Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Michael Garza challenges a Court of Appeals decision to reverse a district court’s order suppressing drug evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Garza argues no jurisdiction existed for the appellate court to consider the State’s appeal of the suppression order and that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the requisite reasonable suspicion existed to support die initial stop. We affirm the court’s jurisdiction, reverse the appellate panel’s determination that substantial competent evidence supported the traffic stop, and remand to the district court for additional factual findings regarding whedier there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop.
Factual and Procedural Background
Shortly after 2 a.m. on a clear and dry night, a Ulysses police officer traveling south down a city road observed what he believed to be one headlight of an oncoming car, traveling north, cross оver into the officer’s lane and then cross back before making a right-hand turn. The road was a two-way traffic street, meaning traffic traveled in both directions. It contained a clearly marked double yellow line in the center, indicating a no passing zone.
The officer testified that he observed the car cross over from 2 blocks away, but he admitted that he could not actually see the centerline at that distance in the dark. When asked whether he knew whether the driver crossed tire center line, the officer testified that “[y]ou can’t actually tell where he was at, but by the way the headlight is, you can tell that he crossed the center line being in my lane.” These events were recorded by the patrol car’s video recording system. The officer also admitted that the centerline was not visible on the video at the oncoming car’s location. The officer pulled the car over, believing the driver had committed a traffic infraction by driving left of center.
Garza was a passenger in the stopped vehicle. While the driver underwent testing to determine impairment, Garza waited in the car as a second officer stood nearby. That officer saw Garza reach into the center console, pull out a baggy of green leafy substance, and attempt to hide it in his waistband. Garza was later charged with felonious possession of marijuana in violation of K.S.A. 2008
Garza filed a motion to suppress tire drug evidence, claiming it was found during an illegal traffic stop because there was no evidence to show it was unsafe for the car to leave its lane of travel. At a hearing on the motion, the State argued the driver violated K.S.A. 8-1514(a), the statute prohibiting driving left of center. That statute does not contain a safety element; it requires thаt all vehicles remain on the right half of the roadway unless one of four exceptions applies. The State argued the driver was in violation of the statute, malting the stop legal, because the testifying officer said he did not observe any applicable exceptions. But Garza argued the applicable law was K.S.A. 8-1522, which is the statute for failing to maintain a single lane. And it requires a showing that it was dangerous to switch lanes.
The district court granted Garza’s motion to suppress. It ruled K.S.A. 8-1514 was inapplicable under a belief that it applied only to unmarked roads, and that K.S.A. 8-1522 applied to roadways containing marked lanes. Under K.S.A. 8-1522 and caselaw, the district court said the State was required to show an element of dangerousness to prove a statutory violation. In other words, it needed to be dangerous for the car to drift into the other lape before the drift would be considered a traffic infraction. The district cоurt found that although the car may have driven slightly left of center, there was no evidence to show it was unsafe to do so. The drug evidence was suppressed, and, following a short discussion on how to proceed, the district court dismissed the case. The State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held the district court relied on the incorrect statute and the State did not need to show it was unsafe for Garza’s car to cross over the cеnterline. The panel also made a specific determination that there was substantial competent evidence in the record to support a finding that the car crossed the centerline dividing the lanes of traffic traveling in the opposite direction, which was a violation of K.S.A. 8-1514(a). State v. Garza, No. 102,953,
Jurisdiction
Before reaching the merits of Garza’s claim, we must first address his argument concerning appellate jurisdiction. Garza claims the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had jurisdiction when tire State appealed from the district court’s dismissal order rather than taking an interlocutory appeal from the suppression order.
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant in this case, Kansas appellate courts generally have jurisdictiоn to entertain an appeal only if that appeal is taken in the manner prescribed by statute. State v. Snodgrass,
In its notice of appeal, the State said it was appealing “all issues from . . . the Suppression Hearing on July 14, 2009.” In its subsequent dockеting statement, the State relied upon K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1), which permits appeals from a case dismissal. Garza argues the exclusive method of appealing the suppression order was by interlocutory appeal under K.S.A. 22-3603. The failure to do so, he contends, eliminated appellate court jurisdiction.
In denying Garza’s jurisdictional claim, the Court of Appeals recognized that a similar argument was raised and denied by this court in State v. Huff,
The jurisdictional argument Garza raises is as unpersuasive now as it was in Huff. Garza’s case was dismissed in the same hearing the evidence was suppressed, similarly making the suppression and dismissal “one and the same.” Accordingly, an appeal from the dismissal was proper. Moreover, just as in Huff, the State’s notice of appeal here said it was appealing “all issues from . . . the Suppression Hearing on July 14, 2009.” The State’s initial notice of appeal was broad and general enough to have put Garza on notice it was appealing the suppression ruling. And unlike Garza’s assertion that the State initially gave no indication it would appeal, the State said at the conclusion of the hearing that it would like the video of the traffic stop to be made part of the record on appeal, and that it was requesting a transcript.
The Court of Appeals correctly held the State’s notice of appeal was appropriate, supporting its jurisdiction to decide the merits. Garza,
Suppression of Evidence
Garza argues the district court properly suppressed the evidence in his case because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which he was a passenger. He urges this court to overturn the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the suppression order.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. Without reweighing the еvidence, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed to de
Garza urges this court to employ a more lenient negative finding standard based upon the district court’s determination that the State failed to meet its burden of proving the traffic stop was lawful. Garza relies on Lostutter v. Estate of Larkin,
But as noted by the Court of Appeals, Garza’s position is contradicted by this court’s decision in State v. Marx,
This case also requires an interpretation of two traffic infraction statutes—K.S.A. 8-1514 and K.S.A. 8-1522. This court has unlimited review over questions of statutory interpretation. See Marx,
Discussion
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides identical protection from unlawful government searches and seizures. State v. Daniel,
Under Terry, which is codified at K.S.A. 22-2402, a law enforcement officer may stop someone in a public place without making an arrest when the officer knows of specific and articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. K.S.A. 22-2402(1); Marx,
Garza’s argument asks us to consider whether the officer s stop was based on reasonable suspicion that the driver committed a traffic infrаction. But a wider issue must be addressed concerning which statute the district court should have applied to the facts of the case: K.S.A. 8-1514 as argued by the State, or K.S.A. 8-1522 as argued by Garza. At the suppression hearing, the district court considered these two competing statutes before ultimately applying K.S.A. 8-1522 as advocated by Garza.
It was an undisputed fact at the hearing that the stop occurred on a two-way city street marked by a yellow line in the center. Based on this scenario, the State argued the driver drove left of center, triggering application of K.S.A. 8-1514(a). That statute provides: “Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.” It states four exceptions to this rule: (1) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction; (2) when an obstruction exists making it necessaiy to drive left of center on the highway; (3) upon a roadway divided into three marked traffic lanes; and (4) upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic. K.S.A. 8-1514(a)(l), (2), (3), and (4). The State argued that because the officer saw the car drive
In State v. Hopper,
Without claiming entitlement to any exceptions, Garza argued an entirely diffеrent statute applied—K.S.A. 8-1522—though defense counsel said at the suppression hearing that K.S.A. 8-1522 “supplements” K.S.A. 8-1514 by discouraging unsafe lane changes. Curiously, rather than challenging the State’s assertion that K.S.A. 8-1514 applied, defense counsel initially said the ultimate question for the district court was a factual one: whether there was significant evidence the vehicle crossed the centerline. K.S.A. 8-1522 states in relevant part:
“Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:
(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
Garza relied on Kansas v. Ross,
But the district court’s decision was erroneous for two reasons. First, the officer’s testimony more correctly fit within the parameters of K.S.A. 8-1514 in this case because it is specific to driving left of center. Second, the district court should have considered only the statute die State alleged Garza violated.
K.S.A. 8-1514 is specific to driving left of center. See Hopper,
We also observe that while either statute could have applied depending on the evidence and circumstances, ultimately the district court should have narrowly considered the evidence in light of the only statute the State claimed was violated—K.S.A. 8-1514(a). After all, it is the State’s function to allege that a crime has been committed. See K.S.A. 22-2104 (all prosecutions are brought in the name of the State); K.S.A. 22-2301(1) (prosecution begins by filing complaint.) And in this case, the State alleged the officer’s actions were proper under K.S.A. 8-1514, so the district cоurt should have considered the evidence under that statute alone. The district court’s failure to apply the officer’s testimony to the violation alleged by the State requires reversal and a remand for further proceedings.
That does not end our inquiry, however, because the Court of Appeals went further by engaging in appellate fact finding to hold
But what the district court actually said is different. It held: “In looking at the video it is my opinion that there was a left of center, although it was slight. I could not see any way to gauge the degree to which the car did cross the center line. It may even just barely [have] touched it, I don’t know.” (Emphasis added.) Such unclear findings cannot serve as a basis for making the determinations required of the legal issues presented. The Court of Appeals made its own factual findings when it held the officer had a reasonable suspiciоn under the statute to justify the traffic stop. This is contrary to the function of an appellate court, which does not serve as a finder of fact. See Huff,
It was error for the Court of Appeals to uphold the traffic stop after determining the trial court applied the wrong statute. We reverse that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. We rеmand the case to die district court for additional findings based on application of K.S.A. 8-1514(a), which is the only statute alleged by the State to have been violated, to determine whether Garza’s motion to suppress should be sustained.
Reversed and remanded.
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Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: I respectfully dissent, because I believe that giving effect to a statute’s plain and unambiguous language means to read the words literally, not figuratively, especially where due process and the rule of lenity are in play. Further, I take issue
Beginning with the plain and unambiguous language of K.S.A. 8-1514(a), it directs that “a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.” (Emphasis added.) Literally, that would mean that, on a 20-foot-wide roadway, the vehicle would have to be driven on the right 10 feet, regardless of what might be painted on the road’s surface. K.S.A. 8-1514(a) does not refer to a “lane” on the roadway. Cf. K.S.A. 8-1522(a) (“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as рracticable entirely within a single lane . . . .”). It does not refer to tire “center line of the roadway,” as does a provision later in the same statute. See K.S.A. 8-1514(c) (upon roadways with 4 or more lanes, “no vehicle shall be driven to the left of the center line of the roadway”). Yet, the majority appears to measure whether Garza complied with K.S.A. 8-1514(a) by looking at the evidence of whether Garza’s vehicle crossed over the double-yellow “cеn-terline” and whether die officer saw Garza driving in the officer’s “lane.”
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that K.S.A. 8-1514(a) is the more specific statute, the concepts of lanes and centerlines are only specific to other statutory provisions, e.g., K.S.A. 8-1522. Indeed, K.S.A. 8-1514(a) begins with the disclaimer that it only applies to “all roadways of sufficient width.” That proviso makes scant sense in die context of “any roadway [tiiat] has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanеs for traffic.” K.S.A. 8-1522. Rather, the prefatory qualification indicates to me that the legislature intended K.S.A. 8-1514(a) to be the general provision applicable to all roadways, including those that have no lane markings or no hard surface.
In otiier words, while the determination of whether Garza drove his vehicle “left of center” might be applicable to K.S.A. 8-1514(a), a determination of whether Garza “drove left of the center line” is not. I did not see any evidence in the recоrd that the centerline here was actually painted at die center of the roadway. Moreover, even if the two yellow lines are, respectively, equidistant from the edges of the roadway, the center of the roadway would fall in between the two lines. Accordingly, Garza could have driven upon
The majоrity’s interpretation of K.S.A. 8-1514(a) in terms of other statutoiy provisions, i.e., reading right half of the roadway to mean entirely within a single lane, does not feel like due process of law. Moreover, the majority appears to be giving the State the benefit of an assumption that the centerline is the measure of the right half of the roadway. In my view, that turns the rule of leniiy on its head. The statute should be strictly construed in Garza’s favor. Accordingly, on remand, I would direct that the district cоurt determine whether the State has proved that Garza failed to drive on the right half of the roadway, rather than whether the vehicle crossed over the centerline.
Finally, I want to address the majority’s reference to the holding in State v. Hopper,