Anthоny Jerome “Pop” Green, appellant, was arrested on June 26, 1974, and charged with the murder of Aurelia Sumter earlier the same day. Subsequently, he was indicted and brought to trial at General Sessions Cоurt of Richland County. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge *602 of murder, and the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant raises two exceptions in contending that his conviction should be reversed. We affirm.
The appellant’s first exception concerns whether the court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to consider the testimony of six year old Tоmmy Sumter, the only known eyewitness to the homicide. When the State offered young Sumter, the brother of the victim, counsel for the appellant objected on the ground that Tommy was too young to respond competently to questions regarding the incident. The court proceeded to conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury on Tommy’s competency to testify. Fоllowing extensive questioning of the child by the court and the solicitor, the court stated that Tommy Sumter was competent. When counsel for the appellant again objected, the court recommenced questioning Tommy to make certain that he was competent. At length the court restated its belief that young Sumter was qualified to testify for .the State and permitted the witness to be еxamined, noting at the same time defense counsel’s renewed objection.
The appellant objects to the court’s admission of Tommy’s testimony for two reasons: (1) the witness could not be sрecific about what he saw and could answer only questions which suggested to him the desired answers (in short, he could not adequately communicate his observations regarding the shooting of his sister) ; and (2) Tоmmy was not asked about a belief in God. The appellant contends that the court’s admitting this witness’ testimony amounted to an abuse of discretion and severely prejudiced the appellаnt. We do not agree.
First, with regard to the appellant’s contention of general incompetency, the record reflects that Tommy’s testimony as to the events of June 26, 1974, was essentially firm аnd unwavering. His responses indicate, that, while he did have some difficulty answering at times, he was aware of what he had observed and was suf *603 ficiently capable of expressing those observations to the court and the jury. Admittedly, Tommy Sumter was a very young witness, a fact demanding that special care be taken to ensure that he was competent. The record discloses that the trial judge took the required steps in this regard.
The mere fact that Tommy was but a six year old boy at the time of the trial did not in itself make him incompetent to testify. There is no fixed age which an individual must attain in order to be competent to testify as a witness.
Wheeler v. United States,
With respect to whether the trial judge should have questioned the witness about a belief in God, this Court granted the respondent’s petition in accordance with Rule 8, § 10 of the Rules of this Court, to review the proposition that when a witness’ competency is challenged on the grounds оf religious defects, the witness must affirmatively state a belief in God before he may be found competent to testify. Tommy Sumter indicated that he attended Sunday School, that he knew the differencе between right and wrong, and that he would tell the truth on the stand. He never stated that he did not believe in God or in retribution from the Almighty for lying. These questions were never put to him. *604 The respondent contends, however, that it is not required that Tommy Sumter have been asked these questions.
One of the earliest cases in this State dealing with this issue is
Jones v. Harris,
In two subsequent cases, this Court adhered to the test laid down in
Jones v. Harris, supra.
In
State v. Belton,
24 S. C. 185 (1886), and
State v. Abercrombie,
130 S. C. 358,
In two' more recent cases, the
Jones
test was relaxed. However, neither of these cases overruled that test, and both are distinguishable on their facts from the earlier decisions. In
State v. Pitts,
256 S. C. 420,
“We think an apt statement of the applicable rule is set forth in
State v. Comstock,
‘The question of the competency of a witness is a question for the court, and not for the jury, and whеn a witness is offered in a criminal case, and doubt is raised as to the competency of such witness, it is the duty of the court to determine that question upon a careful examination of the witnеss as ,to age, capacity, and moral and legal accountability.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
In
State v. Hicks,
257 S. C. 279,
To the extent that it may be necessary to clarify the present rule in this State in cases where the competency оf a witness is challanged on the grounds of defective religious beliefs, we quote with approval the following from C.J.S.:
“At common law, one who did not believe in the existence of a Supreme Bеing and consequently was under no apprehension of future punishment for his falsehood was incompetent to testify, but the constitutions or laws of most American states, if not all, have abolished rеligious tests as to the competency of witnesses, and it is now generally held *606 that religious belief is not a test of the competency of a witness. A belief in the inspired character of the Bible is not essential.” (Emphasis added.)
97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 62 (1957).
We hold that it is not required of a trial judge to ask questions respecting a belief in God or His providence. As long as the challenged witness answers that he knows the difference between right and wrong, that it is right to tell the truth and wrong to lie, that he will tell the truth if permitted to testify, and that he fears being punished if he does lie, even if that fear is motivated solely by the perjury statute, he satisfies the requirеment regarding “moral accountability”. Under this rule it is not essential that a challenged witness state a belief in God or His providence before being allowed to testify. In the instant case it was not necessary for Tommy Sumter to state expressly that he believed in God. Nor was it incumbent upon the trial judge to inquire into such a belief. What was necessary was for Tommy to be aware of right and wrong аnd the probability of punishment for lying. Tommy stated that he believed that he would be punished if he lied (he believed he would be spanked). Furthermore, the court expressly found' that Tommy did know the differencе between right and wrong. There was, therefore, no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in allowing the witness’ testimony.
The appellant’s second exception concerns whether the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the charge of murder. We deem without merit the appellant’s argument that there was insufficient еvidence and that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion, for directed verdict of acquittal and cite as authority for our position the following:
State v. Pauling,
264 S. C. 275,
*607 The appellant .raisеs additional arguments in his brief concerning certain alleged errors in the court’s instructions to the jury and in submitting the case on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. These questions are not raised by any еxception as required by Rule 1 and Rule 4, § 6 of the rules of this Court. However, we have examined the record in light of these arguments and deem them to be without merit.
The judgment appealed from is
Affirmed.