State v. GipsonState v. Gipson
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree sodomy,
We begin by discussing the applicable frаmework provided by the sentencing guidelines grid. The sentencing guidelines grid assigns a presumptive sentence for an offender based on the crime seriousness scale of the crime of conviction and the criminal history of thе offender.
In this case, defendant challenges only the trial court’s classification of his criminal history. That classification depends on defendant’s prior history of adult convictions and juvenile adjudications.
“A — The offender’s criminal history includes three or more person felonies in any combination of adult convictions or juvenile adjudications.
“B — The offender’s criminal history includes two person felonies in any combination of adult convictions or juvenile adjudications.
“C — The offender’s criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person felony; and one or more adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a non-person felony.
“D — The offender’s criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person felony; but no adult conviction or juvenile аdjudications for a nonperson felony.”
Here, the parties agree that defendant’s criminal history includes two prior convictions for person felonies — for felony assault in the fourth degree,
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the state introduced evidence to show that defendant had a prior person-felony conviction at the time of his 1999 sentencing proceeding. That evidence included copies of defendant’s 1999 judgments of conviction, the presentence investigation report submitted in his 1999 sentencing proceeding, his 1982 judgment of conviction on a federal bank robbery offense, the indictment on that federal offense, and the state’s respondent’s brief on defendant’s appeal of the 1999 judgments. Although the 1999 presentence investigation report showed that defendant had committed numerous nonperson felonies but no person felonies, the 1999 sentencing court determined, based on the entire record before that court, that defendаnt’s 1982 federal offense
In this case, the sentencing court likewise concluded that defendant’s 1982 federal bank robbеry conviction was a person felony. Accordingly, the court concluded that defendant had three prior person-felony convictions, classified his criminal history score as category A, found substantial and compelling reasons to support a durational departure sentence, and imposed a sentence that includes a 144-month term of incarceration.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in classifying defendant’s 1982 federal conviction as a person felony under Oregon law. The state counters that defendant is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from raising that challenge because defendant’s 1999 judgments сonclusively resolved that defendant’s 1982 federal conviction was a person felony. Alternatively, the state argues that the trial court was correct on the merits. We agree with the state that issue preclusion bars dеfendant from challenging an issue that was conclusively resolved by the 1999 judgments, and we affirm on that basis without reaching the state’s alternative argument.
The doctrine of issue preclusion bars a party from challenging an issue where the requirements for issue preclusion are satisfied. Those requirements are (1) the issue in the present proceeding must be identical to an issue in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated and “еssential to a final decision on the merits in the prior proceeding”; (3) “[t]he party sought to be precluded [must have] had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that issue”; (4) the party precluded must have been a party or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding; and (5) “[t]he prior proceeding [must have been] the type of proceeding to
which this court will give preclusive effect.”
Nelson v. Emerald People’s Utility Dist.,
Defendant’s sole argument regarding why issue preclusion should not bar him from challenging the issue whether his 1982 federal conviction was for a person felony is based on the second requirement identified in Nelson — that the issue disputed here was not actually litigated and essential to a final decision on the merits in the 1999 sentencing proceeding. Defendant concedes that the state has fulfilled its burden on the other four requirements identified in Nelson.
We conclude that the issue whether defendant’s 1982 federal conviction was for a person felony was actually litigated and essential to the sentence imposed by defendant’s 1999 judgments. Those 1999 judgments classified defendant’s criminal history score as category C. A defendant cannot receive a criminal history score of category C unless the defendant has a prior person-felony conviction.
The trial court’s classification of defendant’s criminal history was аlso essential to his 1999 judgment of conviction on the coercion offense. The trial court classified that offense on the crime seriousness scale at level 7. The maximum departure sentence allowable under the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Grid for a level 7 offense on the crime seriousness scale for an offender with a criminal history score in category C is a 48-month term of incarceration. However, for an offender whose criminal history includes no person felonies, the maximum departure sentence could not exceed a 36-month term of incarceration. The 1999 judgment of conviction on the coercion offense imposed a departure sentence with a 48-month term of incarceration. Consequently, because that 48-month sentence would not have been permissible in the absence of a determination that defendant’s 1982 federal bаnk robbery offense was a person felony, that determination was essential to the 1999 judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that all of the requirements for applying issue preclusion are satisfied in this case and defendant is barred from challenging the determination essential to the 1999 judgments that his 1982 federal conviction was for a person felony. Thus, the trial court in this case correctly determined that defendant had one person-felony cоnviction prior to the 1999 judgments and a total of three person-felony convictions prior to his sentencing in this case. The trial court properly categorized defendant’s criminal history in category A.
The trial court classified defendant’s sodomy conviction at level 9 on the crime seriousness scale pursuant to
Affirmed.
Notes
Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss for lack of speedy trial and, in a supplemental pro se brief, raises additional challenges. We reject those assignments of error without discussion.
The central tenet of the issue preclusion doctrine — that the finаl determination of an issue in an earlier judgment controls subsequent litigation involving that same issue — has been part of the statutory code of this state from its inception.
State of Oregon v. Dewey,
“That only is determined by a former judgment, decree or order which appears upon its face to have been so determined or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.”
A conviction for sodomy,