Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 John Edward Graham pled guilty to one count of Operation of Unlawful Clandestine Laboratory, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-132, MCA, while reserving his right to appeal from the Order of the District Court denying his Motion to Suppress Evidence. By an Order Consolidating Appeals issued by this Court on July 8, 2003, without objection by the State or by Graham, we consolidated the appeal of Shawnon Lanette Jarvis, Cause No. 03-163, a co-tenant of the residence occupied by Graham, pursuant to Rule 4(b), M.R.App.P., as these cases were likewise consolidated in the District Court on the Motion to Suppress. The facts and legal arguments raised below, and the Order of the District Court appealed herein, are identical. We reverse.
¶2 Did the District Court err when it denied Graham’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and concluded that:
¶3 1. the search warrant application contained sufficient probable cause to justify a search of Graham’s residence;
¶4 2. the search warrant application and the search warrant were not overly broad; and
¶5 3. the search warrant application was properly signed under oath?
¶6 Because Issue One is dispositive, we do not reach the remaining issues.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶7 On July 11,2002, Daniel Lawson was arrested in Lincoln County on a charge related to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Lawson confessed and offered to provide information about other clandestine methamphetamine laboratories operating in the Libby area. The information provided by Lawson led to the execution of a search warrant on Graham’s home and property.
¶8 The search warrant application was signed by Detective Klint Gassett of the Lincoln County Sheriffs Office on July 12, 2002, and signed by Lincoln County Justice of the Peace Marlene Herried the following day. The application recites that Gassett had probable cause to believe that an unlawful clandestine laboratory was operating on the premises of the “John Doe Residence” at 3890 South Highway #2 in Libby. Gassett alleged that the property contained items related to a clandestine laboratory and enunciated a list of items to search for that would be considered “contraband, evidence, fruits of the crime, and articles and instrumentalities used in the commission of the crime....” Gassett further states, “[t]hat the facts which are the grounds of this application and upon which applicant relies to establish probable cause for the issuance of a Search Warrant are outlined in the attached Exhibit ‘A’, incorporated by this reference herein.”
¶9 Exhibit A explains that, after confessing to operating a methamphetamine laboratory, Lawson provided information to the arresting officers about other Lincoln County residents who were allegedly manufacturing methamphetamine. It further states that information provided by Lawson about several individuals was corroborated by independent evidence and reports. Exhibit A includes Lawson’s physical description of Graham and the other residents of that household, whose names Lawson did not know. Further specifics Lawson provided about Graham as memorialized by Gassett in Exhibit
Lawson stated [John Doe] has a methamphetamines laboratory in his garage. [A woman and a child] reside in the house with [Doe]. They live in a one story white house with a fence. Their vehicles appear to be a Dodge Dart, maroon or red in color and a Silver 79 to 81 Oldsmobile. The home is next to HW#2 ... across the highway from Pioneer Auto Wrecking. There is an unattached garage next to the home and that is where the methamphetamine laboratory is located.
Lawson said that he has been to the home approximately 10 times, the last time being the day before this interview. Lawson said that he takes out Joe Dubler to the residence and that Joe Dubler cooks methamphetamines for [Doe]. That Dubler has told him this and that when he picks up Dubler from the residence he sometimes get[s] methamphetamines from Dubler. ... Dubler admitted to this affiant that he has been around methamphetamine laboratories. Dubler denies knowing how to cook. Dubler has a prior record for drug related crimes.
Lawson told this affiant that Chris Stone told him he taught [Doe] to cook methamphetamines and that the methamphetamine laboratory was in the garage of DOE....
Lawson told your affiant that... Stone has been in the garage and does cook methamphetamines with DOE. Lawson stated to your affiant that he has dropped Dubler off at the residence and ... Dubler go[es] into the garage with DOE. Lawson stated that when he has picked up Dubler from that location that Dubler has brought out methamphetamines to his vehicle from the garage. Lawson stated that Dublers [sic] and Stone told him recently that the Methamphetamine Laboratory at the DOE residence/garage is still operational.
On July 11, 2002, Lawson showed your affiant where the ... residence/garage was located. The home is as described by Lawson, except that there is light green trim on the one story home. [On] July 12,2002, your affiant got close enough to see the license plate on a gray or silver 4-door vehicle parked in front [of] the house ... registered to a Shawnon Jarvis.... An owner registration check shows that Jarvis also owns a 1994 Saturn 2Door Maroon in color....
The address taken from the Saturn 2-Door registration check is the same address that Lawson showed your affiant where the DOE residence was located....
*114 On July 11,2002 your affiant saw Joe Dublers mother’s vehicle at [this residence]. Your affiant has seen Joe Dubler drive this vehicle before.
With all the information provided your affiant believes that there is a Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratory at the JOHN DOE residence located at 3890 S HW #2, Libby, Mt. Lawsons previous information has turned out to be true and correct and there is no known reason why the information regarding this methamphetamine laboratory should be any different.
¶10 After the search warrant was signed on July 13, the home and property of “John Doe”-who turned out to be John Graham-was subsequently searched. No evidence of a methamphetamine laboratory was found in the garage, but evidence was located and seized elsewhere on the property. After Graham’s arrest, he moved to suppress the evidence gained in the search of his residence. The District Court denied the Motion. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Graham pled guilty to Operation of Unlawful Clandestine Laboratory, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-132, MCA, and reserved his right to appeal the denial of the pretrial Motion to Suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court’s interpretation and application of the law is correct. State v. Marks,
DISCUSSION
¶12 Did the District Court err when it denied Graham’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and concluded that the search warrant application contained sufficient probable cause to justify a search of Graham’s residence?
¶13 Graham argues that the District Court erred when it concluded that Detective Gassett’s search' warrant application contained sufficient probable cause to justify a search of his residence. He argues that the application contained only information identifying Graham’s garage as a location in which a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operated. While he concedes that the search warrant
¶14 The State responds that the search warrant application enunciated a substantial number of facts establishing probable cause that criminal activity had occurred in the residence and was not confined to the garage. The State points to specific facts in the warrant, and asserts that, “a reasonable inference supports the determination that the kinds of ingredients and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine would be found in the home where a suspect resides next to an unattached garage.” The State claims that it is a reasonable inference that the circumstances set forth in Gassett’s application would lead a magistrate to conclude that many of the easily portable common household items, such as cold tablets, matches, and cookware, would move back and forth between the house and the unattached garage. The State, citing State v. Sundberg (1988),
¶15 Pursuant to § 46-5-101(1), MCA, a search of a place may be made and evidence may be seized by the authority of a valid search warrant. A warrant is valid if the application made in support thereof states facts sufficient to show probable cause in accordance with the requirements of § 46-5-221, MCA. Marks, ¶ 14. Section 46-5-221, MCA, provides:
Grounds for search warrant. A judge shall issue a search warrant to a person upon application, in writing or by telephone, made under oath or affirmation, that:
(1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed;
(2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that*116 evidence, contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found;
(3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and
(4) particularly describes who or what is to be seized.
¶16 In its Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, the District Court found that, while Lawson personally observed activity which circumstantially implicated Graham, he did not have direct personal observation of criminal activity by Graham. Thus, the District Court concluded, independent corroboration that suspicious activity was taking place at the location specified by Lawson would be required. (See State v. Reesman,
The subsequent police investigation verified a number of innocent details - that the house was similar to the way it was described by Lawson, that Graham had a gray Oldsmobile, that Graham’s girlfriend was approximately the height and weight described by Lawson - but it also established that a car registered to Joe Dubler’s mother and known to be driven by Joe Dubler, a known drug user - according to his prior criminal record and his own admission - was parked at Graham’s residence on July 11, 2002, the day before the search warrant application was prepared. With that piece of police work, Lawson’s information was adequately corroborated.
Thus, the District Court concluded, the totality of circumstances recited in the search warrant application established probable cause to believe that the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine was being committed on Graham’s property and that evidence of the crime would be found there.
¶17 While we agree that the information supplied by Lawson was corroborated by the appearance of the Graham residence and the presence there of an automobile used by Dubler, such corroborating information does not-without more-supply probable cause to search the residence. The command to search can never include more than is covered by the showing of probable cause to search. United States v. Hinton (7th Cir. 1955),
¶18 The Dissent argues that methamphetamine laboratories are, by their very nature, portable entities. While this may be true, there were no allegations in this search warrant application that the lab or its parts had been or were being transported. Although the affidavit states that Graham was using his garage for the manufacture of methamphetamine, the affidavit does not state that Graham was engaged in the sale of methamphetamine or that Graham personally transported the methamphetamine from place to place, as the Dissent asserts. The only accusation of methamphetamine transport in the application was as to Dubler, and not as to Graham. Had there been allegations in the application of items being transported back and forth by Graham, we would have no problem upholding the search of Graham’s home. If the government demands to search a person’s home, then it must have probable cause and a warrant; without both, the search is per se unreasonable. This is the “indelible rule.” While there are a few “specifically established” and “well-delineated” exceptions to the warrant requirement, a “meth lab” exception is not one of them. We therefore reject the State’s contention that because the easily portable items associated with methamphetamine laboratories, such as cold tablets, matches and cookware, could “move back and forth” between the house and the unattached garage, the search of the residence was justified.
¶19 We have long recognized the sanctity of the home and the need for particularity in granting search warrant applications. State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court (1921),
¶20 Homes have special protection in search and seizure law. In State v. Therriault, 2000 MT 286, ¶ 53,
In analyzing the officer’s entrance of the home, however, we restate[] the indelible rule that warrantless searches conducted inside a home are per se unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” [State v. Hubbel (1997),286 Mont. 200 , 212,951 P.2d 971 , 978.] This Court has routinely stated that the physical invasion of the home is the chief evil to which the 4th Amendment and Montana’s Article II, § 11, are directed. We have emphasized again and again that the entrance to the home is where the federal and Montana constitutions draw a firm line, and that absent an exception, that threshold may not be crossed without a warrant. See, e.g., State v. Kao (1985),215 Mont. 277 , 282-83,697 P.2d 903 , 907 (quoting Payton v. New York (1980),445 U.S. 573 ,100 S. Ct. 1371 ,63 L.Ed.2d 639 ); State v. Bassett,1999 MT 109 , ¶ 25,294 Mont. 327 , ¶ 25,982 P.2d 410 , ¶ 25.
Therriault at ¶ 53. We recently reaffirmed this principle in State v. Stone,
‘At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.’ State v. Scheetz,286 Mont. 41 , 48-49,950 P.2d 722 , 726. ‘The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to protect the privacy and security of individuals and safeguard the sanctity of the home against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’Dorwart v. Caraway,1998 MT 191 , ¶ 21,290 Mont. 196 , ¶ 21,966 P.2d 1121 , ¶ 21 [(overruled on other grounds)].
¶22 Although the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses more than the home, the home, nonetheless, is historically the raison d’etre for the constitutional protection. The people’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure in their “houses” was drawn from the English common-law maxim “A man’s home is his castle.” Minnesota v. Carter (1998),
When an official search is properly authorized - whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant - the scope of the search is limited by the terms of the authorization. Consent to search a garage would not implicitly authorize a search of an adjoining house; a warrant to search for a stolen refrigerator would not authorize the opening of desk drawers. Because “indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment,” Payton v. New York,445 U.S. 575 , 583, that Amendment requires that the scope of every authorized search be particularly described.
Walter v. United States (1980),
¶23 Curiously, the Dissent complains that our decision here today means, “that from now on, in Montana, a home can no longer be the subject of a search warrant unless there is probable cause that relates directly to the home....” See Dissent, ¶ 31 (emphasis in original). Indeed. This is neither a new or disturbing holding-it has long been the case that, without probable cause, law enforcement officers may not search a person’s home. Like it or not, that is the law under both the federal and Montana Constitutions. Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution, people are explicitly guaranteed the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in their houses and homes.
¶24 As noted above, the mere portability of items commonly used in a methamphetamine laboratory does not justify the search of otherwise unimplicated structures. This is especially true when the unimplicated structure is a person’s home. See State v. Kaluza (1993),
¶25 The warrant requirement is the mechanism implementing the constitutional protection against the “chief evil” of the government physically invading the privacy and sanctity of a person’s home. It is the requirement which prevents precisely the sort of fishing expedition for evidence based on speculation and suspicion that the Dissent appears to find acceptable. Indeed, long ago we specifically condemned this practice. State ex rel. Thibodeau v. District Court (1924),
¶26 Moreover, this bedrock principle cannot be overcome by resorting solely to “common sense,” “practical considerations,” and “probability.” Facts stated in the application are also statutorily and constitutionally required before the magistrate is entitled to use these other intuitive approaches in making the totality of circumstances determination. State v. Kuneff,
¶27 Rather, if the authorities had probable cause to search Graham’s home, then they were required under well-settled principles of search and seizure law to include facts supporting that conclusion within the four comers of the search warrant application and to ensure that the home was particularly designated as a place to be searched in the warrant. See State v. Meyer,
CONCLUSION
¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the District Court denying the Motions to suppress filed by Graham and Jarvis and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissents.
¶29 I dissent. This decision will fragment our jurisprudence defining probable cause sufficient to support a search warrant. I would apply the same rules for issuing a search warrant for a residence as I would apply to one’s person, one’s medical records, one’s automobile, and yes, to one’s garage. I would also apply, contrary to what the Court does here, the totality of circumstances test, and common sense.
¶30 Although I emphatically agree with the Court that probable cause to search a detached garage does not automatically translate into probable cause to search a person’s residence on the same property, the warrant was proper as to both structures in this instance. A warrant may issue covering two separate structures based upon information regarding only one structure where, like here, there is a showing that the separate structures are related to each other or used in connection with each other in some material way. See Steele v. United States (1925),
¶31 The Court states: “the mere portability of items commonly used in a methamphetamine laboratory does not justify the search of otherwise unimplicated structures.” ¶ 24. This statement blithely disregards the probability that methamphetamine itself would bp found where the defendant was. I also find particularly troublesome the Court’s implication that from now on, in Montana, a home can no longer be the subject of a search warrant unless there is probable cause that relates directly to the home, no matter what the totality of circumstances, or common sense, indicate. These statements disregard our existing jurisprudence defining the permissible breadth of a search warrant, abrogate the common sense and totality of the circumstances approach to the breadth of search warrants, and make law
¶32 “In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” State v. Rinehart (1993),
¶33 A search will be upheld if “the nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched rested not on direct observation ... but on the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect’s opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide [the contraband].” State v. Pease (1986),
¶34 In Pease, the defendant attempted to suppress evidence seized from his home and his vehicle arguing that probable cause did not exist to search those locations. Pease,
¶35 Similarly, the affidavit in this case indicated that the manufacture of methamphetamine was taking place in the garage located next to the house. This should not preclude a finding of probable cause that evidence of the criminal activity would also be found in the defendant’s residence. Although the informant’s observations indicated the manufacturing was in the garage, the affidavit also stated that the informant had observed the transfer of methamphetamine from Graham’s garage to the informant’s vehicle. The informant reported
¶36 Based upon this evidence of distribution, as well as the officer’s knowledge and experience, a logical nexus existed between the manufacturing site and the residence next to it, where the defendant lived. An issuing magistrate, using a common sense approach, and considering the totality of the circumstances, could easily find that the facts lead to a natural inference that contraband would likely be found in the house especially considering the items sought by law enforcement. See Pease,
¶37 We, like other courts, have recognized that drug trade is a very mobile and portable criminal undertaking. See State v. Byers,
¶38 Law enforcement is also familiar with methamphetamine manufacturers’ efforts to avoid detection, including the production of the drug in a piecemeal fashion. People v. Hard (Ct. App. 2003),
¶39 This knowledge and common sense strengthen the likelihood that
¶40 Here, the Court requires more than this probability of criminal activity in the home, and seemingly imposes a direct observation standard for probable cause to attach to the home. Contra State v. Pease,
¶41 I do not harbor the opinion that there should be any type of “meth lab exception” to the constitution and the statutes. I am of the opinion that, in determining whether there is sufficient probable cause to search a residence, the totality of circumstances should be considered, which includes the use and nature of the items sought, as well as the nexus between separate structures. And, I also think that common sense should not be thrown out the garage window.
¶42 I would conclude the District Court’s decision, that the magistrate made a practical, common sense determination there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the residence, is correct.
¶43 I dissent.