444 N.E.2d 51 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
Appellant, Michael Grady, takes this appeal from a commitment to ten days in county jail following a finding of delinquency by the juvenile court on January 29, 1981.
On November 12, 1980, a complaint was filed alleging that appellant, age about seventeen, had unlawfully retained or disposed of a Moped bicycle belonging to another which he had "reasonable cause" to believe had been stolen (R.C.
On January 29, 1981 (after appellant became eighteen years of age), this matter was heard before a judge in juvenile court. Appellant, who appeared with his mother and was represented by counsel, denied the charges. The judge found that appellant was a "delinquent child" and after a dispositional hearing imposed a ten-day confinement to county jail. Appellant petitioned for a stay of execution of sentence and release on bond pending appeal on January 30, 1981. With only four days remaining in the initial sentence, the court granted bond and released the appellant.
Appellant cites one assignment of error:
"The court erred in committing a child who remained under the jurisdiction of juvenile court to a determinate sentence in county jail."
Appellant argues that his commitment to the county jail as a place intended for incarceration of adult offenders for a determinate ten-day period is in violation of R.C. Chapter 2151 on juvenile court proceedings, and further is a violation of his rights under the
In juvenile proceedings governed by R.C. Chapter 2151, a "child," as defined by R.C.
"* * * a person who is under the age of eighteen years, with the exception that any child who violates a federal or state law or municipal ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a `child' irrespective of his age at the time the complaint is filed or hearing had thereon." *175
Since both parties concede that appellant was seventeen at the time of committing the delinquent act, he is clearly a "child" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, notwithstanding the fact that by the date of the hearing he was eighteen years of age. His having attained the age of eighteen would have been relevant only if juvenile court had chosen to relinquish jurisdiction to the court of common pleas for appellant to stand trial for a felony as an adult offender under R.C.
The applicable statute governing the disposition of a child adjudged delinquent is R.C.
When a child is found to be delinquent as in the case subjudice, the court must determine his disposition by adhering to the options enumerated in R.C.
"(A) If a child is found by the court to be a delinquent child, the court may make any of the following orders of disposition:
"(1) Any order that is authorized by section
"(2) Place the child on probation under any conditions that the court prescribes;
"(3) Commit the child to the temporary custody of any school, camp, institution, or other facility for delinquent children operated for the care of delinquent children by the county, by a district organized under section
"(4) Commit the child to the legal custody of the Ohio youth commission;
"(5) Commit a child sixteen years of age or over who has committed an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony to a maximum security institution operated by the Ohio youth commission for the training and rehabilitation of such delinquent children;
"(6) Impose a fine not to exceed fifty dollars and costs;
"(7) Require the child to make restitution for all or part of the property damage caused by his delinquent act and for all or part of the value of the property that was the subject of any delinquent act that he committed and that would be a theft offense, as defined in division (K) of section
"(8) Suspend or revoke the operator's license issued to the child, or suspend or revoke the registration of all motor vehicles registered in the name of the child; *176
"(9) Make any further disposition that the court finds proper."
The reference in R.C.
We note that the various specific options in R.C.
Ostensibly, the only option whereby the court could have sentenced appellant to incarceration in jail is therefore R.C.
As pertinent to our case, the only statutory references in R.C. Chapter 2151 to housing juveniles in a jail or other facility for incarceration of adults arise in the context of detentional placements, pending hearing and final disposition. These laws either prohibit such incarceration altogether (R.C.
"A child may be detained in jail or other facility for detention of adults only if the facility in division (A)(3)5
of this section is not available and the detention is in a room separate and removed from those for adults. The court may order that a child over the age of fifteen years be detained in a jail in a room separate and removed from adults if public safety and *177
protection reasonably require such detention." R.C.
The philosophy inherent in juvenile proceedings in Ohio is embodied in the often-repeated maxim that rehabilitation and not punishment is the goal of the juvenile justice system. Cope v.Campbell (1964),
"`The proceeding [in juvenile court] is purely statutory; and the commitment, in cases like the present, is not designed as a punishment for crime, but to place minors of the description, and for the causes specified in the statute, under the guardianship of the public authorities named, for proper care and discipline, until they are reformed, or arrive at the age of majority. The institution to which they are committed is a school, not a prison; nor is the character of their detention affected by the fact that it is also a place where juvenile convicts may be sent, who would otherwise be condemned to confinement in the common jail or the penitentiary.' * * *"
Any disposition which results in the incarceration of a juvenile offender in a jail or other adult facility is contrary to the rehabilitative approach to juvenile proceedings contemplated above. In the instant case, we are unable to see how a ten-day incarceration in the county jail can be regarded as "under the guardianship of the public authorities [specified in the statute] for proper care and discipline. * * *"6
We conclude that commitment to a jail for adult offenders is not a proper disposition for a delinquent juvenile absent a finding that housing in an appropriate juvenile facility is unavailable or that the public safety and protection so require. In so holding, we are mindful of the special circumstances in the case of In re Cox, supra (
"We feel that appellants had their opportunity to take advantage of the protective provisions of R.C. Chapter 2151 in 1968 by complying with the order of the juvenile court to report to the Ohio youth commission. We hold that when a child as defined by R.C.
"We feel that this holding conforms with the legislative intent of R.C. Chapter 2151. In addition, we feel that appellants are estopped from claiming the protective provisions of R.C. Chapter 2151 pertaining to persons under eighteen years of age when they contemptuously defied the order of the juvenile court to report to the Ohio youth commission by leaving the jurisdiction of such court until they were *178 twenty-one years old." In re Cox, supra, at pages 69-70.
In the Cox case, the defendants as juveniles were initially committed to the permanent custody of the Ohio Youth Commission, which order was never effected because of their flight. R.C.
In the instant case, since the court cited no reasons in support of its commitment of appellant to county jail, we find this assignment of error is well taken. Having so concluded, we do not reach the constitutional challenge based on the
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
PARRINO and CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.
"No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age, shall be prosecuted as an adult for an offense committed prior to becoming eighteen, unless the child has been transferred as provided in this section. * * *"