State v. GoolsbyState v. Goolsby
This case involves the payment of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expert witness fees incurred in the defense of an indigent. The South Carolina Court Administration appeals from the trial judge’s order awarding payment of defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of the amount authorized by
Sidney Ross Goolsby was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death on October 4, 1978, for the murder of Ruby Ann Medlin. On appeal the sentence was reversed and the case remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.
Prior to the new sentencing proceeding, Goolsby’s attorneys moved for approval of estimated costs for psychiatric and psychological experts, which estimates exceeded the statutory amounts provided therefor. The trial judge indicated he would consider the bills after trial.
The sentencing proceeding began June 8, 1981; the jury returned a life sentence on June 14, 1981. On June 15, 1981, the trial judge awarded attorneys’ fees of Fifteen Hundred and No/100 ($1500.00) Dollars, costs of Six Hundred Sixty-Six and 65/100 ($666.65) Dollars, and expert witness fees of Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Three and No/100 ($2593.00) Dollars.
Appellant first argues the circuit judge erred in ordering payment of attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of the amount provided by
“The State shall pay from funds appropriated for the defense of indigents such fees and costs, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars, as the court shall deem appropriate.” The primary rule of construction in the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply its literal meaning. See cases collected in West’s S. C. Digest, Statutes, Keynote 181(1). The above statute is clear and unambiguous. Applying its plain meaning to the facts of this case, we find the circuit judge erred in *54 ordering payment of attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of Fifteen Hundred ($1500.00) Dollars.
Defense counsel counters that the trial judge has the discretion to order the expenditure of state money in excess of the amount authorized by statute where extraordinary circumstances exist. In cases where an attorney suffered extreme loss of income and practice and where an attorney was on the brink of insolvency due to the time and money spent in the defense of an indigent, other jurisdictions have allowed reimbursement in excess of that authorized by statute. See
People v. Randolph,
35 Ill. (2d) 24, 219 N. E. (2d) 337 (1966),
Bias v. State,
Finally, appellant asserts the holding of the lower court that
Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the constitutionality of an act. Only where an enactment offends specific constitutional provisions beyond a reasonable doubt will we declare it unconstitutional.
Johnson, et al. v. Piedmont Municipal Power Agency, et al.,
S. C.,
Section 17-3-80 of the Code provides for the appropriation of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars for the establishment of a defense fund to reimburse private appointed counsel, public defenders and assistant public defenders for necessary expenses incurred in the defense of indigents. Without a reasonable limitation on the maximum reimbursement allowed in each case, the appropriated funds would rapidly be exhausted.
By placing a ceiling in capital cases, the legislature obviously intended that no more than this amount be expended in non-capital cases. This construction is inescapable in view of the limited funds appropriated by the legislature for these expenses.
*55 “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose.” Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S. C. 66,173 S. E. (2d) 376 (1970).
We, therefore, give effect to the legislature’s clear intent by construing the spending cap mandated by
Accordingly, for the reasons stated we reverse the holding that
Reversed in part; modified in part.