*1 State v. Franklin . STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA JOSEPH RALPH FRANKLIN
No. 446A82 (Filed 1983) July previously § invoking right 1. Criminal Law 75.11— to counsel in con- confession — voluntary respect nection with other waiver to murder murders — which confessed murder, prosecution degree properly In a for first the trial court found voluntarily understandingly defendant's confession was and made after he had fully rights specifically, been knowingly, advised of his constitutional and had intelligently right and present waived his to remain silent and to have counsel during questioning. represented plea Defendant had been counsel on a to a charge exposure, orally of indecent and his counsel had letter informed police department right concerning that defendant invoked his to counsel police question Approx- two murders about which imately also wanted defendant. yet six later when months defendant was arrested on another matter, police question unrelated decided to renew efforts to the defend- concerning previously ant the murders to which defendant had invoked his counsel, discussion, right prior defendant waived his constitutional questions presence and indicated that he would answer without the about, attorney. began When asked what he wanted to talk discussing him, ready not the question two murders to which the regard but rather prosecution. the murder with § prior 2. Constitutional Law 43— stage to counsel to confession —critical proceedings not reached Although custody robbery/rape charge, defendant was in on an unrelated prior defendant’s Sixth Amendment to counsel did not arise to the time question he made a statement about the murder in on 9 October 1981. An ar- October; rest warrant was issued on that date and was executed on 10 defend- judicial appearance ant’s first before a officer was on 15 at October which time appointed probable hearing counsel was cause was scheduled for 29 Oc- tober. Defendant was indicted for the first murder on 26 October, 1981.At no October time to 15 when counsel for defendant was therefore, appointed, prosecute; had the State committed itself Sixth Amendment to counsel did not arise before that time. confession, felony § proof 3. Homicide 21.6— murder —other than absence of underlying felony Independent proof felony felony underlying prosecution in a murder confession, murder, necessary is not where a otherwise corroborated as to the support felony. includes sufficient facts to the existence of the dissenting part concurring part.
Justice Exum J., May the 3 Snepp, Criminal Session of BEFORE Court, County, defendant was convicted of Superior CALDWELL IN THE SUPREME COURT *2 murder) (felony and first of- degree degree first murder sexual of life imprisonment degree fense. From a sentence first murder, on the first felony judgment having degree been arrested conviction, as appeals right, sexual offense defendant a matter 7A-27(a). G.S. § a of both fifth amendment Claiming violation his and sixth counsel, of his assigns defendant as error the admission no Claiming confession into evidence. there was evidence offense, corpus degree delicti the first sexual as of law to contends that the evidence was insufficient a matter therefore, offense, offense of first prove this prove We and affirm felony reject murder. defendant’s claims his conviction. Moody, year a fifteen body Michelle
On June in a clearing a small wooded area old was discovered girl, fully had Lenoir Mall. She was dressed. She Shopping behind the sixteen months twenty-three Approximately times. been stabbed later, rights, advised of being on 9 October after of- to law enforcement following statement gave ficers: at July I met Michelle about or
About June at the rear of the P.M. the Lenoir Mall —this was 7:30 if I ask her she wanted girl I met this before. mall. had never into yes —we walked down some smoke a She said joint. we to the woods we smoked —when down nearby got woods out, her my left arm around my put knife joint pulled —I hand, my right knife which was in placed throat and —I as we walked further was behind her her stomach yards a 100 walked for about into the woods—we down I up- her rape Michelle. took my It intentions to was stopped. I with her breast. around played off first and clothing per enter her off—I started to of her clothes took the rest then to me com- talking about my kept but Michelle penis her; it she was and problems enough that she ing when I told her to give This was get pregnant. want to didn’t I a cli- me reached job —She a blow job gave me a blow I first & told her my clothes on put her mouth —I max in was back on —I think- her clothes put clothes on. She her put children heard some at this time —We running ing about (2) something walking the woods—I did see young boys walking nearby earlier as Michelle me a giving blow them job didn’t see this time but I 2nd heard them —Mi- —I I chelle screamed and her and grabbed started stabbing her several times. She standing up when I first stabbed and I her stabbed her after —I some more she fell stabbed until her she quit moving looked around to see if I was —I I leaving my lost anything. cigarette lighter at this time —I my knife —I hunting used to stab her took my knife to Don- Maxon and my ald he cleaned knife for me. I wiped some of and, the blood off what blood was left on the knife looked like I rust. was take going the knife work press into *3 boards, I some but lost it somewhere I doing to this. my some blood I got overalls and took cigarette a my burned holes in clothes where the blood was —Lenoir took the overalls from me —the above is the truth to the best — my knowledge
Defendant was on 10 again questioned October 1981. He was fully advised of his rights constitutional a signed written confession, waiver. result of this questioning a second consistent with the first in more detail. although On October recorded, 1981 defendant a third which gave statement again consistent the others and with additional again detail and a Finally, waiver of his following rights. on 14 October was taken defendant Lenoir Mall to stage videotaped re- of the crime. enactment He was his again advised of constitu- signed tional another written waiver. orally He was that he refuse to participate advised could the videotaped re- enactment. Evidence at trial corroborate tending to defendant’s confes- (1) following: Burgess
sions included the testified that Virginia she saw Lenoir from the Mall about 8:45 or running (2) 9:00 on the the murder. Donald Maxon p.m. night testified him a knife defendant had asked to clean which had rust-like (3) it. A lighter stains on was found near the victim’s cigarette body. The victim’s that he stepfather testified knew the defend- ant from their at the same Sometime employment company. after say called police June because the had mall, cigarette they found his behind lighter trying (4) him with It also charge appears Michelle’s murder. IN THE SUPREME COURT possession defendant’s overalls on which there re- However, mained a stain that had not been burned. there was no testimony direct to this effect at trial. Edmisten, General, Banks, L. Attorney by Myron C. Rufus General, Attorney the State.
Special Deputy for Petersen, Defender, Ann B. Assistant Appellate Ap- Office of Defender, pellate defendant-appellant. MEYER, Justice.
[1] Defendant contends that his written and recorded confes sions were obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right self-incrimination and his sixth amendment He on the facts: argument following counsel. bases In March defendant had been Assistant represented Lyle on a to a of indecent ex- plea charge Public Defender Yurko time, At that defendant was also a the Meck- posure. suspect Smith, Nealy County Ray murders of Amanda two lenburg Mr. children. The contacted young police department Charlotte in- on the sentencing charge Yurko subsequent It was the intent of officers exposure. decent Charlotte concerning and Parker Kirshner 7A-452(a),Mr. Presumably to G.S. pursuant and Smith murders. § *4 ef- police with represent respect Yurko undertook to defendant Defendant these murders. concerning forts to defendant so in- and the invoked his to counsel Charlotte right attorney orally by Mr. Yurko and letter to the district formed 28 1981. April dated yet another 8 was arrested on
On October with County. charged He was Mecklenburg unrelated matter to those robbery and and confessed rape, kidnapping apparently Police Officer In light developments, crimes. of these Charlotte the defendant to renew efforts to question determined Ray purpose and Smith murders. This was concerning Styron met 9 with the defendant. meeting the October Officer any Prior to County Jail. Mecklenburg with defendant at discussion, in- and rights defendant waived his constitutional presence without the questions that he would answer dicated Styron was not aware that defendant attorney. Officer on during of counsel requested presence questioning earlier sym- on a Ray began murders. He the conversation Smith note, arising acknowledging “predicament” pathetic arrest, viola- out of the his with sexual problems rape/robbery children, his need psychological tions for involving young Ray or Smith murders. treatment. No mention was made Defendant that he taken “downtown.” Officer requested then be cases,” if he “to talk about these Styron asked defendant wanted Center, yes. de- and defendant answered At the Law Enforcement When advised of Officer Price. fendant his again about, discussing what to talk defendant began asked he wanted murders, rather of Mi- Ray not the Smith but the murder Moody chelle in Lenoir. right, argues
With his fifth amendment respect free formally interroga- once he invoked to be from right his without presence tion on Smith and cases counsel, interrogated not on those mat- lawfully he could be ters in a encounter. When Officer again police initiated on October violated the Styron initiated the encounter he the con- right defendant’s Fifth Amendment counsel and All Moody fession case resulted inadmissible. from of the confessions obtained subsequent SBI agent officers Lenoir and the Department Police of the first confession. poisoned were fruits of the tree Arizona, It is that under Edwards v. true criminal invokes his suspected L.Ed. 2d counsel, once a pro- he further until counsel is may questioned himself dialogue unless criminal initiates the suspected vided may pres- which waive to have an time he However, in- in the case defendant had never judice, ent. sub murder. He respect voked his to counsel stated, wanted just he specifically questioning, lawyer.” I do not want a Of- “to ahead this over with. go get he dire that told defendant ficer Price further testified voir lawyer before trial. ought his best obtain interest *5 Price, good We do whether and not decide Officers faith, concerning have questioning initiated might properly request of defendant’s earlier Ray and Smith murders light IN THE SUPREME COURT Franklin on these during he have an present questioning that cases; might we officers have properly nor do decide whether the murder.1 These issues questioning concerning initiated aside, we are unsolicited confes- completely left any to a murder which there had never been intention sion about him. to question fully ad-
Prior to the 9 October defendant was questioning, his remain silent to have rights vised of constitutional attach no significance counsel We present during questioning. on the defendant’s expand the fact that the officers “did not on beyond them the standard explain appeared what rights Nor do we rights signifi- Miranda that he read from.” find card “small, in a was windowless questioned cant no there were prom- room.” There is evidence interrogation made, or in threats or that the confession coerced given, ises waived his way simply induced. The defendant improperly with the law enforcement author- cooperate and chose to rights him This the law to do. permitted ities. of the fifth amendment constitutional purpose
It is
confessions,
to impede
nor
the author-
discourage
protections
bring
our
criminals
agencies
ized role of
law enforcement
Miranda,
As
Warren stated
justice.
Chief Justice
“[confessions
enforcement.” Miranda v.
element
law
proper
remain
Arizona,
We
hold
[2] Defendant’s sixth amendment argument presumes his to the 9 October to counsel arose “Sixth Amendment custody unrelated because defendant statement” robbery/rape charge, With respect robbery/rape charge. recently possibili Supreme most admitted 1. The United States Court has —Gates, exclusionary in Illinois v. ty good exception to the rule of a faith — — —, statutory the exclu codification of North Carolina’s L.Ed. (c). 15A-974(2)(b) exception. We sionary permit would such an See G.S. rule § (N.D. Ill., Wolff, Supp. F. ex rel. Karr find the case United States also 1983) in one inapposite. case defendant invoked to counsel In that E.D. concerning an case. questioning unrelated initiated after which officers case *6 688
State v. Franklin disclose, relevant, the record does not nor do we it find whether formal charges had been instituted this case. At issue is whether defendant’s sixth right amendment to counsel Moody murder had attached. We hold that had not. Prior to the statement, 9 October defendant was no more than a suspect Moody murder. Investigation yet had not reached the ac- cusatory stage certainly and had not reached point where adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated in that case. See Illinois, 682, v. Kirby 406 U.S. 32 411 L.Ed. 2d alternative, In the defendant claims that his sixth amend- Moody ment statement, to counsel arose in the case after his 9 October thus all statements him rendering subsequent against inadmissible. We do not agree.
The record discloses that an arrest warrant was issued Moody murder case on 9 1981 October and was executed on 10 Oc- tober. Defendant’s first appearance judicial before a officer was 1981, day on 15 October after he agreed videotaped re- enactment of the crime. appointed Counsel this time and a probable hearing cause was scheduled for 29 1981. De- October degree fendant indicted the first murder of Michelle Court, Moody at the 26 1981 Superior October session of Caldwell January County. 18 defendant was on the On indicted first sex offense charge. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment only adversary judicial to counsel attaches at such time as by way have been instituted “whether formal proceedings indictment, information or charge, preliminary hearing, arraign Illinois, 406 32 417. In Kirby ment.” U.S. at L.Ed. 2d at McDowell, 279, 289, (1980), 301 271 S.E. 293 N.C. denied, (1981), denied, reh. 451 1012 cert. U.S. Court, while “had nar finding ivestigation this it had not upon defendant], progressed rowed its focus so [the only had committed itself to It is when prosecute. the state finds himself confronted with the re prosecutorial arrayed the state him and immersed in the sources of of a formal criminal the sixth prosecution complexities to counsel is as a triggered guarantee.” amendment statement, case, in- the 9 October following In the “narrowed its focus” upon into the murder had vestigation IN THE SUPREME COURT October, the defendant. Investigation through continued *7 date of defendant’s last statement. 15 ap- On October counsel was pointed for the defendant.2 October,
We therefore hold that at no time
to 15
when
prior
counsel for defendant
appointed,
had the State committed
(5th
Estelle,
itself to prosecute. See
v.
F.
Tarpley
703
2d 157
Cir.
1983) (neither defendant’s arrest nor appearances
mag-
before a
triggered
istrate
the defendant’s
sixth amendment
to
right
counsel as
adversary judicial
no
proceedings
commenced
indictment).3
return of the
2. We further
that
note
even had defendant
counsel
the
in
retained
in
face of
murder,
vestigation
right
into the
his sixth amendment
to counsel would not
adversary judicial proceedings
against
have attached until
A
had been instituted
him.
right
sixth amendment
to counsel is to be viewed “in
of
the context whether the
stage
prosecution,
claimed
in
violation occurred
a critical
a
. .
of
.” United
v.
States
(7th
(1978)
1977),
denied,
Craig,
F.
573
2d 455
Cir.
cert.
439
820
n. 14.
Kamisar,
Williams, Massiah,
3. See also
v.
Brewer
“In
Miranda: What is
(1978),
terrogation”? When Does It
67
1
in
Matter? Geo. L.J.
which the author notes
Supreme]
right
that “The
States
Court has extended the sixth amendment
[United
counsel,
opposed
right,
to
as
to
through
the Miranda
backwards from the trial
the
judicial proceedings, presumably
indictment to the
before
appearance
initiation
the first
judicial
unlikely
right
a
officer” and
to
“the Court is
extend the
Court,
Arizona,
at 83.
Supreme
further.” Id.
U.S.
The United
384
States
in Miranda v.
436,
(1966),
principle
suspects
State v. [3] As second assignment error, contends that law his con support as matter of the evidence is insufficient felony argument As for this states viction of murder. a basis confession, there was no from his apart extrajudicial offense, first of the delicti of sexual corpus evidence murder conviction was felony which the based. underlying upon — — Brown, —, —, S.E. 2d recently As N.C. State — Carolina, —, North conviction ‘a we stated that “[i]n extrajudicial There upon a naked confession. cannot be sustained circumstantial, proof, must either direct independent to be sustained.’ delicti in order for conviction corpus (1978); Green, 244, 248, 244 S.E. 2d State v. 295 N.C. (1975).” 303, 214 In his treatise on S.E. 2d Thompson, N.C. *8 evidence, following insights corpus offers into the Wigmore delicti rule: delicti has been the sub- meaning phrase corpus of the comment, judicial of and an sanc-
ject apparent much loose unjustifiably to an broad given meaning. tion has often been crime, every analysis It of with reference to is clear that it, first, component parts, element of reveals three this (as, injury kind of loss specific occurrence deceased; arson, burnt; homicide, a house lar- person (in second, criminality ceny, somebody’s property missing); accident) contrast, as the source of the loss—these e.g., to by commission of a crime involving two together and, third, identity the accused’s doer somebody; this crime. (Chadbourn 1978). Evidence, rev. He notes Wigmore § in its orthodox sense to
that “the term delicti seems corpus elements,” by judges most merely the first of these signify “[b]ut also, i.e., the second element the term is made include criminality,” view is “too absurd in- somebody’s while the third . with. . .” Id. argued to be deed protect a criminal defendant from
appeared to strike a balance between the need interrogation legitimate and the interest of the aspects custodial the coercive investigations. pursuing its State in Although the rule is applied varying degrees in different jurisdictions,4 North Carolina has traditionally cor- required roborative evidence of both the first and second of the com- definition; is, ponents under Wigmore’s the occurrence of the specific injury kind of or loss somebody’s criminality as the Dawson, source of the loss. See State v. 278 N.C. 180 S.E. 2d (1971).5
Debate as to the degee corroboration necessary to satisfy requirements the corpus delicti rule has centered on two questions: whether necessary corroboration is for all elements established the confession and whether the corroborating facts whatever, may be of any sort provided only they tend to pro- duce confidence in the truth of the confession. These questions addressed the United States Supreme Court Smith v. States, 147, 156, United 348 U.S. 99 L.Ed. 200-201 were answered as follows:
All elements of the must offense be established independ- admissions, ent evidence or corroborated but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession thereby itself and prove the offense ‘through’ statements of the accused. States, (1954);
See
v. United
Opper
348 U.S.
The corpus delicti rule is hesitancy based on the of the law to corroboration, accept, without adequate the extrajudicial confes- sion of a defendant and to solely avoid a convicting person, out of mouth, his own of crime that was never a committed or was com- mitted someone else. Where is proof there of circum- facts and credibility stances which add to the confession and a generate trustworthiness, belief in its and where there independent is death, of proof injury, may as the case damage, require, by means, criminal these concerns vanish and the rule has served its Elements of the purpose. may offense then be proved through statements of the accused.
Further support for our comes position jurisdic from other Johnson, tions which have addressed this issue. In State v. 489, (1960), denied, N.J. A. 2d 11 cert. 368 U.S. the court held that the state was required prove only the element of rely death and could on the of confession to prove felony underlying robbery. attempted The court wrote that:
In a prosecution felony-murder, felony of the proof re- proof of the places mental elements necessary for conviction willful, deliberate premeditated killing. prosecu- a murder, tion for premeditated the State is not required inde- pendently to prove those mental elements if the defendant token, has a given By confession that admits them. the same felony felony-murder in a independent proof prosecu- necessary tion is if proof felony can gathered a from corroborated confession. In our view the State satis- placed upon
fied the burden independently proving the death, by producing fact of corroborative evidence tend- ing they to establish that when the defendants confessed that participated holdup they killing telling the truth. We therefore find that the confessions were properly received in amply evidence and were corroborated. State,
Id.
A.
at 19-20.
v.
Gentry
See
State murder, confession, suf- includes corroborated as to the otherwise felony. proper of the It was the existence support ficient facts to homicide was confession that solely by to show defendant’s was com- the murder by showing that in the murder first felony. of another in the perpetration mitted permitting in the court erred Finally, argues that jurors qualifying questions, death prospective the State to ask a fair trial. jury and thereby impartial to an violating him the issue this decided Court Defendant concedes S.E. and most 2d v. 299 N.C. Avery, in State — — Hill, —, in N.C. recently its decision State affirmed — (filed Defendant, nevertheless, 5/3/1983). requests S.E. in As we stated in these cases. holdings re-examine its Court decisions of this Court “we determine Hill binding be viewed as are sound and should referred to previously ap- on the issues raised controlling precedent ——, —. Id. S.E. 2d at pellant.” No error. in concurring part. in dissenting part
Justice EXUM in which it part majority’s opinion I of the dissent from in violation was not obtained confession concludes defendant’s rights to counsel Amendment Fifth and Fourteenth to remain silent. as follows: judge found the trial are facts as pertinent charged the defendant was January, 2. In with a County indecent liberties taking Mecklenburg of- The Public Defender’s exposure. with indecent minor and by the County appointed Court Mecklenburg fice Lyle assigned which were him in those cases represent Yurko, These cases were Public Defender. then an Assistant finally March 1981. concluded of the defendant representation before the 3. Sometime Of- cases ended Public Defender those Mecklenburg talked Department Police Kirshner Charlotte ficer was a sus- him that and told with Mr. Yurko cases, were unsolved which Smith and pect Franklin homicides occurring Mecklenburg County, and was also a suspect a case County. Caldwell The Officer Mr. asked if Yurko the defendant was willing to be interrogated about *12 Ray the Smith and There were cases. no charges pending the defendant in connection with those in cases County Mecklenburg at that time. Mr. Yurko then conferred Mercer, with Mr. Fritz the Public Defender for Mecklenburg County, Mercer, concerning the matter. Mr. without Court order appointing represent his office to the defendant 7A-452, as to the and Ray Smith cases required by G.S. nonetheless authorized Mr. Yurko to act as the defendant’s attorney as to Ray the Smith and matters.
4. Mr. Yurko then with conferred the defendant who was apparently a in serving sentence the Mecklenburg Coun the time. ty advised Mr. Yurko that he jail defendant had questioned been the police about these cases and did not want to answer any questions them. concerning further Mr. Yurko Kirshner this. Mr. had Yurko informed Officer no further with contact the defendant concerning these mat ters until the time he left the Mecklenburg Public Defender’s 30, 1981, However, on office June to enter private practice. 28, 1981, sometime to Mr. Yurko prior April through learned the news media that the may have been in again terrogated by as to the Smith and mat Ray officers 28, 1981, ters. On he wrote a letter the April to District Attorney Judicial Twenty-sixth District him advising that Mr. Franklin did to re wish have that such questing questioning was desired the Public if be A contacted. this letter was sent copy Defender’s office Charlotte Police Department and Chief of County Police Mecklenburg Department.1 Chief of 9, 1981, in in custody 5. On October the defendant was there, County Mecklenburg charges arising on and unrelated Ray to the instant case or the Smith and cases. On that Styron County date F. of the Mecklenburg Officer J. Police Department 1. In Mr. a cover letter sent Police Chief Charlotte Ray investigating requested Yurko the officers the Smith be murders given questioned at- the information that defendant did want to without an torney Styron present. Apparently this was not done since Officer testified he knowledge no actual of defendant’s invocation of his to silence. March, talked who had occasions Department, cases, Ray the Smith and concerning the defendant custody and went learned that the defendant Styron to him them. knew that the jail to talk about Officer case, the instant but his sole suspect defendant had been talk to jail was to going purpose Styron at the time Ray cases. Officer about the Smith and by Mr. knowledge given of the notice did not have actual representation of the to the Public Defender’s Yurko as Ray cases. and Smith jail ad- Mecklenburg County 6.At Officer that he wanted to talk him about the vised the defendant orally then advised the defendant cases. He Smith silent; anything he said he had a to remain court; *13 him in that he had the against would be used could and while lawyer being a and have him present to talk to lawyer hire a one if he could not afford to that questioned; any questioning him before appointed represent would be stated that warning if wished one. After the the defendant he talk to willing and that he was rights he understood these attorney. Styron an Thereafter the defendant without Officer a result of Styron about the as problems talked to Officer custody, offenses for was then in about sexual which he he complained and that prison, had served time which he any The problem. treatment for his de- never received had him to the Styron to take then asked Officer fendant if Styron him he wanted to talk about asked offices. Officer cases, that he did. replied and the defendant day the was taken from the 7. Later in the defendant L. County jail by Officer S. Price Meck- Mecklenburg Law Enforce- Department Charlotte lenburg Police Price, presence Officer There Officer ment Center. that he orally advised Styron, writing statements; that make no silent and to remain had a be used evidence he made could and would any statement him; attorney present to have an had a that he time; if could af- that he him at that and counsel to advise at no for him attorney provided would be an one hire ford to cost; any making stop he desire to time should if at that be al- he would an wish to contact statement lowed to do so at once. Officer Price read these form, from which printed the defendant followed. defendant, in writing, stated that did he not wish to have an attorney years he was present; age, school; grade attained 12th he had read the waiver, and been having verbally informed and in writing his rights and that he understanding could exercise them at any time his rights agreed waived to answer any ques- tions asked.
8. Immediately after the execution waiver form Officer Price asked defendant what he talk wanted to about. The immediately began talk about girl of a killing named Michelle in Lenoir. He of- stated to the ficers to get wanted it over with and did not want a lawyer.
9. The given Styron information to Officers Price and on this occasion was reduced to writing signed the de- [Emphasis fendant. added.]
Following County initial to the Mecklenburg confession officers, defendant was questioned day the same Charlotte law two enforcement center officers from the Lenoir Police Department. warnings by Defendant was his Miranda given the Lenoir officers. Then officers went over the statement given defendant had about instant case to Officers Price, eliciting day, details additional about incident. The next 10 October defendant was SBI questioned agent who *14 given by had read the statement the to Lenoir police during officers and was the interview Lenoir accompanied On 13 police brought officer. October defendant was to the Lenoir Police where he was Department interviewed assistant attorney. interview was after district The recorded Finally, object. said he did not on 14 October defendant was taken to the Lenoir Mall Lenoir officers where he reenacted police for the events to which he had confessed. videotaping
Thus, had, defendant, attorney,2 his through expressed only his desire to with counsel writing police through deal statutory authority represent 2. Whether or not Mr. Yurko had the to defend- Ray ques- is not a ant to the limited extent he did Smith and cases relevant 698 [308 Ray Smith murders. responding to the and questioning about defendant, with him the The contact pur- not initiated police, Ray him and cases. Officer about the Smith pose questioning Ray he the Smith and Styron told defendant wanted to discuss Arizona, murders, he him his Miranda then informed [v. (1966)] A conversation held about rights. general U.S. sex and the committing with various offenses problem his problem. lack him for Defendant then of treatment afforded jail police headquarters. taken from requested to be to Ray talk defendant was about Smith going believed cases, he a waiver form at the offices executing police but after named Michelle in Lenoir. killing girl to talk about the of a began “It true that under Edwards majority states: is Arizona, suspected L.Ed. 2d once a 451 U.S. counsel, may be right questioned criminal invokes his he criminal suspected is unless provided further until counsel may waive his which time he dialogue himself initiates I with the in- agree majority’s to have an right present.” clear- of Edwards. The United States terpretation Supreme Court ly stated: initially being we advised of have held that after
(A)lthough may validly himself waive his his Miranda the accused rights, see North Carolina respond interrogation, (1979) has in- ], strongly the Court Butler 372-76 necessary when are safeguards dicated additional counsel; we now that when an ac- asks for hold accused present during to have counsel cused has invoked his a valid waiver of that cannot interrogation, custodial that he to further by showing only responded established if has even been interrogation custodial police-initiated accused, such We hold that an rights. advised of further Edwards, with his desire to deal having as expressed counsel, inter- subject is not only through further has been made authorities until counsel by the rogation hearing, suppression “The stated at the case. As trial court tion in the instant notified, whatever writing Police had been evidence is uncontradicted remain silent appointment, invoked his legalities of that the defendant cases, interrogation no those matters regard and Smith Mecklenburg by any agency in without the law enforcement were to be carried *15 presence of defendant’s counsel.” him, available to unless the accused initiates himself further communication, or conversations exchanges, with police. (footnote omitted) added). at 484-85 (emphasis U.S. The in holding Edwards has been characterized subsequently as a rule” Supreme “prophylactic Court “that before a requiring custody suspect subjected interrogation can be to further after attorney an there must requests showing be ” ‘suspect dialogue Oregon himself initiates the authorities.’ --- (U.S. 1983) Bradshaw, ---, 51 U.S. U.S.L.W. June — — (No. 81-1857) (1982) —, Fields, Wyrick v. (quoting curiam)). (per Edwards, majority, recognizing Yet the while the holding ignores analysis it its of the instant case. It begs question right when states “defendant had never invoked his to counsel states, with respect majority murder.” The “We do Price, faith, Styron in good not decide whether Officers might concerning have initiated and Smith properly questioning earlier that he an at- light request murders have torney on these cases . . . .” present during questioning
But this is which must be decided. The precisely robbery, Edwards Court excluded the defendant’s confession murder because his statements were burglary and first “the fruits” of an initiated after he interrogation police “clearly asserted his to counsel.” U.S. at 485. Miranda the had stated: “If the individual states that he Court attorney, attorney wants an must cease until an interrogation time, have opportunity is At that the individual must an present. any and to have him during to confer with the 474. The in Edwards 384 U.S. at Court subsequent questioning.” in Miranda that must “interrogation built on the statement cease attorney is that defendant could not present,” holding until an Thus, he had asserted his to counsel. once reinterrogated police Edwards holds that it is for the to initiate a impermissible a crime for which he has in- with a defendant discuss meeting been made available voked his to counsel unless counsel has “meeting,” If do initiate such a “interrogation,” to him. then statements which result “exchange,” “conversation” contact must be excluded. impermissible from such in Edwards the conclusion that Officers holding compels properly questioning Price could not have initiated *16 IN THE SUPREME COURT murders, did, Ray they the as light about Smith and defend- attorney that an fur- express request during ant’s those Had ther about murders. defendant confessed questioning officers, Ray the to the Smith and murders to his confession would have been inadmissible under Edwards. That defendant Styron, to other the ones and confessed Price, a murder than later Styron’s had not alter the character of mind does initial impermissible That under Edwards. contact. contact addition, subsequent defendant’s confessions Lenoir officers, the SBI and agent, the assistant district his initial When exploitations also inadmissible confession. the phrase interrogation,” the “the fruits the Edwards Court used memorably Wong to a most set Sun v. principle it alluded forth States, The Wong 371 U.S. Sun Court ex- United by Toy immediately verbal statements made cluded entry by and narcotics officers. Narcotics illegal after an arrest Toy’s Yee pursuant illegally-obtained from defendant obtained “fruit of poisonous also excluded as tree” statements were police original illegal the “taint” of action because at 487-88. purged. been 371 U.S. the taint of the police-initiated interrogat
In the instant case being at his request not removed taken ion3 was he not to where confessed police headquarters jail from but murder. Defendant’s Ray murders Smith to and the result of the contact response in direct confession was Styron jail up by at the and followed initiated impermissibly Arizona, Island supra 384 U.S. at and Rhode v. In 3. In both Miranda nis, Supreme recognized “interrogation” has Court 446 U.S. Rather, “techniques persuasion” only “express questioning." such not mean does interrogation society when blaming the defendant’s behavior amount as determining setting.” enunciated in Innis for “in a The test employed custodial words interrogation occurred is whether the or actions has whether likely [they] reasonably in know are to elicit an police should that “the are such omitted). (footnotes suspect." at 301 In the response 446 U.S. criminating from jail Styron while he told defendant defendant was case Officer instant cases, rights, read defendant his and then Smith to talk wanted about problems prison psychological failure of the with him defendant’s discussed problem. also testified treatment for the Officer system provide him with depressed throughout gave time he statement could tell Thus, very it is to characterize emotional. difficult become periodically would anything interroga than an other with defendant Styron's initial conversation tion. Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills unsolicited,” Price at It police headquarters. was not “completely a characterization given the majority.
Furthermore, there “good is no faith” exception the Ed- wards holding. The officers who questioned Edwards had no ac- *17 counsel,4 tual knowledge that had invoked his just as Officer had no actual knowledge instant case.
I do reach the whether defendant’s counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been I violated because believe the confession must excluded under Edwards Miranda.
I also dissent from majority’s conclusion that no error was committed in death qualifying jury for the reasons stated 126, my in (1980). dissent v. Avery, 299 S.E. N.C. 261 2d 803 I concur in majority’s treatment corpus delicti issue. MILLS,
ROY DOWDY v. G. FIELDCREST INC. No. 21PA83 (Filed 1983) July 68, compensation §§ —occupational
1. Master and Servant 91— workers’ dis- ease-statute of limitations 97-58(c) year filing two limit occupa- time under G.S. claims for precedent tional diseases with Industrial Commission is condition comply jurisdiction claimant which a must order to confer on the Industrial claim, plaintiff to hear is on the Commission burden to establish timely claim was filed. Supreme opinion 4. It unclear frm the whether in- is United States Court previous terrogating However, of his officers knew Edwards’ assertion counsel. upon expressly primarily the Court relied the statement stated that developing Supreme opinion facts its own state- set forth the Arizona Court’s opinion it ment of is clear that the facts. n. 1. the state court’s attorney. knowledge requested an 122 Ariz. had no actual officers Edwards 206, P.