STATE оf Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank GRANATO, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16365.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 11, 1980.
The instant case is an independent equity action filed for the purpose of setting aside the judgment. Among other things, it alleges negligence and fraud on the part of the defendant—claims not made in the Rule 60(b) motion.
The difficulty is that it is not clear what the basis was for the trial court‘s ruling denying the Rule 60(b) motion. The trial judge who granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the instant case did not indicate in his memorandum decision the basis for his ruling. The defendants argued that the claims alleged in this action were barred by the statute of limitations and that the prior ruling under
If the trial judge in the preceding case, in ruling on the motions under
Barring the court door to a person who has not had a hearing on the mеrits of his claim is a denial of fundamental fairness and due process of law. I see no reason to assume that the trial judge who entered summary judgment in this case on grounds of res judicata had any valid grounds for knowing the basis of the ruling made by another trial judge on the
In my view, this case should be remanded for an evidentiary determination of the grounds upon which the
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting oрinion of STEWART, J.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
SAM, District Judge:
Defendant Frank Granato appeals from his conviction by the court of an attempt to make a political contribution while employed as a representativе of Old Mr. Boston, a liquor distillery.1 Mr. Granato was fined $500.00.
Defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed as a matter of law on the following alternative grounds: that
The facts were stipulated. They reflect that on May 28, 1976, the defendant wаs a representative of Old Mr. Boston, a liquor distillery. He was also the owner of Granato Food Products and Frank Granato Importing Co., distributors of imported foods. Mr. Scott Matheson was at the time a candidate for the office of Governor of the Statе of Utah.
On two occasions prior to and again on May 28, 1976, Mr. Granato‘s food distributing business prepared and delivered trays of imported foods to fund-raising functions for the campaign of Mr. Matheson. On all three occasions, Mr. Granato charged the Mathesоn for Governor committee at the regular prices. He had received an invitation, along with many others, to attend a fund-raising function for Mr. Matheson, to be held on the evening of May 28, 1976.
With the purpose of promoting good will and future sales of food to the Matheson campaign organization, Mr. Granato accepted the invitation. Upon arrival, Mr. Granato was told that the campaign was taking fifty dollar contributions from all invited guests. Mr. Granato handed over his fifty dollars and when asked to sign a roster so that the cаmpaign would know to whom the offering should be credited, he declined. Later that evening, Mr. Matheson and his campaign manager reviewed all offerings received. Upon seeing the fifty dollar offering from Mr. Granato, the candidate stated that it would be inapрropriate to accept the money, declined to accept it, and ordered that it be returned.
On the day of the trial, the state moved to reduce the offense charged to an attempt to violate
A basic rule with respect to conviction of crime is that there must be some basis in the evidence upon which the fact trier (court or jury) could fairly and reasonably believe that the state had рroved every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; and unless that test is met, a conviction is not justified.
The State having chosen to charge the defendant with an attempt to commit a crime must prove that the defendant acted with the kind of criminal intent required for the commission of the offense, and which conduct constituted a substantial step towards its commission.2
The difficulty with the state‘s case relates to the matter of criminal intent. It will be seen from the statute, which is quoted in the dissent, that this рarticular statute is not solely a malum prohibitum statute, but that it recognizes and provides for some mens rea or guilty knowledge in violating it to justify conviction for crime. This is said in awareness of the formula set forth in
There is a further aspect of this alleged offense to be considered. There is nothing inherently wrong in a person making a contribution to assist another in his effort to be elected to public office. Even less so when it is expressly agreed that he did so without knowing it was wrong. Even if it were, it would seem that in order to makе out the offense of making an unlawful contribution to a campaign fund, it would take two persons: the offerer and the acceptor. A fair and reasonable view of the stipulated facts is that the defendant, without any sense of wrong doing, handed his money to а functionary; and as soon as the intended recipient learned of that fact, he declined to accept the offer. Our statutes do not expressly make an attempt to violate
It is perhaps understandable that the state desires to diligently pоlice and prosecute any violations of the statute referred to in order to keep candidates and public officials from being involved with improper control, influence or corruption. That is indeed a commendable objective with which we are in entire accord. Notwithstanding that proposition, upon our consideration of the facts as discussed herein, it is our conclusion that the actions and the intent of the defendant, as stipulated herein, are not such as to justify reasonable minds as bеlieving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offense.
With reference to the issue of constitutionality, this Court has held that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless it is essential to the solution of the controversy before it. Having determined that such is not essential to the case at hand, there is no need to consider the constitutionality of the statute.3
Reversed. No costs awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, J., concur.
CHRISTOFFERSEN, District Judge (dissenting):
The defendant was charged with a violation of
(1) No licensee under this act or any dealer in, manufacturer, distiller or agent or representative thereof of intoxicating liquor shall make any сontribution, either directly or indirectly, to any candidate for political office or to any political party.
The defendant was employed as a representative of Old Mr. Boston, a liquor distillery. On May 28, 1976, the defendant at a fund raising party for Governor Mаtheson, upon suggestion from someone there, contributed $50.00 to the campaign fund of Governor Matheson. This was later returned.
The majority opinion concludes that the defendant‘s conduct does not constitute the crime contemplated by the involved section of the code nor did his conduct constitute a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. The fact is the defendant is a representative of a liquor licensee under the code and that he directly made a contribution to а candidate for political office. It is urged by the majority that the State has not met its burden of proof in showing these actions meet the minimum requirements of criminal conduct necessary to establish his guilt.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: (1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence with respect to each element of the offense as the definition of the offense requires.
Elements of the offense are (1) that you be a liquor licensee or a dealer in, manufаcturer, distiller or agent or representative thereof; (2) that you either directly or indirectly make a contribution to any candidate for political office. Defendant certainly knew he was an agent of a liquor licensee; he certainly, intentionally and knowingly made the contribution. The fact that Governor Matheson later discovered he had received money from a liquor agent for a liquor licensee doesn‘t affect his conduct or intent at the time the contribution was made, nor does the fact that the defendant states he didn‘t know of the existence of the statute causing this to be a violation negate his intent to do what he did.
(1) Unless other provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense tо any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not сonstitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor‘s reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility fоr interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
The trial court may well have found on the basis of thе stipulated facts that when the defendant gave his contribution and was asked to sign a roster so that the campaign would know to whom to credit the offering, he declined, indicating he was willing to make the contribution but did not want a public record of it. But even so the above statute provides that ignorance of the statute is no defense to the crime except under certain conditions. Those conditions being written interpretations of the law or official statements of the law by authorized administrative agency. This does not exist in this case.
Therefore, it is the opinion of this writer that the defendant not only attempted to commit the violation, he succeeded in doing so and would, therefore, uphold the ruling of the trial court.
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate herein.