State v. Gant

143 P.3d 379 Arizona, Appellee, STATE

Rodney Joseph GANT, Appellant.

2No. CA-CR 2000-0430. Arizona, Appeals of

Court of 2, Department B.

Division

Sept.

Review Feb. Granted

447 Paredes, 609, 612, 607, Ariz. 610 (App.1991). only We look evidence presented hearing on motion. Spears, State v. 908 P.2d (1996). We to the trial defer findings if court’s of fact reasonable evidence legal supports them but review the court’s Wyman, determination de novo. State v. 392, (App.2000). Ariz. 3 P.3d Goddard, General, Terry Attorney Arizona By Olsson, Randall M. Howe and Eric J. enforcement officers arrested Law Tucson, Attorneys Appellee. for outstanding Gant on an warrant after he stepped of an out automobile had seen Jacobs, By Law Offices of Thomas Thomas him driving. placing After Gant handcuffs Jacobs, Tucson, Attorney Appellant. for locking him in a patrol the back of warrant, obtaining and without a search OPINION officers searched his vehicle and found co- pocket jacket they of caine found in BRAMMER, Judge. previous As our vehicle. we stated in Supreme 1 After the United States Court memorandum decision: Gant, vacated our decision State v. trial, suppress Before Gant moved to (App.2002),1 43 P.3d re cocaine, arguing that the officers had court, superior manded this matter to the illegally searched his vehicle because no directing evidentiary hearing it to hold exception to the Fourth Amendment’s war- findings make factual on whether the applied. rant The trial court officers’ warrantless search of Gant’s motion, denied Gant convicted incident to his violated the Fourth following possession trial of unlawful of Amendment to the United States Constitut possession cocaine for sale and unlawful Gant, ion.2 State v. No. 2 CA-CR 2000- drug paraphernalia. He sentenced to (memorandum decision April filed concurrent, terms, mitigated prison 2004). The trial court found no violation. longest years. was three appeals Gant now from ruling.3 initial appeal, our review of reverse. improp- that the trial concluded erly suppress his denied motion to Background Standard of Review and [because the evidence officer had ¶2 argues Gant the trial court contact initiated with Gant after Gant had in denying erred his motion suppress evi petitioned vehicle]. left the The state our dence seized from his vehicle. We review supreme court for The court review. de- ruling trial court’s on a suppress motion to petition, nied and our mandate issued discretion, evidence for an abuse consider peti- on October The state then ing light the evidence in the Supreme most favorable tioned the United States Court to upholding court’s decision. v. for State certiorari.... Gant, requested supplemental briefing ju- 3. We on our Arizona 157 L.Ed.2d 308 to review risdiction the trial court's denial of suppress Gant's motion the evidence. The challenges ruling

2. Gant also the trial court’s on responded, citing state v. Villa- ground that the search violated the Arizona monte-Marquez, 462 U.S. Constitution. But we decline to address (1983), 77 L.Ed.2d 22 n.2 that the argument Gant it to because [our] Court’s "reversal of appeal the trial articulated how court nor on judgment conviction and reinstate why interpretation our relevant state court],” thereby entered the [trial sentence provision depart stitutional should our jurisdiction vesting appeal pursuant over the analysis. Fourth Amendment See v. Pet- State nothing suggest- § 13-4031. Gant A.R.S. filed zoldt, ing jurisdiction. an absence (state (App.1991) aban- constitutional claim is unsupported specific argument). doned when into and locked into placed handcuffs The United States The residence’s granted petition certiorari back cars. state’s and, time at this April 538 owner was although anticipating ar- [her] officers “were rival,” argument suggests oral nothing and set the case for in the she record following ease night. the November. While the the home returned to State v. 2004). was Ariz. 461, 157 L.Ed.2d 308 preme Court decided [State v.] cized our decision Gant analysis. The for reconsideration zona scheduled Gant’s Court (memorandum awaiting argument, After v. appeal subsequently Gant, 76 argument and our resolution of No. 2 P.3d and remanded ^[540] opinion CA-CR 429 (2003). U.S. light vacated both (2003),] had been States the Arizona Su 2000-0430, filed [963], and the which criti rejected Dean. Ari Dean, April case to 124 S.Ct. Supreme vacated, ¶¶ [206 the its 3- us rest,” press vehicle had been “searched imity” Ariz. testimony, the trial court found “search was conducted cent court ately ¶ 6 Gant occupancy” test after was the car” when he was 158, 30, Based on and Gant was arrested therefore denied after to his “was ¶ he concluding vehicle. apparently 76 P.3d the placed officers’ uncontradieted of State This immediately after ar- the motion to in a at most 8-10 feet appeal almost under 437 arrested. The in “close v. followed. car” the immedi- Gant’s prox- sup- “re- 206 the regarding and because Discussion only parties “stipulated had testimony by ... without the benefit of wit- pro Amendment Fourth nesses,” the case the trial remanded and sei scribes all “unreasonable searches evidentiary hearing legal- for an conditions, zures,” which, under most re ¶¶ 1, ity of the warrantless search. quires a warrant before the state obtain evidentiary hearing, po- 4 At the Tucson Const, conducting amend. a search. U.S. they had lice officers testified that first IV; 158, 8, 76 P.3d see responding at a after tacted Gant residence presumes 432. A trial court warrantless activity tip there. Gant to a about narcotics unreasonable, are state searches them that the owner of residence told establishing that evi bears the burden departed present, so the officers See State v. lawfully dence has been seized. obtaining officers after Gant’s name. The Ault, Ariz. record check and then conducted routine presumptive A search is warrantless a suspended Gant had driver’s license found and, therefore, ly unconstitu unreasonable driving for outstanding warrant it “falls one the few tional unless within suspended The officers returned license. specifically well-delineated established and person at evening, in the arrested one later exceptions to the warrant re constitutional drug para- possession the residence Kempton, 166 Ariz. quirement.” v. State giving infor- phernalia and another for false 392, 395-96, (App.1990). 116-17 mation, up then drive to the saw Gant recognized exception courts allows One have stepped out the vehi- residence. As Gant search of an to conduct warrantless officers cle, to him and Gant walked an officer called and, contemporaneous to person arrestee’s placed officer the officer. The Gant toward arrest, the area within arrestee’s eight to ten feet from under arrest about California, control. Chimel immediate car. Gant handcuffed and locked car. nearby patrol of a into the back (1969); Dean, L.Ed.2d 685 ¶¶ 11-12, P.3d at 432-33. one to three minutes Within arrest, Gant’s car. two officers searched Chimel,

Therein, and a found contraband search, justifying excep explained rationale other weapon. At the time of the tion: had also been secured: both arrestees made,

anWhen arrest is it is authorizing reasonable Court case war arresting for the per- officer to search the rantless searches incident to had em phasized any scope son arrested in order to weap- remove such a search “strictly justified by” ons that ‘must be might the latter seek to tied to and use order to resist circumstances which rendered initi escape. arrest or effect his its Otherwise, permissible.’” ation safety might officer’s well Chimel, quoting 76 P.3d at endangered, and the arrest itself frus- addition, quoting Terry 89 S.Ct. at entirely trated. it is reason- Ohio, able for officer to search for (1968). Thus, L.Ed.2d 889 the Arizona Su and seize evidence on the arrestee’s preme Court has reminded us that a war person in prevent order to its concealment only rantless search incident to arrest is not or destruction. And the area into which justified, limited, by but is also the need might an arrestee reach in grab order to promote safety prevent officer destruc weapon evidentiary must, or items context, tion of evidence. In course, governed by the su be a like rule. preme court has instructed us to examine Thus, U.S. at 89 S.Ct. at 2040. totality “whether the pres the facts ... requirement the warrant ents the justifies kind of situation that dis premised such searches is on the “twin aims” pensing requirement.” with the warrant safety of officer preservation of evidence. 158, ¶ 34, 76 P.3d at 437. 76 P.3d at 433. Indeed, the Dean court invalidated the that, argues 9 Gant because he and search in precisely the case because suspects other were handcuffed and ei justifications “neither of the for a warrant- ther locked in the vehicles or other less search of protection of the vehicle— secured, wise departing rationale for arresting preservation officers and of the requirement from the warrant existed at the present.” [wa]s evidence— time the essence, search was conducted. that, by Gant contends the time the search ¶ 11 We are mindful the United States occurred, no officer could reasonably have “[e]very Court has stated that ar believed that presented arrestees any presumed rest must present a risk of risk of reaching weapon destroying or evi danger to Washing officer.” dence located in his car. agree with Chrisman, 1, 7, 102 ton v. S.Ct. analysis Gant that our guided by must be (1982). But, here, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 underlying rationales the search incident to presented state has no concrete evidence arrest exception to that, whatsoever when the officers searched and that these rationales are absent under car, any there was risk of the arres the circumstances here. acquiring tees weapon in Gant’s car or 10 In supreme destroying any ad evidence therein.4 To the dressed the search of a vehicle incident contrary, witnesses, to a both of the relevant Offi defendant’s arrest when the arrest was re Reed, cers Todd Griffith and Robert testified mote in time and location from the defen once handcuffed and secured in occupancy dant’s of the vehicle. 206 Ariz. patrol the back of a posed no risk of 158, ¶¶ 3-41,76 P.3d at 431. A returning unanimous to his ear tampering Chimel, court noted that the seminal United items in it.5 The officers also testified that testify generally The officers did that "officer two additional arrestees —could have accessed safety always during illegal drug is an issue" sale Gant’s vehicle. investigations because it is not unusual for the people weapons. involved to have Two officers 5. Officer Reed testified at the time of the also testified that had been told that a fe- search of Gant’s Gant "had been se- male who owned the house was not longer cured" and therefore "no might the scene and return to the anyone home. How- threat to me or else because he had no ever, infra, conceded, as discussed anything both officers access to else." Officer Griffith con- essence, possibil- that there was no reasonable ceded possibility there had been no reasonable ity actually the civilians escape the scene—Gant and patrol get Gant could from the car and similarly agree cannot with the contention

the two arrestees at the scene were state’s confined in handcuffs and the back seated that this controlled To case is Thornton. Thus, although presume cars.6 contrary, concurring opinions in poses safety arrest officer risks to both Thornton demonstrate that the issue we ad- and creates an incentive for arrestees dress is far from settled.9 evidence, destroy had ceased to risks Belton, challenged the defendant exist at time of the in this case. scope of of his an otherwise valid search The state contends car, contending the officers had searched holdings in Thornton Court’s compartment parts passenger he could States, v. United possibly have desired to reached he and New York destroy weapon. evidence or seize 455-56,101 Reject- U.S. at 2861-62. (1981),compel L.Ed.2d a different result. claim, ing his that “articles the Court found Although the state correct that the passenger compartment inside the ... of an meaningfully distinguish- “not Thornton are generally automobile ... ... within ‘the are case, able” from the facts Thornton might area ... an arrestee reach in order resolved issue: an officer a different whether ” and, evidentiary grab weapon ite[m]’ may a search incident conduct arrest therefore, contemporaneous incident” “as a “even when an officer does not make contact arrest, until the the lawful officers to person the arrested has left vehi- to were entitled 617, cle.” at at 2129. passenger compartment U.S. S.Ct. the search entire And, although Ginsberg 2864, Justices Scalia and 460, 101 a vehicle. Id. at S.Ct. at precise here in addressed the issue raised a Chimel, 763, at at quoting 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. concurring opinion may officers Belton). (brackets holding, In in so —whether incident arrest once conduct a search to emphasized single, ‘[a] that familiar Court arrestee is handcuffed and secured guide police is offi- standard essential ” patrol back car8 —a and that implied cers’ had erected specifically declined reach that Court issue bright-line to relieve officers in the field rule by not because it had been briefed liti- having to make hairline distinctions 4, gants. n. at 2132 n. 4 Id. at 624 124 S.Ct. based on nuances. Id. at subtle (“Whatever the merits of Justice Scalia’s Dunaway quoting at v. New S.Ct. opinion concurring judgment, in the this is York, 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. them.”); in which address wrong case 2256-57, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (O’Connor, J., id. at at employ 14 The state contends should (declining to the issue “in concurring) reach that, once approach ruling the same here a ease in neither the context of occupant of a petitioner had officers arrest a recent nor the has Government merit”). Accordingly, to search that vehicle speak chance to to its should be entitled (con- 8. See 541 124 S.Ct. at 2133 into his vehicle. Griffith also testified that own patrol excep- cluding justified Gant locked in back of the under Chimel had been “ ‘grab "can’t [be] and back doors would tion when risk that the defendant open[ed] from the inside.” weapon evidentiary was ite[m]’ from his car (Scalia, J., extreme”) Gins- remote 6. Both officers testified that the additional male Chimel, J., berg, concurring), quoting 395 U.S. police car arrestee been confined to a had Thornton). (brackets 89 S.Ct. at 2040 the car searched. Officer handcuffed when specifically recalled female Reed that the arres- argument, the state asserted that 9. At oral tee had been and secured in likewise handcuffed part four in should look at a later footnote patrol at the time the search. Officer car Thornton, plurality asserted in which Griffith the female been corroborated position in Justice Scalia’s would, his concurrence by the time of the arrested and handcuffed purposes, [overrule] "for all intents search, could not recall whether she had but precedent." 541 constitutional our established placed car. However, at 2132 U.S. at 624 n. 124 S.Ct. n. only members this footnote was endorsed four appeal, Gant not contend the this does the Court. for that reason. search of his vehicle invalid ” Id., having distinguish Belton, without quoting whether rests.’ 453 U.S. at 460 3,101 justifying apply rationales the search under n. 2864 3. specific circumstances of the ease. Second, concluding far from that the vein, the state maintains that whether constitutional basis for a search incident to two Chimel rationales are always presumed arrest is from the inherent “irrelevant” because pre- “those risks are arrest, dangers of an the Belton sumed to exist” once arrest occurs. It continuing vitality underscored the of its two Robinson, relies on United 414 U.S. previous opinions invalidating inci- searches 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 427 dent to arrest appropriate when the constitu- (1973),which held: tional bases for the to the warrant authority person to search the inci- requirement did not exist. 453 U.S. at 461- dent to a lawful custodial while (distinguishing 101 S.Ct. at 2864-65 Unit- upon based the need to disarm and to Chadwick, ed States v. 433 U.S. 97 S.Ct. evidence, discover depend does not on 2476, (1977), and Arkansas v. may

what a court later decide Sanders, was the probability particular in a arrest situation observing L.Ed.2d 235 un- weapons or evidence fact be like the circumstances “neither of upon person found suspect____ arguably those cases involved an valid It is the fact of the search.”). lawful arrest which search____10 authority establishes the short, 17 In Supreme neither the Arizona Michigan See also Long, Court nor the United States 1050 n. 3481 n. 77 has relieving characterized Belton as (1983) (“[T]he L.Ed.2d 1201 ‘bright line’ [the duty state of its appropri- demonstrate drew in clearly Court] Belton au- ate constitutional basis for a search conduct- thorizes such a[n] [automobile] search when- Rather, ed incident to an arrest. both courts arrest.”). ever officers effect a custodial have restricted the reasoning ques- Belton to regarding tions spatial scope of an al- acknowledge principles set ready valid search.11 See 453 U.S. at Robinson, forth in Belton and but we dis- (“Our 460 n. at holding 2864 n. 3 agree they apply First, that here. our own today does no more than determine the supreme specifically court has rejected such meaning principles of Chimel’s in partic- application a broad of the Beltovr-Robinson conte[x]t.”). problematic ular and bright-line rule. the court ex- the court summarized the in flaw the state’s plained that, “although provided Belton clear reasoning: bright-line “While the an- rule guidance respect spatial to th[e] limita- police nounced Belton reheves the of dem- scope tion” on the of an otherwise lawful onstrating particular portion that a of the search, signal Belton did not a retreat from passenger compartment is within the ‘imme- justification limitations on the for con- arrestee, diate control’ of an it does not ducting a the first instance. 206 purport dispense to analysis with all such as ¶¶ 17-18, at P.3d 434. As the police may whether the search the vehicle observed, court Belton clarified ¶ at all.” 206 Ariz. 76 P.3d at bright way its line rule ‘in no alters the 437. principles fundamental established in the regarding Chimel case scope the basic of readily distinguishable 18 Belton is searches incident case, lawful custodial ar- several other reasons as well. In that 10. person There, similarly Robinson involved a search of a distinguishable. rather 11. Robinson is suggested person's person than the search of a defendant that his area of control. could not be searched incident to arrest absent inde- 414 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at 471. The Court pendent probable cause to believe contraband or distinguished person search of a from other weapons might be found on him. 414 U.S. at Id.; generally searches incident to arrest. see 227, 94 S.Ct. at 473. But Gant does not contend LaFave, Seizure, Wayne 6.3(c), §§ R. Search and merely that the search here was invalid because 7.1(b) (4d ed.2004). independent probable the state lacked cause to believe the search would be fruitful. analysis requirements forth in con- of the set police

lone officer had searched the car Belton and clear direction temporaneously with his arrest of the four Chimel and given thereby, us are not occupants of car—none of court has whom or, City patrol apparently, persuaded in a to follow those cases. See secured Inc., Leroy’s Liquors, 177 Ariz. v. restrained handcuffs. at Phoenix (“[W]e scenario, (App.1993) at P.2d 2861-62. Under that safety posed by by are Arizona Su poten- the risk to officer bound decisions of the authority ... preme have presence any weapons tial the arrestee’s Court and no them.”); was, search, disregard v. pro- at see also car the time Weatherford State, contrast, 529, ¶ 9, Here, by four nounced. least (2003) (“[S]tate scene, by are deci all courts not bound officers were courts.”); Kotterman suspects handcuffed locked sions of federal circuit three were Killian, Moreover, Belton patrol bright-line cars. (1999) (decisions are express state courts requirement

rule itself includes an other law”). question “contempo- that the search in “useful” but “do control supreme court arrest.” And do not believe our raneous incident of Id. at th[e] Here, analysis although stands alone in its of Belton officers above, shortly justices completing after As discussed several searched Gant’s car Chimel. have securing their arrest him the United States dangers opined application the Belton the arrest that would trigger exception to under circumstances identical the Chimel doctrine “beyond no those stretch that case longer existed that time. here would Thornton, Thus, breaking point.” ear its the officers did not search Gant’s 625, 124 (Scalia, J., concurring); contemporaneously with his arrest if we de- S.Ct. at (O’Con- “contemporaneously” with see id. at S.Ct. at 2133 fine reference also nor, J., concurring) (criticizing permitting a war- lower the Chimel rationales for ability that “treat the to search rantless search at all.12 decisions a recent to the arrest of vehicle incident cited cases both state has than occupant rather as a entitlement Appeals the Ninth Circuit Court of and other justified ratio as an the twin upheld Belton un- states have searches California.”). nales of Chimel or identical der circumstances similar dissenting opinion dissenting expresses And our 20 The here. authority today’s encourage offi- colleague predating cites cern that decision will investigations of light cers to conduct Dean to the same effect. of our motivated suspects’ intentionally conduct supreme scholarly and vehicles court’s exhaustive discussed, Although scrupulously As the United of that vehicle. we have followed search by requires analytical compelled that Court also framework Dean States here, suggests evaluating contemporaneous For the issue the dissent with the arrest. search be applied we have the rule it in con example, that resolving abandoned a warrantless search of a vehicle specific before recent days case it—the could an arrest ducted hours or after occupancy occupancy test. test is But the recent justified grounds if scarcely on be Chimel — even designed constitutionality assess initially close in arrest occurred defendant’s ducting a vehicle search under Chimel ratio- occupancy vehicle. time of the to the defendant’s longer 11-12, when a is no within the Chadwick, nale defendant See United States Thus, arrest. vehicle at moment of it focuses (1977) (search of foot 2485-86 lapse occupancy between on the of time securely long after defendants were locker 33-34, ¶¶ Dean, arrest. See rationale). custody improper under Chimel (finding be- P.3d at 437 search unconstitutional Thus, reject the recent we neither nor overlook long lapse of "the of time between the cause analytical adopt occupancy when test Here, vehicle”). arrest and Dean’s exit from Rather, on framework set forth Dean. correctly trial court found that Gant appeal by a different set address enough occupancy his that arrested soon after challenge involving specific a different on basis. Chimel search was not barred that log the search of a defendant’s vehicle. Neither language counsels us ic Dean that a nor But the dissent overlooks defendant's to a necessary, this case with exclusive reference occupancy but resolve of a vehicle is recent sufficient, specific challenge inapplicable raised. test to the precondition of valid Chimel not searches of those effectively vehicles before the arres- attempts to roll back the clock to safely reasoning tees are secured. But this previous “disarray” among state and fed- erroneously way “assumes one an- eral proper scope courts as to “the of a other, place.” the search must take Id. at search of the interior of an automobile inci- 627,124 (Scalia, J., concurring). dent to a lawful custodial arrest of its occu- Thornton, As Justice Scalia stated in “con- pants.” 453 U.S. at 459 n. ducting a Chimel search is not the Govern- 2863. This is an outcome right; exception -justified by ment’s it is an — contemplated nor sanctioned our necessity a rule that would otherwise —to Dean, supreme court in and I fear this court render the search unlawful.” Id. And noth- getting wrong it for the second time. ing opinion about today prevent majority essentially ignores taking officers from steps they whatever be- expressly adopted Dean occupan the “recent necessary protect lieve safety. their See test, cy” (Scalia, J., id. at determines vehicle search is S.Ct. at 2134-35 (“If concurring) police procedures’ within the limits of ‘sensible Belton when the defen require suspects put dant is proximity handcuffed and arrested close to the cars, in squad then immediately should handcuff vehicle after the defendant exits suspects, cars, put squad them in not the automobile. search.”). conduct simply hold that a 434, citing P.3d at Thorn search of an arrestee’s vehicle is not one of ton, (4th Cir.2003), 325 F.3d 194-95 steps poses once the arrestee no fur- aff'd, States, Thornton v. United gaining ther risk of access to it. (2004) (Thornton II); and Glasco v. Common supreme 21 Our court has instructed us wealth, 257 Va. 513 S.E.2d 141-42 to consider the rationales behind the search (1999). Indeed, explicitly the court in Dean incident to arrest to the warrant rule,” id., 30, held that to be “the correct requirement when examining the searches of applying a vehicle it to the incident to facts before arrest. ¶¶ it, “[W]hen, here, concluded: as P.3d at 437. arrest We have done long so and occurs find were after the defendant had left the satisfied when far vehicle was from the Accordingly, searched. we reverse the ruling trial court’s of the Fourth ap and hold Amendment plies.” the evidence sup- seized should be 429. The pressed. disregards holding, contending instead “the Dean court invalidated the CONCURRING: PETER J. precisely case because ‘neither of ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge. justifications for warrantless search of protection offi vehicle— ESPINOSA, Judge, dissenting. preservation cers and [wa]s evidence — ¶22 I respectfully dissent. The ” ¶ present.’ supra, quoting arrives at its seizing conclusion dicta 158, ¶ 32, Ariz. 76 P.3d at 437. But the 158, ¶ 34, State v. 206 Adz. 76 P.3d key omits the qualifying court’s 429, (2003),to, essence, 437 single-handed language, phrase directly preceding quoted the ly bright-line discard the rule set forth in ]nder the circumstances “[u 454, 460, New York v. 453 101 U.S. case,” principal as well as the court’s reason 2860, 2864, (1981), S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d 768 and ing: since, followed in scores of including eases Hein, analysis, Under those Arizona such as reasoned Dean sim- State v. 138 360, 365, 1358, (1983); ply occupant” Ariz. 674 was not a “recent P.2d 1363 Hanna, 30, 32, Jeep purposes State v. Ariz. for 173 839 P.2d Belton when he was 450, Hersch, (App.1992); 452 occupied State v. 135 arrested. He had not the vehicle 528, 531, 1035, Ariz. hours, 662 (App. P.2d 1038 for some two and one-half and his ¶ 1982); itself, and Dean proximity 76 arrest occurred not in close to so, doing P.3d at today’s decision the but instead inside the house. 454 2043, added). nia, 752, 2034, 32, U.S. 23 (emphasis 76 P.3d 429 The 395 89 S.Ct.

Id. alone, conduct selectively quotes also from Dean’s L.Ed.2d 685 to the that, entirety, occupant observation its or fact-bound arrest and search while the the defen- automobile, many issue is not whether “[T]he reads: the which in instanc near by departing has ‘evaded’ search the es, dant to police physically might be able do. the totality of rather 621, but whether II, at 124 also Thornton See presents still the kind of situation that (custodial at 2131 arrest is “fluid” and require- justifies dispensing danger ‘flowsfrom the fact apparent 76 429. It is ment.” P.3d stress, proximity, and its attendant language majority carefully culls ”), uncertainty’ quoting and United States v. simply separated Dean cannot be from from Robinson, U.S. unique facts with which the court was Today’s 476 n. faced, particularly on to when relied avoid decision, however, return law very type rule on of situation the Belton uncertain enforcement officers to the and designed that rule and facts address. which, “fac[ing] dangerous environment sidestep majority goes II, The situation,” highly volatile Thornton holding attempting true to distin Dean’s at officers must U.S. at guish the facts at from Belton’s ratio hand weapons probability or “calculate reasonably But be main nale. cannot involved,” may evidence State destructible vehicle tained that search of Gant’s Curiel, Ariz. to three after Gant mere “one minutes” (App.1981); attention [their] “divert anything can be but secured considered free and close [i]s search while defendant contemporaneous to his occu proximate and hand,” Kelley, at State vehicle car pancy of the and arrest. Gant’s (1971); ... “estimate[ ] P.2d and minutes after was searched within scant he or reach of what items were were not within it, and he scene while exited was at the moment,” any particular an arrestee above, As noted conducted. II, 124 S.Ct. at Thornton specifically adopted the Dean court Glasco jobs. 2132, in order to their hazardous do occupancy rule and noted “con recent Chrisman, Washington v. See cepts proximity’ such as ‘close and ‘immedi (1982) 812, 817, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 subject ately after’ are of to factual course (“Every presumed arrest must be analysis.” officer.”). danger a risk of to the Glasco, 437, quoting at 142. 513 S.E.2d view, ¶ 26 Contrary majority’s to the emphasized The court it was the combination safety do not “as grave concerns officer temporal spatial of Dean’s distance another, way one or the search sume[ ] Id., that supported the vehicle its decision. II, 541 U.S. at place,” must take Thornton (“But 513 S.E.2d we have been able 627,124 (Scalia, J., concurring), S.Ct. at 2134 case, no has cited to discover State now, up bright line con beyond Belton’s none, passenger in which a search of is, however, practical tours. There upheld under compartment of vehicle was today’s unfortunate effect of long as Belton when the driver was arrested encourage police to search arrestee’s will and as far from after he left vehicle delay area vehicle without immediate here.”). as was the defendant secured, safely precisely he or she is state, supplemental brief Belton and its danger the real-world point requested, a different this court makes sought while bal progeny have to ameliorate bright-line mentioning. that bears Belton’s requirements the Fourth ancing the in arresting minimizes the inherent rule risks See id. at Amendment. by permit- occupants of automobiles recent 2132; 480 P.2d at Kelley, 107 Ariz. at arrest ting police officers to make the Curiel, 659-60; away from the vehicle the arrestee secure avoids conducting a This search. ¶ 27 Finally, not an outcome the this is potential dangers involved at- greater reasonably extrapolate, par- could trial court tempting, in the name of Chimel Califor-

455-459 ticularly in and the view Dean recent Court in Thornton

II, virtually identical involved facts Although here.

correctly points out that Thornton II ad- legal question,

dressed narrower the ma-

jority characterizes the issue as “far concurring settled” based on comments plurality

not contained in the II Thornton ¶ 12, And,

opinion. supra. while the

purports merely following to be “the clear us,” given has [the

direction Dean court it is ] my journey view a backwards that Dean maps supra. out supports. nor

¶ Accordingly, uphold I would the trial finding

court’s decision search of Belton, Dean,

vehicle within the bounds

and the Fourth Amendment.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Gant

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Date Published: Sep 20, 2006

Citation: 143 P.3d 379

Docket Number: 2 CA-CR 2000-0430

Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.