State v. GibsonState v. Gibson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Morris
Aрpellant assigns as • error the ruling of the court that his confession to Officer Setzer was frеely and voluntarily made.
Officer Setzer testified on voir dire as follows: That he came on duty at 6 o’clock a.m. on 11 October 1.967; that two other officers brought defendant into the police station at approximately 7 o’clock a.m.; that defendant was in custody at that time; that he talked to defendant and. advised him that he had the right to remain silent, *189that he had the right to have counsel, thаt “he had a right to the advice” and could call some of his relatives, and anything asked him сould be used against him and he (defendant) didn’t have to tell him anything if he didn’t want to; that he didn’t have to sаy anything without having an attorney present and if he needed an attorney, one would be obtained for him if he couldn’t afford it; that defendant advised that he didn’t know anything at that time about whаt he was talking about.
“Q. And then what happened?
“A. I further questioned Dennis ... if I’m permitted to say this, I have known Dennis for several yеars and I have had occasions to talk to Dennis in the police station, and I advisеd Dennis if he knew anything about this, if he would tell me, I would in any way assist him or help him as a youngster.”
Defendant then related to Officer Setzer the events in connection with the charges against him. Officer Setzer further testified that de-’ fendant had been at the police station about 30 minutеs when he made the statements involving himself in the crime; that defendant told him that he was 14 years of age; that he had known defendant and that defendant had frequently dropped by the statiоn to talk with the officers, as other youngsters did; that at the time he was not aware that defеndant had been in Jackson Training School; that by his statement that he would assist defendant or help him in any way he could he meant “By knowing Dennis, whatever I could do to help him — any advicе or anything he wanted me to assist him with.”
We are not able to distinguish this case from State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C. 333, 130 S.E. 2d 641, where the sheriff told the defendant that “if he would help me out on this thing I would certainly appreciate it” and “if he would help us on this thing, we would certainly try tо help him”, and State v. Fuqua, 269 N.C. 223, 152 S.E. 2d 68, where the officer testified on voir dire as to his conversation with defendant, “Yes, sir, I told him if he wanted to talk to me then I would be able to testify that he talked to me and was cooperative.” In both these сases, our Supreme Court held that these statements constituted a type of promisе which- aroused in the defendant some hope and were sufficient to render the cоnfession involuntary.
In this case, we are cognizant of the fact that this defendant was not unfamiliar with police routine, that he had been in training school, had run away three times, and hаd been declared an incorrigible. Nevertheless, he is entitled to the same protеction of careful procedures to assure the voluntariness of his confession аs our Court has assured to other defendants.
*190In State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259, 261-262, a landmark decision in the area of free and voluntary confessions, the Court said:
“Confessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called voluntary when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but аre attributable to that love of truth which predominates in the breast of every man, not operated upon by other motives more powerful with him, and which, it is said, ili-the perfectly goоd man cannot be countervailed. These confessions are the highest evidences of truth, even in cases affecting life. But it is said, and said with truth, that confessions induced by hope оr extorted by fear are, of all kinds of evidence, the least to be relied on, and аre therefore entirely to be rejected.”
The fact that this defendant was a juvenilе delinquent does not dispel the compelling conclusion that the statement of Officеr Setzer aroused in defendant some hope and that this emotion of hope inducеd the confession. We do not think the confession can be considered as freely and voluntarily given within the meaning of our decisions. It was, therefore, inadmissible.
Statements made tо Charles Huggins and to Officer Hand are likewise inadmissible. They were made within a short time after the statement to Officer Setzer.
“Where a confession has been obtained under cirсumstances rendering it involuntary, any subsequent confession is presumed to proceed from the same vitiating influence, and the burden is on the State to establish the voluntary character of the subsequent confession before it can be received in evidence.” State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 88, 81 S.E. 2d 193.
The State did not carry this burden.
Other assignments of error addressed to the failure of the court to grant defendant’s motion for nonsuit and to portions of the judge’s charge are not considered, because there must be a
New trial.
Campbell and BRItt, JJ., concur.