State v. GeorgeState v. George
The defendant, Pearl Lee George, was convicted, and sentenced to serve thirty days in jail, under a bill of information which charged that on July 22, 1963 she “unlawfully violated R.S. 14:26, in that she did intentionally conspire by entering into a combination of two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing а criminal mischief, and specifically to violate R.S. 14:103.1, as amended * *
On defendant’s applicatiоn we granted certiorari, as well as issued a rule to show cause, there being no remedy by appeal.
A consideration of the several alleged errors complained of by the defendаnt in her application for certiorari and in her brief submitted to this court would necessitate our еxamining the testimony adduced at the trial. But such evidence is not annexed to and made a part of any perfected bill of exceptions. This omission, consequently, precludes our considering those complaints. See State v. Gaines et al.,
Nevertheless, the bill of information on which the defеndant was tried was so defective (being vague and indefinite) as to entitle her to a reversal of the conviction and sentence, the defect constituting an error patent on the face of the record of which this court must notice ex proprio motu. State v. Daye,
LRS 15 :227 requires that, when as here the authorized short form is not used, “The indictment must state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offensе * * This statute, as we noted in State v. Smith et al.,
The law of this state denouncing a criminal conspiracy, being LRS 14:26, makes it abundantly clear that therе must he, in addition to an agreement or combination of two or more persons to commit a сrime, an overt act by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the object of suсh agreement or combination. State v. D'Ingianni,
Further, we note that in the bill of information the crime which the defendant is said to have conspired to commit is described as “criminal mischief, and specifically tо violate R.S. 14:103.1, as amended.” However, LRS 14:103.1 defines the crime of “disturbing the peace”, not “criminal mischiеf”, the latter being denounced by LRS 14:59. The mentioned two crimes, obviously, differ as to intent and to the conduсt denounced. Also, different penalties are provided by the respective statutes. Accordingly, considering the manner in which the instant bill of information in the long form is drawn, it would be impossible for this defendant to know whether she was being prosecuted for conspiring to commit acts constituting criminal mischief оr ones relating to a disturbance of the peace.
Besides, the commission of each оf such offenses may be accomplished in a number of separate and distinct ways. This requires, henсe, that an information in the long form charge the accused with the commission of at least onе of the several specific acts embraced within the statutory provisions. State v. Verdin et al.,
We are not unaware that the crime of conspiracy is one for which a short form accusation may be used pursuant to LRS 15 :235. But it is to be noted that the information here is not in keeping with the provisions оf such statute, particularly in that it fails to name any co-conspirator —apparently a necessary averment in a short form. Nonetheless, the ambiguity created by charging a conspiracy to commit “criminal mischief, and specifically to violate R.S. 14:103.1”, when the latter does not denounce criminal mischief, renders thé
Incidentally, when the case was orally .argued in this court the question of the sufficienсy of the bill of information was raised from the bench. However, the state’s attorney made no argument to sustain its validity. Rather, he conceded that it was, indeed, exceedingly vague and indefinite.
For the rеasons assigned the supervisory writs heretofore issued by us are made peremptory, the conviction and sentence are annulled and set aside, and the defendant is discharged.