State v. GordonState v. Gordon
On September 15, 1994, Officers Derek Sino and Richard Mungua initiated a traffic stop after observing Stanley Gordon, III, run a stop sign. When Officer Mungua approached the car on the driver‘s side, Gordon presеnted an NOPD identification card. Upon observing that the photo of Gordon appeared to be taped on top of the original photo, Officer Mungua removed the photo and observed the photo of Officer Henry Marshall. When the officers requested Gordon‘s drivers license, registration, and proof of insurance, he motioned towards a brown organizer lаying on the front seat, indicating that the officers could find the documents in the organizer. The organizer contained a copy of a temporary drivers license issued by the traffic court with аn expiration date of September 27, 1994, and bearing the name and purported signature of Officer Henry Marshall.1
Gordon was charged by bill of information with one count of impersonating a рolice officer and one count of forgery. After a trial by jury, he was convicted on both counts. Gordon was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of twenty months and forty months, rеspectively, on the impersonation and forgery convictions. The State filed a multiple bill on the forgery conviction, Gordon admitted to being a fourth felony offender under the Habitual Offender statute, and the trial court again imposed a forty month term of imprisonment to be served concurrently.
On appeal, Gordon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying both convictions. The State also appeals, contending that Gordon was improperly sentenced to a
Assignment of Error No. 1
First, Gordon contends that because no evidence was introduced that he was wearing a police uniform or showed a police badge, his conviction for impersonation of a police officer is invalid.
False personation is the performance of any of the following acts with the intent to injure or defraud, or to obtain or secure any special privilege or advantage:
(1) Impersonating any public officer, оr private individual having special authority by law to perform an act affecting the rights or interests of another, or the assuming, without authority, of any uniform or badge by which such officer or person is lawfully distinguished....
Thus, contrary to Gordon‘s argument, impersonating an officer is an act unto itself and does not require a showing that he wore a uniform or carried a badge. Gordon admitted at trial that he had pasted his photo on top of Officer Marshall‘s NOPD identification card and that he had possessed the card for approximately eight years.2 The arresting officer testified that when he asked Gordon for his license, registration, and proof of insurance, Gordon “automatically handed me the I.D. card” and that “[t]herefore, I was taking it that he was a police officer.” Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable juror could have found that, upon being stopped for a traffic violation, Gordon impersonated a police officer with the intent of obtaining a special privilege or advantage.
Gordon also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his forgеry conviction.
Forgery is the false making or altering,3 with intent to defraud, of any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting to have legal efficacy.
Gordon contends that the conviction is invalid because a coрy of a temporary drivers license has no legal efficacy. We disagree. Efficacy is defined as the “[p]ower or capacity to produce the desired effect” or thе “ability to achieve results.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New York 1973). The Reporter‘s Comment accompanying
Thus, while it is clearly illegal to operate a motor vehicle unless one has been issued a drivers license,
Defense counsel contended at oral argument, however, that the State did not establish
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
Assignment of Error No. 2
Gordon raises a second assignment of error, asserting that the trial court erred by allowing the introductiоn of certain documents into evidence. He fails to argue this assignment, however, stating only that the State “submitted all of their exhibits over the objection of the defense,” without indicating what evidеnce was introduced and how the introduction of that evidence prejudiced the appellant. Assignments of error not briefed are deemed abandoned. State v. Bray, 548 So.2d 350 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989); Rule 2-12.4, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal. Therefore, we do not consider this issue.
State‘s Assignment of Error
Finally, the State appeals Gordon‘s sentence,5 arguing that the trial court erred in not sentencing him as a fourth offender under the Habitual Offender Law to the mandatory minimum of twenty years. See
Although Dorthey gives аlmost no guidance as to how detailed a trial court must be when explaining the basis for its decision that the statutory minimum sentence is constitutionally excessive as to the individual defendant, for purposes of appellate review it is generally necessary for some articulation as to (1) whether the sentence contributes measurably to acceptable goals of punishment or amounts to nothing more than imposition of pain and suffering and (2) whether the statutory minimum sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. In this case, howevеr, a review of the record supports the trial court‘s determination. Gordon‘s predicate offenses (theft and forgery) are nonviolent in nature, as is the instant offense, involving no possibility оf great bodily harm or death to the victims. See State v. Daniel Hyorth, 95-1181 (La.App. 4th Cir. 9/15/95), 661 So.2d 1059. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the trial judge erred in imposing the 40 month sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.