STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. PAUL ANDREW McCLAIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 13CA17
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PICKAWAY COUNTY
Released: 09/17/14
[Cite as State v. McClain, 2014-Ohio-4192.]
APPEARANCES:
Michael D. Hess, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellant.
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
McFarland, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, violations of
FACTS
{¶2} Appellant was indicted for two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, “S.F.,” by the Pickaway County Grand Jury. The indictments arose from two incidents which occurred on or about October 18, 2012 and on or about November 1, 2012 in Pickaway County. Appellant was arraigned on the charges, entered a not guilty plea, and the matter proceeded to trial.
{¶3} At trial on April 18, 2013, the State of Ohio presented the testimony of Jennifer Greeno, Penelope Hyatt, Detective Phillip Roar, the victim, “S.F.,” S.F.‘s brother, “C.F.” Appellant‘s sole witness was himself.
{¶4} Jennifer Greeno testified she was playing cards with Penny Hyatt, Appellant, and others on the evening of December 22, 2012. Appellant was drinking alcohol. Hyatt was taking pictures and Greeno was tagging1 them on Facebook. Greeno could not get the pictures to upload to
{¶5} Greeno and Hyatt left around 5:30 a.m. to go to McDonalds. When they returned Appellant was passed out at the kitchen table. They tried to awaken him. Appellant became sick and vomited. Around 7:00 a.m., Greeno and Hyatt got on Facebook again. Appellant‘s Facebook page was still logged in. Greeno and Hyatt began reading messages Appellant‘s messages. They also saw pictures which disturbed them. One picture was a young girl in bra and panties. Another pictures showed the girl completely naked. There was also a picture of a little boy.
{¶6} Greeno also noticed a sexual conversation between Appellant and the young girl. The content of the conversation indicated the girl was being “blackmailed.” There was also a message in which Appellant asked the girl if she was pregnant. Greeno clicked on the girl‘s name and it took her to the girl‘s Facebook page. The page indicated the girl was a high school student.
{¶7} Greeno and Hyatt left. Ultimately, they reported what they found on Appellant‘s Facebook page to the Circleville Police Department.
{¶8} Penelope Hyatt testified Appellant and she often played cards on the weekends. He was always “on guard” about his cell phone and he often changed his password. Hyatt testified to an incident in November 2012, when they were playing cards. That evening, Appellant seemed depressed and standoffish rather than his usual upbeat attitude. Hyatt later noticed Appellant was texting someone.2
{¶9} Hyatt‘s testimony regarding the events of December 22, 2012 paralleled much of Jеnnifer Greeno‘s testimony. Hyatt testified Jennifer Greeno, Jennifer Wilbanks, Damien Boysel, Appellant, and she were playing Euchre. Appellant and Damien Boysel were drinking alcohol. Hyatt was taking pictures on her phone and sending them to Facebook. Greeno was tagging the pictures, but there was a problem with loading them onto Appellant‘s page. Appellant gave Greeno his password so she could post the pictures to his page. When that was successful, the group continued to listen to music and play cards. Appellant got drunk and was acting “belligerent and sexual” towards Greeno.
{¶11} Detective Phillip Roar of the Circleville Police Department testified he spoke with Greeno and Hyatt on January 3, 2013.3 Based on their reports, he proceeded to identify S.F., a high school freshman. He went to S.F.‘s home and spoke to S.F., her mother, and her brother. Appellant‘s
{¶12} On cross-examination, Detective Roar testified S.F. had taken nude photographs of herself and sent them to Chris Miller. S.F. told Detective Roar that Appellant and Chris Miller were best friends.
{¶13} S.F. testified she was 14-years-old and a freshman. She identified Appellant and testified she had gone to the same church as him, where her grandparents attended. She also knew Appellant through Chris Miller, a guy she was talking to on Facebook. She had never met Chris Miller face-to-face.
{¶14} S.F. testified she was looking at Chris Miller‘s Facebook page and messaged him. He sent a message back. This began when she was still 13-years-old. He asked her for “dirty” pictures. She viewed him as a boyfriend. They texted as well. Initially she refused to send pictures, but she later relented and sent two pictures: one in bra and panties, and one completely nude.
{¶16} S.F.‘s brother refused to let S.F. meet Appellant away from home, so he came to her house in the mid-September 2012. S.F.‘s brother talked to Appellant and wanted to know more about Chris Miller. Appellant told them Chris had a lot of money and girls were always chasing him. He stayed about 45 minutes. After he left, S.F. and her brother went inside, and Appellant texted S.F. He told her since they didn‘t have sex he was going to the cops with the pictures.
{¶17} S.F. agreed to meet him, but she did not agree to have sex. They met in October, before the Pumpkin Show, behind the Y.M.C.A. S.F. was on her way to a party. It was approximately 7:30 at night, after dark. S.F. testified Appellant “fingered her up,” and she did not say stop. She performed oral sex on Appellant, and he performed it on her. S.F. testified as follows:
“And he wanted to have sex, and I said that I didn‘t want to, and he said just let me put it in ten times. And I said, I don‘t want to, you know, and he said, just ten times, I said well, that‘s all. So I let him put it in ten times and I counted the ten out
loud. And I said stop, and he said one more time, and I said No Paul, Stop. You said ten times. I‘m crying the whole time, and I told him, and then he finally stops. And I just get up and I‘m like I‘m scared, and I say, I would like the pictures and stuff. And he handed me two pictures, and I said wеll, I‘ve got to go. And he walked me to Blockbusters.”
{¶18} S.F. then walked to the party. It was her understanding the pictures would be deleted. She felt very uncomfortable.
{¶19} S.F. testified she was continuing to hear from Chris Miller. A couple of weeks later, he told her Appellant had the pictures and he would take them to her parents and the police and she would have to have sex with him again.5
{¶20} S.F. then met Appellant at the Y.M.C.A. in Circleville on a Sunday, around 12:00 noon. They began talking and Appellant made the same threats. She again had oral sex and vaginal intercourse. S.F. told him to stop and he would not, so she did not say anything else. After it was over, Appellant showed her he deleted the pictures and she walked home. S.F. was too scared to tell anyone about the inсident.
{¶21} S.F. continued to hear from Chris Miller and Appellant. Chris told her to “give Appellant a try” because he really liked her. Appellant was texting her and she deleted his number from his phone because she didn‘t
{¶22} S.F.‘s brother C.F. testified. He is a 17-year-old junior in high school. He testified Appellant came to their residence to meet his sister sometime before the Pumpkin Show in 2012. C.F. recalled it was dark outside. Appellant came to discuss photos on a phone he had swapped. S.F. wanted to meet him behind nearby dumpsters, but C.F. insisted Appellant come to the home. They talked outside about 30 minutes. Appellant told them he was friends with Chris. According to Appellant, Chris was a spoiled kid and drove a new Camaro. C.F. thought everything was o.k. and Appellant left. To his knowledge, nothing else happened at the time.
{¶23} Detective Roar was recalled to the witness stand. He testified Appellant was arrested in Williamsport. Roar interviewed him at the Circleville Police Department in the presence of three other officers. During the interview, Appellant explained he knew S.F. through church and he was friends with her grandрarents. He acknowledged she was his friend
{¶24} Appellant also stated he typically left his phone lying around and lots of people used his phone to text. He stated lots of people used his Facebook page. Appellant stated he met Chris Miller in 2010 and they were casual friends. They always hung out with a group. He testified Chris Miller used his phone to text, used his Facebook page, and also communicated with S.F.
{¶25} Appellant provided a phone number for Chris Miller that was no longer in service. He refused to give a second number he had. He never gave a specific address for Chris Miller. When Detective Roar told Appellant that Chris Miller could potentially have valuable information, Appellant indicated Roar was a detective and he could “figure it out.” Appellant also acknowledged he went to S.F.‘s residence to discuss the photos.
{¶26} Detective Roar was able to find a profile picture of “Chris Miller” on a Facebook page belonging to “Brent Corrigan.” The profile picture matched a picture S.F. had on her phone of Chris Miller. Brent Corrigan is a porn star. On redirect examination, Detective Roar
{¶27} Appellant also maintained his innocence at trial. He testified he was familiar with S.F. but never had sex with her. He denied posting her pictures on Facebook. He denied knowing where they originated. He testified he gave people access to his Facebook page on the evening of December 22, 2012, and actually 15-20 people had access. Appellant acknowledged he discussed the photographs of S.F. with her. He admonished her that she was 14-years-old and it was a “bad idea.”
{¶28} On cross-examination, Appellant testified he met Chris Miller outside of Circle D one night. He testified Chris, age 17, was from Lima and lived in Williamsport. He denied telling anyone Chris went to Zane Trace. He acknowledged he was intoxicated on December 22, 2012.
{¶29} Appellant denied threatening S.F. about going to the police. He testified he told her he would talk to her grandparents and she should turn them in herself. He denied telling anyone he was best friends with Chris. He testified he didn‘t help Detective Roar find Chris Miller because the detective had accused him.
{¶30} The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty. He was sentenced on May 29, 2013 to a maximum prison term of eight years on
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON EACH COUNT AND IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.”
“II. APPELLANT‘S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
{¶31} Appellant raises two issues under this assignment of error. Appellant argues the court failed to make any findings in reference to imposing maximum sentences. Appellant also argues the court failed to find that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct or to the danger posed to the рublic. Appellant requests this Court to reverse the trial court‘s judgment and the sentences imposed.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶32} In the past, this court has reviewed felony sentences under the two-step process set forth in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶4. State v. Batty, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3398, 2014-Ohio-2826; see, also, State v. McClintock, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 13CA4, 2013-Ohio-5598, ¶4; State v. Evans, 4th Dist. Washington No. 11CA16, 2012-Ohio-850, ¶5; State v. Moman, 4th Dist. Adams No. 08CA876, 2009-Ohio-2510, ¶6. Pursuant to Kalish, supra, at ¶4. an appellate court first determines whether the trial court complied with all applicable rules and statutes. Id. If it did, the appellate court then reviews the sentence under the abuse of discretion standard. Id.; State v. Roach, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 11CA12, 2012-Ohio-1295, ¶4.
{¶33} However, a growing number of appellate districts have abandoned Kalish‘s second step “abuse of discretion” standard of review. Batty, supra; State v. Brewer, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 14CA1, 2014-Ohio-1903, ¶33. Former
{¶34} When the General Assembly reenacted
{¶35} Appellant has not specifically brought this appeal under the Provisions of
“Well, as indicated by the prosecutor, the court finds this to be a very aggravated case in the sense that these are two unlawful sexual conduct with a minor charges, the minor is 14 years of age. The Court does find, in fact, Mr. McClain committed the worst form of this offense in the sense that he extorted this young lady basically for sex, based upon the threat to reveal the pictures and nude photographs he had of her to the law enforcement authorities, and that is extortion and it makes this case that much worse. And, based upon the conduct of the defendant, coupled with his prior record, which is set forth in the presentence investigation, which will be filed and made a part of the recоrd, he does have a prior adjudication as a juvenile for the offense of rape; he was, at the time, a sex offender, who he has a lengthy criminal history even in the juvenile system, and he‘s not 25 years of age and has continued this course of conduct as an adult.
In order to make these sentences consecutive, which this court is going to do, the court must find consecutive sentences is necessary to protect the public from future crime, or to punish the offender, which it does make.
The court finds that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct; and to the danger the offender poses to the public. Based upon his lengthy criminal history, even at 25 years of age, the court finds that under
2929.14(C)(4)(c) , his history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.The court has weighed all the factors in
2929.11 and2929.12 , obviously find that a prison sanction is the appropriate sanction, the court finds that the maximum sentence of eight years on each count is appropriate, those will be ordered consecutive to each other.”
1. Maximum sentences
{¶36} Maximum sentences do not require specific findings. State v. Lister, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 13CA15, 2014-Ohio-1405, ¶10, citing State v. White, 2013-Ohio-4225, 997 N.E.2d 629, (1st. Dist.), ¶7. Although trial courts have full discretion to impose any term of imprisonment within the statutory range, they must consider the sentencing purposes in
“(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and
making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
{¶37} Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years in prison for each violation of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor,
“The court has weighed all the factors in
2929.11 and2929.12 , obviously finds that a prison sanction is the appropriate sanction, the court finds that the maximum sentence of eight years on each count is appropriate, those will be ordered consecutive to each other.”
{¶38} When sentencing an offender, each case stands on its own unique facts. Lister, supra, at ¶13 citing State v. Stamper, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-08-166, 2013-Ohio-5669, ¶15, quoting State v. Mannarino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98727, 2013-Ohio-1795, ¶58. In the sentencing remarks, the trial judge here noted he found the case to be aggravated in the sense that “these are two unlawful sexual conduct with a minor charges, the minor is 14 years of age.” The trial judge also found Appellant committed
{¶39} The trial court imposed a sentence within the appropriate definite prison term pursuant to
2. Consecutive sentences
{¶40} “In 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2013-Ohio-4165, a court may not impose consecutive sentences unless it ‘finds’ three statutory factors enumerated in then
{¶41} Under
- The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
2929.16 ,2929.17 , or2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. - At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
- The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. State v. Bever, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA21, 2014-Ohio-600, ¶16.
{¶42} While the sentencing сourt is required to make these findings, it is not required to give reasons explaining the findings. Bever, supra, at ¶17. H.B. 86 does not require the trial court to give its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed. State v. Williams, 5th Dist. Licking No. 11-CA-115, 2012-Ohio-3211, ¶47, (Hoffman, P.J., concurring).
{¶44} Here, a review of the record reveals the trial court engaged in the required three-step analysis under
” In order to make these sentences consecutive, which this court is going to do, the court must find consecutive sentences is necessary to protect the public from future crime, or to punish the offender, which it does make.”
The trial judge further stated:
“The court finds that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct; and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”
Finally, the trial judge alluded to Appellant‘s lengthy criminal history, “even at 25 years of age” stated:
“The court finds that under
2929.14(C)(4)(c) , his history ofcriminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.”
{¶45} Based on the above, we find the imposition of a consecutive sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. The trial court did not err with regard to Appellant‘s conseсutive sentence. We also reiterate the trial court complied with all applicable rules and statutes and the imposition of a maximum sentence for each count is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. We conclude Appellant‘s first assignment of error has no merit and is therefore, overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
{¶46} Appellant also contends his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues the State of Ohio failed to corroborate S.F.‘s allegations, including her testimony that she had numerous telephone and text conversations with Appellant. As such, Appellant argues the trier of fact lost its way and his conviction creates a manifest miscarriage of justice which must be reversed. Appellee responds that the manifest weight of the evidence was carried by the burden of persuasion and the jury obviously found the testimony of the State‘s witnesses and evidence to be more persuasive than that of Appellant. We must agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶48} “A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction where there is substantiаl evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. Whether the evidence supporting a defendant‘s conviction is direct or circumstantial does not bear on our determination. “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof.” Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus.
B. LEGAL ANALYSIS
(A) No person who is eighteen years of age or older shall engage in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the оffender, when the offender knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless in that regard.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.
***
(4) If the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section
2907.02 ,2907.03 , or2907.04 of the Revised Code or a violation of former section2907.12 of the Revised Code, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor is a felony of the second degree.
{¶50} It appears that here, the jury found the testimony of the State‘s witnesses more persuasive than that of Appellant. The weight to be given evidence and the credibility to be afforded testimony are issues to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 339, 1995-Ohio-235, 652 N.E.2d 1000, citing State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 477, 1993-Ohio-171, 620 N.E.2d 50. The fact finder “is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gеstures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
“1. The reviewing court is not required to accept as true the incredible;
2. Whether the evidence is uncontradicted;
3. Whether a witness was impeached;
4. What was not proved;
5. The certainty of the evidence;
6. The reliability of the evidence;
7. Whether a witness testimony is self-serving;
8. Whether the evidence is vague, uncertain, conflicting, or fragmentary.”
{¶52} We have previously declined to adopt the Mattison factors as “hard and fast rules.” State v. Chambers, 4th Dist. Adams No. 10CA902, 2011-Ohio-4352, ¶23, quoting State v. Reeves, 4th Dist. Highland No. 757. We have determined that the Mattison factors are mere “guidelines” that we may consider. Chambers, supra, see, generally State v. Dixon, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 06CA3114, 2008-Ohio-3184.
{¶53} In this case, the lack of documentation or testimony regarding S.F.‘s telephone and text conversations with Appellant is not problematic.
{¶54} In this case, it appears Appellant created a Facebook page under the name “Chris Miller,” but Appellant was actually passing himself off as Chris Miller. It appears Appellant used a picture of another person, “Brent Corrigan” on the “Chris Miller” profile picture. Unfortunately, S.F. contacted Chris Miller and communications began. S.F. did not know she was communicating with Appellant and, as “Chris Miller,” he requested that she send him nude photographs. S.F. was 13-years-old when the communications began. Appellant was 25 at the time of trial, approximately one year later. S.F. never met “Chris Miller” in person although she communicated with him for months and they scheduled dates. Appellant‘s actions in pretending to be “Chris Miller” and establishing a relationship with an underage teenage girl were predatory and devious.
{¶55} The jury heard testimony from Greeno and Hyatt, describing what they saw on Appellant‘s Facebook page, and the disturbing content they saw in the messages and pictures. They were the persons who reported
{¶56} S.F. testified she sent the photographs of herself to “Chris Miller,” the “boyfriend she never met,” and later, Appellant contacted her that he was in possession of the photographs. These were the same photographs Greeno and Hyatt saw on Appellant‘s Facebook page. S.F. testified Appellant told her that he would go tо her parents and the police if she did not have sex with him. She also testified “Chris Miller” told her to have sex with Appellant to keep him from going to the authorities. S.F.
{¶57} C.F. also testified that Appellant came to their home to discuss the nude photographs. C.F. testified Appellant told them specific facts about his friend Chris Miller, such as Chris was “spoiled” and he drove a new Camaro. S.F. recalled the conversation among the three slightly different. She recalled Appellant telling them Chris had a lot of money and “girls were always chasing him.” Although the testimony indicated Appellant knew quite a lot of information about Chris Miller, Appellant later testified they were casual friends. This is in contrast to Detective Roar‘s testimony that S.F. told him Appellant told her he and Chris were “best friends.” Also, despite knowing a lot about “Chris Miller,” Appellant‘s interview with Detective Roar on the subject of Chris‘s contact information seems evasive.
{¶58} Although Appellant denied having sexual contact with S.F., he did admit to having the nude photographs. The evidence demonstrated that S.F. sent the photographs to “Chris Miller” and Appellant ended up with the photographs. S.F. never met “Chris Miller” face-to-face. Detective Roar could never locate “Chris Miller.” Appellant did not assist the detective in
{¶59} The jury had these witnеsses and their testimony to evaluate. Appellant‘s defense was essentially a denial of the sexual conduct and suggesting to the jury that 15-20 other people had access to his Facebook page and his page may have been hacked. He explained his lack of willingness to assist Detective Roar in finding “Chris Miller” as his reaction after the detective accused him.
{¶60} In light of the evidence adduced at trial, and the credibility determinations which were the jury‘s to make, we cannot conclude the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding Appellant guilty of two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Under these circumstances, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
{¶61} As such, we find the jury‘s verdict was not against the mаnifest weight of the evidence. We hereby overrule Appellant‘s second assignment of error.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
BY:
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.