Chief Justice.
Gеrmaine French was convicted of two counts of criminal nónsupport under section 568.040, RSMo 1994, which occurred during consecutive six-month periods in 1997 and 1998. After appeal to the Court of Appeals, Western District, this Court granted transfer to address the question of whether French’s failure to provide support was a continuing course of conduct and whether his two convictions for that continuous conduct violated the Double Jeоpardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 10. Having determined that nonpayment during “each of six individual months within any twelve-month period” are separate crimes under the charging statute, this Court holds that French’s two convictions do not violate the bar against double jeopardy. The judgment is affirmed.
I.
In September of 1992, Victoria Wilson met French at a party. When French called her a few days later, she invited him to her apartment, аnd they had sex one time. In November of 1992, Wilson dis *898 covered she was pregnant. She called French, told him that she was pregnant, that he was the father, and that she expected him to pay child support. In a later conversation, French told Wilson, “I’m not paying for any child support for a child that’s not mine.” Wilson did not contact French during the remainder of the pregnancy or list his name as the father on the birth certificate.
In 1995, French offered to send Wilson money if she agreed not to file for child support, but when French failed to send money, Wilson called the Child Support Enforcement Department of the Buchanan County Prosecutor’s Office. The Department then contacted French, but he was uncooperative. Thereafter, the Department filed a petition to establish paternity and served French with a summons, to which was attached a petition to establish paternity and child support and an order compelling him to submit to genetic testing. However, French failed to appear, and on November 26, 1996, a default judgment was entered declaring him to be the fаther and ordering him to pay $431 per month in child support. A copy of the judgment was sent to French by certified mail, but was returned unclaimed. The only payment made on the child support obligation was in 1998 when the child suppоrt enforcement authorities intercepted French’s state income tax refund check and applied it to the balance owed.
The State charged French with two counts of felony nonsupport. Count I сharged him with nonsupport during the six-month period between January 1, 1998, and June 30, 1998, within the twelvemonth period of July 1,1997, through June 30, 1998. Count II charged him with nonsupport during the six months of July 1, 1998, through December 31, 1998, within the twelve-month period of January 1, 1998, through Decеmber 31, 1998. A jury
found French guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to two six-month sentences, to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.
II. ,
Section 568.040 states in pertinent part:
1. A person commits the crime of nonsupport if he knowingly fails tо provide, without good cause, adequate support for his spouse; a parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly fails to provide, without good cause, adequate support whiсh such parent is legally obligated to provide for his child or stepchild who is not otherwise emancipated by operation of law.
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4. Criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor, unless the person obligated to pay child support commits the crime of nonsupport in each of six individual months within any twelve-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of five thousand dollars, in either of which case it is a class D felony.
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(Emphasis added.)
As noted, French’s primary argument is that his seсond conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because non-payment of child support is one indivisible course of criminal conduct, a single crime. In this regard, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “ ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”
Missouri v. Hunter,
Here, the legislative intent to allow multiрle punishments is clear by virtue of the statutory provision for temporal units of prosecution—six separate months of non-payment in one-year’s time under section 568.040.4. Thus, the state was permitted to bring charges both fоr failure to make support payments for six of the twelve months between July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998, and for a separate six-month period during the separate twelve-month period between January 1, 1998, through December 31, 1998.
Defendant argues that subsection 4 of sec. 568.040 is not intended to define a unit of prosecution, but acts only as a sentence enhancement provision “similar to how a marijuana possession charge is elevated to felony status when a person possesses over 35 grams [under sec. 195.211].” Inexplicably, defendant overlooks this Court’s decision in
State v. Burns,
French also cites section 556.041, RSMo, which precludes multiple convictions for offenses constituting a continuing course of conduct and seizes on the language of several cases from the Court of Appeals,
see, e. g., State v. Morrow,
When the same conduct of a person may establish the commission of more than one offense he may be prosecuted for each such offense. Hе may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if ...
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(4) The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the person’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
French’s argument fails for two reasons:
First, the offense of criminal nonsupport in section 568.040 is not defined as a continuing course of conduct, but is defined in separate temporal units of prosecution.
State v. Morrow,
Second, even if criminal nonsupport were defined in section 568.040 as а continuing course of conduct, the clause in section 556.041(4), “unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses,” is an express exception to the immediately preceding prohibition against multiple convictions. In this case, the exception would apply because the legislature has in fact provided that specific periods of the prohibited conduct constitute separate offenses. Again, French apparently is unwilling to acknowledge that those specific periods are elements of the crime that define separate units of prosеcution.
III.
In his second point, French challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury concluded that he “knowingly” failed to pay child support. Specifically, he claims that in the absence of proof that he received a copy of the judgment setting out the support order, “knowledge” cannot be presumed. In the context of criminal non-support, a parent acts with the particular mental state of “knowingly” when a parent is aware of the support obligation.
State v. Morovitz,
When reviewing fоr sufficiency of the evidence, a court views the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.
State v. Black,
IV.
Finally, French claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to elicit testimony from Deborah Welter, an employee of the prosecutor’s office, regarding the process of establishing paternity and French’s lack of cooperation in genetic testing during the paternity proceedings. He argues that the testimony was irrelevant because Frеnch’s paternity already had been adjudicated in the civil action and, further, that the testimony was prejudicial because the jury would focus improperly on the question of whether he knew he was the father, rathеr than whether he knew of his support obligation. However, French failed to object to the initial questions regarding this testimony, and he requested no other relief after his objections to the later questions were sustained. In this situation, there is nothing for this Court to review, except for manifest injustice warranting plain error relief under Rule 30.20. From a review of the record, suffice it to say that the' alleged errors do not approach manifest injustice and that an extended .opinion on the mat *901 ter would have no precedential value. Rule 84.16(b).
The judgment is affirmed.