428 N.E.2d 866 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1980
These two cases have been consolidated for appeal purposes.
Defendants-appellants, Jonathon Gould, a.k.a. John Gould, and Robert Kociolek, were both charged in the Hamilton County Municipal Court with disorderly conduct and criminal trespass. Plea bargaining resulted in dismissal of the criminal trespass charges, and Gould and Kociolek pleaded no contest to disorderly conduct.1 They were found guilty and each sentenced to the maximum penalties provided by law, that is, thirty days imprisonment and $250 in fines, plus court costs.2 The sentences have been suspended pending resolution of these appeals.
Distilling the challenges proffered in the two assignments of error, and issues of law thereunder, we discover that the appellants are alleging prejudicial error on the part of the trial court (1) in failing to follow the statutory guidelines of R. C.
Although the sentencing judge did not specifically categorize representations made by defendants below as prevarications, it is none the less apparent to us that he doubted their truthfulness and so stated.
It is the duty of the trial court to exercise a judicious discretion and to give consideration to the criteria set out in R. C.
Next we consider the legal significance of the trial judge's articulated belief that the defendants lied to him during the sentencing colloquy. Appellants claimed that their alleged prevarication was considered by the court in imposing the maximum sentence upon them both. We agree with appellants' contention that the sentences did include consideration of what the judge believed to be untruthfulness on the part of the appellants. Relying strongly upon State v. Jeffers (1978),
A judge should have a reasonable latitude in questioning a defendant as a part of the sentencing process. At this juncture, after guilt has already been established, the judge should be able to rely upon the defendant's truthful representations *218
and honest answers in connection with subjects reasonably pursued. This would seem to be a sine qua non to an intelligent and meaningful sentence. Among other things, it becomes difficult to apply the criteria of R. C.
For these reasons, the assignments of error lack merit and are overruled.
We affirm the judgments below.
Judgments affirmed.
PALMER, P. J., KEEFE and BLACK, JJ., concur.
"A sentencing judge, in fixing the sentence of a defendant within statutory limits, may consider the defendant's false testimony observed by the judge during the trial. * * * [Emphasis added.]
"(a) A defendant's truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own behalf is probative of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation, and is thus a relevant factor in the sentencing process. * * *
"(b) Taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been indicted, tried, or convicted by due process; rather, it is an attempt rationally to exercise judicial discretion by evaluating the defendant's personality and prospects for rehabilitation. To the extent that a sentencing judge is precluded from relying on relevant information concerning `every aspect of a defendant's life,' Williams v.New York,
Thus, it appears that Jeffers, at least to the extent that it is predicated upon federal constitutional issues, conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Grayson. *219