State v. GloverState v. Glover
Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2021.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by J. JOSHUA RIZZO, Atty. Reg. No. 0099218, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
MARVIN M. GLOVER, #A711-591, P.O. Box 57, Marion, Ohio 43302
Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se
{¶ 1} Marvin M. Glover appeals pro se from the trial court‘s overruling of a motion to correct his sentence.
{¶ 2} Glover advances two assignments of error. First, he contends the trial court erred in imposing five years of mandatory post-release control for four counts of sexual battery, felonies of the third degree. He argues that he was subject to three years of post-release control on these counts. He also argues that the trial court should not have imposed five years of mandatory post-release control for two counts of rape of a child under age 10, felonies of the first degree. Second, he claims the trial court erred in filing a corrected judgment entry to reflect that the trial court, rather than a jury, found him guilty on the two counts of rape.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Glover pled no-contest to three of the sexual battery counts in 2014. He also was found guilty following a bench trial on the remaining sexual battery count and on the two counts of rape. He was sentenced to 10 years to life in prison for each of the rape convictions and to 48 months in prison for each of the sexual battery convictions. All of the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, and each sentence included five years of post-release control. The trial court‘s judgment entry incorrectly reflected that a jury had found Glover guilty on the rape counts and that he had pled no contest to all four of the sexual battery counts. This court affirmed on direct appeal, overruling assignments of error that did not address this misstatement in the judgment entry. See State v. Glover, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26523, 2016-Ohio-2749.
{¶ 4} In 2019, Glover filed a series of motions, including an August 9, 2019 “Motion for ‘Sentencing.’ ” As relevant here, Glover argued that post-release control did not apply
{¶ 5} The trial court rejected Glover‘s arguments. Citing
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Glover again asserts that he should have been subject to three years of post-release control for the sexual battery convictions. In the body of his argument, he also contends post-release control was not the proper supervision mechanism for the rape convictions. In support of his argument that five years of mandatory post-release control was “unauthorized” for his offenses, Glover cites
{¶ 7} We note that
{¶ 8} We need not dwell on the foregoing statutes, however, because each of Glover‘s challenges to post-release control is barred by res judicata. The Ohio Supreme Court recently made clear that sentencing errors merely render a sentence voidable, not void, if the sentencing court had jurisdiction over the case and the defendant. State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34. “A judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. Therefore, when a sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors “render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42. This rule applies equally to alleged errors regarding the imposition of post-release control. Id.
{¶ 9} Here the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Glover‘s case. See Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8 (“[A] common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.“). The trial court also had personal jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3206, 2015-Ohio-210, ¶ 11 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction exists when the defendant has been properly served with the indictment.“). As a result, any challenge to Glover‘s sentence, including the trial court‘s post-release control sanctions, could be
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Glover contends the trial court erred in filing a nunc pro tunc judgment entry correcting the erroneous statement that he had been convicted by a jury.1
{¶ 11} As noted above, the trial court‘s amended judgment entry noted that Glover had been found guilty on two counts of rape following a bench trial, not a jury trial. This is in fact what had occurred. Under
{¶ 12} The State notes, however, that Glover‘s bench trial also included one of the four sexual battery counts. The original 2014 judgment entry and the amended December 14, 2020 judgment entry incorrectly reflect that all four counts of sexual battery were disposed of by a no-contest plea. Consequently, we will remand the matter to the trial court to file a nunc pro tunc judgment entry reflecting that the conviction for sexual battery
{¶ 13} Having overruled Glover‘s assignments of error, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment. We remand the case, however, for the filing of a nunc pro tunc judgment entry correcting the issue mentioned above.
DONOVAN, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
J. Joshua Rizzo
Marvin M. Glover
Hon. Susan Solle