State v. FrazierState v. Frazier
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kalitowski
Appellant contends that
FACTS
Appellant William Allen Frazier sold crack cocaine to confidential reliable informants on November 2 and 9, 1999, and January 29, 2000. In an amended complaint, appellant was charged with one count of first-degree controlled substance crime, two counts of second-degree controlled substance crime, and one count of third-degree controlled substance crime. The state also alleged that all of the offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang, in violation of
At his sentencing hearing on September 14, 2000, appellant, a black male, challenged the constitutionality of
The district court rejected appellant’s argument and sentenced appellant to the presumptive 48 month executed term on the second-degree controlled substance conviction and an additional consecutive 12 month executed term on the crime committed for the benefit of a gang conviction. On this appeal appellant challenges the constitutionality of his conviction of crime committed for the benefit of a gang.
ISSUES
1. Did appellant waive his right to challenge the constitutionality of
2. Does
ANALYSIS
I.
The state, relying on
State v. Lothenbach,
296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1980), contends that appellant forfeited his right to contest the constitutionality of
Appellant contends that
Federal courts review an equal protection challenge using a rational basis test requiring
(1)a legitimate purpose for the challenged legislation, and (2) that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn.1991) (citation omitted). But in Minnesota, our courts have applied a more stringent rational basis test than the federal equivalent.
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
Id. at 888 (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts require “a reasonable connection between the actual * * * effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals.” Id. at 889 (citation omitted).
In 1991, Minnesota enacted a criminal statute, making it unlawful to commit a crime for the benefit of a gang. 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 279, § 30. The statute defines a criminal gang as any ongoing group with three or more persons that
(1) has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of one or more of the offenses listed in section 609.11, subdivision 9;
(2) has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; and
(3) includes members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity-
Under the first prong of the
Russell
test, we evaluate
Moreover, to justify the creation of this new crime, two witnesses presented testimony about the growing problem with criminal gangs in Minnesota. A psychologist with the Minneapolis Public Schools testified that an increasing number of the students are afraid to leave their homes at night because of street gangs, and that he has noticed young children flashing gang signs, the prevalence of gang insignias on students’ folders, and a recent death threat by a gang member against an assistant principal. Id. (statement by Dr. Donald Kodluboy). Further, he hypothesized that if nothing was done to respond to the influx of street gangs, the gangs would become a “permanent part of our community as they are in virtually every other major urban area.” Id. Additionally, the Minnesota President of the NAACP, a member of Operation Take Back, and a Central Minneapolis resident, testified that residents in his neighborhood are living in fear because of gang intimidation. Id. (statement by Lewis Freeman). We conclude that the legislature based its decision to treat street gang members differently from nongang members on more than anecdotal evidence.
Appellant also contends there is no showing that prosecution under statutes defining “traditional criminal offenses” was ineffective in dealing with criminal offenses committed by gang members. But statutes are presumed constitutional, Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419, and the legislature concluded that the gang statute was necessary to combat violent street gangs. Thus, the legislature found that statutes defining traditional criminal offenses were not sufficient to deal with crimes committed by gang members. We defer to that finding.
Additionally, appellant contends that the gang statute does not have a rational basis because it does not cover similarly situated organizations that do not have a “common name or common identifying sign or symbol.” But appellant bears the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that a statute is unconstitutional. Id. And appellant fails to identify a similarly situated criminal organization that may escape the gang statute’s purview because it does not have a common name or identifying symbol. Thus, appellant fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gang statute violates equal protection guarantees.
Appellant also suggests that the gang statute has no rational basis and violates equal protection guarantees because it focuses on “ongoing” gangs as opposed to “disbanded” gangs. We disagree. Disband means to “break up.”
The American Heritage Dictionary
401 (2d ed.1985). By its very definition, a disbanded street gang is no longer a threat to the community and thus it is rational for the legislature to focus its efforts on “ongoing” street gangs.
Although appellant did not contest
DECISION
Appellant did not waive his right to contest the constitutionality of MinmStat.
Affirmed.