Defendant brings forward five issues on appeal. He argues that these convictions should be reversed because the indictments were insufficient to inform him of the nature of the charges against him. Alternatively, he contends that this court should grant him a new trial because the trial court erred in joining all of the offenses for trial, admitted certain incompetent evidence, and excluded competent evidence offered by . the defense. After a careful review of the record, we hold that defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the case because the indictments were insufficient to notify him of the acts constituting the charged offenses so that he could properly prepare his defense. In making his argument, defendant concedes that this court in
State v. Singleton,
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in joining the five offenses charged for a single trial. Joinder decisions are in the sound discretion of the trial court. We find no abuse of discretion here.
G.S. 15A-926 allows joinder of two or more offenses when they “are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” G.S. 15A-926(a). Our courts have interpreted this statute as not allowing joinder of offenses solely because the offenses charged were the same type of acts unless
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there is also a “transactional connection.”
State v. Greene,
Here each of the offenses charged occurred in a Boy Scout environment. Defendant was each victim’s scoutmaster during the entire period. Three of the offenses occurred at a single campsite and the remaining offenses occurred at the troop’s meeting place. We find that these circumstances are not so distinct as to render consolidation unjust. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates a scheme or plan in which the defendant used his position as troop leader to commit these acts. We overrule this assignment of error.
Defendant assigns as error the State’s introduction of evidence showing that defendant had a bad temper and used profanity. We agree that evidence of profanity and temper are irrelevant to the charges tried, but defendant has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by their introduction. G.S. 15A-1443(a);
State v. Alston,
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing evidence of defendant’s general character and reputation. The trial court limited the character evidence introduced by defendant to evidence directed to pertinent character traits. The State argues that Rule 404(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires that character evidence is admissible only when it addresses pertinent character traits. Our Supreme Court in
State v. Squire,
*84 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State, during rebuttal, to introduce into evidence acts of unprosecuted misconduct by defendant which occurred more than ten years earlier. The State argues that the evidence was proper rebuttal testimony and was admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. We hold that because defendant opened the door, the State’s rebuttal evidence was properly admitted here.
The State elicited the complained of testimony from Joseph Johnson, a rebuttal witness. He told of three specific sexually related incidents which occurred between defendant and him in 1976 while he was a member of the same scout troop. During this time defendant was the assistant troop leader. Johnson testified that on two occasions when he was alone with the defendant, defendant told him to masturbate as his initiation into the troop. The first incident occurred while the troop was on a camping trip. The second incident occurred in Chapel Hill where defendant took Johnson to a football game. After the game defendant and Johnson went up into the bell tower and defendant told him to masturbate again. During this second incident, defendant also tickled Johnson’s genitals. Johnson testified that the third incident was when defendant bought him a Playboy magazine. Johnson was in the troop from 1975 until 1977.
Rule 404(b) provides that, while evidence of other wrongs or acts committed by defendant is not admissible to prove defendant’s character, this evidence is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, or plan. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b);
State v. Boyd,
Once the trial court establishes that it will admit the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), the court must then determine whether the evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403.
State v. DeLeonardo,
Our courts will allow the State to introduce evidence, even when it is not otherwise admissible, if it is “offered to explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant himself.”
State v. Albert,
Q. Have you ever fondled a boy’s private parts or touched him in any improper way?
A. No, sir, I have not.
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Q. Did you ever touch [the victims] in any improper way or fondle them?
A. I never touched any boy in my troop in an improper way.
Defendant explicitly testified that he had never touched or fondled a member of his scout troop. Johnson’s testimony, then, was proper rebuttal testimony. Furthermore, defendant had previously called Jeffrey Edward Berthold as a witness and questioned him concerning events while Berthold was a member of the troop from 1977 until 1981. Accordingly, we hold that defendant opened the door to testimony about this remote time period. Defendant having opened the door, we find no prejudicial error in admitting the complained of evidence.
Our review of the record convinces us that defendant has received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
No error.