2005 Ohio 3204 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} The facts of this case are as provided in the agreed statement submitted pursuant to Appellate Rule 9(D).
{¶ 3} On November 14, 2003 at 2:18 a.m. a Bowling Green Police Officer observed appellant, Bradley F. Godwin, exit a municipal parking lot by means of a driveway marked with "Wrong Way Do Not Enter" and "No Left/Right Turn" signs. The officer stopped appellant for failure to obey a traffic control device.
{¶ 4} Based upon observations following the traffic stop, the officer arrested appellant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Appellant was also charged with failure to obey a traffic control device.
{¶ 5} Appellant moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing that the traffic sign he allegedly disobeyed was improper and could not serve as a basis for a permissible stop.
{¶ 6} On July 29, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress and denied the motion in part. The trial court found that the Bowling Green Traffic Commission did not authorize the "Wrong Way Do Not Enter" and "No Left/Right Turn" signs. As a result, the court dismissed the offense of failure to obey a traffic control device. The trial court denied the remainder of the motion, finding that an officer's ignorance of a traffic control sign's authorization does not necessarily render an investigatory stop unreasonable.
{¶ 7} Following the trial court's ruling, appellant amended his plea to no contest and was found guilty of a violation of R.C.
{¶ 8} "The traffic stop of the appellant was unlawful for the reason the officer could not have had reasonable articulable suspicion appellant was violating the law where the traffic sign was a nullity."
{¶ 9} The
{¶ 10} The first is the ordinary stop in which a police officer witnesses a violation of the traffic code and stops the motorist to issue a citation, a warning, or effect an arrest. For such a traffic stop, there must be probable cause. Id. Probable cause is a "reasonable ground for belief or guilt." State v. Moore (2000),
{¶ 12} In a motion to suppress, the state has the burden of proving, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, that a traffic stop was initiated with sufficient cause. Athens v. Wolf (1974),
{¶ 13} In this case, the officer stopped appellant for what he thought was a traffic violation, an illegal exit from a municipal parking lot. Normally, observation of a traffic violation provides the police with probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. Dayton v. Erickson (1996),
{¶ 14} This court dealt with a similar issue in State v. Berry, 6th Dist. No. WD-02-043, 2003 Ohio 1620. In fact, the Berry case involved the exact same municipal lot. While the lot's signage has changed, our result does not.
{¶ 15} In Berry, this court set forth that in "order to form the basis for criminal liability, [a] sign must be `official', and it must be in a `proper position' and `sufficiently legible.'" State v. Berry, supra, at ¶ 8; see also City of Maple Heights v. Smith (1999),
{¶ 16} In an attempt to correct the problems in Berry, the city of Bowling Green replaced the old signage with those currently at issue. However, the "Wrong Way Do Not Enter" and "No Left/Right Turn" replacement signs lack the proper authorization as required by the Bowling Green Municipal Code. These new signs are not "official." Absent the requisite governmental approval, a traffic control device nears the realm of arbitrary. Though we are drawing a technical distinction, such distinction is necessary in order to separate traffic control devices endorsed by the proper authorities and those possibly placed at a person's whim.
{¶ 17} As this court previously held in Berry, "one is not engaged in criminal behavior by violating a non-conforming sign." State v. Berry, supra, at ¶ 9. Accordingly, the officer did not observe a traffic violation because the "Wrong Way Do Not Enter" and "No Left/Right Turn" signs were not enforceable. Absent an offense, there is no reason to stop appellant's vehicle.
{¶ 18} As a result, appellant's sole assignment of error is found well taken.
{¶ 19} Upon consideration whereof, the judgment of the Bowling Green Municipal Court is reversed. Appellee, the city of Bowling Green, is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal for which sum judgment is rendered against appellee on behalf of Wood County and for which execution is awarded. See App.R. 24.
Judgment Reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Singer, P.J., Skow, J., Concur.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 20} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
{¶ 21} It should be noted that this case deals with the exact same parking lot signage that was successfully challenged in the Berry case. In response to Berry, signs fully conforming to the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("OMUTCD") were subsequently erected. Despite legitimate signs in full conformity with relevant regulations and a driver who violated the sign, the majority holds that the officer nevertheless lacked "reasonable articulable suspicion" to make the traffic stop.
{¶ 22} Under the reasoning of the majority, the officer lacked "reasonable articulable suspicion" because the new signs were apparently never officially reauthorized by the city of Bowling Green. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer on patrol will have specific knowledge on whether or not conforming traffic signs have received official municipal authorization. On the contrary, absent evidence to suggest a sign may be counterfeit, it is logical for the officer to believe the sign would not be present without proper authorization. Thus, the officer clearly possessed the minimal objective justification to initiate the investigative stop. Accordingly, regardless of whether the state of Ohio could satisfy the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for the suspected sign violation, there was "reasonable articulable suspicion" to warrant the stop. Therefore, I would find in favor of appellee, and respectfully dissent.
