State v. Fritz

STATE

David FRITZ.

No. 2001-369-C.A.

Supreme Island. Court Rhode

June raine). Wesiman, judgment Aaron L. for Plaintiff. their final divorce Lorraine January entered Mirza, Rumford, L for Defen- Thomas children, custody of the awarded sole dant. per defendant was ordered $147.50 WILLIAMS, C.J., Present support. point, in At that week child de- BOURCIER, LEDERBERG, $1,800 arrearage of fendant owed an GOLDBERG, FLANDERS, and JJ. support. obtained medical child Lorraine coverage through for Aid to the children OPINION Dependent Children Families with LEDERBERG, J. (AFDC). parental rights The defendant’s to his two terminated children were (state) The State of Rhode Island Family consent on Court with defendant’s appealed judgment a that 25, 1994, in November accordance with a a information criminal entered dismissed defendant, Fritz, that the Rhode had been against David for Children, Department non-payment support. of child The state Island Youth and (DCYF).1 argued ruling Although that the erred the children Families voluntary mother, defendant’s termination of their custody remained responsibility ended DCYF as appointed support payments. child It opin- is our guardian purposes all the children “for ion that the termination rights.” as to [defendant’s] ipso extinguish does a parent’s not facto original Because the child order Therefore, obligations. child vacated, Island never the Rhode office sustain appeal respect the state’s with (CSE), of Child Enforcement Support the Family interpretation Court’s Department of subdivision of the Adminis- statutes on termination of child support. Taxation, never tration’s Division of re- addition, we vacate the dismissal termination of defen- ceived notice of the criminal information remand for fur- dant’s and continued to proceedings ther on whether the defendant weekly assess same child sums willfully withheld child in violation At the time of the against defendant. of a criminal statute and whether he was termination, defendant had selectively prosecuted alleged for the viola- accrued, calculation, on the depending ei- tion. $7,660 $9,303 in child ther ar- History Facts and Procedural body rearage, and in December after defendant The defendant fathered two attachment was issued children (Lor- hearing while appear married to Lorraine Fritz failed CSE’s ute, position parties 1. The treated termi- and both took the judgment for the in the termination of nation as one termination of resulted parental rights. We believe defendant's consent the children’s 15-7-6, § adoption parties misinterpreted § which is G.L.1956 Section under 15-7-6. scope par- more limited than is 15-7-6 addresses statute, § adoption pro- That er- right to consent 15-7-7. ent’s ror, however, our petitioning placement does not affect vides that child here, pro- appointed guardian equally applicable to both agency which is shall 15-7-5, visions, § Although which sets purposes.” the Fami- well as "for all ly under in its forth several circumstances which Court cited this statute bench deci- sion, consent the state referred to 15-7-6 as required. “voluntary-parental-termination-rights” stat- contempt motion for outstanding sup- arrearage, calculation of the state had port. present prima failed to criminal facie complaint for failure to child support CSE forwarded defendant’s pursuant appeal- 11-2-1.1. The state General, name to the office of the Attorney ed. along the names approximately 1,235 alleged others outstanding of Review Standard

body arrearages attachments and of more $30,000, than 11- violation G.L.1956 justice’s In evaluating the trial felony 2-1.1. A complaint was issued finding parental support that defendant’s against defendant in December but it payments pursuant discharged were was not filed Court until statutory authority, we turn to the rele May 25, 2000, which on date defendant was provisions vant of the General Laws. As arrested. the final arbiter on of statutory issues The against state an information construction, this Court reviews de novo in August ground defendant 2000 on the questions statutory interpretation. he had accrued a child arrear- Depositors Rhode Island Economic Pro $75,000, age of than thereby violating more Associates, v. Corp. Bowen Court tection provisions 11-2-1.1. The defen- 1005, (R.I.2001) (citing 763 A.2d City charges dant was incarcerated on these East Providence v. Public Utilities 25, 2000, 5, 2000, May until October Commission, (R.I. 1305, 566 A.2d personal when he was on recogni- released 1989)); Powers, 828, v. State 644 A.2d $10,000 zance in the amount of pending (R.I.1994). In doing, adopt plain so we verification that his had meaning of the in a language legislative been terminated. Although he was held Powers, enactment. at 644 A.2d 830. If on felony charges, appears that he was we statutory ambiguity, discern a this denied during the assistance of counsel legis establishes and effectuates the period most of this of incarceration.2 lative behind intent the enactment. Id. The defendant filed motion to dismiss When a motion to addressing dis information, claiming that his obli- information, amiss criminal a Family

gation child his ended once justice required to examine terminated, parental rights had been information and attached exhibits to he asserted that on the pa- date that his terminated, determine whether tlie state has rental satisfied rights were his arrear- probable its $9,303 burden to establish cause to age totaled no more than that the highest charged state’s believe offense was com estimate. mitted and that the defendant dismissed the information committed 219, arrearage Aponte, and ruled that it. v. 649 A.2d could State (R.I.1994) curiam); (per beyond not accrue the date of termination see G.L.1956 justice’s 12-12-1.7;3 rights. Super.R.Crim.P. Under the 9.1.4 challenged 2.The pre- defendant has not this 3. General Laws 1956 12-12-1.7 sets forth procedure by grounds sumed violation of his Sixth which and the Amendment Wainwright, which defendant move to see Gideon v. dismiss U.S. 792, (1963); criminal information. 83 S.Ct. 9 L.Ed.2d 799 State 93, 100-01, Holliday, v. 109 R.I. 280 A.2d (1971), Superior therefore do not 9.1 of Rule Court Rules of duplicates appeal. essentially address the issue on Criminal Procedure provisions to invoke the a decision to sufficient This Court reviews statute, depends upon wheth- criminal motion to dis this grant criminal defendant’s obligations continued justice’s examining whether the er his miss rights were or his findings by the evidence to accrue after supported are whether, jus making findings, 1994. The defen- those in November terminated arrearage material tice misconceived overlooked not seek relief from dant did Ouimette, termination, v. 415 A.2d nor evidence. State that accrued before (R.I.1980) (citing Wolf, terminating he ever seek order did Wolf (1975)). 138, 139 114 R.I. responsibilities. ongoing great weight justice’s find We allot Thus, case whether the issue ings and will not set them aside unless termination of defendant’s clearly are erroneous or fail findings those continuing automatically brought parties. to achieve between the Id. obligations to an end. obligation determining that a Support Obligations Post-Termination when that point ceases The criminal statute under which defen- rights have been termi- person’s parental ll-2-l.l(b)(l), § pro- charged, dant was nated, § 15- justice relied on G.L. the trial vides: § 15- and 15-7.2-2. Section 7-7 G.L.1956 “Every person obligated who is 7-7, pa- “Termination which is entitled pursuant child an or order provides pertinent part: rights,” rental by registered or decree established shall, by petition a filed upon “The court family pursuant chapter the court agency placement a child governmental 11.1 of title who incurred arrear- placement agency child after or licensed age past-due in the hearing on parent notice to the and a ($30,- thirty amount of thousand dollars legal petition, any and all terminate 000), so, having the means to do who and child, includ- parent rights willfully install- pay one or more fails any subsequent ing to notice ments of child in an amount child, involving the adoption proceedings court, previously by according set by a if the finds as fact clear and court court, previously terms set [any several convincing evidence that in- guilty felony for each similar occurred].” conditions have enumerated subsequent to make stance of failure added.)5 15-7-7(a). (Emphasis Section payments. Upon person conviction punished imprisonment be shall par- if may granted “[t]he Termination be (5) years.” (Empha- more than no five prop- willfully neglected provide ent has added.) sis for a for the child care and maintenance er year where financial- of at least one period incurred Whether defendant had 15-7-7(a)(l). $30,000, so.” Section ly than there- able do arrearage more give to a or withhold consent Reporter’s § ent’s provisions of 12-12-1.7. See Notes, Super.R.Crim.P. ”mak[ing] agency 9.1. adoption and child’s purposes” pursu- guardian all of the child for parent Upon petition of a natural addition, § ant 15-7-6. 15-7-5(b)(l), parental § grandparent, under may grant an without same may be terminated on the also delineat- conditions tal consent under certain § grounds as those set forth in 15-7-7. The (b)(2). § ed in 15-7-5 also, may with the au- thorization, terminating par- issue decree § The trial parental rights also relied 15-7.2- nation of responsibili- 2 of the Voluntary Passive Mu- Adoption ties” and he reasoned that necessarily “[i]t Registry Act, tual Consent in- which is follows that the termination of one’s paren- to provide registry tended in which responsibil- terminates one’s parents, adoptees, birth adult and surviv- Specifically, ities.” determined ing identify- register relatives thereof that “a parents [sic] obli- ing information for release to each other. gation is terminated when his/her Section 15-7.2-2 is “Policy” entitled court, provided are terminated provides pertinent part: this Court finds that said termination is “It policy adop- is the of this state that voluntary and the child’s best interest.” tion is upon legal based The defendant repeatedly asserted that of parental rights responsibilities being he ceased with attendant parents birth and the creation of the obligations the time his legal relationship and child state, were terminated. on the other adoptee between an adoptive and the hand, 15-7-7(a), argued that under only added.) parents.” (Emphases terminated, are not paren- contrast, tal obligations. subsequent adoption If a statute, 15-7-7, included occurs, then child can obligations title, Relations, Domestic chapter plain terminated. The language of entitled, “Adoption of Signifi- Children.” 15-7-7(a) shall, states that court “[t]he cantly, the termination of parental rights by a governmental * * * statute not require does that a child be placement agency terminate placed adoption. all legal rights parent and of the to the added.) contrast, child.” purpose (Emphasis of the In termination of § rights 15-7-5, 15-7-6, §§ under 15-7.2-2 policy states that is the “[i]t 15-7-7, provide adoption is this state that upon “to children who is based are legal permanent parental rights need with termination of placement,” and safe (Em- S., A.2d.329, (R.I.1997), responsibilities re Kyle parents.” In 692 birth 332 added.) eases, phasis and in argued certain The state if “to allow the state to Legislature make the adoption,” children available for had intended that the volun- John, (R.I.1992). 486, tary re In 605 A.2d rights 487 would Here, a parent’s rights the children were terminate both adopted, and re- but sponsibilities, custody remained in the it would have of their mother. so stated 15-7-7(a), § involuntary explicitly An as had done was § by analysis. filed 15-7.2-2. We concur with this DCYF to which defendant subse- quently consented. basing The defendant contended that granting responsibilities defendant’s motion to dis- the financial a parent information, miss the criminal upon adoptive status of the children to found by consenting to whom parent’s been termi- the termination of his to nated is unsound because 15-7-7 ex- children, relinquished defendant also pressly parent’s right forecloses a to notice “all that is encompassed respon- adoption defendant, with that proceedings. The sibility, give however, as well as his has failed to take into account adoption.” withhold consent to their He that the costs of supporting child who 15-7.2-2, pursuant found further that adopted has been will be assumed “adoption legal adoptive is based termi- parent(s). adoption, Absent an

685 only the “le- 15-7-7, statute, § addresses nec- parent from one terminating support child” and to the parent gal rights of responsi- full financial essarily places the child with reciprocal assis- not the bility parent, often with on the other this Court case, parent. Because to the respect In this from the state. tance “ interpret ‘[to] at the has declined consistently guideline worksheet omitted unless a matter from defendant to include time of Lorraine’s divorce statute would legislation gross income purpose indicated that the mother’s clear ” Wehr, Inc. v. “0,” implication,’ medical cov- provided and AFDC without the fail n (R.I.1997) 1085, (per erage Truex, children. for the 700 A.2d 1088 curiam) Feng, v. State (quoting believe, should not A we parent, 1258, (R.I.1980)), interpret we sup to avoid or evade child permitted as an indica- Assembly’s silence General voluntarily terminating obligations by port § 15-7-7 not intend that that it did tion when, as in this especially parental rights, right of the child terminate the case, contemplated. More adoption no parents.6 over, 15-7-7 required no effectuate a termination in order to Island, a non-cus even In Rhode courts, rights. Although some duty to has a common-law todial statutory provision or specific absent Adoption her re support his or child. that termi statutory ambiguity, have held 316, 319, G., R.I. L. and financial ends nation (1977). Moreover, agree that 799, well, obligations it is our away or contract parent cannot waive “a statutes, pa under current Rhode Island v. support.” Runner child’s financial continues until rental Howell, 518 S.E.2d 205 W.Va. adopted, has emancipated, been curiam) v. (1999) Wyatt (per (quoting age majority, or until the reaches the 408 S.E.2d Wyatt, 185 W.Va. obligation duly terminated after been Brewer, (1991)); Culpepper see also held a Court has (1978) (“A 619, 621 Ga. S.E.2d stating findings. its issued order responsibili primary cannot father void by contracting his children jurisdictions, “parental ty support term some responsi assume this party a third incorporat with rights” interpreted has been as belongs support bility. right The child rights of ing all the relation child.”); v. Harvey Cook Matter including only rights that to the ship, those 434, 109, Neill, those, 504 N.Y.S.2d 118 A.D.2d but such as parent, flow to the also (1986) (“A away cannot contract father support, that flow to 436 right to financial either See, his child with duty County v. his e.g., the child. Ventura (quoting or a third Gonzales, 1120, person.”) Cal. the mother Cal.App.4th 350, Jones, (2001) v. 43 Misc.2d Matter Smith (citing State Wel Rptr.2d (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1964)); Division, Re 250 N.Y.S.2d Department Human fare Hobus, 158, 161 N.W.2d Vine, v. Hobus 662 P.2d Nev. sources (“Parents (N.D.1995) voluntarily may not (1983)). of Rhode plain language The a child to avoid rights in their terminate Island’s termination consent to 15-7-5(b)(l), ability give or withhold incorporates ent’s 6. Section provisions do not adoption, set forth in 15-7-7. those grounds child's Therefore, only a also terminates before the child right section a child’s alter Moreover, because parent's rights to a child. adopted. par- 15-7-5(b)(2) §§ address 15-7-6 short, payments.”)- agree ing In re Christina D. would be violated gravamen with the argument of CSE’s if continuing rights a child’s to financial that “a voluntary termination [of support automatically were terminated rights] agreement not to visit with the without giving representative the child’s an child” suspension cannot be the basis for a opportunity to address the court on the or termination of child “If support. support. issue of law, were the parents the non-eustodial agree We with the dissent that 15-7- up ‘voluntarily’ line would terminate derogating a statute common law rights simply paying to avoid sup- rights, strictly must be construed. port.” And, out, as colleague points our the stat- clearly provides ute principle that a the termination of child’s all “any legal rights to receive change survives added.) by 15-7-17, (Emphasis is evidenced child.” In our titled, “Rights parents opinion, of natural termi strict construction of the statute nated-Inheritance natural authorizes the termination parents,” in which Assembly the General parental responsibilities. but not directed all a parent’s financial obli holding Our this case relies on deci gations to his or her child are not elimi sions of this pa Court that have treated nated, even adoption of the child: rental rights distinctly from parental re granting “[T]he for adop- sponsibilities. example, For in In re tion will not deprive adopted child of S., (R.I.1994) Jessica 643 A.2d 794 (per to inherit from through curiam), we biological held that a father or her natural the same man- was not entitled to receive foster-care ner as all other natural children.” Sec- after his to his two chil

tion 15-7-17. dren had been terminated in Texas for us, therefore,

It apparent his failure to pay support, and the that a ongoing rights child’s to financial father later undertook care for the an independent constitute interest children parent. foster Id. at 794- represented must be a hearing 95. We thus recognized that the termi be held before child support is terminated nation of did not neces Court. This sarily sever financial ties to recognized independent such an interest his or her children. We also held that a adoption hearing child at an in In re father, non-biological who had been mar D., (R.I.1987) (per Christina 525 A.2d 1306 during ried to the child’s mother curiam), by pointing out: years, respon child’s first four should be

“It guardian is inconceivable that the ad for support sible child after he divorced litem, appointed represent the child’s mother, the even though child’s he “had interests, opportu- would be the denied no reestablishing intention of contact and nity convey those to the trial interests providing the child with further love and justice proceeding the ulti- which sought affection” and had an ter order mate focus is the interests of the best minating his parental and obli at child.” Id. gations respect with to the child. Piet Pietros, 545, 546, objective in ros v. A.2d Although adoption pro-' the an 547-48 (R.I.1994). ceeding again, differs from that in termination There we treated a hearing, putative parent’s obligations or child financial support principles underlying the sound rights. hold- distinct from his Con- example, by a represented, for be held that the must versely, this Court has state, not, if the litem or guardian ad pay support child mere failure custody of the itself, care and is in the cause termination child 7—Y(a)(1). on behalf representation In re under state. Such 15— (R.I.1991). C., holding in our A.2d is consistent with the child Oscar D., at In re Christina Moreover, that position our participated ad litem guardian where a does not behalf of adoption proceeding an trigger par automatic termination of child. obligations is consistent with ent’s financial statute, § 15- support the child G.L.1956 Information to Dismiss the Motion 5-16.2, interpreted the cases that have argued that because the The state also 5—16.2(c) ongoing it. Section calls 15— Family justice committed error Court respect Family oversight Court defendant’s child finding of law in that wishing A support child orders. automatically obligations ceased support support obligations her must alter of his upon the termination amend the affirmatively assert a motion to dismissing the crimi- judgment prove changed cir order for vacated, and the information should be nal otherwise, cumstances; original order criminal information should be reinstated. Healey Healey, v. continues to run. dismiss, assessing In the motion (R.I.1991) curiam); (per A.2d required to de- 120 R.I. Calcagno Calcagno, see also ex- “the information and termine whether (1978) 723, 729, (holding * * * demonstrate^] hibits appended that a child order “is not self- to believe probable cause the existence until terminating but is valid and effective com- charged been ha[d] the offense by an order of the amended or terminated that the defendant committed mitted [and] court,” of the children even when some 12-12-1.7; Super.R.Crim.P. it.” Section emancipated or have reached become 9.1. bar, age majority). the case at the defendant conceded case, criminal informa In this crimi hearing on his motion dismiss the violating charged tion defendant with motion to separate nal information that a 2—1.1(b)(1), every provides which 11— suspend required, child pay court order to person who is under never submitted one. but defendant arrearage “who has incurred support, considerations, amount of light past-due of these ($30,000), and hav thirty thousand dollars proce specific and in the absence of so, willfully fails who the means to do Legislature, ing dural directive of child more installments following one or pro are of the ** * Here, felony.” of a statutory guilty will effectuate tocol best “[a]t found that responsi which the scheme voluntary relin of the defendant’s gov are the time and children bilities rights, his out quishment ob of his parental Before erned. Nine arrearage was support along standing child may be terminated ligations and Three Hundred Thousand Three Family Court must the justice the ($9,303.00) Because dollars.” that must findings on child make At that defendant’s determined in an order or decision. included be when obligations child also ended interests the hearing, the in were terminated November employed “The standard to gauge Attorney concluded that “the statutory Gen- whether a particular term rea- satisfy eral has failed to this court es- sonably informs an individual of the tablishing prima facie case under R.I. criminality of his conduct whether the 11-2-1.1,” Laws Gen. the court but disputed verbiage provides adequate findings remaining made no on the ele- warning person ordinary to a intelli- ments of the statute. gence illegal by that his conduct is com- practice.”. mon understanding and Id. our Given determination that defen- Authelet, at (quoting State v. remained, dant’s child support obligations (1978)). R.I. notwithstanding the pa- termination of his rental rights, appears from the record Having rested his decision on a determina- that arrearage exceeded the parental rights tion that $30,000 statutory threshold of at the time chapter automatically under 7 of title 15 Family Court dismissed the informa- terminated the defendant’s obli- tion. We therefore vacate the dismissal of gations, Family “did not the criminal information and remand this ques- reach these issues. Because these Family hearing case Court for a matters, inherently tions involve factual determine, alia, inter whether the infor- remand the case Court for a mation and attached exhibits demon- ascertain whether the action strated probable cause to believe de- against represented defendant selec- fendant, “having so,” means do prosecution of alleged tive violation “willfully fail[ed]” make the court-or- 11-2-1.1(b)(1). payments. dered child support Section

11-2-1.1(b)(1). Conclusion Court,

In their automatically briefs this both It is our cut- ting the defendant and the American off Civil Lib financial at curiae, (ACLU), erties Union as amicus time to the child are termi- has, noted past, that CSE ignores plain language discontin nated and in- ued child arrearage obli tent of our recognize statutes. We and/or gations upon many of parental whose their chil- The rights. defendant and the ACLU con dren are terminated have no capacity to holding tended that provide defendant liable financial support, and their chil- case, light this may custody of CSE’s dren be in the care and past practice, Equal would violate the Pro state. Such circumstances can be consid- tection during Clause of the Fourteenth Amend ered hearing which the ment to the represented. United States Constitution. of the child shall be hearing may part The defendant also claimed that because of of a or practice, possibly he “could not termination proceeding. know Therefore, case, reasonably appeal believe that his cessation of in this state’s support payments after his sustained insofar we reverse the judgment were was a To sup finding terminated crime.” that child port his position, support obligations automatically defendant cited State ceased Fonseca, (R.I.1996), 670 A.2d 1237 in as of the date the defendant’s the, set rights'were which this Court forth standard for terminated. also vacate We determining criminal dismissal whether a statute is of the criminal information unconstitutionally vague: and remand the case to the again was The defendant in- incarceration. on whether the for criminal lack of bail. to the ACI for remanded and the attached exhibits dem- formation Thus, a maximum of five although facing probable cause believe onstrated offense, felony for this years imprisonment willfully withheld the defendant counsel for not afforded defendant was 2—1.1(b)(1) §of and whether violation 11— and was held than three months more for unfairly the defendant was selected months. than four of bail for more lieu putative violation prosecution individual, prior no with Simply put, the statute. innocent, record, presumed is criminal who goes Family It ignored by the Court. was GOLDBERG, Justice, dissenting. of this state that the courts saying without opinion par- I am of the that a Because juris- criminal felony with that are vested obligation extin- ent’s re- constitutional diction have concomitant his or her upon the termination of guished with including compliance sponsibilities, respectfully I dissent are notice- Rights Bill of all which majority. absent in this case. ably matter, As an initial the introduction Pay Support Child Failure to this first to Rhode Island’s crimi- offender ar- Although a warrant for defendant’s system nothing nal of a short support was pay for failure to rest shocking episode jurisprudence 1997, 2, defendant 25, 2000, issued on December May Court. On than two (Fritz defendant) apprehended for more was ar- David Fritz was his home on years until was arrested at he raigned felony on one count of failure 24, gainful- was May 2000. The defendant support in violation of G.L.1956 pay child ly employed living apartment in an and He Bail 11-2-1.1. was a first offender. information Kingstown. A criminal North $40,000 surety, was set at an amount of fail- with one count charging defendant higher imposed that is than the bail that is support in violation ure to dealers, drug child molesters on August 11-2-1.1 was filed bail, post surety thieves. defen- Unable a state- information was Included dant was remanded to the Adult Correc- former in which wife ment (ACI), lan- tional Institutions where he that defen- investigator she informed counsel, for more than guished, without parental rights previously had been dant’s four months. Fritz did not return court However, no further investi- terminated. 28, 2000, July, until more than two months gation was undertaken. According to appearance. after his initial file, re- defendant was compounded was plight The defendant’s prison, again manded to without bene- him with provide failure by the court’s counsel, appear- fit of “to ensure his court by the Sixth guaranteed counsel August On three months ance.” States Constitu- to the United Amendment counsel, after his arrest and still without his ar- informed tion. We are incarceration, a sec- re-arraigned, defendant was entered defendant wrote rest guilty Judge ond of not and was returned plea the Chief rights to his inability based his continued him that his ACI on notified in 1994. tei’minated surety bail. Counsel children had been post this exorbitant to the referred ap- communication was finally appointed, and entered This responded who legal counsel more than Court’s pearance September verifying to find an order was unable arrest and she three months after defendant’s (R.I.1992). defendant, the termination and that there- 488-89 The record fore, responsible support. was for the child complaint alleg- this case discloses that a However, counsel, by hearing aided at a on ing against abuse the children was filed defendant, Fritz’s continued incarceration because of this and the children were bail, lack of the fact that his parental placed custody physi- of DCYF with n rights had been “instantly placement terminated was cal with the mother. At some by through defendant, verified” the clerk simple point, later with the assistance telephone Family juvenile counsel, call not peti- elected to contest the Upon office. verification that voluntarily tion and consented DCYF’s terminated, petition. had been he hearing A held was $10,000 was on personal recogni- by released during zance. The defendant subsequently which defendant that he free- testified was information, moved dismiss the ly assert- and voluntarily consenting to the termi- ing that the failed present prima state nation of his rights. At the con- case.7 hearing, hearing justice clusion facie declared that defendant’s in every As termination case permanently appoint- were terminated and state, the decree of termination resulted ed DCYF as guardian children. from petition, Department give of the father to or withhold Children, (DCYF), Youth and Families al- consent to given their and to be leging that the children had been abused notice an adoption extin- father. Significantly, their in Rhode guished. I am proceed- satisfied that this Island, jurisdictions, many unlike ing complete resulted severance rights can only peti- be terminated parent-child relationship and that tion governmental of “a placement rights of both defendant and the children agency or placement licensed child agency finally were considered determined. after notice the parent hearing and a * * Accordingly, I am of the that de- 15-7-7(a). petition *.” G.L.1956 obligation to to support fendant’s continue Thus, a “voluntary paren- termination” of children relinquished these ended when he cannot occur at the instance of a his parental rights. recalcitrant parent who wishes to be re- responsi- lieved his or her child support In his dismissing written decision information, An bring bilities. individual criminal hearing justice terminate his or her own found that defendant had tal rights pending relinquished unless there is a petition “his his chil- John, for adoption of the child. In encompassed re 605 dren and all that is with that (R.I.1982) Although (the duty hearing jus- defendant moved dismiss the pursuant information to G.L.1956 12-12- passing tice in aon motion to dismiss filed 1.7, case, prima failure to set forth pursuant §to 12-12-1.7 “to examine facie majority has remanded this case to the de- information and the attached exhibits to hearing Court “for a to ascertain whether the probable termine ‘whether there exists cause against represented a action defendant selec- charged to believe that the offense ha[d] been prosecution pro- tive [defendant]."” This committed and that [the] [had] defendant incorrect; cedurally substantively these "). ruling it’ committed on a motion hearing jus- issues were not raised before the cause, probable dismiss for lack of appropriately tice and are not before this pass upon any permitted is not Further, Court. the constitutional issue of challenges constitutional de- set forth prosecution cognizable selective is not under fendant. Jenison, See 12-12-1.7. State v. child, responsibility, give including as the of right well as to to notice to adoption.” involving or withhold consent then.' subsequent adoption proceedings * * 15-7.2-2, added.) § Pursuant to it “the G.L.1956 is (Emphases the child adoption that is policy of this state based that DCYF does not seek record discloses upon legal the termination of parents children support from whose responsibilities parents and of birth Indeed, custody. in placed have been its and the creation of the of legal relationship the not acknowledged that state does parents adoptee and child an and between seek children whose adoptive parents.” the He concluded custody routinely are in state and vacates adoption an occur until has cannot there any arrearages that have accrued from the parent’s been a termination of the natural I petition the termination was filed. date responsibilities and the child. to agree policy comports this with the Thus, I believe that the termination of best interests of the child.

parental rights pa- extinguishes one’s Because and the termination adoption responsibilities, including rental the re- of parental rights were unknown to the children; sponsibility the other- law, body common this entire of law is wise the children are not for available statutory. It axiomatic that statutes adoption the parent-child relationship, and derogation strictly of common the law are concerning least maintenance and sup- provides A construed. statute that port, has not been severed. I am the the has an termination of opinion that the majority decision of the liberty protected a interest impact upon creates anomalous situation which parent signifi- the child and has parental relationship is not terminated consequences parent cant who is decree of the par- a deprived right to with his associate obliged ent who is to continue to John, or re her own child. process right child has due to notice Accordingly, at 488. statutes are these the child’s so that his her or construed, strictly Court will not support obligations can be discontinued. that are read into statute conditions Further, in cases such as the one before Id, expressly forth set therein. With us, in the children remain with their which pursuant terminations 15- respect to mother, the of support amount due from 7-6, “the undertaken primary inquiry each parent changes from time time. of pa- court is whether surrender par- Since the financial resources both voluntary rental and in the rights is best must fixing ents be considered in * * Kyle In re interests of the parent amount of child support, has the S., (R.I.1997). 329, 332 Howev- for a er, whether the termination of modification of upon based §§ 15-7- pursuant is effectuated change proceed- in circumstances. These 15-7-7, in- Legislative 15-7-6 necessarily will ings involve further entan- same, provide “to children who tent glements parties, situation I between permanent need with and safe are suggest that is not the best interests of S., Kyle re 692 A.2d at placement.” In In my opinion, the children. this is an if my Legislature opinion, absurd result that frustrates the intent parent require intended to clearly expressed in Legislature 15-7-7(a) perma- after a decree or her children that the termination terminating parent-child rela- “any nently includes the termination tionship, it have done so clear legal rights to the would and all unequivocal language. This Court An overwhelming majority of states recognized purpose the salient recognized duty provide 15-7-6 is voluntary extinguished by a child is opera- without re tion law the termination of his or gard to question parental the of unfitness. parental rights. concept her This rests have We declined to construe chapter fairly the that uniform belief “[a] in way title 15 such a as to discourage person relinquished has who voluntary the rights through adoption, voluntary a termi- S., rights. Kyle See In re nation of parental rights or an involuntary (previous voluntary of pa termination parental rights longer severance of is no a rights may rental not serve as the basis parent.” Secretary State ex rel. Social of a later involuntary peti termination Clear, and Rehabilitation Services tion). my opinion, the construction (1991). Thus, Kan. 804 P.2d placed upon chapter by majority, this the parent rights [per- “[t]he whose have been holding parent that voluntarily who re manently] severed is relieved of all duties linquishes his or her rights a child still Indeed, obligations and to the child.” Id. I obliged child, is that will have hard-pressed jurisdic- am to find a single the unwarranted effect of discouraging position tion that the approaches by taken voluntary may terminations that other today. the in majority I believe that in wise be a child’s best interests. explicit legislation absence of to the con-

It emphasized should be that in this trary, join majori- Rhode Island should case have not been asked to address ty recognize, that states as did the children. best inter- justice, hearing specifically ests the children were ad- responsibilities flow the existence dressed and by decided and a termination decree who, hearing justice on a petition based in parent- results the dissolution of the by protective state child agency, relationship all that it entails. ordered the termination incorrect, I reject, as legally rights to his children. The expressed by fear majority that recal- children to nurturing live safe and parents citrant up voluntarily would line environment without their father’s influ- terminate simply their to avoid child participation judicially ence were First, support. get cannot line finally adjudicated in disagree I without invitation from the state. As majority with the that the children have noted, jurisdiction, only pro- this a child any residual rights respect to their agency petition tection such DCYF can father, right save for the to inherit. The for the termination rights, Assembly provided General petition whether voluntary invol- right a only possesses after the ter- Second, untary. issue overarching parent-child mination of relationship by decided to inherit from his or her natural justice is is in parents pursuant §to what the child’s best inter- suggest 15-7-17. I Significantly, sug- if the ests. there has no Assembly General wanted to been gestion agreed afford these children other in- that Fritz termi- cluding nation of support, it would have his to avoid child so, expressly particularly support. proceedings done since termi- These were initiated by prosecuted nation decrees cannot arise from complaint divorce abuse .an proceedings. DCYF. avoid sought to that father dence showed

Contrary expressed to the fears M.K., 254 R.H. v. obligation); have ad majority, states that numerous (Ch.Div. refused question simply N.J.Super. dressed 1991) voluntarily on the desire surren may a termination based not (parent to allow or her child parent escape of a other than der his or her Indeed, some responsibilities. contest); Depart Commonwealth Connecticut, states, including the State Hager v. ex rel. Public ment Welfare for the termi permit petition 433, 419 A.2d Pa.Super. Woolf, 276 her parental rights nation of his or even (1980) to avoid seek (parent adoption. How pending the absence of filing of a obligation the “mere ever, simply permits no state rights”); In to terminate Be obligations. support to avoid child 312, A.B., 444 151 Wis.2d re Interest of that a universally recognized cause it (1989) 415, obligation (support 419 N.W.2d extinguishes parent’s obli termination of the to considered as one of the father child, closely courts gation to in determining best considerations a petitions these with view toward examine child in of consensual cases terests R., In re Bruce the child’s best interests. termination). Thus, my opinion, (1995). 107, 194, 662 234 Conn. court, upon a suggest trial absurd jurisdictions parent peti In a that allow agency, a ever will petition state voluntarily tion for the simply terminate to re parent’s rights a her the desire to avoid parental rights, or of his or her child parent lieve the an insufficient support responsibilities is overwhelming An number responsibilities. petition; the test is ground granting for recognized that jurisdictions See, always the child. the best interests of extin termination Brooks, 614, 616 e.g., parte Ex 513 So.2d the child. guishes obligation (termination (Ala.1987) permit parent to seek in states that Even parent are not “means for a statutes searching in termination, conduct a courts child”); obligation avoid his of the child the best interests quiry into K.L.S., re Ga.App. In S.E.2d voluntary termi deny request for (1986) (“statutory authority seeks to parent in which nation cases [voluntary] juvenile peti court entertain parent may support; “no avoid child not tions to terminate does away paren or her blithely from his walk ju by parents seeking petitions extend to In re Interest responsibilities.” tal paren to abandon their imprimatur” dicial certainly A.B., That is at 419. N.W.2d responsibilities); In re Interest happened here. what 1985) (Iowa D.W.K, 32, 35 365 N.W.2d (father’s where stated here- termination denied reasons Accordingly, * * * “ultimately ma- open in, termination would the decision I dissent from escape his her hatch for uphold decision jority and would child”); duty re justice. Welfare of Alle, N.W.2d 304 Minn. (children

(1975) to look have a and father’s legal

their father terminated avoid may not be R.A.S., 826 re Interest

support); (consen (Mo.Ct.App.1992) S.W.2d where evi- petition denied

sual

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Fritz

Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date Published: Jun 12, 2002

Citation: 801 A.2d 679

Docket Number: 2001-369-C.A.

Court Abbreviation: R.I.