State v. GoodmanState v. Goodman
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor; Christopher D. Becker and Ashleigh Musick, Assistant Prosecutors, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael H. Goodman, pro se, PID: A520-070, Trumbull Correctional Institution, 5701 Burnett Road, Leavittsburg, OH 44430 (Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael H. Goodman, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to waive or defer court costs. Because appellant‘s argument is barred by res judicata and, in any event, the court‘s judgment was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
{¶2} In August 2009, a jury convicted appellant of multiple counts of aggravated robbery and related felonies that he committed in November 2004. The trial court
{¶3} In 2009, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in the trial court, alleging defects in his indictment. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, this court affirmed in State v. Goodman, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2009-T-0068, 2010-Ohio-407, ¶29 (”Goodman II“).
{¶4} In April 2014, appellant filed a motion, asking the trial court to establish a payment plan for his court costs. The trial court denied the motion and appellant did not appeal. One month later, in May 2014, appellant sent a letter to the trial court, again requesting a payment plan. The trial court construed this request as a second motion for a payment plan; filed it with the clerk; and denied it. Appellant appealed, and we dismissed the appeal in State v. Goodman, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0047, 2014-Ohio-4884, ¶19 (”Goodman III“). In relevant part, this court held that, despite the recent amendment of
{¶5} On or about March 13, 2017, appellant moved the trial court to waive or defer his court costs. The state opposed the motion. By a judgment entered on June 21,
{¶6} “The trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying appellant‘s motion to waive or defer court costs, in violation of his protection against cruel and unusual punishment and right to due process, as provided under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.”
{¶7} Appellant essentially argues that the clerk of court‘s monthly deduction from his inmate account to be applied toward his court costs prevents him from purchasing various items he believes are necessary to maintain a decent life in prison. Initially, we note this court in Goodman III erred in holding that an order denying modification of court costs in a criminal case is not a final order. Id. at ¶15. This court in Goodman III held that the denial of a postconviction motion to impose a payment plan for costs does not affect a substantial right and thus is not a final order. Id.
{¶8} However,
{¶9} However, while the denial of appellant‘s motion to waive costs is a final order, this appeal is barred by res judicata. In the context of criminal cases, a convicted defendant is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata “from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1996). Further, in order for a claim to avoid the bar of res judicata, it must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. State v. Gresham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90433, 2008-Ohio-4248, ¶13.
{¶10} As noted above, in April 2014, appellant filed a motion for an order to establish a payment plan for the payment of costs. That motion was filed after
{¶11} In any event, even if the instant motion was not barred by res judicata, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s motion to waive/delay costs.
{¶12} A trial court‘s denial of a criminal defendant‘s motion to waive court costs is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, ¶23.
{¶13} The Second District, in State v. Hawley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25897, 2014-Ohio-731, applied
{¶14} Appellant argued in his present motion that he is entitled to a waiver or delay in paying costs because this sanction hinders his ability to buy things he needs from the commissary. However, he admitted that, in addition to medical care and other items provided to him by the state, he receives a monthly stipend, which, he admits, is sufficient to buy the materials he needs to prepare his legal filings and other commissary items he needs. Appellant does not demonstrate that his inability to buy every item (or any particular item) he would like amounts to a constitutional violation. Nor does he reference the record to show he is unable to pay the amount deducted by the clerk to be applied to his court costs.
{¶15} The trial court stated in its entry that it considered appellant‘s motion to waive/defer costs and the attached exhibits. Those documents showed that appellant is
{¶16} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled. It is the order and judgment of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs in judgment only with a Concurring Opinion.
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J., dissents.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs in judgment only with a Concurring Opinion.
{¶17} I concur in the decision to affirm the trial court‘s judgment, as this matter is barred by res judicata. I write separately, however, to emphasize the independent ground upon which res judicata applies.
{¶18} In the present matter, Goodman was initially found guilty of his offenses in 2006. His convictions were affirmed by this court in 2007. The issue of waiver or modification of court costs was not raised before the trial court at the sentencing hearing or in a motion after the entry of his sentence was issued, nor was it raised in his direct appeal. See State v. Goodman, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2006-T-0130, 2007-Ohio-6252.
{¶19} While it is accurate that
{¶20} Goodman should have raised the issue of the waiver of costs at the time of sentencing in 2006 but failed to do so, both at the trial court level and on his direct appeal. The fact that the pertinent statute now allows a court to retain jurisdiction is of no import. This statute was not in effect until several years after the sentence and costs were imposed. Thus, Goodman is barred from raising this claim by his actions, or lack thereof, in 2006.
{¶21} I disagree with the proposition that Goodman “could have asked the trial court to waive court costs in his April 2014 motion,” supra at ¶ 10, since he instead should
{¶22} Since this matter is barred by res judicata due to Goodman‘s failure to raise this issue in 2006, I concur in judgment only.