Lead Opinion
We hold that Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) has not demonstrated any compelling justification for overruling Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, State of Hawai‘i,
I.
At around 12:50 a.m. on September 5, 1999, Defendant was stopped and arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), HRS § 291-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1999).
Pursuant to the Administrative Driver’s License Revocation Law, I must inform you (arrestee) of the following:
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That if you refuse to take any tests the consequences are as follows:
1. If your driving record shows no pri- or alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of your arrest, your driving privileges will be revoked for one year instead of the three month revocation that would apply if you chose to take a test and failed it [.]
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Defendant placed his initials next to the foregoing statement and next to the words “AGREED TO TAKE BREATH TEST” on the form. The arresting officer signed the
On January 28, 2000, Defendant moved to suppress the test result. In his supporting memorandum, Defendant argued that the informational statement read to him from HPD Form 396B was identical to the one found faulty in Wilson and, based on the holding in that case, the court should suppress the test result. On February 9, 2000, the prosecution filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion to suppress.
At a February 25, 2000 hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, the court granted Defendant’s motion. On May 19, 2000, the court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The conclusions stated as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Before the breath alcohol concentration test was administered, Defendant was not accurately informed by a police officer of the sanctions under HRS [c]hapter 286 “... Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3” as required by HRS § 286-151(b).
2. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Wilson,92 Hawai'i 45 ,987 P.2d 268 (1999), is applicable to this case (i.e., “... that the information conveyed to Wilson regarding his rights under chapter 286 was inaccurate and misleading, Wilson was precluded from knowingly and intelligently consenting to the blood alcohol test in violation of HRS chapter 286.”) Id. [a]t 22-23.
3. Here, as in Wilson, before the alcohol concentration test was administered, the defendant was not accurately informed by a police officer of the sanctions under HRS [c]hapter 286 “... Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3” as required by HRS § 286-151(b).
4. Here, as in Wilson, the information concerning the sanctions under HRS [chapter 286 “... Part XIV and HRS § 286-151.5 and 286-157.3” that [was] conveyed to the defendant was inaccurate and misleading, and the defendant was precluded from knowingly and intelligently consenting to the alcohol concentration test in violation of HRS chapter 286.
5. Here, as in Wilson, the failure to comply with the requirements of HRS § 286-151(b) constitutes a “per se violation” and it is not necessary for the defendant to prove that the defendant was mislead [sic] regarding his rights under chapter 286.
6. The [c]ourt has considered the .three-prong test for fairness described by the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Ikezawa,75 Haw. 210 ,857 P.2d 593 (1993), and will give retroactive effect to those cases which are presently pending.
7. This case was “pending” at the time the Wilson decision was issued because it was in the pretrial stage of the proceedings (as opposed to a “nonpending” ease in which the defendant had already been convicted, and in which the time for the filing of an appeal from the judgment of conviction had already elapsed).
On May 31, 2000, the prosecution filed its notice of appeal.
II.
The prosecution raises the following arguments: (1) Wilson was based on a misinterpretation of HRS § 286-261 by Gray;
The relevant issue in Gray was whether and to what extent the Administrative Director of the Court, State of. Hawai'i (the Director) was authorized to determine the periods of administrative driver’s license revocation under HRS § 286-261 (1993).
(b) The periods of administrative revocation [for arrestees5 ] which may be imposed under this part are as follows:
(1) Three months, if the arrestee’s driving record shows no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(2) One year if the arrestee’s chiving record shows one prior alcohol enforcement contact during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(3) Two years if the arrestee’s driving record shows two prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the seven years preceding the date of arrest;
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(c) The license of an arrestee who refuses to be tested after being informed of the sanctions of this part shall be revoked under subsection (b)(1), (2), or (3) for a period of one year, two years, and four years, respectively.
(Emphases added.) Discerning an ambiguity between the use of the word “may” in subsection (b) and the effect to be given to the word “shall” in subsection (c), this court construed the two terms in pari materia, see Gray,
Thus, under Gray, “if an arrestee with no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years predating the date of arrest consents to a blood [or breath] test and fails, he or she may face revocation of his or her driving privileges from three months up to one year.” Wilson,
IV.
In Wilson, this court applied its holding in Gray to the advice given by police officers in requesting a driver’s consent to a BAC test. In that case, Wilson was informed that “if [he] refuse[d] to take any [BAC] tests[,] ... [his] driving privileges will be revoked for one year instead of the three month revocation
Citing State v. Pattioay,
While acknowledging that “the PCA does not spawn personal rights[, and,] therefore, exclusion is not theoretically necessary as an added deterrent to the serious criminal sanctions provided in the PCA[,]” id. at 466,
In Wilson, the majority decided that, under a contrary position, “a police officer could give a driver arbitrary, false, or misleading information regarding a driver’s rights under the implied consent law and still compel the admission of the results in the criminal context” and that “[e]learly, that cannot be the intended result of our implied consent statute.” Wilson,
Justices Nakayama and Ramil dissented on the grounds that (1) “[t]he implied consent law neither creates a right of voluntary choice, nor does it condition the admissibility of test evidence in criminal DUI prosecutions on compliance with the statutory notice re-quirementsf,]” Wilson,
V.
In 2000, the legislature amended HRS § 286-261 to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Effective date and period of administrative revocation; criteria....
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(b) The periods of administrative revocation with respect to a driver’s license and motor vehicle registration, if applicable, that [may] shall be imposed under this part are as follows:
(1) [Three] A minimum of three months[,] up to a, maximum of one year revocation of driver’s license, if the arrestee’s driving record shows no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(2) [One] A minimum of one year up to a maximum of two years revocation of driver’s license and all registrations of motor vehicles registered to the arrestee if the arrestee’s driving record shows one prior alcohol en-fqrcement contact during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(3) [Two] A minimum of tivo years up to a maximum of four years revocation of driver’s license and all registrations of motor vehicles registered to the arrestee if the arrestee’s driving record shows two prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the seven years preceding the date of arrest;
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[ (c)] (d) The driver’s license of an ar-restee who refuses to be tested after being informed of the sanctions of this part shall be revoked under subsection (b)(1), (2), [and] (3) ... for a period of one year*, two years, [and] four years, ... respectively.
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2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, § 16, at 401-02 (underscored sections added and bracketed sections deleted). The purpose of this amendment was to
codify[ ] existing appellate case law, (See State v. Wilson,92 Hawai'i 45 ,987 P.2d 268 (1999) and Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court,84 Hawai'i 138 ,931 P.2d 580 (1997)) concerning the minimum and maximum periods of administrative revocation possible under section 286-261(b)(1)-(3), HRS[.] ’
Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2000 House Journal, at 855. The amendment became effective on September 30, 2000. See 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, § 41(2), at 433.
VI.
As mentioned earlier, the prosecution argues that Gray misinterpreted HRS § 286-261(b) and, thus, Gray and Wilson, which was engendered by Gray, were wrongly decided. When faced with that contention, we must determine whether the circumstances here require overruling the precedents established in Gray and Wilson.
A.
Precedent is “[a]n adjudged case or decision of a court, considered as furnishing an example of authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising or a similar question of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (6th ed.1990). The “[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point[s]” is referred to as the doctrine of stare decisis, id. at 1406, and operates “as a principle of self-restraint ... with respect to the overruling of prior decisions.” Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
While “there is no necessity or sound legal reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare decisis[,]” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we agree with the proposition expressed by the. United States Supreme Court that a court should “not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification." Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm’n,
B.
HRS § 286-261(b), as it existed prior to the 2000- amendment, was ambiguous. In Gray, this court arrived at a construction of HRS § 286-261(b) that fell within the reasoned interpretative choices available. After Gray was decided, the State did not request reconsideration of the decision. In Wilson, the majority concluded that suppression of a BAC test result was required when the advice to an arrestee constituted a misstatement of possible HRS § 286—261(b) sanctions for consenting to take a BAC test and failing it. This conclusion was based at least in part in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system, see Pattioay,
Three years following the Gray decision and a year after the Wilson decision, the legislature ratified the Gray construction and amended HRS § 286-261(b) accordingly. In doing so, the legislature explained that it was adopting “existing appellate case law,” referring to Gray and Wilson. Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2000 House Journal, at 855. As a result of the amendment, the propositions established in Gray, and relied on in Wilson, are now essentially embodied in HRS § 286-261(b). The course advocated by the prosecution would call into question the recent legislative amendment that expressly conformed to this court’s decisions in Gray and in Wilson. Adherence to the principle of “[s]tare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response.” Hilton,
VII.
Our reaffirmance of Wilson as binding precedent disposes of the prosecution’s challenges to its holding, most of which resurrect arguments either expressly or impliedly rejected by the Wilson majority. The prosecution contends that (1) “[t]he implied consent statute does not give defendants a right to refuse an alcohol test performed as a lawful incident to arrest for DUI”; (2) “an incorrect warning alone is [injsuffieient to require suppression of the alcohol test results”; and (3) there is “no indication a warning that [correctly] apprised him ... would have changed [Defendant’s] decision to take the alcohol test in any way.” However, in Wilson, a majority of this court rejected the same arguments. The Wilson majority affirmed that “a driver’s ‘implied consent’ to an evidentiary chemical alcohol test is qualified by his or her implied right to refuse such a test.”
With respect to the foregoing statement contained in the Wilson dissent, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) has recently opined that “[t]he majority opinion was silent on the question of the defendant’s reli-anee on and prejudice” from the faulty advice. Santos v. Administrative Director of the Court,
VIII.
A.
Relying on State v. Ikezawa,
B.
Courts may resolve the retroactivity issue in three ways. “First, a decision may be made fully retroactive, applying both to the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed.... This practice is overwhelmingly the norm[.]” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
“Second, there is the purely prospective method of overruling, under which a new rule is applied neither to the parties in the lawmaking decision nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that decision.” Id. In this formulation, “[t]he case is decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision.” Id. “This approach claims justification in its appreciation that ‘[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration,’ ... and that to apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic notions of justice and fairness.” Id. (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
Third, “a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. This method[ is called] modified, or selective, prospectivity[.]” Id. at 537,
The Court’s rationale for employing selective prospectivity was to avoid disruptions of the administration of criminal law, while at the same time fostering review by applying the new rule to the case in which the rule was announced. See id. The drawback, of selective prospectivity is that it “breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally.” Id. (citation omitted). According to the Court, “[it] departs from this basic judicial tradition when [it] simply piek[s] and choose[s] from among simflarly situated defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional law.” Id. at 537-38,
Inasmuch as this court applied Wilson’s new exclusionary rule to Wilson based on the violation by the police of HRS § 286-261(b), we are not concerned with the second method, pure prospectivity. The prosecution in effect argues for selective prospectivity, in which the Wilson holding would apply to Wilson only, but not to others whose cases were pending at the time of the decision in his case.
IX.
Because our case law on the retroactive application of court-rendered rules has extensively drawn on federal decisions, it is instructive to capsulize the evolution of the United States Supreme Court decisions in this area. It was initially thought by the Court that “[t]he [United States] Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect” and “the [c]ourt’s task is to exercise its discretion, weighing the merits and demerits of retroactive application of the particular rule.” Linkletter v. Walker,
Following Linkletter and subsequent cases, the Court in Stovall “clarified [Linkletter's] criteria,” R. Fellon & D. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L.Rev. 1731, 1741 (1991), setting forth, “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the
The United States Supreme Court “subsequently overruled Linkletter [and Stovall] in Griffith, and eliminated limits on retroactivity in the criminal eontext[,]” Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation,
X.
We adhere to the view that “[wjhen questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of them own decisions.” Smith,
Rather than utilizing the Linkletter and Stovall factors in State v. Santiago,
In Russell v. Blackwell,
Subsequently, in Ikezawa, this court referred to the Linkletter and Stovall factors identified in Santiago and Russell but augmented its decision in two ways. Fust, emphasis was placed on “the concept of fatness,” which was described as “implicit in the factors described in Santiago and Russell [.] ”
The same approach was resorted to in State v. Nakata,
In connection with the second question, the appellants questioned whether this court's decision with respect to the foregoing issues could be applied retroactively. See id. at 363, 377,
In Jackson, the question whether to give retroactive effect to a new rule announced in State v. Hoey,
While suggesting that retroactive application is not automatic and that the concept of fairness affects retroactivity, see id. at 51,
Because we applied the Hoey rule to vacate Hoey’s conviction, rather than limiting its application to future appeals, “persuasive federal authority would suggest that we would be obligated to apply the same rule to all other criminal proceedings currently pending in the court system.” [Kekona,77 Hawai'i at 410 n. 3,886 P.2d at 748 n. 3] (citing Powell [, supra]). This is true for two reasons:
First, the nature of judicial review precludes us from simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new [rules], and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule. Second, selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.
Id. (quoting Powell, 511 U.S. at [84],114 S.Ct. at 1283 ) (citations, quotation marks, ellipsis points, brackets, and emphases omitted).
Id. It was reasoned that because (1) Jackson’s appeal was pending when the new rule in Hoey was announced and, thus, Jackson’s “appeal could just as easily have been the ease ‘fish[ed] from the stream of appellate review’ to serve as the vehicle for the pronouncement of this rule,” and because (2) the court “chose to apply the new rule to Hoey himself, [this court was] obligated to apply the rule to all similarly situated defendants whose appeals were pending at the time it was announced.” Id. (citations and parenthetical explanations omitted). Jackson did not employ the criteria set forth in Russell and Ikezawa.> but viewed retroactive application as “obligat[ory]” when “this court applied [a new] rule to vacate [a defendant’s conviction [in the case announcing the new rule], rather than limiting its application to future appeals[.]”
XI.
Retroactive application of Wilson will not prejudice Defendant. In Wilson, a majority of this court applied the holding to Wilson, the defendant in that case, by suppressing his BAC test result. See
XII.
“[A]ll other similarly situated defendants” are those defendants in “all cases ... pending on direct review or not yet final [,] ” id. at 328,
In this case, Defendant was arrested on September 5, 1999. Arraignment, plea, and trial were set for October 8, 1999 and apparently continued to November 29, 1999. On October 28, 1999, this court decided Wilson. Defendant was apparently arraigned on November 29, 1999. On January 28, 2000, Defendant moved to suppress the BAC test result. The court entered its order granting the motion on May 19, 2000. Defendant’s case was pending at the trial level at the time of the Wilson decision. Therefore, we conclude that Wilson applies retroactively to him.
XIII.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s May 19, 2000 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress the intoxilyzer result.
Notes
. The presiding judge in this case was the Honorable Russell Blair.
. HRS § 291—4(a)(2) provides as follows:
Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (a) A person commits the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor if:
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(2) The person operates or assumes actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle with .08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters or cubic centimeters of blood or .08 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath.
Effective January 1, 2002, Part XIV of HRS chapter 286, comprising of HRS §§ 286-251 to •- 266, will be repealed. See 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, §§ 29 and 41, at 432-33.
Defendant was also charged with driving without no-fault insurance, HRS § 431:10C-104 (Supp.2000), operation of a vehicle without a certificate of inspection, HRS § 286-25 (1993), and being delinquent on payment of the motor vehicle tax, HRS § 291C-32(a)(3)(A) (1993). These other charges are not subjects of this appeal.
. The prosecution contends that Gray misinterpreted HRS § 286-261(b) as follows: (1) the plain language of HRS § 286—261(b) does not support this court’s analysis in Gray; (2) Gray does not carry out the legislature’s intent; (3) Gray’s "judicial legislation" is prohibited under the doctrine of separation of powers; (4) "the ... legislature intended to remove the Director’s authority to impose revocation periods greater than those specifically articulated in [HRS] § 286-261(b)”; and (5) "in light of the plain language of [HRS] § 286-261(b) and the recognized intent of the legislature,” Gray's reliance on "non[-]dispositive” legislative history is unpersuasive.
. As stated infra, the legislature amended HRS § 286-261 in 2000. See infra Part V. There were no amendments between 1993 and 2000 except for “minor grammatical changes to HRS §§ 286-261(b) and (c)’’ in 1995. Gray,
. “'HRS § 286—261(b) ... deals with a consequence of administrative revocation[,] i.e., the period of administrative revocation applicable to arrestees who have consented to be tested for blood alcohol concenlrationf]’ ’’ Gray,
. Justice Ramil, joined by Chief Justice Moon, concurring, "agree[d] that the evidence obtained in violation of the PCA should be suppressed on adequate and independent state grounds via the exclusionary rule as applied in the State of Hawai'i.” Pattioay,
. The prosecution contends that Defendant did not suffer any "prejudice” because Defendant received a three-month revocation as he had been informed. Even if a defendant's ultimate revocation period did not exceed three months, the sanction ultimately imposed after taking the test has nothing to do with the defendant’s right to be properly advised so as to enable the defendant to make an informed decision.
. The prosecution maintains that Wilson overrules Rossell v. City and County of Honolulu,
. For example, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Scalia, had contended that "ftjhe nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before us, and, if it requires us to announce a new rule, to do so in the context of the case and apply it to the parties who brought us the case to decide” and that "[t]o do otherwise is to warp the role that we, as judges, play in a Government of limited powers.” Beam Distilling,
. In Linkletter, the Court did not give retroactive effect to the new rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio.
. "In the civil context, [the United States Supreme Court] ... permitted the denial of retroactive effect to 'a new principle of law’ if such a limitation would avoid 'injustice or hardship' without unduly undermining ‘the purpose and effect’ of the new rule.” Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation,
[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.
Id. at 97,
. In Stovall, the Court refused to apply a new rule established in United States v. Wade,
. The issue in Griffith was "whether [the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky,
. McLaughlin held that a delay exceeding forty-eight hours between an arrest without a warrant and a probable cause determination presumptively violates the fourth amendment. See
. Russell did not discuss “the reliance placed upon [old precedent],’’ one of the factors considered in Linkletter.
.Ikezawa was arrested and charged with third degree assault on March 23, 1990. See 75 Haw. at 213,
Ikezawa apparently depended on State v. Stone,
On March 19, 1992, this court decided State v. Balauro,
. HRS § 291—4(b)( 1 )(C)(ii) (1993) provided that Ae maximum prison sentence for commission of a first offense of DUI was five days, reduced from the thirLy-day sentence in effect prior to Act 128’s amendment. See Nakata,
. Hoey involved the validity of a state criminal procedural rule. See Jackson,
. In Jackson, it was said that "Powell requires retroactive application of Hoey.”
. Russell involved the retroactive effect to be given a new rule after a case has become final. We are not presented with that issue in this case. For example, see Justice Harlan’s dissent in Mackey to the effect that "given the current broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas, it is sounder ... generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of all these cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.”
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
with whom RAMIL, J., joins
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. In my view, State v. Wilson, 92
The arguments that Wilson was incorrectly decided are set out at length in my dissent in Wilson.
This court has previously recognized that: “ ‘A defendant who seeks to benefit from the protections of the exclusionary rule has the burden of establishing not only that the evidence sought to be excluded was unlawfully secured, but also that his own constitutional rights were violated by the search and seizure challenged.’ ” State v. Pattioay,
In my view, the majority’s holding in Wilson is inconsistent with the principle that this court’s supervisory powers should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. I cannot agree that such exceptional circumstances existed in Wilson because the implied consent statute does not create a right of voluntary choice and does not expressly provide for the remedy of suppression in criminal DUI prosecutions where the defendant was not fully informed of the administrative consequences. See
[i]t cannot be the intent of the implied consent statute to allow a blood sample to be taken in violation of its terms, to suppress it in the driver's administrative revocation proceeding as being violative of the law, and then to allow its admission in the driver’s corresponding criminal DUI prosecution because there was no infirmity in its acquisition.
Further, even assuming that the remedy of suppression is available in the DUI prosecution, I do not believe that the warning Wilson received was so misleading as to warrant the exceptional action of suppressing the evidence under this court’s supervisory powers. The warning given to Wilson did not imply that taking the test was a “safe harbor, free of adverse consequences.” See Wilson,
Finally, although I agree with the majority that the principle of stare decisis has added force when the legislature has relied upon a judicial decision, see Majority opinion at 206,
Codifying existing appellate case law, (See State v. Wilson,92 Hawai'i 45 ,987 P.2d 268 (1999) and Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court,84 Hawai'i 138 ,931 P.2d 580 (1997)) concerning the minimum and maximum periods of administrative revocation possible under section 286-261(b)(1)-(3), HRS[.]
Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2000 House Journal at 855 (emphasis added). Act 189 amended HRS § 286-261 in pertinent part:
(b) The periods of administrative revocation with respect to a driver’s license and motor vehicle registration, if applicable, that [may] shall be imposed under this part are as follows:
(1) [Three] A minimum of three months[,] up to a maximum of one year revocation of driver’s license, if the arrestee’s driving record shows no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(2) [One] A minimum of one year up to a maximum of two years revocation of driver’s license and all registrations of motor vehicles registered to the arrestee if the arrestee’s driving record shows one prior alcohol enforcement contact during the five years preceding the date of arrest;
(3) [Two] A minimum of two years up to a maximum of four years revocation of driver’s license and all registrations of motor vehicles 'registered to the arrestee if the arrestee’s driving record shows two prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the seven years preceding the date of arrest;
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[ (c)] (d) The driver’s license of an arres-tee who refuses to be tested after being informed pf the sanctions of this part shall be revoked under subsection (b)(1), (2), [and] (3), and (4-) for a period of one year, two years, [and] four years, and a life time, respectively.
2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, § 16, at 401-02 (relevant additions underscored and relevant deletions bracketed). The legislature did not amend HRS § 286-261 in reliance upon this court’s holding in Wilson concerning whether suppression is appropriate in a DUI prosecution where there was an erroneous advisement regarding the administrative penalties.
Based on the foregoing, I would overrule Wilson and hold that the circuit court in the present case erroneously granted Garcia’s motion to suppress the results of his intoxi-lyzer test.
. I also note that none of the other amendments to HRS Chapter 286, Part XIV, Administrative Revocation of Driver's License, or to HRS §§ 291-4, Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or 291-4.4, Habitually driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, relied upon these portions of Wilson. Further, the legislature did not amend HRS § 286-151, the implied consent statute. 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189 (amending various provisions of chapter 286).