State v. GainesState v. Gaines
Affirmed.
DIXON, J., dissents.
ON REHEARING
DENNIS, Justice.
Defendant Leon Gaines was indicted for the offense of simple escape,
On April 28, 1977, the defendant, an inmate of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, was assigned to work in the prison okra patch under the supervision of Cleveland Deshotel, a security guard. Deshotel placed the defendant and another trusted inmate at the end of a line of men stretched out across the okra patch. While Deshotel was occupied at the opposite end of the line, the defendant and the man next to him broke from the line and ran toward Lake Killarney located abоut a half mile away, although still on the prison grounds. Deshotel called out for the men to halt and fired
Other security officers were immediately notified, and a “chase procedure” was set in motion. Upon discovering tracks leading into Lake Killarney, guard lines were set up around the lake. Just ovеr two hours after the defendant had broken from the line of men in the okra patch, the defendant was apprehended as he emerged from thе lake on the side opposite from the okra patch.
By his second assignment of error the defendant contends that the trial court erred in dеnying his motion for a new trial on the ground that there was no evidence to support a conviction for simple escape. It is the defendant‘s position that his attempt to escape was not successful because he did not depart from the confines of the penitentiary grounds before he was apprehended. Defendant contends that his actions did not come within the definition of simple escape in effect at the timе of the incident.
The issue of statutory interpretation raised by the defendant is based on a 1975 amendment to the simple escape statute. Prior to its amendment in 1975, the pertinent portion of the simple escape statute read as follows:
“A. Simple escape is:
“(1) The intentional departure of a person, while imprisoned, whether before or after sentence, under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered, from lawful custody of any officer of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer or from any place where he is lawfully detained by any law enforcеment officer; (emphasis added) * * *”
This definition was amended by Act 450 of 1975 to read as follows:
“A. Simple escape is:
“(1) The intentional departure, under circumstances wherein humаn life is not endangered, of a person imprisoned, committed, detained, or otherwise in the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer оr officer of the Department of Corrections, from any place where such person is legally confined; * * *” The latter version of the statutе was in effect on April 28, 1977, when the defendant departed from the line of men in the okra patch.
A careful reading of the simple escape statute before and after the 1975 amendment reveals that an important change was effected by the amendment. Whereas the former law рroscribed departure either from lawful custody or departure from a place where lawfully detained, the statute as amended in 1975 omitted the disjunctive “or” so that the statute proscribed departure of a person in lawful custody from any place where he is legally confined. The defendant argues that the amended statute required both departure from lawful custody and departure from a place of confinement.1 The defendant contends that there is no evidence of escape under this statute because he was confinеd not to the okra patch, but to the Angola penitentiary complex, and there is no evidence that he ever departed from the pеnitentiary grounds.
The statute in effect at the time of the occurrence clearly requires departure both from legal custody and from a plаce of confinement. Where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, they are not to be ignored under the pretext of pursuing their spirit. State v. Pierre, 320 So.2d 185 (La.1975); State v. Snyder, 277 So.2d 660 (La.1973). Moreover, even if the statute were found to be ambiguous, it is clear that any ambiguity must be construed favorably to the defendant. State v. Young, 357 So.2d 503 (La.1978). In the presеnt case the simple escape statute must be construed as defendant contends, to require proof of departure from lawful custody and departure from a place of confinement.
The serious question remaining in this case is whether or not the defendant departed
We do not think that the interpretation of either party expresses the legislative intent. “[A]ny place where ... legally confined,” as used in
Applying this definition we conclude that there is no evidence in the record of this case to support a finding that the defendant departed from a “place of confinement” within the meaning of the escape statute. The record indicates that the okra patch was surrounded by a four strand barbеd wire fence designed to keep cattle out and not prisoners in; no other natural or man-made barriers separated the okra pаtch from the rest of the Angola complex. Accordingly the defendant was not physically restrained or actually confined within the okra patch and his departure therefrom could amount to no more than an attempt to escape.
In United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes a second trial once a reviewing court has found the evidence to be insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. Accordingly, the defendant in the present case may not be retried for the offense of simple escape upon remаnd.
The defendant‘s conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inсonsistent with the views expressed herein.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SUMMERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.