Case Information
*1 Supreme Court No. 2011-240-C.A. (N2/11-48A) State :
v. :
Frederick Baillargeron. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222- 3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. *2 Supreme Court No. 2011-240-C.A. (N2/11-48A) State :
v. :
Frederick Baillargeron. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The Attorney General seeks to reverse a decision by a justice of the Superior Court dismissing for lack of probable cause a criminal information against the defendant, Frederick Baillargeron. The defendant was charged by information with threatening a public official with bodily harm ―as a result of the lawful performance of his official duties‖ in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-42-4. The motion justice ruled that, based on the contents of the information package, the state would not be able to prove beyond a reasonable *3 doubt that the defendant’s statements constituted a threat of bodily harm to a public official in the performance of his public duties. The motion justice accordingly dismissed the information. [2]
This matter came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ arguments (both oral and written), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I Facts and Travel It is undisputed that defendant wrote a letter, dated January 22, 2011, to Peter Martin, a member of the Rhode Island House of Representatives. A form of letterhead appears at the top of the letter setting forth defendant’s name, address, and telephone number as well as Peter Martin’s name and address. The letter [3] reads as follows:
―Dear A***hole –
―I really don’t give a f***k what you think of my truck. ―As a matter of fact, I have zero respect for anything you think or say.
*4 ―Idiots, such as yourself, who support crooked Politicians (like a***hole [name omitted], that supported Police Corruption over The U.S. Constitution) will NEVER receive respect from me. PERIOD! As far as I’m concerned, you’re all the lowest form of SCUM on the face of the Earth – and ALWAYS will be! The World will be a better place, when ALL of you are DEAD, including the CROOKED COPS!
―In addition, I don’t appreciate a***holes who’ve threatened me on multiple occasions (ie: YOU) approaching me in public – especially, when alcohol is involved.
―Should you do this AGAIN , you just might find out what your teeth taste like – or wind up dead.
―This isn’t a threat, but a warning. After the bulls***t I suffered via Newport’s CROOKED F***KING COPS – I don’t plan on allowing others the same opportunity to take advantage of me. ―As such, I’ll be defending myself in the future by all means available, including striking first – instead of allowing my life, safety and/or health to be put in jeopardy.
―In closing, I hope you have a miserable day, because you deserve it AND are smart enough to STAY THE F***K AWAY FROM ME!
―Life is not a joke, a***hole – but YOU are!
―Disgustedly yours,
/s/
―Frederick Baillargeron‖ The defendant sent a copy of the just-quoted January 22, 2011 letter to Chief Michael McKenna of the Newport Police Department with a cover letter; that cover letter reads as follows:
―Dear Chief McKenna,
―Enclosed is a copy of the letter I’m sending to corruption supporter & RI Rep. – A***hole, Peter Martin.
*5 ―You’re receiving it, because it specifically mentioned your department & I don’t say things behind people’s back.
―As such, a copy was also sent to R.I.’s Corruption supporting Senator – A***hole, [name omitted].
―Disgustedly yours,
/s/
―Frederick Baillargeron‖ According to the ―police narrative,‖ which forms part of the information package, on January 25, 2011, Representative Martin contacted the Rhode Island State Police and requested to speak with a state trooper about the January 22, 2011 letter. Representative Martin reported to the state police that he had encountered defendant at a restaurant two days prior to the date on the letter and that Representative Martin made a comment to defendant about a truck that defendant had refurbished. Representative Martin explained to the state police that defendant did not respond to his comment about the truck, but had ―only looked at him angrily.‖ According to the information package: (1) defendant and Representative Martin knew each other; and (2) they had been involved in a confrontation with each other at a dedication ceremony in Newport approximately four years prior to the incident in January of 2011.
On March 24, 2011, the Attorney General filed a criminal information charging defendant with one count of ―threaten[ing] * * * a public official with bodily harm as a result of the lawful performance of his official duties, in violation of § 11-42-4.‖ Twelve exhibits were attached to the criminal information, including a state trooper’s affidavit, his police narrative, and his witness statement; the information package also included defendant’s witness statement, a copy of the January 22, 2011 letter at issue, a copy of the cover letter mailed to Chief McKenna, and Representative Martin’s witness statement.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause pursuant to Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his written submission to the Superior Court, defendant conceded that Peter Martin was a public official as defined in § 11-42-4, and he let it be assumed for the purposes of the motion that the state had proven the existence of an actual threat. However, defendant argued that the state had failed to establish probable cause to support a finding that the threat was directed towards Peter Martin in his official capacity as a state representative. A hearing was held before a justice of the Superior Court, who then granted the motion to dismiss, explaining that, even if the letter constituted a threat, that threat ―was not directed to Peter Martin in his capacity as a public official.‖ The state filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Standard of Review
In assessing a motion to dismiss an information, a motion justice is charged with
―examin[ing] the information and the attached exhibits to determine whether there [is] probable
cause to believe that the offense charged [was] committed and that [the accused] had committed
it.‖ State v. Reed,
III
Analysis The information at issue in the instant case sets forth the sole charge against defendant as follows:
―That [defendant], on or about the 25th day of January, 2011, in the City of Newport, in the County of Newport, did threaten Peter Martin, a public official with bodily harm as a result of the lawful performance of his official duties, in violation of § 11-42-4 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, as amended (Reenactment of 2002).‖
As previously noted, the discrete issue before the motion justice on the motion to dismiss the
information was ―whether or not there [were] sufficient facts and circumstances contained in the
information packet which would lead a reasonable person to believe‖ that defendant had violated
*8
§ 11-42-4 in the manner alleged in the information. See Jenison,
In our view, the motion justice, after examining the information and the attachments thereto, properly determined that ―the State, under no circumstances based on this information package, could succeed in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant’s] statements were *9 directed to Mr. Martin while Mr. Martin was engaged in the discharge of his professional, political, or public responsibilities.‖
It is noteworthy that defendant sent the January 22, 2011 letter to Representative Martin at his home and that the letter’s first sentence references defendant’s truck—which vehicle Representative Martin stated (in his witness statement) had been the only topic of their interaction two days prior to the date on the letter. We are of the opinion that the motion justice correctly concluded that any threat contained within the letter was separate and apart from Representative Martin’s ―performance or nonperformance of [his] public duty.‖ See § 11-42-4. We reiterate that, when evaluating a motion to dismiss an information for lack of probable cause, the analysis should be limited to an examination of the information package. See Young, 941 A.2d at 128; Reed, 764 A.2d at 146. By specifying in the information that defendant had violated § 11-42-4 by threatening Representative Martin ―as a result of the lawful performance of his official duties,‖ the state limited itself to that portion of the statute and was not entitled thereafter to expand the charge by referencing other language in the statute.
Accordingly, we hold that the motion justice did not err in dismissing the information because she properly limited her examination of the information and its supporting documents to a search for probable cause that a threat was made as a result of the lawful performance of Representative Martin’s duties. And, as we have previously discussed, we agree that there was no evidence in the record of probable cause to support such a charge.
The Attorney General, citing this Court’s decision in State v. Grayhurst,
IV
Conclusion For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The record may be returned to the Superior Court.
R HODE I SLAND S UPREME C OURT C LERK ’ S O FFICE Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet TITLE OF CASE: State v. Frederick Baillargeron.
CASE NO: No. 2011-240-C.A.
(N2/11-48A)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: January 22, 2013
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ. WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice William P. Robinson III SOURCE OF APPEAL: Newport County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT :
Associate Justice Melanie Wilk Thunberg ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State: Aaron L. Weisman
Department of Attorney General For Defendant: Lara E. Montecalvo Office of the Public Defender
Notes
[1] General Laws 1956 § 11-42-4 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: ―(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully delivers or conveys, directly or indirectly, a verbal or written threat to take the life of, or to inflict bodily harm upon, a public official or a member of his or her immediate family because of the performance or nonperformance of some public duty * * * shall be guilty of a felony * * *.‖
[2] In dismissing the criminal information at issue in this case, the motion justice relied upon Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: ―A defendant who has been charged by information may * * * move to dismiss on the ground that the information and exhibits appended thereto do not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it.‖ See also G.L. 1956 § 12-12-1.10.
[3] The body of the letter to Representative Martin contains foul language—which, for the sake of decorum, we have sanitized by using ellipses. The emphasis in the letter is in the original.
[4] The cover letter to Chief McKenna also contains foul language—which, for the sake of decorum, we have sanitized by using ellipses.
[5] The state filed its notice of appeal prior to entry of the final order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, which order was entered on September 19, 2011. However, it is well settled that ―[t]his Court will treat a premature appeal as if it had been timely filed.‖ See Azevedo v. State, 945 A.2d 335, 337 n.4 (R.I. 2008); see also State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 1197 n.3 (R.I. 2006) (―A notice of appeal filed prematurely, before the entry of judgment, is valid, because this Court treats the appeal as if it had been filed after the entry of judgment.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[6] The pertinent portion of § 11-42-4 is quoted in footnote 1, supra.