State v. GaddyState v. Gaddy
Juliet Gaddy was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The substance, cocaine, was discovered in Gaddy‘s car when the police searched it incident to her arrest for driving while license suspended. The Court of Appeals аffirmed Gaddy‘s conviction, concluding that information the arresting officer received from the Department of Licensing (DOL) was presumptively reliable and that the arresting officer, therefore, had probable cause to arrest Gaddy. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
I
The Arrest
In the early mоrning hours of October 5, 2000, a vehicle driven by Juliet Gaddy was stopped by two police officers of the City of Seattle. The stop was based on the officers’ perception that Gaddy failed to signal when making a right turn. Because Gaddy was unable to provide the officers with a valid
In a search of Gaddy‘s vehicle incident to the arrest, the police officers found a purse in which there was a substance they believed was cocaine. A field test was conducted which indicated that the substance was cocaine. When the officers confronted Gaddy about what they had found, Gaddy denied that the purse in which the substance was found belonged to her. Gaddy then informed the police officers, for the first time, that she had a driver‘s license on her person. The license, which was in one of Gaddy‘s pants pockets, was retrieved by the officers. Gaddy was eventually charged in King County Superior Court with one count of possession of a cоntrolled substance, to wit: cocaine. She was not charged with driving while license suspended.1
The Suppression Hearing
Gaddy filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the search conducted by the officers was invalid because they lacked probable cause to arrest her. Speсifically, Gaddy contended that the DOL information was incorrect and that the erroneous information did not provide probable cause for her arrest. In support of her argument, Gaddy maintained that her driver‘s license was not suspended at the time of her arrest. At a hearing on her suppression motion, Gaddy introduced a copy of an abstract of her driving record which revealed that a driver‘s license had been issued to her on September 21, 2000.
The State countered by introducing two documents that it believed established that Gaddy‘s driver‘s license was in a state of susрension on October 5, 2000, the date of her arrest. One of the documents was a copy of a suspension order which indicated that Gaddy was to stop driving on September 14, 2000, due to the cancellation of her insurance coverage. The other document was a letter from DOL‘s custodian of records. It stated that on October 5, 2000, the day of Gaddy‘s arrest, Gaddy had not reinstated her driving privilege. The latter document indicated that a license was issued to Gaddy on September 21, 2000. It did not, however, state whether another suspension order had been entered during the pеriod between September 21, 2000, and October 5, 2000.
The trial court acknowledged that Gaddy‘s driving record was confusing but concluded that the accuracy of Gaddy‘s record was not relevant. In its view, the pertinent issue was whether the arresting officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Gaddy was committing the crime of driving with a suspended license at the time they placed her under arrest. It ruled that the combination of Gaddy‘s inability to produce a valid driver‘s license at the time of questioning and the officers’ receipt of information from the MDT, provided the officers with probable cause to arrest Gaddy for driving while license suspended. It, therefore, denied Gaddy‘s suppression motion.
The Trial and Appeal
Following a jury trial in King County Superior Court, Gaddy was convicted of the charge of possession of a controlled substance. She was thereafter sentenced tо serve two months in jail. Gaddy appealed her conviction to Division One of the Court of Appeals, claiming only that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest her for driving with a suspended driver‘s license because the DOL information that the officers recеived via their MDT was not reliable. See Appellant‘s Opening Br. at 14 (“Here, the State offered no other evidence as to the reliability of the records regarding license suspensions, i.e., ... testimony regarding the accuracy of such records.“). The
II
Gaddy contends here, as she did at the Court of Appeals, that the trial court erred in not granting her suppression motion. In supрort of this contention, she asserts that her arrest was based on unreliable DOL information that does not provide a basis for a determination that there was probable cause to arrest her for driving while license suspended. Because Gaddy does not dispute the findings of fact the trial court entered in support of its order denying suppression, the question before us is whether the trial court‘s conclusion is supported by its findings. This is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999).
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486, 496, 987 P.2d 73 (1999). Exceptions to the strict warrant requirement rule are limited and narrowly drawn. One exception is a seаrch incident to arrest. Under
Per
The question in this case is whether the DOL information that was obtained by the arresting officer via the MDT located in the police vehicle provided the officers with probable cause to arrest Gaddy for driving with a suspended driver‘s license. Gaddy cites the so-called “fellow officer rule” and contends that the DOL information should be treated as if it were information such as a police bulletin or “`hot sheet‘” that is generated by a police agency. State v. Mance, 82 Wash.App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527 (1996). Under this rule, an arrеst on the basis of such information is justified only if the police agency issuing the information or bulletin has sufficient information for probable cause. If the issuing agency or officer lacks probable cause, then the arresting officer also lacks probable cause.
Gaddy‘s reliance on the fellow officer rule is not justified here. We say that because the arresting officers relied on information disseminated by DOL, not information from a police agency or other officer. We reach that conclusion because we are satisfied that DOL is not a police agency. In reaching this determination we take note of the fact that in 1965 the legislature severed the licensing function that DOL now performs from the responsibilities of the Washington State Patrol. LAWS OF 1965, ch. 156, § 2. This resulted in the separation of the regulation of motor vehicle drivers’ licenses from the law enforcement functions that the state patrol carries out. The fact that DOL and law enforcement agencies often work cooperatively, does not detract from the point that the duties and functions of DOL
What then is the proper test to apply in determining whether or not the information provided by DOL furnished probable cause for Gaddy‘s arrest? In our view, it is the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a test that is applied to police informants.2 Under that test, an informant‘s tip can furnish probable cause for an arrest if the State establishes (1) the basis of the informant‘s information and (2) the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the informant‘s information. State v. Cole, 128 Wash.2d 262, 287, 906 P.2d 925 (1995). To satisfy both parts of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the State must prove the underlying circumstances which the trier of fact “may draw upon to conclude the informant was credible and obtained the information in a rеliable manner.” State v. Vickers, 148 Wash.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002).
The first prong of the test relates to the informant‘s basis of knowledge. State v. Smith, 102 Wash.2d 449, 455, 688 P.2d 146 (1984). Here, it is undisputed that the informant, DOL, had a basis to know whether Gaddy‘s driver‘s license was suspended on October 5, 2000. DOL, as we have noted above, is the agency which regulates drivers’ licenses in this state. Its authority to dо so stems from
The second part of the Aguilar-Spinelli test requires an examination of the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the informant‘s information. Smith, 102 Wash.2d at 455, 688 P.2d 146. That is the prong that is in contention here.3 If the identity of an informant is known — as opposed to being anonymous or professional — the necessary showing of reliability is relaxed. See State v. Huft, 106 Wash.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). This is so because there is less risk of the information being a rumor or irresponsible conjecture which may accompany anonymous informants. State v. Northness, 20 Wash.App. 551, 557, 582 P.2d 546 (1978). Also, an identified informant‘s report is less likely to be marred by self-interest. Citizen informants are deemed presumptively reliable. State v. Wakeley, 29 Wash.App. 238, 241, 628 P.2d 835, review denied, 95 Wash.2d 1032 (1981).
We are satisfied that DOL should be accorded the status of a citizen informant. We reach this conclusion because DOL is governed by extensive statutes and provisions and the Washington Administrative Code, which establishes its reliability. There are many statutes in place that mandate DOL to maintain current and accurate information. See, e.g.,
For the reasons we have set forth above, we conclude that the DOL records are presumptively reliable. We conclude, additionally, that Gaddy failed to rеbut this presumption. At her suppression hearing, Gaddy argued only that her driving records were inaccurate. To prevail on a reliability challenge, it would have been necessary for Gaddy to make at least a prima facie showing that accuracy of the DOL records are affеcted by systemic problems in maintaining accurate and reliable records of the millions of drivers it oversees. Gaddy did not attempt to make such a showing here. The fact that one driving record may have been inaccurate, if that is the case here, does not establish that DOL records as a whole are unreliable.
III
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, information from DOL is presumptively reliable. That presumption has not been overcome. Thus, the DOL information concerning Gaddy‘s record that was obtained via an MDT located in the arresting police officer‘s vehicle provided prоbable cause to arrest Gaddy for driving with a suspended license.
Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding Gaddy‘s conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
WE CONCUR: JOHNSON, MADSEN, SANDERS, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS, OWENS, and FAIRHURST, JJ.