{¶ 2} In June of 2003, Frazier was indicted on five counts of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Subsequently, a jury trial was held, and Frazier was found guilty of the five counts of trafficking in cocaine. In Novembеr of 2004, a sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, the trial court sentenced Frazier upon his convictions. The trial court sentenced Frazier to eight years in prison and imposed a mandatory fine of ten thousand dollars for count one, trafficking of an amount of crack cocaine that equals or exceeds twenty-five grams but is less than one hundred grаms in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} It is from this sentencing Frazier appeals, prеsenting the following assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 5} Due to the nature of the assignments of error, we choose to address them out of order.
{¶ 8} R.C.
* * *
If an offender alleges in an affidavit filed with the court prior tosentencing that the offender is indigent and unable to pay the mandatoryfine and if the court determines the offender is an indigent person andis unable to pay the mandatory fine described in this division, the courtshall not impose the mandatory fine upon the offender."
{¶ 9} The failure to file an affidavit of indigence prior to sentencing may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the record shows a reasonable probability that the trial court would have found a defendant indigеnt and relieved him of the obligation to pay the fine had the affidavit been filed. State v. Harris, 6th Dist. No. F-04-005,
{¶ 10} Information regarding a defendant's financial status is typically outside the record on merit appeal; therefore, the more appropriate vehicle for pursuing this issue is a post-conviction relief proceeding filed pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 11} Herein, the trial court found Frazier to be indigent both before and after imposing its sentence. First, Frazier had been found to be indigent, following his being indicted, and he had been appointed counsel. While Frazier subsequently requested that he be represented by retained counsel, he also stated that it was his family that was paying for such counsel. Additionally, the trial court again found Frazier to be indigent for the purposes of appointing appellate cоunsel. Immediately following the imposition of sentence, the trial court stated the following on the record:
Court: Mr. Frazier, do you have the necessary funds to retain somebodyfor appeal? Defendant: No, I don't. Court: Mr. Frazier, I am going to take another look here and take youto your word that you are indigent * * *.
{¶ 12} Additionally, upon review of the record, it is evident that the trial court based its findings as to the imposition of sentence upon the fact that no affidavit of indigence had been filed. Specifically, the trial court stated, immediately before imposing sentence, that "[t]he Court also finds there has been no affidavit of indigency (sic.) filed as to the mandatory fine situation." Upon making that finding, the trial court did not make any additional inquiry into Frazier's ability to pay. Finally, the presentence investigation report shows that Frazier denied having any assets and that he had a poor work history.
{¶ 13} Thus, it is clear from the trial record that Frazier was not given the opportunity to demonstrate that he was indigent for the purposes of avoiding the thirty-two thousand dollar fine. Additionally, the trial court's prior and subsequent findings of Frazier's indigence weigh heavily in favor of such a finding at the time of sentencing as well. We are persuaded that it is reasonable to conclude that Frazier, age thirty-three, facing twenty-one years in prison and a thirty-twо thousand dollar fine, could have proven himself indigent had his trial counsel submitted a proper affidavit of indigence.
{¶ 14} To the extent that Frazier's trial counsel failed to file an affidavit of indigence when he faced imposition of his sentence, we find that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Frazier's second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 17} Having found no error prejudicial to appellant in the third assignment of error, but having found error prejudicial to appellant in the second assignment of error, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded. Cupp, P.J., and Shaw, J., concur.
