STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ALBERT GELDRICH, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2015-11-103
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
6/13/2016
[Cite as State v. Geldrich, 2016-Ohio-3400.]
S. POWELL, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 13CR29717
Fowler, Stueve & Planas, Jeffrey W. Stueve, 301 East Silver Street, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for defendant-appellant
OPINION
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Albert Geldrich, appeals from the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas ordering him to pay $2,383.98 in restitution upon remand from this court directing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On March 8, 2014, Geldrich entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to
{¶ 3} On appeal, the state conceded and this court agreed that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing after Geldrich disputed the amount of restitution imposed. State v. Geldrich, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-08-112, 2015-Ohio-1706, ¶ 7. The matter was then remanded to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to “determine the appropriate amount of restitution that should be imposed on Geldrich, if any.” Id. at ¶ 9.
{¶ 4} On October 14, 2015, the trial court held the required evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the state called a single witnesses, Mother, who testified that she was seeking a restitution order for her son‘s medical bills now in collection, the value of the clothes and shoes he was wearing at the time of his murder, as well as money to help pay for a headstone, an amount the trial court determined totaled $2,383.98. Following this testimony, Geldrich raised a number of arguments as to why he believed he should not be ordered to pay any restitution, which included the fact that he “was going to be in prison for a long time and that he was indigent.” Overruling Geldrich‘s various arguments, the trial court then issued a decision ordering Geldrich to pay $2,383.98 in restitution to Mother.
Standard of Review
{¶ 6} As this court recently stated, instead of applying an abuse of discretion standard, “the proper standard of review for analyzing the imposition of restitution as a part of a felony sentence is whether the sentence complies with
Restitution and R.C. 2929.18(A)(1)
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} Due process “requires that the amount of restitution ordered bear a reasonable relationship to the actual loss suffered by the victim.” State v. Stamper, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-04-115, 2010-Ohio-1939, ¶ 17. Thus, the restitution amount is limited to the “actual
Actual Economic Loss
{¶ 9} Initially, Geldrich argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to Mother because she did not suffer any actual economic loss since she has not yet paid her son‘s medical bills now in collection, nor has she purchased a headstone to mark her son‘s grave. We find this argument unpersuasive as it essentially advocates for a rule of law that permits only those individuals who can afford to pay a victim‘s medical costs and funeral expenses upfront to be entitled to recover those costs and expenses through an order of restitution. This is inconsistent with the reasoning behind ordering an offender to pay restitution as part of his or her sentence. Moreover, the fact that an estate had not been opened for the victim is inconsequential since the collection notices regarding the victim‘s medical bills were directed specifically to Mother. Again,
Competent and Credible Evidence
{¶ 10} Next, Geldrich argues the trial court‘s decision ordering him to pay restitution was improper since the order was not supported by competent and credible evidence. “A
Present and Future Ability to Pay
{¶ 11} Geldrich further argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution because the trial court failed to consider his present and future ability to pay. We disagree.
{¶ 12} Pursuant to
{¶ 13} In this case, Geldrich claims the only evidence in the record regarding his present and future ability to pay is the fact that he was found indigent. However, not only is this claim inaccurate, it is well-established that “a finding that appellant is indigent for the purpose of receiving appointed counsel does not prohibit the trial court from imposing a financial sanction.” State v. Hinojosa, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-05-104, 2004-Ohio-1192, ¶ 31. Rather, as the record reveals, the trial court was able to personally view Geldrich multiple times at the hearing on his motion to suppress, his plea and sentencing hearings, the hearing regarding restitution, as well his testimony at his co-defendant Michael Watson‘s jury trial. As a result, the trial court had ample opportunity based upon its collective perceptions and impressions formed throughout the various proceedings to consider Geldrich‘s present and future ability to pay prior to issuing its decision. This is particularly true here considering Geldrich explicitly argued that, similar to his co-defendant Michael Watson, he should not be ordered to pay restitution since he “was going to be in prison for a long time and that he was indigent.” This argument, which the trial court clearly rejected, necessarily requires the trial court to take into consideration Geldrich‘s present and future ability to pay.
{¶ 14} As this court has stated previously, because the standard of review contained in
Disproportionate Sentences
{¶ 15} Finally, Geldrich argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution when his co-defendant Michael Watson was not. According to Geldrich, this constituted a disproportionate sentence that violated his constitutional rights and
{¶ 16} Pursuant to
{¶ 17} After a thorough review of the record, we find nothing improper about the trial court‘s decision to order Geldrich to pay restitution when his co-defendant was not. As the record indicates, although requesting an order of restitution, the state did not provide any evidence regarding an amount of restitution for the victim‘s medical costs, clothes, or funeral expenses at Watson‘s sentencing hearing, whereas in this case the state clearly did. Therefore, because the record indicates the trial court properly considered the statutory
{¶ 18} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.