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State v. Garza
236 P.3d 501
Kan.
2010
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*1 100,359 No. Appellee, Kansas,

State of Jr., Appellant. Garza, Merardo (236 501) P.3d Opinion filed 2010. July Davis, Michelle A. Office, Kansas Defender Appellate argued cause was on the brief for appellant. Isherwood, A. assistant Lesley district cause, attorney, argued and Nola Foulston, Tedesco Six, district and Steve attorney, attorney were general, with her on the brief for appellee. of the court was delivered opinion Garza, Merardo his sentence and Jr., appeals Biles, convic- J.: tions indecent liberties with a child pursuant of a child 21-3504(a)(3)(A) K.S.A. *2 in to life 21-3502(a)(2). sentenced He was K.S.A. to pursuant under sentence of minimum years with mandatory prison court has Law. This 21-4643, known as K.S.A. commonly Jessica’s crime; life 22-3601(b)(l) sen- K.S.A. (off-grid

jurisdiction tence). (1) Was Garza raised on are

The appeal: following questions (2) the district court ex- trial? Did new counsel before to entitled insuffi- (3) document Was evidence? relevant charging clude list it did not because crime Garza to to sentence off-grid cient (4) sentence Garza’s the crime? Should of as an element his age Bello, v. under State and remanded be vacated resentencing (5) its 195-200, and 211 P.3d 139 progeny? amounts sentence claim that his Garza Did off-grid preserve (6) Is the and unusual provision to a cruel departure punishment? it allows 21-4643(d) because arbitrary K.S.A. unconstitutional in conviction (7) and Should decision and making? capricious and reversed va- a child be with indecent liberties of aggravated in the alternative? he was because cated charged under 14 of a child of Garza’s conviction years We affirm indecent his conviction and vacate We reverse aggravated age. in the al- was this offense a child with charged liberties convicted of cannot be holds a defendant Our case law ternative. alternative. State in the crimes are when offenses both charged Garza’s sen- But Dixon, did district because the affirmed nonetheless tence liberties convic- indecent him for sentence actually resolved and are addressed below raised against Other issues tion. Garza. Background Procedural

Factual and children, the child wife, have four and his Garza including Amy, X.S., who was 13 victim, has two M.G. Garza also stepdaughters, lived with Garza. A.C., old. old, was who They years aon to this case occurred incident rise Saturday evening The giving from returned home members and other visiting M.G. after family after relatives midnight.

M.G. testified she down on the room floor to lay to living go Garza was on the couch. M.G. testified sleep. lying beside lay her, his “put [her] like fingers them.” She vagina wiggled took his hand out of times, her two and then he pants rubbed her bottom the on outside of her The next M.G. told her pants. day, Then, she told her mother. Her stepsisters. mother took her to the evaluation, for an and the incident hospital was reported police. Garza’s defense was that forced M.G. theory make a Amy false accusation. He relied on from one of his other who testified Garza and had daughters, Amy previously fought went to also Amy jail. testified had said daughter she Amy would tohe Garza testified he put jail. com- caught Amy with other men on the Internet. municating He also testified M.G. to Kansas with her supposed uncle the go City night *3 incident, but did not let her Amy go. The information Garza with indecent lib- charged erties with a child under K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) (c) and, and in the alternative, 21-3502(a)(2) (c). K.S.A. and Both were listed as felonies, and Garza’s date of off-grid person birth was listed as 1969. Neither included Garza’s as an element charge age trial, offense. At the detective testified Garza investigating was over 18 The district court issued the age. elements instruction from PIK Crim. 3d 57.06 and PIK Crim. 3d 57.01. The instructions did not include Garza’s as an element the of- age fenses, and the did not make a jury his He finding regarding age. was convicted of both offenses.

Garza filed a downward on behalf, motion his own departure and his counsel also filed a motion a downward seeking departure. Garza’s counsel’s motion stated: “This is a Law’ case and ‘Jessica’s sentence is Life with presumptive parole eligibility years. The defendant would state that a such sentence would amount to cruel and unusual The Court has punishment. to option depart (cid:127) to the a sentencing guidelines sentence.” impose guideline

At the on motions, these Garza a hearing was argued departure because a life sentence exceeds appropriate of harm degree committed this He case. also he was entitled to a argued depar- ture sentence his criminal includes one mis- histoiy only eval- offender cited the sexual Garza conviction. demeanor Finally, risk of had a low Garza uation, determined reoffending which The district would be treatment sexual offender appropriate. that rea- substantial to find compelling court held was required claim, was it held each After departure to sons addressing depart. filed a Garza warranted. timely appeal. of additional filed a letter Garza his While pending, appeal R. 6.09(b) (2009 Kan. Ct. Rule Court under Supreme authority defendant’s recent 47), this court’s Annot. holdings citing determined that must be the offense by is an element See Morningstar, offense. to sentence off-grid Gonzales, State (2009); 2-3, 213 P.3d Syl. ¶¶ Bello, (2009); 10-11, 212 P.3d ¶¶ Syl. 3-4. Syl. ¶¶ New Counsel to Issue 1: Entitlement district counsel. The dire, substitute Garza Refore voir requested sufficient had not Garza motion court denied the presented finding he es- On new counsel. argues appeal, grounds appoint counsel with his dissatisfaction” tablished appointed “justifiable his He have new counsel and he was entitled appointed. concerns about was not attorney’s trial counsel citing prepared, witness and to secure failure to transcript provide preliminary refus- did not err district State testimony. did not establish new counsel because justi- ing appoint counsel. his trial with fiable dissatisfaction Review Standard of *4 to the court’s refusal review district appoint courts

Appellate discre- of discretion. for an abuse trial counsel substitute “Judicial fanciful, is action the district court’s abused when arbitrary, tion is McGee, Kan. or unreasonable.” take would reasonable (2006). whether test is The person any 280 Kan. at 894. district the court. the view adopted estab- must a defendant is substitute counsel Refore appointed, This counsel. his or her current with dissatisfaction” lish “justifiable interest, an irreconcil- of a conflict be established by showing may between in communication conflict, breakdown a able complete at 894. counsel. Ultimately, and the defendant appointed counsel for new a is request court denying a district justified rela- for basis attorney-client is a reasonable there believing.the counsel to a deteriorated appointed has not point tionship the client’s de- in the aid effective not presentation could give (2008). P.3d 1122 v. State fense. Bryant, conflict. an irreconcilable there was Garza argues

Analysis the new counsel complaints: following citing

Garza requested the a him with failed to (1) preliminary copy Counsel provide witnesses; (3) coun- to (2) failed contact counsel transcript; hearing to was feel counsel (4) lied; Garza did pro- prepared sel ceed. he stated counsel transcript, hearing preliminary Regarding ordered, but he been had if a unsure

was transcript preliminary available. The if one was a check would copy provide tran- into should look counsel indicated getting district was not a to grounds failure but noted transcript provide script have a con- do not because defendants new counsel for appointing for a asked Counsel ato subsequently stitutional transcript. right was office, which clerk’s check the granted. continuance a whether resumed without transcript mentioning proceedings tran- indicates the record hearing but preliminary provided, trial. after until was not prepared script to have the failure whether must decide preliminary We irrec demonstrates use at trial prepared transcript hearing findWe and his existed between attorney. oncilable conflict entitled are not Defendants prelimi not. automatically does entitled are defendants only Indigent transcripts. nary hearing are used factors Two effective defense. for an transcripts required (1) necessity whether to determine transcript required: of alterna (2) the for the defendant availability the transcript 493, 497, 731 P.2d Ruebke, 240 Kan. State tive devices. 483 U.S. 1024 cert. denied testified M.G. hearing. wife and both preliminary cross- were the record demonstrates thoroughly

A review of they *5 examined trial. Garza’s counsel was at the during present prelim- so he was aware of these inary hearing, witnesses’ personally prior at the such, As the district preliminary hearing. found the failure to a correctly did not demon- request transcript strate irreconcilable conflict.

The counsel’s failure to contact complaints regarding witnesses and Garza’s accusation his counsel lied are the same actually issue. Garza did not believe one witness would be to willing appear in court because the witness had an warrant. Garza outstanding believed counsel lied when counsel told him the had witness agreed to Counsel stated he became aware of testily. the witness the pre- vious him, with and the witness evening, spoke agreed testify. said he was with the witness attorney that afternoon. meeting Counsel also have had valid acknowledged may reservations about the witness because of the warrants, but he in- outstanding tended to follow he up. said Finally, intended to issue attorney for the if witness he subpoena scheduled kept appointment and had meaningful testimony.

The district court held it was not counsel’s fault witness was not earlier because the subpoenaed information had come to just and a continuance would light be more if appropriate remedy the witness could not be A reasonable subpoenaed. would person with the district court’s agree denial on this issue. Garza’sargument that had occurred, not anticipated and the problems better remedy be would to seek a continuance could not be subpoena trial, served. At no witnesses were called defense, for but the record is silent as to No additional why. was made on argument about the failure to call defense appeal any witnesses.

As to Garza’s final raised trial—that he did not point feel counsel was prepared counsel said he proceed —Garza’s The district court found counsel prepared. had not done anything fhat him from prevented trial. for We being prepared agree.

For the first time on he was entitled appeal to new counsel because Garza stated he wanted seek a continuance before voir dire to the witness but his counsel did subpoena file motion. new theories cannot Generally, be raised legal the first time on Kirtdoll, 1138, 1149, 136 appeal. *6 The an not assert (2006). Garza does 417 exception applies. P.3d new coun- erred not have could appoint district court by refusing was not when sel presented. theory raised, fail because it would were if this issue But even properly meet- after the scheduled a continuance to seek had time counsel to secure issue the if he could not with the witness subpoena ing circumstance does trial. This at signal the witness’ presence Garza and his existed between conflict attorney. irreconcilable Evidence 2: Exclusion Issue excluded twice the district court next improperly review, we find this. On The State only evidence.

relevant disputes evidence excluded the district in which one instance actually irrelevant. claimed, that evidence was as Review Standard of is to the exclusion evidence when first

The step reviewing 60-401(b) de- K.S.A. is relevant. the evidence whether determine in reason as “evidence relevant evidence tendency fines having any 574, Henson, Kan. 287 See State material fact.” any prove two com- (2008). 578, This 456 definition 197 P.3d encompasses it is ma- and whether the evidence is whether probative ponents: 69-70, Dixon, 209 289 Kan. 578; at see State v. terial. “ ‘furnishes, is evidence that (2009). Probative evidence P.3d 675 ” Klose v. Wood contributes toward Valley establishes proof.’ (1999). It is Club, 975 P.2d Inc., Racquet Dixon, 289 Kan. standard. an abuse of discretion under reviewed is fact at issue that to a evidence at 69. Material significant goes Reid, 286 Kan. State v. law of the case. under the substantive whether evidence (2008). The determination 186 P.3d Dixon, 289 Kan. at a de standard. novo material is reviewed 69. established, rules relevance is governing

Once evidentiary matter of as a are exclusion of evidence admission or applied discretion, on the in the exercise of ap- law or depending judicial basis is But if the rule. questioned, legal adequacy plicable 70; de novo. this issue courts review appellate 39, 47-48, Gunby,

Analysis

First, Garza to admit (M.G.’s evidence that sought mother Amy wife) Garza’s had an Internet man, with another relationship who moved in arrest, after Garza’s left the man alone Amy with the children. The district court allowed that a man moved into the house after Garza’s arrest. The State be- objected fore the next bench, discussion at the question. During counsel stated he intended to ask whether left the children Amy alone with this man to show she was not concerned for her chil- dren’s safety. occurred: following exchange “THE COURT: Now that’s out of field on it getting way because that doesn’t have to do with the anything motive for her her child having falsify situation. *7 “[THE Before he STATE]: into chief, goes like this in his case in anything I want to have a outside the hearing presence the because I don’t think it’s relevant.

“[GARZA’S I won’t COUNSEL]: there. go “THE COURT: Okay.”

Garza’s counsel returned and on another began questioning Amy issue. The demonstrates that the trial transcript only ques- relevance, tioned but it did not rule on the Garza vol- objection. declined to the untarily further, pursue to questioning presumably avoid additional submitting establish relevance. testimony Therefore, Garza’s to this issue on challenge appeal misplaced.

Second, Garza the exclusion of from challenges the sister, A.C., victim’s whether Garza once became regarding upset “with and the and even you at siblings Amy looking inappropriate websites.” Garza it was relevant to show argued how the household run, was would demonstrate was firm on be- inappropriate haviors, and was admissible because it was not a instance specific of conduct. The State it was irrelevant objected, and in- arguing admissible as a instance conduct specific described impeach. The State Garza had established argued the how already household was run because one of Garza’s had testified she stepdaughters just her dad would them thought for ground looking inappropriate material. The district court sustained the objection. relevance, it should be noted the

Before testimony’s addressing have testified. how A.C. would failed to question proffer as of the evidence indicate the substance does itself clearly 60-405, states: which K.S.A. required by aside, or decision set nor shall shall not be judgment “A verdict or finding reversed, exclusion of evidence reason of the erroneous be thereon by based evidence either made known of record that proponent unless appears in a form and method by of the evidence approved judge, substance evidence substance of the by questions indicating indicated the expected answers.” desired reference contained

Counsel’s inappropriate avague question were the websites websites sexuallyexplicit. suggested this the first time on now counsel appeal appellate the children’s relevant to establish information knowledge not in the record be- this assumes evidence material. But sexual what he deemed counsel did not establish cause “inappropriate child, and it is unclear whether for an website” 11-year-old M.G., her victim, in the incident was involved involving allegedly did not make claim error because he is not entitled to sister. Garza Coleman, See State v. a proffer. not assert error

(1993) (“It that a is well established may party of a of evidence the absence on the erroneous exclusion based evidence.”). of that excluded proffer websites” establishes even the term But “inappropriate assuming A.C., and Garza sub- viewed her Amy pornography siblings, children, matter does not this subject sequently disciplined *8 made a defense was that M.G. Garza’s case. His theory support the it to Garza out of false Amy encouraged get allegation children. Evidence the children without of the house custody losing toward does not establish or contribute viewed proof pornography In than M.G.’s or was more credible that Garza’s Amy’s. addition, Garza was the who while evidence only parent suggesting websites the children for helps viewing inappropriate disciplined claimed, behaviors, as he firm on establish Garza was inappropriate material to a fact at issue. the evidence was not argued made her. The district court M.G. lied because trial that Amy this evidence. correct to exclude 3:

Issue Document Sufficiency Charging Garza next the district court lacked to sen- jurisdiction tence him under K.S.A. 21-4643 because the instrument charging did not he was 18 or older. He he should allege years age be sentenced under because of this defect. This guidelines issue was raised for the first time on and it fails under this appeal, Gonzales, court’s and State v. analysis Gracey, Whether a document confers mat- charging sufficiently subject ter is a of law to unlimited review. jurisdiction question subject The test document de- governing sufficiency charging when the issue is raised. If it is for the first pends upon challenged time on the defendant must show the defect either: appeal, alleged (1) defense; (2) defendant’s of a im- prejudiced preparation the defendant’s the conviction in sub- paired ability plead any (3) limited the defendant’s substantial sequent prosecution; to a fair trial. 288 Kan. at 254. Gracey, rights Gonzales, 368-69, 289 Kan. at 288 Kan. at 256- Gracey, 57, this court document’s under iden- upheld charging validity tical facts to those cases, here. In all three the infor- presented mation’s contained the defendant’s date of birth and the caption document stated it was. for an Under these circum- off-grid felony. stances and in review, of the standard of this court held the light defendant was informed about the crime adequately charged Gonzales, 369; 289 Kan. at 288 Kan. at 257. penalty. Gracey, We believe the same is true in this The failure to appeal. allege Garza was 18 or older does not invalidate his convic- age tion.

Issue 4: Law age Proof of defendant’s Jessica’s Gonzales, above,

As mentioned and Morningstar, Bello, 211 P.3d 139 this court held the de fendant’s had to be submitted to the before a defendant age could be sentenced to an offense under K.S.A. 21-4643. off-grid Garza was convicted of and he was sentenced to an rape, off-grid offense under K.S.A. 21-3502 and K.S.A. 21-4643. The State con cedes Garza’s was not submitted to or determined jury. *9 Gonzales, Bello, and there was evidence

But unlike Morningstar, case, a detective to the In this Garza’s jury. age presented regarding Nevertheless, Garza than 18 of was older testified Garza age. years 466, 530 U.S. v. New violates his sentence Apprendi Jersey, (2000), 435, because his 490, 120 S. Ct. 147 L. Ed. 2d age— or older— whether he was 18 or the determination age a child indecent liberties with of both was an element 21- crimes under K.S.A. sentenced to when off-grid on and the and its 4643. Bello subsequent rely Apprendi progeny for their cases holdings. followingApprendi in State the harmless error Garza also analysis recognized 1147, Daniels, 53, cert. denied 543 U.S. 982 v. to the (2004), does not assigned importance apply each element of the offense under have a determine jury right an element of the is not The State argues age Apprendi. The to be submitted to the and it was not offense jury. required in the harmless error Dan not address whether State does analysis iels applies. Daniels, on an essential the failure to instruct a jury According “ if ‘a court concludes

element is harmless error beyond reviewing element was uncontested and doubt that the omitted reasonable evidence, such that the verdict jury by overwhelming supported ” at 62. This the error.’ 278 Kan. would have been the same absent 1, 17-19, States, 527 U.S. is based Neder v. United analysis upon 35, (1999). S. Ct. 1827 144 L. Ed. 2d (2010), 666, re- 234 P.3d 761 we In State v. Reyna, instruct the on this whether the failure to considered jury cently when the trial record element of the crime was harmless actually the defendant’s that uncontested evidence about contained make the would have finding, appropriate permitted we that a harm- instructed to do so. In concluded Reyna, properly 682. 290 Kan. at less error analysis applicable. this court’s deci the issue light Reyna analyzed Davis, Daniels, 278 Kan. at

sions as well as Apprendi Washington 466, 126 Recuenco, 212, 165 2d S. Ct. 2546 548 U.S. L. Ed. “[fjailure a sen- Recuenco, to submit the Court concluded *10 factor to the like failure to submit an element to the tenting jury, is not structural error.” 548 U.S. at 222. After these jury, reviewing decisions, our in Reyna explained its as follows: holding “Daniels stands for the that this court will the harmless error proposition apply to the omission anof element from the analysis instructions to the when a jury review of the evidence leads to the conclusion a reasonable doubt that beyond the omitted evidence, element was uncontested and supported overwhelming such that the verdict would have been the same absent the jury error. And Re- cuenco stands for the that the omission as an proposition characterizing Apprendi- error, i.e., type judicial omitted element when that element factfinding sentence, enhances the maximum does not applicable change analysis.” 290 Kan. at 681. Reyna, case,

In Garza’s than there was Garza was more There was no about this as the trial age. dispute pro Therefore, there was uncontested evidence before the gressed. jury on which it could have based a about Garza’s at the finding age offense, time of the instructed to do so. This evidence properly Gonzales, and Bello. Garza’s case from Morningstar, distinguishes inAs we are convinced the Reyna, error that oc Apprendi-type i.e., case, in curred when the trial court made the de termination rather than make the actual having finding, was harmless.

Issue 5: Cruel and Unusual Punishment Argument his life sentence violates the constitutional argues prohi bition cruel and unusual against punishment Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution of the Kan § sas Constitution Bill of He this issue was Rights. argues preserved for because he stated the sentence would “amount to cruel appeal and unusual in his motion. punishment” departure Finally, Freeman, State v. cites the 223 Kan. applicable analysis the test for is argues disproportionality satisfied because the for this offense is than punishment greater for more serious crimes. punishment

The State this issue should not be reached because it is argues State v. raised for the first time on Ortega-Cadelan, appeal, citing 2, 194 287 Kan. P.3d 1195 The State also Syl. ¶ for the Freeman the first driven and must prong analysis factually alternative, the district court. In the the State be raised before not unconstitutional. the sentence is cases, this court declined to review this issue for the previous 485-87, State v. first time on appeal. Easterling, 650, 652-54, (2009); P.3d 418 State Spotts, Thomas, 157, 160-61, 199 (2009); P.3d 1265 (2009); 287 Kan. at 161. These cases used the Ortega-Cadelan, test established Freeman to determine whether a sen three-part This test tence is cruel unusual punishment. provides: “(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with to the rele- degree particular regard danger present society; crime, vant to this are the facts of the the violent or nonviolent nature of inquiry offense, the extent of and the culpability injury resulting, penological *11 of the prescribed punishment; purposes “(2) A of the with in this comparison punishment juris- punishments imposed offenses, diction for more serious and them are found more serious among than the crimes less offense punished severely question challenged penalty to that extent and suspect; “(3) A with in other comparison penalty punishments jurisdictions the same offense.” 223 Kan. at 367.

Since these factors include both and factual legal inquiries the district court did not make these this court required findings, 487; Thomas, declined to address the issue. 289 Kan. at Easterling, 288 Kan. at 161. Garza this barrier should not argues apply he raised the issue in his But this has motion. departure argument Seward, limited merit under 289 State in which this court remanded the issue for the district court to make the necessary findings. Seward, the defendant claim mentioned this ne- during plea motion, it in included his written downward

gotiations, departure and reiterated the claim on the record at the sentencing hearing. This court held the issue was raised before the district sufficiently court. It then addressed whether the failure to move for additional under Court Rule barred the claim. See findings Supreme (2009 239). Rule Kan. Ct. R. Annot. The court concluded was not barred. This court remanded the issue to the district court to maleethe factual and determinations. 289 Kan. at required legal 720-21. But the Seward court cautioned: future, we believe this case to be In the a

“We emphasize exceptional. constitutional to a defendant who wishes to on the basis appeal challenge statute must ensure the and conclusions the district sentencing findings judge of a motion are sufficient by filing invoking support appellate argument, 165, if under Rule Kan. at 721. judge’s duty necessary.” failed Garza’s claim is from Seward because he distinguishable raise the issue before the district court. In his de sufficiently motion, Garza stated a life sentence would constitute a parture cruel and unusual But he did not cite punishment. any authority, test, address the Freeman this three-prong argue point during Seward, In contrast to the defendant in departure hearing. there is no evidence of an effort to this issue for preserve appeal. Issues raised in that are not or cited passing by argument supported are deemed waived. authority Morningstar, Syl. ¶ 4.

Issue 6: Arbitrary Capricious Argument 21-4643(d),

Garza next that K.S.A. statute departure Law, contained violates his due process rights Jessica’s the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 18 of the Kansas Bill Constitution because it allows for § Rights decision arbitrary discriminatory making. statute is unconstitu-

Principally, departure tional because it allows decision The State treats arbitrary making. this as a to the district court’s determination that sub- challenge stantial and reasons did not exist to compelling justify departure. *12 This court addressed a defendant’s due at recently process rights and a of our determined that the sen- sentencing, part analysis discretion, itself, court’s does not violate due tencing by process the discretion is exercised within the of requirements procedural due 289 Kan. at 482. process. Easterling, the defendant his due were Easterling, argued process rights sentence, violated because the based his sentencing judge part, on information contained in an arrest that the defendant report could not and the State did not This court dispute prove. recog- nized a defendant is entitled to due 289 Kan. process sentencing. at 476. It also a consider recognized sentencing may any a more and accurate circumstance complete picture providing behavior, and that the the defendant’s use history, background, not itself violate a of such information does defendant’s due by at 481. But this court added due process rights. a itself the information reli- court to assure required process able, accurate, and and the defendant must have an trustworthy, to rebut the evidence. 289 Kan. at 482. opportunity Garza does not violated his due process argue judge rights Instead, he while his discretion. the discretion itself argues using violates due Under the this analysis Easterling, process. argu- ment lacks merit.

Issue 7: Conviction the Alternative Charge the district court erred con-

Finally, by entering indecent with a victions for both liberties child and aggravated of child under because the information charged these counts in the alternative. Garza contends he is prejudiced by this error because the indecent liberties conviction ap- on his criminal record. The State the conviction does pears not have to be reversed and vacated because these are not charges multiplicitous. Dixon, (1992),

In State v. P.2d this court held that defendant with more than one offense “[a] charged in a be than convicted of more one multiple-count complaint may where, here, offense. In contrast as the defendant has been alternative, in the he be convicted of one of charged may only Blanchette, 686, 704, 134 fense.” See State v. 2d P.3d App. rev. denied 282 Kan. 792 cert. denied U.S. 1229 (2007). The State Dixon it attempts distinguish only arguing when the are But Dixon on to applies multiplicitous. charges goes find that the does need to deliberate on lesser alter native if the defendant is convicted of the offense charge greater and the are 252 Kan. at 49. Rather than charges multiplicitous. this cuts it re State’s supporting argument, against iterates that a defendant can be convicted of one of the alter only native crimes when in the alternative. charged *13 1036

Dixon holds that a defendant cannot be convicted of both clearly when the in offenses crimes are the alternative. The dis- charged trict court understand this since did not appeared partially sentence Garza for indecent liberties with a child. But aggravated indecent liberties conviction must be reversed.

Affirmed in in reversed part part. I with the J., dissenting: respectfully disagree major-

Johnson, decision to affirm Garza’s sentence for the version of ity’s off-grid 21-3502(a)(2). under K.S.A. I believe Garza should have been sentenced for the crime with which he was and of which charged i.e., he was convicted level 1 version of the juiy, severity offense. State v.

I discussed reasons for on in this issue my dissenting (2010), 234 P.3d 761 Reyna, which the upon in this case relies. I will not here. majority replow ground However, in this case has some ad- majority’s opinion sparked ditional which I will share. thoughts Garza’s claim that the district court discussing erroneously evidence, excluded relevant that the *14 surmise, the State but from direct One can Reyna’s testimony. only be but would not unfair to that defense counsel totally presume, did not believe the client’s was a fact at issue in that trial when to recite his The result is that Reyna asking age. Reyna sentences, Garza received hard life whereas Gon- Momingstar, zales, not, and Bello did based the fortuitous circum- solely upon stance that immaterial evidence to be in ev- just happened placed idence at trial. One whether the framers of our might ponder federal and state Constitutions envisioned such a circumstance as with due of law and fundamental I fairness. comporting process think not. notes majority materiality of relevance that the evidence be material component requires a fact at issue the case. If the defendant’s was not identified age as an element of the crime either the document or the charging instructions, what made the defendant’s a fact at issue jury age of the trial? I would submit that where the during guilt phase will not be asked to find that the defendant age older, and, therefore, that fact is not at issue the trial is not during material evidence. Garza received an enhanced sen- Accordingly, tence based evidence which was irrelevant when it in- upon troduced. in the State v. Morningstar, Apparently, prosecutors Gonzales, State v. (2009), Bello, and (2009), P.3d 215 cases did not believe the defendants’ respective ages evidence, were material because no evidence of was introduced fact, at their trials. In the evidence of came not from Reyna’s age

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Garza
Court Name: Supreme Court of Kansas
Date Published: Jul 30, 2010
Citation: 236 P.3d 501
Docket Number: 100,359
Court Abbreviation: Kan.
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