102 Wash. App. 912 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2000
— Kenneth Gordon appeals his commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 71.09 RCW on numerous grounds. Because none of Gordon’s arguments merit reversal, we affirm. The State raises a cross assignment of error about the meaning of “secure facility” in chapter 71.09 RCW. We reject the State’s argument, but that determination has no effect on Gordon’s present order of commitment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gordon was convicted of second degree rape and second degree robbery in 1984 and received two 10-year concurrent sentences. Before his term of confinement expired in 1997,
At trial, defense and State experts generally agreed that Gordon’s diagnoses are schizophrenia,
DISCUSSION
Eligibility for Commitment Under Chapter 71.05 RCW
Gordon first contends that he could not be committed under chapter 71.09 RCW, the sexually violent predator act (SVPA), because he suffers from a schizophrenia-type condition that qualifies him for commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW, the involuntary treatment act (ITA).
Even if schizophrenia were Gordon’s only diagnosed condition, that would not automatically make him eligible for ITA commitment and consequently ineligible for SVPA commitment.
Because Gordon was ineligible for commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW, we hold the State’s decision to pursue commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW was proper. Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative findings in RCW 71.09.010, which reads in pertinent part: “The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the existing involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW . . . .”
Jury Instructions
Relying on Kansas v. Hendricks,
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court considered a substantive due process challenge to the definition of “mental abnormality” in Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act.
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof*918 of some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality.” These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.[13 ]
The Court concluded that the Kansas Act meets this standard because it “requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”
Like the Kansas statute, Washington’s sexual predator commitment scheme requires the State to prove and a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a causal link exists between an alleged sexual predator’s mental abnormality or personality disorder and the likelihood that he or she will engage in predatory acts of sexual violence in the future.
Our reading of Hendricks here does not conflict with our
Definition of “Secure Facility” in Chapter 71.09 RCW
We next consider the State’s contention that the trial court erred in ruling that Western State Hospital is not a “secure facility” as contemplated by chapter 71.09 RCW. The State argues that “[biased on this erroneous ruling, the trial court allowed Gordon to present testimony that he was not a sexually violent predator because if he was [sic] not confined in a secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW, he would be confined in a locked ward at WSH under chapter 71.05 RCW and in this way his dangerousness would be controlled.” We reject the State’s argument.
RCW 71.09.060 requires that if the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, he be committed to a “secure facility” until the person is safe either “to be at large” or “to be released to a less restrictive alternative . . . .”
Affirmed.
The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions.
Kennedy and Cox, JJ., concur.
Gordon’s confinement lasted more than 10 years because he served his sentences for the 1983 rape and robbery consecutive to a third sentence for a 1980 second degree robbery conviction.
RCW 71.09.020(1).
There was testimony that Gordon has one or both of two subtypes of schizophrenia- — schizoaffective disorder and paranoid schizophrenia.
The experts agreed that Gordon’s polysubstance abuse disorder was in remission because he had been confined for many years preceding trial.
Gordon cites cases demonstrating that schizophrenia may be a basis for commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW. See, e.g., In re Detention of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
We note that Gordon’s position is weakened by his combination of psychiatric conditions that, according to the State’s expert at trial, together predispose him to committing future acts of sexual violence.
There was some testimonial evidence at trial, however, that Gordon would likely stop taking his medication and decompensate if he were released. Presumably he could then be eligible for commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW.
RCW 71.09.010.
Of course, specified criteria must be met before the State may even file a petition for SVPA commitment. See RCW 71.09.030.
We decline to consider Gordon’s contention that he was entitled to chapter 71.05 RCW’s greater procedural protections because the major premise of that claim, that he was eligible for ITA commitment, is false.
521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997).
Kansas’ definition of mental abnormality is strikingly similar to Washington’s: “ ‘Mental abnormality" ” means a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b). Hendricks unsuccessfully argued that in order to satisfy substantive due process, a civil commitment statute must require a state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a person is both (1) “mentally ill” and (2) a danger to himself or others. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
Id.
While Gordon is correct that the statute’s definition of “mental abnormality requires only that the abnormality predispose the individual to commit “criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others,” RCW 71.09.020(2), the causal link is found in the statute’s definition of “sexually violent predator.” See RCW 71.09.020(1) (“a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence”) (emphasis added).
94 Wn. App. 716, 973 P.2d486, review granted, 138 Wn.2d 1021, 989 P.2d 1136 (1999).
Id. at 729 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
See RCW 71.09.060(1).
See RCW 71.09.060(3).
Id.