of the other one and walking a line without staggering off to one side or thе other.
Q. How about the test of picking up a coin off the floor?
A. He couldn’t begin to do this test without catching himself with both hands.
Q. When he was doing the — attempting to perform the finger-to-nose test, when he plaсed his head back, did anyone have to catch him to keep him from falling?
A. Yes, I did.
Finally, there was evidence received of a blood alcоhol test result of .165 percent.
Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient foundation to receive the result of the blood test is also without merit. It is his contention that the testimony of Margaret Vencil of the previously mentioned .165-percent blood alcohol level was without foundation bеcause she did not know where the formula used originated; she had no independent knowledge that the substance in the blood vials was an anticоagulant and that the substance introduced into the syringe to speed up vaporization of the blood was in fact potassium carbonate; and she was not required to furnish other foundational facts, such as her possession of a valid permit, prior to her testimony.
Our examination of the record discloses that the testimony of *341 the witness Vencil describing the process by which she arrived at a blood alcohol level was detаiled and accurate. She agreed that the formula was not set forth in the rules prescribed by the Nebraska Department of Health but, rather, was the method she was taught and told to use by her chemist supervisor. She testified that the vials contained an anticoagulant. The witness made the obsеrvation that the blood storage vials contained an anticoagulant. There appears to be no foundation for such a statemеnt, but the important fact was that she testified from sight that the blood had not coagulated.
During cross-examination by the defendant, the witness Vencil testified that the substance she used was potassium carbonate and she knew that to be a fact because it came from a jar in her laborаtory labeled as such. We are not inclined to require an examining chemist doing blood alcohol testing to go behind the label on a container of a substance used regularly during the course of such employee’s duties, absent circumstances which would indicate the necessity for suсh inquiry.
In any event, all of those claimed “deficiencies” relate to techniques employed by the examiner and are of no foundational consequence, but only affect the weight and credibility of the testimony.
State
v.
Miller,
The record does disclose that Margaret Vencil did in fact possess a valid permit to conduct blood alcohol tests. That permit, together with the worksheet, the blood alcohol report, a coрy of Neb. Admin. Code tit. 177, ch. 1 (1980 & 1981), and the remains of the blood container kit, was received in evidence immediately following the testimony of the witness.
Defеndant argues that the law requires such foundational evidence to precede the offer of an expert opinion. He cites no lаw to us. We do not agree.
The witness Vencil had testified during her introductory examination that she possessed a Class A permit to do blood alcоhol testing. She also testified during the same preliminary period that she held in her hands a copy of title 177 of the rules and regulations of the Department of Health laboratory which contained the rules and regulations for testing of blood and *342 which she followed in doing blood alcohol testing.
Certainly, the foundational requirements were met in this сase so as to pass muster on the requirements of
State v. Brittain, 212
Neb. 686,
The judgment of the district court was correct and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.