This is a direct appeal from a conviction for capital murder, Sec. 565.001, RSMo, with a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for fifty years. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const, art. V, Sec. 3.
On Tuesday, September 5, 1978, citizens informed a Douglas County deputy sheriff, Jenkins, that Clayton Dawson might be missing. Dawson was a sixty-six year old man who lived in a trailer near Ava, Missouri, with his nephew whom he had raised since infancy. The nephew, Robin Scott Greathouse, 17 years old, called his uncle “dad.” The last time the neighbors saw Dawson was on Thursday night, August 31. On Friday, a neighbor saw Dawson’s truck leave the prеmises but did not see the driver. Dawson did not report or call in for work Friday, an unprecedented occurrence. From Friday through Tuesday, Robin answered inquiries about Dawson by saying that he had “left with some lady,” and that he had gone to West Plains to visit a cousin. On Wednesday morning, Jenkins and another offiсer visited Dawson’s trailer. Robin accompanied Jenkins and the other officer, Deputy Thurman, to the Sheriff’s office in Ava where Robin admitted he had killed his uncle, and led several officers to the remains of the body and back to the trailer where he showed them the rifle and reenacted his version of the killing. According to Robin, he and his dad had a fight because Robin had not been going to school. His dad was going to give him a thrashing and he got scared and hit his dad with an ax and then, after fighting over a gun, shot him eight times.
The first of appellant’s four claims on this appeal is that his statements tо law enforcement officials should have been suppressed because the first of these statements was made before appellant was advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona,
The trial court could reasonably have found the relevant facts to be as follows: On September 5, 1978, when Clayton Dawson had not been seen by neighbors for five days, a neighbor contacted Deputy Lester Jenkins who also lived near Dawson and appellant and knew them both very wеll. The next morning (Wednesday, September 6), Jenkins and another deputy, Alva Thurman, went to the trailer where Dawson and appellant lived and, finding appellant there, asked him about Dawson. Appellant told the officers that Dawson had left at 5:00 a. m. the previous Friday in the company of a brown-haired woman of medium height driving a red 1975 or 1976 Buick Electra with the intent of getting married; that he was not supposed to tell anyone where they had gone and that, because they had been expected back on Tuesday or Wednesday (the day of appellant’s statement was Wednesday), he “wished [he] did know” where they were at that moment. When Thurman noticed some paper-covered holes in the wall of the trailer, appellant said that he had “shot up the house” when he was drunk and that he didn’t want his “dad” to see the holes when he came home. Jenkins asked аppellant if he wanted to go into town with them to telephone the details of Dawson’s absence to the Highway Patrol in Willow Springs for broadcast over their radio, and said that appellant didn’t have to go unless he wanted to, to which appellant replied that he would go with thеm.
Shortly after appellant and Thurman arrived at the Sheriff’s office, Thurman was required to leave to assist in the feeding of prisoners in the jail. Thurman told appellant that he could either wait in the front office or, since several people had been coming into the officе to ask about Dawson’s whereabouts, he could wait in the back, where there were some empty cells, commonly used for women and juveniles; appellant replied, “I’d rather go in the back if you’ve got a place.” Thurman took appel *594 lant to an empty cell and lоcked the door behind him, not to keep appellant in but as a matter of jail policy because a prisoner had once escaped through that area. Appellant was told to “holler or knock on the walls” if he wanted anyone for anything. Sometime after Thurman hаd gone, Jenkins arrived at the office, unlocked the cell block door and took appellant to another room where they could talk. Jenkins said to appellant, “Robbie, I’ve been a good friend of you and your dad a long time ... I’d like for you to tell me where we can find your dad because . . . [t]hat woman he went off with could have killed him or something.” Jenkins further told appellant that Dawson’s friends and neighbors were worried about him and reminded appellant that he had said Dawson was expected back Tuesday or Wednesday and it was now Wednesday afternоon. At this, appellant broke down crying and said, “Lester, I shot him. I killed him and took him over on UU Highway.” After this statement, Jenkins also broke down and left the room and appellant was not questioned further until after he had been advised of and waived his Miranda rights. When Thurman returned, Jenkins told him what had occurred and Thurman gave appellant his Miranda rights and took his statement. Twenty minutes later, a Highway Patrol Officer read him his rights and took his statement. Prior to appellant’s unsolicited and voluntary statement, he was not suspected of any crime by either Jenkins or Thurman (as stated by Jenkins, “I just didn’t think he’d do anything like that”) and appellant was not under arrest or otherwise in custody.
Under the above facts, the statement by appellant was clearly not a product of custodial interrogation and no Miranda warnings were required to make it admissible. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda:
“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Emphasis supplied)
Id.,
In Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, the defendant, a parolee suspected in a burglary, was asked to come to a police office, where he was interviewed by an officer in a clоsed room and admitted committing the crime. In holding that the defendant’s statement was admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
“police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the require *595 ment of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the quеstioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody’. It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited” (Emphasis in original).
Id.,
Clearly the facts in this case are stronger than those in Mathiason in that appellant was not a criminal suspect prior to his statement, and was not in police custody inasmuch as he voluntarily accompanied the officers to Ava and of his own choice elected to be temporarily placed in a jail cell.
Appellant cites
Orozco v. Texas,
In appellant’s second point, he contends that because his initial statement to the law enforcement officers was in violation of the Miranda doctrine, all subsequent statements and all physical evidence discovered as a result of his confession must also be suppressed. We find the original statement was admissible, therefore, this point is ruled against him.
In his third point, appеllant complains that the trial court should not have permitted the state to endorse additional witnesses “on the day of trial.” As has been repeatedly held, trial courts have a broad discretion in permitting the endorsement of the names of additional witnesses on the information or indictment.
State v. Strawther,
A careful examination of the record discloses that the endorsements were not made “on the day of trial.” Of the seven persons called as state’s witnesses who were not listed on the original information, six were endorsed on the amended information filed more than three weeks before trial. Six days later, in response to appellant’s untimely request for disclosure, the prosecution advised appellant when and where the written statements or memoranda regarding these witnesses could be examined. The seventh witness, Jon Miller, was disclosed tо appellant four days before trial testimony was adduced (immediately after he was discovered by the prosecution), and appellant was given at least two opportunities to meet with and interview him. Miller was called as a witness for appellant in a motion hearing three days before he testified before the jury. In addition, his testimony was rather simple in nature in that it related to a statement made by appellant in jail two days after his arrest. Therefore, we find appellant was not prejudiced by the endorsement of these witnesses.
State v. Strawther, supra,
at 579-80;
State v. Lorenze,
*596
Finally, it is asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation.
1
In reviewing this contention, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, affording to the state all reasonable favorable inferences and ignoring all contrary evidence and inferences.
State v. Ludwig,
A complete review of the evidence discloses that the jury could reasonably conclude that the murder of Clayton Dawson was not the result of a sudden scuffle or аrgument between appellant and his “dad.”
Appellant’s statements that he would receive his uncle’s money and property upon his death, which amounted to almost $80,-000, the fact that appellant gave different reasons for Dawson’s absence and two neighbors who had known Dawson and appellant for many years testified that they had never known of Dawson to strike appellant or spank him when he was small, was circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing of Dawson was not as a result of a scuffle or argument between them.
Immediаtely after the murder and in the several days thereafter, appellant displayed both a presence of mind and a somewhat chilling nonchalance about events. In addition to loading his uncle’s body, the victim’s personal belongings and the ax used to kill him on Dawson’s truck, the contents tо be abandoned in an isolated area, he thought to take bales of hay to conceal the evidence. Having dumped and concealed the body, he took $120.00 from his “dad’s” wallet, went into town and bought a dual exhaust system for the truck which had been Dawson’s and was now his. The next day аppellant returned to his “dad’s” body, poured gasoline on it and burned it; he took Dawson’s truck and engaged in various social activities with his friends, including a jaunt to Springfield and Branson, and a float trip, all with a complete air of indifference.
Two days after his arrest appellant was visited in jail by a school friend, Jon Miller. After telling Miller his version of the events, appellant was asked whether he was sorry for what he had done and replied, “if I had to do it all over again, I’d do the same thing.”
From all of the above evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that appellant’s killing of Clayton Dawson was a planned, deliberated and premeditated act and not, as he claims, the product of an assault by the victim and a retaliatory response.
State v. Lieberknecht,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant also states that “the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence presented.” This assertion raises no legitimate claim: “ ‘The weight of the evidence ... is not a matter reviewable by an appellate court’ ” (Citation omitted).
State v. Amerson,