117 P. 657 | Or. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal error complained of by the defendant is the action of the court in receiving in evidence certain confessions said to have been made by the defendant. Soon after the disappearance of the deceased, the defendant was arrested by the sheriff of Coos County and one J. E. Graham, some time a detective. The arrest seems to have been made on suspicion, and so far as appears from the record, the defendant was apprehended without a warrant, and, instead of being taken before a magis
The defendant is described by nearly all the witnesses who spoke on that question as not being very bright and rather weak-minded. During the time he remained in the Marshfield city jail, and before he was taken to the county jail at Coquille City, Graham visited the defendant frequently, and questioned him very closely about the commission of the alleged murder. The witness first approached the defendant on the grounds that a good many people were finding fault with him because he was so intimate with the defendant, and it would be only justice to the witness that the defendant tell about his connection with the murder. The witness, in answer to categorical questions propounded by the prosecutor, stated in form that neither he nor any one else to his knowledge ever used any force or inducement to persuade the defendant to talk; but on cross-examination he admitted that during the conversations referred to he told the defendant that, if he would tell him all he knew about the aifair, he would protect him from any mob, and that the accused appeared to be in fear that he would be mobbed, and, further, the witness admits telling him that it would be better for him if he would tell about the murder, and that, as the facts would come out in time, he had just as well tell. This is a substantial statement of all the evidence on the subject of whether the confession was voluntary. In response to the questioning of the detective, Graham, according to his statement, the defendant told him that he stole a boat and put the body of the deceased into it, after having shot him; that he only fired one shot and tied some rocks to the body, one at either end, and took it in the stolen boat to the mouth of Coos .River, where he threw it into the water and after-
In the case at bar, however, the prosecution, with the sanction of the trial court, went beyond even the latter class of cases, and gave in evidence not only statements of the defendant as to where the body might be found and the like, but also his direct confession of having shot the decedent. In our judgment the border line of sound legal principle is reached when a witness is allowed to state in general terms that he ascertained the facts and circumstances by his own investigation prompted by statements of the defendant. To go further and admit direct confessions of guilt obtained by either threats or promises designed to influence the prisoner is to put a premium on the unscrupulous methods of overzealous detectives, and to take a step backward towards the thumb screw and
The prosecution called, as an expert, in rebuttal Dr. O. E. Tamiesie, one of the physicians at the State Hospital
Going to the other extreme, the prosecutor propounded to the expert witness a series of questions embracing’ the complete history of the crime as claimed by the prosecution, including not only the conduct and actions of the defendant, but also the movements and statements of the deceased and other matters in which the defendant had no part. These doings of other persons do not indicate anything about the mental development of the accused, and have no place whatever in the hypothetical questions propounded to the expert witness relating to the prisoner’s sanity. A hypothetical question should be germane to the matter in hand. Interrogatories propounded to the specialist about the sanity or insanity of the defendant should be.based upon some theory fairly to be derived from the testimony on that subject. They should not be clouded with matters not pertaining to the mental soundness of the accused. In these respects we deem the examination of the expert witness to be faulty and the rulings of the court erroneous.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings as provided by law. Reversed.