State v. GhoramState v. Ghoram
Defendant was convicted, after a trial by jury, of murder and was sentencеd to life imprisonment. He has filed this appeal, relying upon one bill of exceptions for a reversal of his conviction and sentence.
Defendant was tried for the felony murder of George Davis, a customer оf the Hernandez Ice Company, Baton Rouge, which occurred while defendant and two other individuals were engaged in the perpetration of an armed robbery at that company. The evidence introduced at trial indicates that Davis was unintentionally shot by one of defendant‘s confederates during the course of the robbery.
Defendant‘s only bill of exceptions was reserved when the trial court overruled his objection tо protracted questioning by the assistant district attorney regarding several other armed robberies in which the defendant allegedly participated. The questions were asked of defendant on cross-examination, аfter he had taken the stand to testify in his own behalf. No conviction of any of these other armed robberies had been obtained at the time of defendant‘s trial in this matter, nor does the State contend it was impeaсhing the witness.*
Upon the trial of this defendant, the State made no attempt to comply with the procedural guidelines for use of other offenses under
In its brief the State argues, as it did at trial, that the cross-examination as to participation in other armed robberies was permissible under
“When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or deсlarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.”
As may clearly be seen by an examination of the above-stated statute, evidence of these other armed rоbberies could properly be offered under it only if knowledge or intent formed an essential part of the inquiry. Since the murder charged was a felony murder, no specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm had to be proven.
Despite these admissions, the record reveals that the assistant distriсt attorney repeatedly attempted to badger the defendant into denying his participation in the armed robbery, going so far, at one point, as to implore the defendant to deny his participation. When thеse attempts failed, the assistant district attorney abandoned this course of questioning and misstated the defendant‘s answer in order to cross-examine him as to other offenses.
As noted above, the State argues that the guidelines set forth in Prieur, to be followed when the State intends to offer evidence of other criminal acts under
“If a statute has made it a crime to do a particular act, no further proof of intent is required than that accused voluntarily did the act; and any evidence that he did not know such act to be forbidden by law is inadmissible.”
Had defendant‘s testimony in fact denied guilty knowledge and intent, the State could properly have objected to suсh testimony under
It is clear that the assistant district attorney elicited defendant‘s testimony of participation in other armed robberies after the trial court overruled defense objection to the line of questioning in order to show that the defendant had a bad character, not to establish guilty knowledge and intent which had already been admitted by defendant during prior examination. This conduct is contrary to the letter and the spirit of our statutory scheme and our jurisprudence. See State v. Prieur, supra. It is statutorily provided that a defendant‘s character is not properly at issue until he chooses to put it at issue.
In State v. Pettle, 286 So.2d 625 (La.1973), we stated:
“This Court is very intent upon enforcing the rules of law under
R.S. 15:445 andR.S. 15:446 as set forth in State v. Prieur and State v. Moore, supra. We fully expect the State to weigh carefully the probative value of even relevant and admissible evidence of other crimes against the prejudicial effeсt upon the jury. We expect the trial court to control the production of relevant evidence of probative value in a manner which will guard against an over-zealous presentation by the State designеd primarily to prejudice the jury into a determination of guilt based upon the defendant‘s guilt of a crime for which he is not on trial. The evidence of other relevant admissible crimes must be of highly probative value and must not be merely repetitious or cumulative. This evidence cannot be overindulged in to depict bad character or propensity for bad behavior. * * *”
Our intentions have not altered. We hold that the rules applicable to the introduction of prior offenses under
Having concluded that the trial court erred in overruling defendant‘s objection tо questioning which improperly elicited evidence of other crimes, we reverse the conviction and sentence of this defendant and remand the case for a new trial.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, J., concurs with reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents with reasons.
SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting).
This case extends the procedural rules governing the admission of similar offenses announced in State v. Prieur, La., 277 So.2d 126 (1973) to include the use of such offenses in cross-examination of the defendant and in rebuttal. Having dissented from the original decision, I also dissent from the present extension. See State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966).
MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I do not agree with the majority in this case for the reason that it constitutes an extension of State v. Prieur to rebuttal testimony.
CALOGERO, Justice (concurring).
I concur in holding that the conviction and sentence in this case should be revеrsed and the case remanded for a new trial because I agree that the evidence of other crimes was not admissible under
This is the first case we have entertained following Prieur in which non-compliance with Prieur procedural guidelines has been at issue. I consequently consider it appropriate to comment on those guidelinеs.
Jurisprudentially imposed procedures are certainly not unprecedented.*
They are nonetheless preferably to be imposed, or enacted by the Legislature. We set them forth in Prieur until such time as the Legislature considers the matter because of the serious risk of reversals in this difficult area of the law, were the trial courts to be unaided by an expression from this Court.
Those five guidelines of course speak for themselves. Essentially however, they are designed, in fairness, to alert the defendant to what crimes, uncharged, the State intends to use, to cause by the trial court a studied consideration of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced, and to assure that in the event such evidence is introduced proper instructions as to the purpose of such introduction is afforded the jury.
The majority opinion properly states that our pronouncement in Prieur, including the required procedures, has not changed or altered. I deem it advisable however to express that I personally consider substantial compliance with those five procedural guidelines sufficient. I do not believe that hypertechnical application of those rules is required. Certainly that is not whаt I understand to have been the intention of this Court when Prieur was handed down.
SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).
It is my opinion that the extension of the rule announced in State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973), which this opinion represents, will be impossible to apply in actual practice. It is unfair to impose upon the District Attorney the burden of anticipating that it will be necessary to use evidence of other offenses to prove intent, knowledge or system on cross-examination or rebuttal. It requires anticipating the defendant‘s evidence in advance of trial when the State has no right to discovery or production. Moreover, I dissented in State v. Prieur, and I have not since been convinced of the salutary features of that decision.
I respectfully dissent.