OPINION
¶1 Matthew Graham challenges his convie-tions for terroristic threat, a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-(2)(a) (2008) (current version at id. § 76-5-107.3(1)(b)G), (2)(a) (Supp. 2011)), and domestic violence in the presence of a child, a third degree felony, see id. § 76-5-109.1(2)(b), (8)(a) (2008) (current version at id. (Supp. 2011)). Specifically, Graham claims that he could not be convicted of felony terroristic threat because the sheriff's office does not constitute a "unit of government" or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to a lesser punishment because the sheriffs office is both a unit of government and an ageney organized to respond to emergencies. He also contends that he could not be guilty of felony domestic violence in the presence of a child because he did not "use" a dangerous weapon. We affirm.
BACKGROUND 1
¶2 At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, January 81, 2008, forty to fifty officers from the Utah County Sheriff's Office, including members of its SWAT and hostage negotiation teams, as well as neighboring police and fire departments, responded to a report of domestic violence occurring at Graham's home in Eagle Mountain, Utah. The standoff that еnsued lasted four to five hours before Graham surrendered.
I. The Events Inside Graham's Home
¶3 Earlier that day, Graham and his wife (Wife) had gotten into an argument after Wife indicated that she was not feeling well enough to accommodate his sexual desires. Throughout the morning, Graham's frustration and anger escalated, and Wife was unable to "calm him down by talking." Because Graham had previously threatened to kill Wife and dispose of her body, Wife began to fear that he might actually seriously harm her or even end her life. As a result, she telephoned a friend to pick up their four children so that the children would not continue to be exposed to the argument or witness physical violence, if any occurred. Once Graham discovered that Wife had asked a friend to care for the children, he told Wife to call the friend back and tell her not to come because the "kids aren't going anywhere." Graham then ordered the children upstairs to clean the loft, which was used as a playroom; Wife went with them. The Grahams' daughter testified that by that point her mother was "[slobbing, bawling" and her father was "in a rage."
¶4 In the loft, Wife sent a text message to the friend she had called to care for the children, in which she pleaded with her friend, "[Flight [for] custody of my kids" "[when [I']m gone." The friend, who had already begun driving to the Graham home, contacted a person she knew at the sheriffs office to have a deputy sent to the home. In the meantime, Wife went into the master bedroom to pack a change of clothing and some medicine for herself. She also wrote a
¶5 Wife then returned to the loft. Graham came in a few minutes later with two handguns holstered on his belt. Although the Grahams' daughter testified that it was not unusual for her father to wear his guns, Wife testified that her husband had never before armed himself during an argument. Graham and Wife again argued over whether the children could leave the home, and Graham demanded that Wife contact the friend to "[tJell her not to come or [Graham] would shoot her [(the friend) ]." Wife then called the friend and begged her not to come. After Graham left the loft, Wife sent a text message to her church bishop, which read, "Please help me!" The bishop did not recognize the number, but he immediately called it back. According to the bishop, Wife answered in a whisper that she was in trouble, that Graham had his guns, and that he had ordered her "to kill herself and the children or that [he] would." The bishop asked if Wife was in immediate danger, and she said yes. Wife then hung up because Graham was returning. The bishop called 911.
¶6 Graham returned to the loft after having discovered the bag that Wife had packed. Graham became even more furious, raising his voice and throwing the bag. Three of the children retreated to the corner while one child attempted to protect Wife. Graham repeatedly told the children that their mother was going to kill herself, and he read them the note that she had written to them. As a result, the children began to ery and the eldest child became "hysterical."
¶7 At that point, law enforcement officers arrived at the home. Graham said, " 'Here we go," and walked down the stairs to answer the door. Because Graham considered the police to be "the enemy" and he was holding one gun in his hand and had another on his belt, Wife testified that she expected gunfire immediately. Consequently, she begged Graham "not to do it." Graham retorted, ""This is what you wanted."" Wife and the children hid in the corner of the loft while Graham opened the door.
IL The Police Standoff
¶8 Deputy B.J. Eckles and Deputy Jared Nelson of the Utah County Sheriff's Office 2 responded to the Graham home after receiving a report of domestic violence by a person who was in possession of multiple guns, had military training, and was possibly suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. They were also told that the man had threatened to kill his wife and possibly himself. In response to the officers' knock, Graham opened the door approximately twelve inches so that the officers could see only his head and his shoulder.
¶9 Deputy Ecekles explained that they were responding to a report of domestic violence and asked Graham if they could enter the home. Graham responded "no" and told the officers to leave his property. Deputy Eckles testified that Graham was "very agitated," "volatile," and "angry" that officers were there. He then asked if Graham had something in his hand. Graham replied, " 'I do.'" When asked if it was a weapon, Graham answered, " 'That's for me to know and for you to find out'" At that point, the officers drew their weapons but kept them in a "low ready position." Deputy Eckles then asked if he could speak to Wife. Graham called Wife to the door and told her that she could leave. Wife refused to leave without the children so Graham told her that the children could go as well. As Wife and the children prepared to go, they kept their eyes fixed on Graham's right hand. The children refused to make eye contact with their father, and they walked as far away as possible from him as they exited the front door. Wife described it as the "scariest walk of [her] life" because she was "afraid that [Graham]
¶10 A short while later, Lieutenant Neil Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriff's Office met several officers inside a nearby home where Wife and the children had been taken to receive a briefing on what had transpired. When Graham called Wife's cell phone, Lieutenant Castleberry answered the call 3 Lieutenant Castleberry explained to Graham that the officers' goals were to "keep him ... and the community safe" and to "resolve the situation at the lowest level possible." When Graham indicated that he had not done anything wrong and that he wanted the officers to leave his property, Lieutenant Castleberry informed him that the officers "weren't going away because a crime [ (domestic violence)] had been committed." 4 Lieutenant Castleberry explained that the officers would remain on the seene until Graham came out of the home without any weapons and spoke to them. At that point, Graham stated that he "had no intention to come out ..., that he felt that [the officers] being there was a threat to him and his property, . and that ... [if he saw] any individual that he felt posed a threat to him{, he] would . take action to neutralize the threat." Graham also indicated that he had the "training and the means" to "neutralize the threat." Lieutenant Castleberry understood Graham's statements to mean that Graham would shoot any officer that he observed on his property. In subsequent calls, Graham made similar statements. Lieutenant Castle-berry kept Wife's cell phone in order to stay in communication with Graham when he left the home for the on-scene command post.
¶11 At the command post, Lieutenant Castleberry briefed Lieutenant Walter Pershon, the Utah County SWAT commander. During this briefing, Graham called Lieutenаnt Castleberry again. Graham continued to insist that he had done nothing wrong and expressed increasing frustration that the officers had not left. He reiterated that he had military training and was "willing and able" to harm any officers he observed. Graham became "quite agitated" and demanded that the officers " '[jJJust leave [him] alone and go away' "; then he disconnected the call. Lieu tenant Pershon, who was present during this call, testified that because he perceived the situation to be "escalating very rapidly" and because he felt "desperation" about the safety of his officers, he borrowed Wife's cell phone to call Graham. Lieutenant Pershon was not a negotiator, but he hoped to connect with Graham because he had similar military training and experience. Over the next hour, Graham and Lieutenant Pershon spoke five or six times. Lieutenant Pershon testified that Graham continued to threaten to take action against the officers for approximately ten minutes of the first call. Specifically, the lieutenant reported that Graham stated that he could see armed police officers in his backyard and that he was capable of " 'tak[ing] someone out at 700 yards.' "
5
Gra
¶12 Graham and Lieutenant Pershon discussed "exit strategies," which would include Graham putting away his weapons and coming out of the home. Graham eventually settled on the idea that he wanted assurance that he would not be charged with any crimes. At this point, Lieutenant Pershon handed the negotiations over to Deputy Whitnie Tait, a member of the sheriff's office negotiation team. Deputy Tait testified at trial that she spoke with Graham numerous times during which he remained in control of his emotions but demanded that the officers leave his property and that he be provided with a letter assuring him that he would not be criminally charged. Deputy Tait's negotiations with Graham lasted two-and-one-half to three hours. The officers, in coordination with the county attorney, finally decided to provide Graham with such a letter, though it was a ruse used only because the officers could think of no other way to persuade Graham to surrender. Tait testified that she read the letter to Graham over the phone. Tait reported that after she read the letter, she heard movement from Graham and the sound of a gun magazine being ejected. Graham then left the home unarmed and was taken into custody.
III. The Charges and Trial
¶13 Graham was charged by information with aggravated kidnapping or, in the alternative, with aggravated assault (domestic violence), felony terroristic threat, and felony domestic violence in the presence of a child. The jury found Graham guilty of the terroristic threat and domestic violence in the presence of a child charges and acquitted him of the other charges. Graham now appeals the convictions.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶14 Graham first complains that the trial court erred in the pertinent jury instruction by defining the "unit of government" element of the terroristic threat statute to include "a police department or agency," thus including, in effect, the county sheriff's office. Questions of statutory interpretation are matters of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. McNearmey,
¶ 15 Graham also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for domestic violence in the presence of a child. In particular, Graham argues that "reasonable minds could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" because he merely possessed the gun and possession of a dangerous weapon by itself does not constitute "use" as a matter of law. See generally State v. Hales,
IL. Terroristic Threat
¶ 16 The terroristic threat statute in effect on January 31, 2008, provided, in relevant part,
(1) A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damages, and:
[[Image here]]
(b) he acts with intent to:
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the conduct of a government or a unit of government; {[or]
(8) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies;
[[Image here]]
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection ... (1)(b)) is a second degree felony.
[[Image here]]
(c) Any other violation of this seсtion is a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1)(b)(i), (2)(a), (c) (2008) (emphases added) (current version at id. § 76-5-107.3(1)(b)i(), (iii), (2) (Supp.2011)). The trial court instructed the jury that a " '[glovernment or unit of government' includes a police department or agency." Graham admits that his implicit threats to harm the officers constituted an offense under the terroristic threat statute and that his actions were directed at a police department, namely the sheriff's office, but disputes the trial court's determination that a police department constitutes a "unit of government." Alternatively, Graham asserts that the sheriff's office is both a "unit of government" and an "official ... agency organized to deal with emergencies" and that because the actions necessary to constitute an offense are the same regardless of the entity, he is entitled to a conviction on the misdemeanor offense under the rule of lenity, "[the judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous eriminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment," Black's Law Dictionary 1449 (9th ed. 2009). 6
¶17 The State does not dispute Graham's position that a "unit of government" may have an emergency response function but advocates an interpretation of the statute that takes into account not only the type of entity targeted by the threat but also the nature of the action the threat is intended to evoke. It argues that by considering together the identity of the targeted governmental body and what a defendant is demanding that it do, this court can reconcile any conflicts within the statutory language by "affording each provision a meaningful purpose and separating [a] convoluted statute[ ] with a meaningful distinction," see State v. Jeffries,
¶ 18 "Our goal when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. It is axiomatic that the best evidence of legislative intеnt is the plain language of the statute itself." Anderson v. Bell,
119 The terroristic threat statute identifies two types of entities that may be the
¶20 Our analysis begins with the nature of the entity targeted by the threat. A voluntary fire department, an entity whose principal purpose is to respond to emergencies, seems to be a quintessential example of a "volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies," and an organized fire department may represent its "official" counterpart. When a threat is made to "cause action of any nature" by an agency like these, the terroristic threat statute seems unambiguous in confining the level of conviction to a class B misdemeanor. See generally id. § 76-5-107(1)(b)Gi).
¶21 A "unit of government," however, has broader responsibilities than do emergency response entities, including management of resources, maintenance of order and public peace, establishment and implementation of public policy goals, as well as many other functions in support of the public weal. Most governments also have an inherent responsibility to respond to the great variеty of emergencies that inevitably arise within their jurisdictions, and in this sense most govern
¶22 "The sheriffs office is an elective office of the county ... and is a co-ordinate office or branch of our county government." Sheriff of Salt Lake Cnty. v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake Cnty.,
¶23 That said, the statutory language itself gives no discernable guidance as to whether the two categories of government entities it refers to are mutually exclusive for the statute's purposes or whether they can overlap. Common understanding of the terms suggests they might overlap in certain instances. See generally Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City,
¶24 This assumption does nоt resolve the statutory puzzle in this case, however, due to the apparently coextensive nature of the activity that is protected by both the felony and misdemeanor provisions in the statute. The felony provision proscribes a threat intended to "influence or affect the conduct" of a governmental entity, while the threat addressed by the misdemeanor provision is one aimed at "caus[ing] action of any nature" by the targeted emergency responder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1)(b)(i)(ii). Common dictionary definitions do not suggest a ready distinction between these terms. For example, to "influence" is "to affect or alter the conduct, thought or character of by indirect or intangible means: sway" or "to have an effect on the condition or development of: . modify," Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1160 (1993), and "conduct" is defined as "the act, manner, or process of ... carrying forward (as a business, government, or war): management," id. at 473, while "cause" means to "bring into existence: make," id. at 356, and "action" is "[the process of doing something; conduct or behavior" or "[al thing done," Black's Law Dictionary 3.2 (9th ed.2009).
12
Based on their definitions аnd common usage, both "influence or affect the conduct" and "cause action of any nature" seem to encompass virtually any attempt to cause or affect a governmental entity's response to a threat. The terroristic threat statute is therefore also ambiguous as to whether a threat aimed at inducing some action or response by government, if made in the context of an emergency, can be intended to either "influence or affect the conduct of" a governmental unit or "cause action of any nature" by an ageney formed to respond to
¶25 Nevertheless, the legislature has elected to attach disparate penalties to attempts to influence the conduct of governmental units when compared with simply causing action by an еmergency response ageney. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(2)(a), (c) (2008) (current version at id. § 76-5-107.8(2) (Supp. 2011)) (classifying a threat to influence the conduct of government as a second degree felony and a threat to cause action by an emergency agency as a class B misdemeanor). Compare id. § 76-3-208(2) (2008) (imposing a prison term of one to fifteen years for a second degree felony), with id. § 76-8-204(2) (punishing class B misdemeanors with a maximum prison term of six months). It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the greater penalty was reserved for threats aimed at something broader and more significant in terms of governmental functioning than the on-the-ground handling of the emergency itself. See generally id. § 76-1-106 (requiring provisions of the code to "be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes"); id. § 76-1-104(8) (including, as one of the purposes of the criminal code, the "[pjrescri{ption of] penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses").
¶26 For this reason, it makes sense to charge as a misdemeanor, for example, a person's threat to set his house on fire unless the voluntary fire department stays off the property or parks the fire trucks around the corner. In this context, the threat only seeks action within the purview of the emer-geney response itself, that is, the tactical, on-the-ground decisions of how the agency will deal with this particular emergency. But when the object of a threat goes beyond the immediate tactical decisions of the emer-geney and is targeted at the kind of decisions that fall within the more expansive authority and responsibility of a "government or unit of government," then the threat moves over the line from misdemeanor to felony. While the line we limn remains somewhat imprecise, it nevertheless serves the canonical purpose of "affording each provision a meaningful purpose and separating convoluted statutes with a meaningful distinction," see State v. Jeffries,
¶27 Here, Graham demanded, under the implicit threat of violence, that the officers entirely abandon their public responsibility by departing the seene without arresting him for any domestic violence crimes committed within the home or any criminal aspects of the armed stand-off and without ensuring that Graham was emotionally stable and no longer a potential threat to himself or the safety of his immediate family, the neighbors, or the broader community. As further assurance that there would be no
II. Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child
428 Graham also challenges his conviction for domestic violence in the presence of a child. A person is guilty of domestic violence in the presence of a child if he "uses a dangerous weapon ... against a cohabitant, in the presence of a child." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1(2)(b) (2003) (current version at id. (Supp. 2011)). Graham argues that his conviction must be reversed because "the State failed to prove every element of the offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a third-degree felony, to wit: that
he used a dangerous weapon." (Second emphasis added.) To support this contention, Graham asserts that the only information before the jury upon which it could have based a conclusion that he "used" a dangerous weapon was that he was in possession of two guns during the course of the events. According to Wife's own testimony, Graham never pointed a gun at her or the children. Wife also testified that Graham did not overtly threaten to shoot her or to otherwise use a gun against her. Graham argues that he therefore did not "use" a weapon as the statute requires because the plain meaning of the word "use" requires active employment of the firearm. At the very minimum, he asserts that "use" requires something more than mere possession-for instance an explicit threat, by word, action, or gesture.
17
Al
¶29 In previous decisions, we have held that possession amounted to "use" where the facts of the case indicated that the presence of the weapon was intended to cause fear. For example, in In re R.G.B.,
¶30 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers the evidence and the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence to determine whether there is a basis upon which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Pedersen,
¶31 Wife testified that she was very afraid of Graham because of his prior threats to "hurt [her] and dispose of [her] body." This fear intensified when she saw that Graham had armed himself with guns, something that she testified he had never done during an argument. A defense witness corroborated Wife's statements, testifying that although she had seen Graham with a gun previously, she had never seen him armed during an argument. Indeed, the bishop testified that Wife had told him that Graham had threatened to kill her and the children and that it was Wife's fear of imminent danger that caused him to immediately contact the police department. The officers who responded to the home also indicated that Wife appeared
¶32 The fact that the evidence may be in conflict does not undermine its sufficiency to support the finding. It is within the province of the jury, as the finder of fact, to make credibility determinations. See Child v. Gonda,
CONCLUSION
¶33 Graham's threats to harm the officers responding to reports of domestic violence at his home were intended to influence or affect the conduct of government because they were targeted at the discretionary functions of government, namely the decisions about who, when, and how to charge with criminal offenses. Consequently, we uphold his cоnviction for felony terroristic threat. In addition, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Graham "used" a dangerous weapon against Wife in the presence of their children. Graham's conviction for domestic violence in the presence of a child is therefore affirmed.
¶34 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judge.
Notes
. "On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Jeffs,
. Eagle Mountain contracted with the Utah County Sheriff's Office for police services.
. Audio recording equipment was not available, and no written reports detailing the specifics of the calls were made. Consequently, the account of what occurred during the negotiation discussions comes from the testimony of the three Utah County Sheriff's Officers who spoke with Graham.
. It is undisputed that Graham was not at that time a restricted person for purposes of gun ownership, that all of his weapons were legal, and that neither possession of nor arming oneself with a weapon inside one's home is unlawful. Nevertheless, based on the information they had at the time, the officers were appropriately concerned that a domestic violence offense had been committed.
. During this time, approximately twenty-four SWAT team members and an unknown number of other police officers had taken up positions around Graham's home. Various officers testi
. The State interprets Graham's opening brief as also raising an argument pursuant to State v. Shondel,
. The "Making a False Alarm" statute contains similar language, but our appellate courts have not yet had an opportunity to interpret the language in that context either. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105 (2008) ("A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bombing, or other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or warning is false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of any building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, to cause public inconvenience or alarm or action of any sort by any official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies." {(emphasis added)).
The only other statute that we could locate that includes both the "influence" the conduct of government and "cause action" by any agency organized to deal with emergencies language is from Texas. Under the Texas Penal Code, one is guilty of a class B misdemeanor terroristic threat if "he threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or prоperty with intent to[ ] cause a reaction of any type to his threat by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies" and a third degree felony ter-roristic threat if he makes such a threat to "influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the federal government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state." Tex. Penal Code Amn. § 22.07(a)(1), (6), (b), (e) (Vernon, Westlaw through first called session of 82nd legislature) (emphases added). We have not located any Texas appellate court decisions interpreting this language.
. Although officers responded from at least one municipal police department, the Utah County Sheriff's Office was the agency in charge of the response because the incident was occurring within its jurisdiction. Additionally, the sheriff's office conducted all of the interactions with Graham and was the primary target of his threats and demands. Consequently, our discussion focuses specifically on whether a sheriff's office, as opposed to police departments in general, is a unit of government under this statute.
. "Preserving the peace" conceivably can involve both emergency and nonemergency functions. For example, responding to a crime in progress may amount to an emergency response, while patrolling of businesses or neighborhoods and providing school resource officers are part of a broader effort to keep the peace and avoid emergencies.
. Such an interpretation is not incongruous with the interpretations of the phrase "unit of government" in other jurisdictions. The District of Columbia defines "{uJnit of government" in its "Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002" as including "[alny executive department or agency of the District of Columbia, including any independent agency, board, or commission." D.C.Code § 22-3152(11)(E) (Westlaw through July 2011). New York's terroristic threat statute, which does not define unit of government and contains the same level of generality as Utah's statute, see N.Y. Penal Law § 490.20(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2011 legislature), has applied the term more broadly to include public employees of a governmental department, specifically the Department of Social Services, see People v. Jenner, 39 AD.3d 1083, 835 NYS.2d 501, 504-05 (N.Y¥.App.Div.2007).
. The term "governmental unit" is dеfined as including "[a] subdivision, agency, department, county, parish, municipality, or other unit of government of a country or a state." Black's Law Dictionary 765 (Oth ed. 2009) (emphasis added). j
. Definitions from other sources further highlight the apparent convergence of meaning in these terms. For example, "influence" is also defined as the exercise of "the capacity or power . to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behaviors, opinions, etc. of others," Random House, Inc., Dictionary.com Unabridged, available at http://dictionary. reference.com/browse/influence (last visited September 16, 2011), while "cause" means to "make ... happen," New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed.), OxfordDictionaries.com, available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cause? region=51fus (last visited September 16, 2011). "Conduct" is "the action or manner of managing an activity or organization," New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed.), OxfordDictionaries.com, available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/conduct?region=us (last visited September 16, 2011), and "action" means "something done or performed; act; deed," Random House, Inc., Dictionary.com Unabridged, available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ action (last visited September 16, 2011).
. As we have already explained, we have reserved the question of whether a government or unit of government can even be classified as an "agency organized to deal with emergencies" for purposes of this statute and are simply accepting for purposes of appeal Graham's contention that the statute allows a governmental entity to be classified as both. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that any threat described by the statute (ie., a threat "to commit any offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damages," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1) (2008) (current version at id. § 76-5-107.3 (Supp.2011))) is likely to precipitate an emergency of some sort, and if every government action in response to that emergency were therefore deemed to fall within the scope of the misdemeanor provision, the felony provision would become virtually meaningless.
. Even though the sheriff's office purported to agree to Grаham's demands in the context of a tactical decision about how to negotiate in response to his threat and resolve the ensuing emergency, Graham's threats were made with the intent of influencing the sheriff's office (and ultimately the county prosecutor) to, in fact, simply walk away from the situation without resolving the immediate risk he posed and without filing any criminal charges. What Graham was seeking was actual assurance that the government would tie its hands in response to his threats. Such a threat is aimed at influencing or affecting the conduct of government, whether or not the government actually accedes to the threat or, as here, disarms it with a tactical ruse.
. The New York decisiоn of People v. Jenner, 39 AD.3d 1083, 835 NY.S.2d 501 (N.Y.App.Div.2007), provides an interesting parallel. There, the defendant had threatened to kill certain employees of the Department of Social Services (DSS) after they informed his girlfriend that pursuant to DSS policy, her minor son would not be returned to her as long as she allowed the defendant, a convicted sex offender, to reside with her. See id. at 503. The defendant was charged and convicted of making a terroristic threat. See id. at 504. In New York,
"(al person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when with intent to ... influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kid-naping, he or she threatens to commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and there-
by causes a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such an offense." Id. (alteration and omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 490.20(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2011 legislature)). Although the defendant argued that "his conduct was not what the Legislature had in mind when it enacted th{e} statute after the terroristiс attacks of September 11, 2001, and he should not [therefore] be labeled a terrorist," the Jenner court upheld the defendant's conviction, stating that his threat "was intended to intimidate or coerce public employees to influence DSS's policy regarding contact between children and sex offenders" and the defendant's intention in making the threat was to interfere with this policy. See id. The Utah statute, while not including New York's policy-focused language, proscribes nearly identical threats. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1)(b)) (2008) (criminalizing threats intended "to influence or affect the conduct of ... a unit of government"), with N.Y. Penal Law § 490.20(1) (proscribing threats intended to "affect the conduct of the unit of government"). Many states adopted similar language in creating anti-terrorism statutes following September 11, 2001, although we have located no cases where the pertinent language is interpreted. See, eg., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-203(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 regular session) (prohibiting certain threats intended to "influence the policy of a government or a unit of government"); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5421(a)(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through 2010 regular session) (prohibiting certain acts intended to "influence government policy ... or affect the operation of any unit of government"); Mich. Comp. Laws
. In reaching this conclusion, we have made our best effort to interpret the statute in accordance with its plain meaning and the apparent legislative intent. Our analysis, however, suggests significant areas of ambiguity in the language of the statute that may pose commensurate difficulties in its application, especially when a unit of government responds in an emergency capacity. Moreover, the tools at the courts' disposal for resolving statutory ambiguity, such as the legislative history, are of limited assistance here. The 2002 floor debates, for example, focused on the purpose of the statute-to ensure that Utah has appropriate means for dealing with acts of terrorism, particularly with weapons of mass destruction, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks-without any discussion on the meaning of the provisions at issue here. See Recording of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 54th Leg., 2002 Gen. Sess. (March 6, 2002); Recording of Utah House Floor Debates, 54th Leg., 2002 Gen. Sess. (March 5, 2002). In 2010, the statute was amended to separate ordinary threats of violence against individuals, aimed simply at causing fear of injury or death, from crimes of terrorism, ie., threats against the public or governmental entities. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (2008) (Terroristic threat), with id. § 76-5-107 & amend. notes (Supp. 2011) (Threat of violence), and id. § 76-5-107.3 & amend. notes (Supp. 2011) (Threat of terrorism). The debates surrounding this amendment centered on why this change was desirable. See Recording of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (March 11, 2010); Recording of Utah House Floor Debates, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 2010).
In light of the ambiguous nature of this statute, the legislature may wish to consider revisiting the statutory language to clarify the circumstances under which a threat described by the terroristic threat statute can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor. In addition, the legislature may want to take this opportunity to correct what appears to be an oversight in the current statute. While the prior version of the statute made a threat intended "to cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies" a class B misdemeanor, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1)(b)(ii), (2)(c) (2008), the amended version prohibits the act but fails to attach any penalty to a violation, see id. § 76-5-107.3(1)(b)iii), (2) (Supp. 2011).
. 'At various points in his briefing, Graham attempts to raise an argument that he made in his motion for a new trial in the district court-the lack of an underlying crime that the firearms were "used" to commit. We do not reach the issue for two reasons. First, Graham seems to concede the existence of an underlying crime by admitting that he could have been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, which requires the commission of an act of domestic violence against a cohabitant, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1(2)(c) (2003) (current version at id. (Supp. 2011)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(4) (Supp.2007) (defining "domestic violence" as
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-102(2)(a) (2008) (defining "cohabitant'"' to include a spouse). Second, he has not adequately briefed the issue, see Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant to include the reasoning and the legal authority for his or her position).