State v. FritscheState v. Fritsche
Appeal by defendant from order entered 7 May 2021 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2022.
No brief filed on behalf of the State.
CarnesWarwick, by Amy Lynne Schmitz and Jonathan Carnes, for defendant-appellant.
¶ 1 Defendant Larry Fritsche appeals from the trial court‘s order denying his petition to terminate his sex-offender registration. After careful review, we affirm.
Background
¶ 2 On 17 November 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty in Arapahoe County, Colorado, district court to sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of
¶ 3 In February 2020, Defendant moved from Colorado to Florida. On 21 February 2020, Defendant registered with the Florida Sex Offender Registry, as required by Florida law. See
¶ 4 Defendant then moved to North Carolina in October 2020 to be closer to his two children. On 28 October 2020, he filed a petition pursuant to
¶ 5 On 14 April 2021, Defendant filed a petition pursuant to
Discussion
¶ 6 On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition to terminate his requirement to register as a sex offender because Borden was incorrectly decided and should be overturned, or, in the alternative, because the termination statute‘s ten-year North Carolina registry requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I. Standard of Review
¶ 7 Whether to terminate a sex offender‘s registration requirement is a matter left to the trial court‘s discretion. In re Hamilton, 220 N.C. App. 350, 359, 725 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2012);
¶ 9 “An appellate court reviews conclusions of law pertaining to a constitutional matter de novo.” State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335, 340, 700 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010). “In exercising de novo review, we presume that laws enacted by the General Assembly are constitutional, and we will not declare a law invalid unless we determine that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Strudwick, 379 N.C. 94, 2021-NCSC-127, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is the burden of the proponent of a finding of facial unconstitutionality to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an act of the General Assembly is unconstitutional in every sense.” Id.
II. Analysis
¶ 10 A sex offender who commits certain “reportable convictions” as defined by
¶ 11 This Court addressed
¶ 12 However, this Court interpreted the statutory phrase “[t]en years from the date of initial county registration” as limiting eligibility for removal from the North Carolina sex-offender registry to offenders who have been registered for at least ten years from their initial date of registration in a North Carolina county, rather than ten years from the offender‘s initial date of registration in any jurisdiction. Id. at 583, 718 S.E.2d at 686.
¶ 13 The Court reasoned that allowing removal of offenders from the sex-offender registry after less than ten years of registration in this state would “contradict[ ] the intent of the statute to protect the public, maintain public safety, and assist law enforcement agencies and the public in knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders.” Id. Thus, although the Borden defendant had been registered as a sex offender in his various states of residence for more than ten years altogether, he was nevertheless ineligible to terminate his sex-offender registration in North Carolina because he had not been registered on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry for at least ten years. Id. at 583–84, 718 S.E.2d at 686–87.
¶ 14 In sum,
¶ 15 The facts of the case at bar are strikingly similar to those presented in Borden.
¶ 16 In light of this outcome, Defendant requests that we overturn Borden. However, we are bound by our Court‘s decision in that case unless and until a higher court overturns it. In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.“).
¶ 17 Defendant next asserts that
¶ 18 Defendant asserted this equal-protection challenge below; when denying Defendant‘s petition, the trial court acknowledged Defendant‘s constitutional challenge and noted that Defendant had “preserved that argument by making it” at the hearing. Accordingly, as a preliminary matter, we examine the trial court‘s jurisdiction to rule on Defendant‘s constitutional challenge to
¶ 19
¶ 20 Nevertheless, this Court has previously determined that the three-judge panel provisions are not applicable where a defendant raises a facial constitutional challenge to the validity of the satellite-based monitoring statutory regime, which is a civil matter but often arises during criminal sentencing. See State v. Stroessenreuther, 250 N.C. App. 772, 774 n.1, 793 S.E.2d 734, 736 n.1 (2016) (“Section 1-267.1(a1) . . . permit[s] a criminal defendant to assert [a facial] constitutional challenge before a single trial judge during sentencing without having to transfer the issue to a three-judge panel.“).
¶ 21 Like satellite-based monitoring, our sex-offender registration statutes exist along that indistinct boundary between criminal and civil actions. See, e.g., Bowditch, 364 N.C. at 352, 700 S.E.2d at 13; State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 330, 677 S.E.2d 444, 450 (2009); State v. White, 162 N.C. App. 183, 195, 590 S.E.2d 448, 456 (2004). Because
¶ 23 The analysis of an equal-protection challenge is two-pronged:
Our state courts use the same test as federal courts in evaluating the constitutionality of challenged classifications under an equal protection analysis. When evaluating a challenged classification, the court must first determine which of several tiers of scrutiny should be utilized. Then it must determine whether the statute meets the relevant standard of review.
Fowler, 197 N.C. App. at 26, 676 S.E.2d at 544 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 24 Although the Equal Protection Clause “require[s] that all persons similarly situated be treated alike[,]” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), it “do[es] not require perfection in respect of classifications. In borderline cases, the legislative determination is entitled to great weight[,]” State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 658, 187 S.E.2d 8, 13 (1972); see also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (“State laws are generally entitled to a presumption of validity against attack under the Equal Protection Clause.“). The Clause “impose[s] upon law-making bodies the requirement that any legislative classification be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.” Greenwood, 280 N.C. at 656, 187 S.E.2d at 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In the absence of a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges upon fundamental rights, a state statute is to be upheld against equal protection attack if it is rationally related to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends.” G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408 (1982).
¶ 25 The classification of which Defendant complains—that is, an individual‘s residency at the time of his initial registration as a sex offender—is not inherently suspect; thus, we apply rational-basis review to determine whether the legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 242 N.C. App. 162, 166, 775 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2015); White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) (“When a governmental classification does not burden the exercise of a fundamental right or operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, the lower tier of equal protection analysis requiring that the classification be made upon a rational basis must be applied.“). Under rational-basis review, the validity of any challenged law “depends upon its reasonable relation to the accomplishment of the State‘s legitimate objective[.]” Greenwood, 280 N.C. at 656, 187 S.E.2d at 12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 26 The requirement that a defendant be registered in North Carolina as a sex offender for at least ten years in order to be eligible for early termination of sex-offender registration is rationally related to the State‘s legitimate interests in maintaining public safety and protection. As our Supreme Court has explained: “The North Carolina Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program is a public safety measure specifically designed to assist law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect communities.” State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 560, 614 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
¶ 27 Moreover, in the instant case, Defendant was treated the same as all other registered sex offenders who initially enrolled in another jurisdiction‘s sex-offender registry based upon an out-of-state conviction. That Defendant, as a sex offender who initially registered in another state, is negatively impacted by an otherwise neutral law does not, alone, render
¶ 28 Thus,
Conclusion
¶ 29 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s order denying Defendant‘s petition for termination of his requirement to register as a sex offender on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry.
AFFIRMED.
Judges INMAN and GORE concur.