THE STATE v. J. S. FREELAND, Appellant.
Division Two
December 12, 1927.
300 S. W. 675
Before a person may be сonvicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence under our statute, not only must death have ensued from the negligent act or omission of such person, but there must be facts and circumstances in evidence tending to prove that such person wаs actuated at the time by a reckless disregard of the consequences of his act, from which the jury may reasonably infer the criminal intent so essential to guilt in every lawful conviction for violation of our criminal statutes.
Instruction 4 failed even to conform to the definition of culpable negligence approved in the Weisman case and other cases cited. When properly understood, the Emery and Horner cases are not authority tending to support the correctness of such instruction. That instruction fell far short of submitting to the jury a correct definition of culpable negligence аs including the element of reckless disregard of the consequences.
Other errors complained of are of such character that they will hardly recur upon another trial and need not be considered.
For error in failing to define culpаble negligence properly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for retrial. All concur.
The information is based on
“I have your letter of the eleventh in regard to dynamiting gar. At any time you catch them congregating in schools, you may go ahead and dynamite or use any other means to destroy them. Watch carefully to see that you are not destroying game fish.”
We herewith insert a paraphrase in rhyme of the assistant commissioner‘s letter of instructions to defendant, the result of an inspiration penned by the learned Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Lovan, interpreting the letter as permitting the taking of the pound of flesh, but proscribing the spilling of a drop of blood, rеading:
“Mr. Deputy in charge of fish,
You are informed it is my wish,
That you take some dynamite in your flivver
And proceed to Jack‘s Fork River.
And, standing on the gravelly bar,
Cast in the shots to kill the gar.“But when you execute this command,
Don‘t forget the law will demand
That while killing a gar, you must not harass
A single sucker, catfish or bass.
You must obey instructions without fail
Or run the risk of going to jail.”
The evidence develops that gar hinder and prevent the propagation of game and food fish. A number of witnesses testified that the water hole of Jack‘s Fork mentioned had become infested with gar. It also develops that the Statе Game-and-Fish Commissioner construed
“Sec. 5615. Explosives prohibited—penalty.—Thе use of dynamite or explosives in any of the waters of this State is prohibited ex-
cept by the special permission and under the supervision of the state game and fish commissioner, and then only for mining or mechanical purposes, or to recover the bodies of persons. Any person, firm or corporation offending against any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for each offense. “Sec. 5616. Poison and explosives not to be used to kill fish—penalty.—No person shall place or use in any of the waters of this State any medical drug, any coculus indicus, or fish berry, or any other poisonous thing оr substance, calculated to poison, kill, or injure any fish, nor shall by such means kill, catch or take any fish that may be in said waters, and no person shall place any dynamite, giant powder, nitroglycerin, or any explosive substance of which nitroglycerin composes a part, or any other explosive substance or preparation in any of the waters of this State, whereby any fish that may be in said waters may be killed, injured, or destroyed, and no person by any such means shall kill, catch or takе any fish from said waters. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section, shall on conviction be adjudged guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding two years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than thirty days, or by fine not less than one hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
“Sec. 5622. Logging, rock or hand fishing.—It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to take, catch or kill any fish in any of the waters of this State by means of ‘logging’ or ‘rock fishing.’ Provided further, thаt fish known as hickory shad and grinnel and gar may be killed at any time with a gig.
“Sec. 5652. May remove fish, when.—The state game and fish commissioner may take at such time and in such manner from public waters of this State fish which, in his judgment, hinder or prevent the propagation of game or food fish, or when fish are in danger of perishing. Such removal shall be effected by such means and under such regulations as the state game and fish commissioner may provide. So much of such money realized from the sale of fish so removed may bе used by the state game and fish commissioner in continuing the work of removal, and all surplus money must be turned into the game protection fund. The Missouri fish commission may take or cause to be taken under the supervision of the state game and fish commissioner any fish from public waters in any manner, at any time, for any purpose connected with the fish culture or with scientific observation.”
The purpose of the game and fish statutes is to propagate and preserve such fish as benefit mankind. It follows that the State by enacting prohibitory statutes has adopted the policy of fostering reproduction of game and food fish. In furtherance of its policy the State has declared such fish as in the judgment of the commissioner hinder or prevent the propagation of food or game fish may be taken from the public waters. Inasmuch аs the State can only act through representatives, it has properly assigned the care and propagation of fish to the commissioner.
When different sections of the statutes bear on a subject, it is a rule of construction that such sections must be harmonized if possible.
It follows that the judgment is reversed and the defendant is discharged. Higbee and Henwood, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by DAVIS, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur, except Walker, J., who dissents.
