456 N.E.2d 1319 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1983
This matter is before us on defendant-appellant's appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County finding him guilty of *245
deception to obtain dangerous drugs in violation of R.C.
Defendant, Mark C. Garrett, waived a jury and agreed to a trial by stipulation of facts. The parts of the stipulation that are important to our disposition of the appeal are as follows: that a member of the Columbus Police Department assigned to the Narcotics Bureau would testify that, while conducting a routine inspection, she noticed two prescriptions that had been filled in a Franklin County drug store that pertained to the same patient and with dates only two days apart; that she confiscated both prescriptions and that the prescriptions identified defendant as the person receiving the medication and identified Dr. Heffelfinger as the doctor writing the prescriptions; that Dr. Heffelfinger would testify that he could identify defendant as the patient who had been in his office first in April 1978, at which time defendant stated he was working at Buckeye Steel Castings, that defendant told him he had problems sleeping and that the doctor, therefore, issued a prescription for Quaaludes; that, on January 12, 1982, defendant came to his office and stated he was having problems sleeping and needed Quaaludes, whereupon the doctor wrote a prescription for three units of Sopors, and that, on January 14, 1982, defendant came to his office and told him that the prescription he had received on January 12 was stolen with his wallet from his locker at Buckeye Steel Castings; that the doctor gave defendant another prescription and that, if he had known that defendant was, in fact, not employed at Buckeye Steel Castings and that his wallet containing the January 12 prescription had not been stolen, he would not have written the prescription on January 14; and that defendant never worked at Buckeye Steel Castings and that he had both prescriptions filled at the drug store.
Defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the doctor's testimony and filed a motion in limine prior to trial seeking an order excluding from evidence any testimony from any physician who had treated the defendant.
Defendant asserts the following assignment of error in support of his appeal:
"The Court below committed error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant when it admitted, over defendant's objection, as the only evidence of defendant's deception, the statements of the defendant's physician concerning communications made to the physician by the defendant-patient in that relation of physician and patient."
The sole legal issue presented by this appeal is whether the testimony of a physician is admissible under R.C.
The statutory physician-patient privilege is found in R.C.
"The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
"* * *
"(B) A physician concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that relation or his advice to his patient but the physician may testify by express consent of the patient * * *."
The privilege was created by the General Assembly to protect from public disclosure communications between physicians and patients in the treatment of patients. State v. Geis (June 16, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-723, unreported.
However, in the case of State v. Antill (1964),
In applying the rule of strict construction to R.C.
"In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
"* * *
"(C) A just and reasonable result is intended."
See, also, State, ex rel. Haines, v. Rhodes (1958),
168 Ohio St. 165 [5 O.O.2d 467], paragraph two of the syllabus.
The other rule is R.C.
"If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:
"(A) The object sought to be attained;
"* * *
"(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;
"(E) The consequences of a particular construction."
The privilege created by R.C.
Clearly, at least on January 14, 1982, defendant sought the professional services of Dr. Heffelfinger, not as a result of a disease or disorder suffered by defendant, but, rather, for the obtaining of an illegal drug by the use of false statements to the physician. If we were to interpret the statutory phrase "in that relation" to include the conduct of the defendant in this case, we would produce an unjust and unreasonable result and our interpretation would produce consequences that were not intended by the General Assembly and are inconsistent with the object sought to be obtained by the adoption of R.C.
We hold that R.C.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
REILLY and NORRIS, JJ., concur.